Pak-India Water Disputes

The POST, Sun, Feb,26, 2006.

Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema


Among the serious disputes that were the product of hasty, unimaginative and surgical partition of the British India, the water dispute and the ongoing Kashmir dispute were probably most complicated. The water dispute surfaced when the Indian Punjab cut off the flow of waters in April 1948. Given the uncertainty of rains, agriculture was heavily dependent upon the river waters.  No dispute generated so much bitterness as did the one over the flow of waters to Pakistan. Neither Kashmir nor any other dispute could induce Pakistan to begin to entertain the possibility of a full fledged war with India except the water dispute.

India and Pakistan attempted to resolve the dispute but were unable to find a permanent solution, though interim arrangements provided a temporary respite for Pakistani farmers. Eventually through the efforts of World Bank President Mr. Eugene Black the dispute was resolved and Indus Water Treaty was signed between the two countries. The treaty allotted the waters of three western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab) and those of eastern rivers (Ravi, Bias, Sutlej) to India. The treaty also envisaged the construction of link canal system, storage dams, power generation and an elaborate network of tube wells for drainage purposes. For smooth operation of the treaty a permanent India-Pakistan Indus Commission was established.

By and large the Indus Water Treaty has been working smoothly and minor irritations were effectively handled by the Commission to the satisfaction of both countries. However in recent times not only the treaty has been subjected to serious criticism but the violation of its many provisions has raised new issues. Voices particularly from the Indian Held Kashmir went suggested to scrap the treaty and to renegotiate the distribution of waters. Simultaneously three disputes related to the provisions of the treaty have surfaced. These dispute are Wullar Lake Barrage, Baghilhar Dam and Kishanganga Project.

The Wullar Lake barrage issue emerged in 1985 when Pakistan came to know about Indian plans to construct a barrage on the Wullar Lake which was known in India as Tulbul navigation project. The barrage was to be constructed on river Jhelum near the town of Sopor where it flows out of the lake. The Indian stated objected was to construct the barrage for the improved navigational facilities in the river Jhelum during the winter season. For Pakistan the main worry was a barrage on that site could jeopardize and effectively damage the three canal system consisting of Upper Jhelum Canal, Upper Chenab Canal and Lower Bari Doab Canal.

India argued that Tulbul project would be beneficial for the Pakistanis as it would regulate the supply of waters to Mangla Dam which would increase Pakistan’s capacity to generate electricity as well as to regulate the irrigation through the above mentioned Canal system. Pakistan argued that India has violated the Indus Water Treaty. The Pakistani quoted the relevant provision of the treaty which clearly stipulated that India is entitled to construct an ‘incidental storage capacity’ provided the design has been examined and approved by Pakistan on one hand and the storage capacity of does not exceed 0.1 MAF of water on the other. It needs to be mentioned here that the capacity of Wullar Lake barrage is 3.0MAF.

As per provisions of the treaty the case was referred to the Permanent Indus Commission in 1986 but it could not resolve it and by 1987 it recorded its failure. The Indian stopped the construction work on the project, the Pakistanis decided not to refer it to the World Bank. The ensuing period witnessed several rounds of talks between the two parties but they could not reach an agreement. In 2005 the Indians changed the structural design but it was once again rejected by the Pakistanis on grounds that it was against the spirit and provision of the Indus water Treaty. Pakistan feels that it could not allow India to have a 30 times more storage capacity than what is permitted by the treaty.

The second dispute is over the Baglihar Dam; a 450 MW (eventually 900 MW) hydropower project is being constructed on the river Chenab. This project has serious repercussion for Pakistan. The Pakistanis argue that India stores waters in a reservoir behind the gated spillways depriving Pakistan its share of Chenab waters which is a violation of the Indus water treaty.  The construction on the Baglihar dam project on the river Chenab started in 1999 though it was conceived and approved much earlier. In order to quickly complete the project the Indians have currently employed several hundreds of engineers and the laborers. The reports indicated that they have hired the services of many more individuals to speed up the construction work with ostensible aim of confronting Pakistan with a fait accompli.

The Pakistanis had conveyed their objections and reservation regarding the design of the project despite the fact that the requested requisite data was never supplied quickly. According to the Indus water treaty of 1960, the unrestricted flow of Chenab waters was allocated to Pakistan. However it needs to be mentioned here that India was allowed the use of limited waters of western rivers for development of irrigation, generation of electric power along with other uses that were spelled out in the annexes of the treaty.

Pakistan’s objection and reservations about the project primarily deals with the design which allows more flow of waters than what is permissible under the Indus water treaty. On learning about the construction the Pakistanis raised their objections which India, tried to ignore initially but later began to respond somewhat hesitantly. Even the Pakistanis were allowed to visit the site. After the visit the Pakistanis became even more convinced that if the dam is constructed in accordance with the current design, Pakistan is likely to lose 7000 to 8000 cusecs a day. This implies that Pakistan will have to learn to live with these losses.

Cognizant of the likely losses the Pakistanis initially tried to have the necessary rectification of design done at the Indus Commissioners level but once they were unable to secure a desired agreement, the dispute-level was raised to the level of secretaries of water and power. The two sides have met many times but have so far not been able to work out a mutually acceptable agreement. Eventually the dispute was referred to the World Bank and a neutral expert was appointed who, after listening to both sides is in the process of finalizing his verdict.

Judged by any yardstick the failure to reach an agreement over the Baglihar dam is bound to take not only a heavy chunk of existing goodwill and cordiality of atmosphere but would also strengthen the belief that India is employing age old delaying tactics.  Whether or not this failure would adversely impact upon the ongoing composite dialogue remains to be seen but there is no doubt it would certainly dampen the existing optimism.

The third emerging dispute is over the Indian announced intention to construct 330 MW Kishangange hydro project. For this project India intends to divert the waters of the Neelam River. When Kishangane River enters Pakistani Kashmir it is known as Neelam River. River Neelam is an important tributary of river Jhelum. Pakistan has articulated its objections in the form of six questions; three are related to the design, two on diversion and one on power house. The diversion tunnel would reduce the flow of water by 27%. Besides Pakistan has a plan to construct 969 MW hydropower project on the river Neelam. In fact they have already spent 71 million rupees on it. Similarly the Indians have completed 75% tunnel construction work. Since Indians have demonstrated a tendency to work fast and present the Pakistanis a fait accompli, they have already accelerated the work. Pakistan has decided in Nov. 2005 to refer the case to World Bank soon.

The writer works for Islamabad Policy Research Institute.