Book Review - II

 A Nuclear Strategy for India 

Rear Admiral Raja Menon, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2000,
Pages 316, Rs. 595.00 by Mazhar Hussain Shah, Asst. Research Officer (IPRI)

 

outh Asian security witnessed a sea change when India conducted its nuclear tests provoking similar response from Pakistan and brought about qualitative shift to their adversarial relations. Since then, a wave of literature featuring nuclear policies and operational strategies of both India and Pakistan has surfaced to detect the possible course of their nuclear doctrines. In this pursuit, Indian nuclear policies and possible nuclear doctrines have gravitated more attention among the Indian security analysts. Apart from others, Raja Menon’s contribution stands prominent.

The book comprises seven chapters and has dealt the subject of strategic studies at length with remarkable precision, to construct the background for narration of Indian nuclear policy and to track its flaws that make it distinctive from nuclear policies of the other nuclear powers. He broached with defining international relations and India’s geopolitical environment and explained initial Indian policy in the framework of Gandhian moral principles that guided Indian foreign and defence policies. In the first chapter especially, he explained Morgenthau’s six principles of realism and sought their selective application on few events to establish that initially Indian policies had been governed by idealism. For this purpose, he streamlined Indian stances on arms control and disarmament regimes during 1960s and onwards, without referring to ground realities that by that time India was actively pursuing its weapon oriented nuclear programme. In the same line of thinking, he has tried to underplay the role of military power in Indian pursuit of national interests by categorising wars with Pakistan and attributing their inconclusive results to “India’s lack of understanding of difference between violence and politics.” He further opined that India pursued Nehruvian policy, believing that the world would change according to moral principles, overcoming the intrinsic evil nature of human mind. He referred to this practice when India carried out nuclear tests and did not pursue weaponisation and declared no first use even before it conducted its series of nuclear tests, while cherishing the notion of disarmament. He, in fact, has tried to downplay the role of Indian diplomacy which wrapped the hidden intentions in to well knit campaign of moral politics based on nuclear disarmament.

The second chapter reviews the Western nuclear theology since the advent and the use of nuclear weapons and for this purpose it mainly focussed on U.S. nuclear policies. It underscored the evolution and development of the concept and policy of nuclear deterrence and traced its link with U.S. nuclear strategy. He discussed briefly the nuclear doctrinal development in the U.S. and dwelt upon the dynamics of nuclear technology that helped drag U.S. nuclear policy forward. The author contends that minimum nuclear deterrence must be adhered to, as he says, “If there is to be nuclear weaponsing and if arms race is not spiral, the level at which mutuality must occur should be arrived at as early as possible.”

Consistent with Western narrative, he discussed Indian nuclear theology since the beginning of Indian nuclear programme. The roles of Homi Bhaba and Nehru were the defining features of Indian nuclear policy. The Cold War played a significant role in the development of Indian nuclear policy, combined with internal political dynamics, accelerated the pace. However, war with China and subsequent Chinese nuclear test played a catalyst in meriting the Western attention and dividends that trailed to India during and after the war. “There are even unconfirmed reports that in 1965-66, the Americans let it be known that they would not take it amiss if India produced a nuclear device, a message said to have been delivered orally through Dean Rusk.” Menon regretted that India should have taken the opportunity and gone nuclear to avoid excessive pressure on succeeding generations. Conversely, Pakistan by 1980s had reached near the nuclear weapon capability and India missed the first chance to do so. While the second chance to go nuclear was missed when “in 1987 Pakistan had a weapon, and India was still scrambling towards one.” This assertion is quite debatable, for India had started its missile programme in early 1980s to achieve nuclear delivery system. Without a nuclear weapon programme, initiating missile programme seemed illogical and unconvincing. He has further tried to establish that China tried to develop Pakistan as its proxy against India through supplying nuclear and missile related material and components. Then he briefly goes through Brasstacks, policy of nuclear ambiguity and CTBT, linking them to evolving phases of Indian nuclear programme and strategy.

To develop interest for readers, he discussed pure strategy and the role of technology in its development. Many times, both have been mutually reinforcing. For this purpose, he focussed on Western literature on nuclear strategy, evolution and development of nuclear doctrines that held sway during the Cold War period. Deterrence, for that matter, became his focal point of discussion and he presented its various dimensions. In the next chapter he reviewed Chinese and Pakistani nuclear programmes and analysed their logic, to determine the reasonableness of Indian nuclear programme and developing nuclear policy. Constructing the background, he discussed Indian nuclear programme, its potential, warhead designs, missiles and their probable accuracy of hitting their targets. He analysed some options for India to accommodate them in its nuclear policy and then develop a viable nuclear doctrine. To accomplish this objective he points out and proposes, Indian missile force, nuclear submarines, mobile launchers, silos, and cruise missiles.

Nuclear command and control system of India attracted considerable attention in this book because it is one of the main elements that stabilises nuclear deterrence, and discourages the use by unauthorised authority. Conventional war and its potential escalation to nuclear war has been his major concern and, therefore, proposes that in case of conventional war with Pakistan, Central National Command Post (CNP) must manage its transition to nuclear level. It would be composed of two sections. One sub-section will manage conventional war in three modes and the other will manage nuclear war. Complete control of CNP on conventional war with Pakistan would increase greater possibility to contain it. In the same line of thinking, he pleaded formulation of operationally viable nuclear strategy so that adequate use of nuclear weapons could be invoked when it is required. He evaluated various options that are exercisable to manage tight nuclear control and its subsequent use on premeditated targets during war. That presupposes acquisition of hi-tech modern infrastructure required to support viable nuclear doctrine, with a complete chain of authority for the use of nuclear weapons.

Finally, he evaluates regional and international environment in which Indian nuclear policy will have to develop and operate. Operationally the international environment, in fact, will lend legitimacy to emerging nuclear posture of India. “India does not have a completely free hand in navigating its way to a unilateral nuclear strategy is acknowledged.” The sanctions, CTBT, the level of development of reliable relations with Pakistan, and reduction of nuclear risks, influence of international agencies and the behaviour of superpowers about nuclear use will tend to dictate the kind of nuclear strategy India needs. Raja Menon tried to overcome the problem of technology replacement after a new technology enters the arena. This is the major problem India faces in the development of its nuclear strategy and, therefore, advocates that India cannot afford the luxury of nuclear deterrence based on Triad, and best available option for India is to maintain minimum nuclear deterrence. “For us minimum deterrence will always remain barely above the poverty line.”

But he has not defined clearly as to what really constitute minimum nuclear deterrence? Minimum nuclear deterrence is a dynamic concept, which is not bound by time and space. The changes in threat perception and military technology would force corresponding changes in the quality and quantity of minimum nuclear deterrence force. Thus, the rhetoric of minimum nuclear deterrence appears to be eyewash, devised to cater to nuclear diplomacy and political expediency. The fundamental impediment in the definition of minimum nuclear deterrence of India is not mere technological improvements but strategic mythmakers in its decision-making circle. They continue to create myths about unfounded security threats and propagate them to solicit national and international legitimacy. Raja Menon, perhaps deliberately or otherwise, failed to address this dilemma that drives Indian nuclear policy at a greater pace.