Adverse Partnership

A Paradigm for Indo-Pakistan Detente

 Imtiaz H. Bokhari*

Introduction

oving from an adversarial relationship towards détente is a necessity for the nuclear-armed South Asian rivals. The use of the word “détente” is quite common, but is often understood to mean what is in fact “entente”. This article does not advocate a leap in Indo-Pakistan relations to entente; rather, it suggests a framework for détente, which simply means an improvement in the relationship between two or more countries that have been unfriendly towards each other in the past. Entente, on the other hand, denotes a friendly relationship between two or more countries and the absence of politico-strategic disputes and a common threat perception.[1] In the South Asian context, even the word “unfriendly” does not truly reflect the relationship between India and Pakistan since their emergence as two independent states in 1947. Détente may be understood as an instrument for managing an adverse partnership. It presupposes that the “partners” have common as well as conflicting interests.

Nuclear weapons generate their own logic and Henry A. Kissinger encapsulated this dilemma of nuclear-weapon states as early as 1962 in the following words:

In the past, the military establishment was asked to prepare for war. Its test was combat; its vindication, victory. In the nuclear age, however, victory has lost its traditional significance. The outbreak [emphasis original] of war is increasingly considered the worst catastrophe. Henceforth, the adequacy of any military establishment will be tested by its ability to preserve the peace.[2]

This philosophical leap from winning a war to preventing its outbreak is the most profound consequence of the development of nuclear weapons. All past attempts at acquiring greater lethality in the history of warfare were evolutionary, but the induction of nuclear weapons has revolutionized warfare, turning it upside down. Has this consequence of nuclearization been fully absorbed by defence planners in India and Pakistan? Empirical evidence after the May 1998 nuclear explosions does not inspire much confidence. Having fought three wars, the two countries are apparently experienced enough to know how to make war but there seems little to suggest that their military establishments are working hard enough to learn how to prevent the outbreak of the next war: the very raison d’être of their existence.

Interestingly, the South Asian and the East–West Cold Wars commenced in the same year (1947), but the former has the dubious distinction of having outlasted the latter; it seems to have become perpetual, while gaining greater intensity.[3] At a time when the world’s most intractable conflicts have either been resolved or the warring parties are engaged in negotiations, the South Asian scene appears to be an anachronism. A silver lining in the otherwise dark clouds of Indo–Pakistan relations was discernible in mid-2003, when some tentative moves by both countries indicated a thaw in their relations. But these measures, it appears, are more symbolic than substantive and do not constitute even the initial steps of the long and arduous journey towards peace.[4] Peace–not mere absence of war–cannot be attained unless both countries agree on a settlement of the Kashmir problem.

“The Necessity for Choice”[5]

It takes one to make war but two to make peace. If the military establishments of India and Pakistan exist to maintain peace, then both countries have to work together for the attainment of that objective. The prerequisite for peace is not tactical manoeuvring, aimed at one-upmanship, but statesmanship with a strategic vision. This should flow from the realization that the Indo–Pakistan conflict is the basic cause of nuclearization and poverty in South Asia. This twin menace must be viewed by the leaders of both India and Pakistan as a common enemy. A war involving nuclear weapons will destroy both countries, while poverty can bring either or both to the brink of annihilation, with regional ramifications. Only by forming a common front can Pakistan and India hope to fight their common enemies successfully. It has to be fought and won as a joint battle, otherwise both will lose. This realization should result in a reordering of the relationship between India and Pakistan on the basis of adverse partnership.[6] The central thesis of this essay is that, by taking adverse partnership as a paradigm for building a peace in which the two nations can continue their efforts for the resolution of conflicts, including the Kashmir dispute, they could, simultaneously, “play partners” for the limited twin objectives of preventing the outbreak of nuclear war and fighting poverty until their pride and prejudices thaw a little.

National Interest

In an anarchic international system, such as obtains at present, the policies of states are determined largely by their interests. For policies to change, a redefinition of interests by both India and Pakistan is required. One of the foremost tasks which ought to engage the attention of regional leaders and academia is for both to start to perceive the prevention of nuclear war and the fight against poverty as vital national interests. Perhaps the most compelling collective needs of the region are the maintenance of peace and the alleviation of poverty: neither can be achieved without revisiting the concept of national interests and reordering priorities. The end of the Cold War has already rendered obsolete Stephen Cohen’s three obstacles to Indo–Pakistan strategic co-operation.[7] In fact, this co-operation would strengthen the democratic process in Pakistan by weakening the army’s stranglehold on politics.

Apart from regional considerations, there are issues such as controlling the spread of weapons of mass destruction, protecting human rights and the environment, fighting terrorism, etc., that are supranational and may well be in conflict with the narrowly-defined national interests of a particular state. The need of the hour is a combined effort by Pakistan and India to foster international regimes that ensure political equilibrium with a balance of satisfaction, a balance of rights and obligations and pay-offs, rather than a balance of power.  

“Adverse Partnership” as a model

Professor Coral Bell developed the concept of adverse partnership within the framework of the cold war, a situation in which the costs obviously outweighed profits of any direct confrontation between the two superpowers. By “adverse partnership”, Professor Bell does not “mean to imply anything particularly cordial, trusting, or friendly: only a consciousness, between the dominant powers, that they have solid common interests as well as sharp differences”.[8] During the cold war years, one overriding factor dictated the need for the superpowers to act as “partners”: the mutual fear of nuclear weapons. The United States and the Soviet Union did not arrive at the stage of adverse partners all of a sudden; rather, it was the result of a developing consciousness of a common interest, following the 1962 Cuban Missile crisis. It took a crisis and almost a decade for the two nuclear rivals to formalize this relationship of adverse partnership, formulated during the May 1972 Nixon-Brezhnev summit in Moscow. During this summit, the two leaders signed seven agreements, including the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and the “Statement of Basic Principles of US–Soviet Relations”, outlining the parameters of adverse partnership, thus marking the beginning of “détente” between the two superpowers.[9]

Another important dimension of this model is that both superpowers were in a state of almost continuous negotiations. Unlike the Indo–Pakistan situation, the doors for negotiations, even at the highest level, were always kept open. The thread that ran through their decades-long negotiations and agreements was the strengthening of strategic stability. It took various forms and shapes, such as each keeping the population of the other hostage to nuclear strikes through the ABM Treaty; balancing stabilizing measures against destabilizing developments; mutually reducing the number of launchers and warheads; and banning the placing of weapons in space, etc.

These direct measures for ensuring the stability of the strategic balance were supplemented by political measures: the establishment of a hotline between Washington and Moscow, negotiations, and communicating information of an impending regional crisis to the other. In addition, the two superpowers never let their soldiers face each other in combat or even in a combat-like situation, so that the question of face-saving never arose and neither was seen retracting from a crisis under pressure from the opposing superpower.

‘Adverse Partnership’ and the Indo–Pakistan Equation

There is nothing more relevant, urgent or profitable for the safety and welfare of South Asia than learning and adapting this model of adverse partnership for reordering relations between India and Pakistan. These countries did not have to go through their own nuclear crises–not one but two (the 1999 Kargil and 2002 military stand-off)–to act as a nursery for learning. It is often argued that the political leadership in both India and Pakistan is mature, rational and shrewd enough in their decision-making and should therefore be capable of handling nuclear weapons with the same maturity and responsibility as Western leaders. This view is correct, but unfortunately crises sometimes generate a momentum of their own, imposing their own logic on the decision-making system. That is why crises between the nuclear-armed South Asian rivals are fraught with great dangers.

Through adept adverse partnership, Pakistan and India can initiate measures that mitigate the concerns of their own people as well as those of the outside world. This model can at least provide a framework for dialogue to advance common interests. It is the leaders of India and Pakistan who have to fill in the details and those are neither few nor straightforward. It is crucial that they first understand the complexity of the common enemies to their common interests, enemies that they will have to fight together as partners.

Enemy One: Militarism and Nuclearization

Increased militarism is very much the result of continuing conflict between India and Pakistan, but, over time, militarism in South Asia has become more a state of mind, with a dynamic and momentum of its own.[10] The pace and level of militarism has assumed a life of its own, independent of the question it was supposed to address: security from external threat. In this meaning of the term, it is at the very root of the problem.

Both India and Pakistan have declared that their nuclear weapons are for deterrence only. Mere declarations are, however, not adequate insurance, when the cost of deterrence failure can be over one hundred million casualties.[11] A detailed study would be needed to assess the damage to the industry and infrastructure in either country. This is intended to force serious thinking about the risk and cost of a nuclear confrontation. The two countries can fight this “enemy” together: in fighting it alone, both will be defeated. There is, therefore, a need to briefly analyse why, in going it alone, both will be losers.

Military Balance

The military balance in South Asia has two components: conventional and nuclear. A brief review of both follows.

Military Balance: Conventional

It is not intended here to go into the bean count of military balance but to review the implications of these balances.[12] Both countries have large defence forces with fine military traditions and fighting skills. Both forces are considered professional and are based on low- to medium-level technology and have yet to demonstrate their ability to effectively integrate advanced conventional technology into their operational and battlefield management.[13] Although India inherited a much larger industrial base than Pakistan, both have expanded their defence industrial complex to become fairly self- reliant in conventional armaments, but both continue to buy major equipment from abroad. India’s purchases, particularly for its navy and air force, reflect its extra-regional ambitions.

In terms of manpower, India’s army is almost twice as large as that of Pakistan, its navy a little more than double, and its air force three times greater than Pakistan’s. As regards major items of equipment, India has 3,414 main battle tanks against Pakistan’s 2,320; 1,440 armoured fighting infantry vehicles against 1,150; 4,175 pieces of towed artillery against 1,590; 180 self-propelled pieces against 240; 2,400 air defence guns against 2,000. Both countries have an array of anti-tank guided weapons. India possesses about twice the number of aircraft that Pakistan has and enjoys a qualitative edge as well. The Indian navy enjoys a substantial superiority over its Pakistani counterpart.

An Assessment of Conventional Asymmetry

India’s armed forces are substantially superior in numbers. The ratio is 2.25 to 1 in manpower and 5 to 1 in terms of defence expenditure. This superiority is not only in numerical terms but also in qualitative terms across the board. However, Indian conventional superiority is not decisive, and a conventional war would be a very costly affair. If India decides to launch an offensive, it can capture some Pakistani territory as it will have the advantage of surprise and will be able to concentrate men and arms at the time and place of its own choosing. For that matter, Pakistan also has the capability of launching a limited offensive in which it could capture some Indian territory. The advantage in an offensive operation is inherent.

            Conventional asymmetry and the nuclear threshold have an inverse relationship: the greater the asymmetry, the lower the nuclear threshold. In this sense, the Indo-Pakistan conventional military imbalance is a destabilizing factor.[14] This could adversely affect strategic stability, which is considered essential for preventing war amongst nuclear-armed rivals, like India and Pakistan.

Military Balance: Nuclear

The exact size of each country’s nuclear arsenal remains a highly-guarded secret and the numbers are not publicly known. Estimated figures vary substantially, crediting India with 50 to 100 nuclear warheads and Pakistan with 20 to 30.[15] The Carnegie Analysis suggests that India has a significant lead over Pakistan in “nuclear weapon equivalents” (NWEs). The former is estimated to have acquired more than 100 NWEs by 2000–at least twice and perhaps three times as many as those of Pakistan. However Pakistan’s production of NWEs increased in 1999 and may approximate India’s current rate.[16] Peter Lavoy gives figures of 40-120 for India and 35-95 for Pakistan.[17] The figures of the Carnegie Analysis and JFQ indicate a closing of the gap between the NWEs of the two countries.

Both India and Pakistan have an adequate number of delivery systems and are working hard on the development of missiles with longer ranges and greater accuracy. The Indian Prithvis and Pakistani Hatfs cover the heartlands of both countries. The Indian Medium-range Ballistic Missile (MRBM), Agni-2, covers China, a major part of the Middle East and Central Asia, while Pakistan’s Shaheen-2, with a range of 2000-2500 kilometres, covers the whole of India but falls well short of Israel. Pakistan needs to focus more on achieving greater accuracy rather than merely increasing the range of its missiles.

Nuclear Deterrence and Strategic Stability

While the West has moved far beyond the deterrence embodied in the Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) stage of their relationship, South Asia has just entered the pre-MAD stage of deterrence that is likely to provide the theoretical bedrock for analysing and understanding strategic issues in the foreseeable future. Conceptualizing nuclear deterrence is more complex than conventional deterrence, where a country can miscalculate and still survive to fight another day. Not so in the case of nuclear weapons. With nuclear weapons, a deterrent balance or “balance of terror” is perceived to exist, “when each side has somewhat more than the minimum strike-back requirement–i.e., when neither side, in striking first, can destroy enough of the opponent’s forces to make the latter’s retaliation bearable.”[18] If either of the countries perceives that it can absorb retaliation by its opponent after it has carried out a pre-emptive or preventive strike, then deterrence does not exist.

Glenn Snyder goes on to explain that the existence of a deterrent balance is different from the stability of the balance. Stability refers to the change in the military, technological or political situation that gives one side a sufficient first-strike capability or sufficient incentive to strike first.[19] The balance would be unstable if: i) either side required only a small additional expenditure of resources to achieve a first-strike capability that could reduce its opponent’s retaliation to an acceptable level; or, ii) a technological breakthrough gave one side a first-strike capability; or, iii) if, politically, one side was willing to accept greater retaliatory damage.

Another form of instability could be a correlation of forces that would produce strong fears on one or both sides that the other was about to strike first, thus creating an incentive for a pre-emptive strike. This could lead to a very dangerous instability spiral.

In a conventional environment, adversaries try to attain as much superiority as possible over the other to ensure victory in case of war. However, between nuclear-armed rivals, concepts of strategic superiority and strategic inferiority become irrelevant as one can die only once. So, even if India believes that it has strategic superiority, the question is what will it do with it? In the unlikely event of a nuclear war, the question is not who will win but at what cost. If no conceivable political objective can justify the cost of a nuclear war, then both India and Pakistan have to focus on preventing the outbreak of a nuclear war. They both have stakes as partners in ensuring that the stability of the nuclear deterrent balance is maintained. This has to result from a deliberate and calculated policy, as it will be in the foremost national interest of both countries.

It is logical that the policies of Pakistan and India should not undermine strategic stability but instead strengthen it. An exceedingly important step forward in their relationship would be to start negotiations on this sensitive issue. As adverse partners, they should renounce the option of acquiring first-strike capability. This policy should not be merely declaratory, as only concrete measures in that direction will contribute towards mutual confidence. Other steps could include storing warheads and missiles separately, thereby sending a clear message to the other country that initiation of war through a pre-emptive strike is not the preferred option. This measure will also obviate the chances of an accidental launch of nuclear warheads. Another factor needing careful attention is the balancing of defensive and offensive systems, with the explicit objective of strengthening stability. These measures are meant to suggest a possible direction in which the two countries need to proceed. Moreover, it is essential to take a number of steps through prolonged mutual dialogue in order to strengthen stability.

Nuclear Asymmetry

Empirical evidence suggests that a non-nuclear weapon state (NNWS) is most vulnerable to nuclear blackmail in situations of conflict with a NWS, particularly when it happens to be weaker in conventional forces as well. The United States, for instance, was not deterred by the Soviet nuclear weapons during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis as then Soviet Premier Khruschev was relying on bluff and the Americans knew the exact number of Soviet long-range missiles. It was only after the Cuban crisis that a situation of MAD, with rough parity, emerged, providing not only a credible mutual deterrent balance, but also strategic stability in terms of Snyder’s theoretical framework. The stability of the central strategic balance was assiduously and consciously sought and preserved through the ABM Treaty, SALT I, SALT II and other agreements. The process involved the balancing of stabilizing measures (i.e., invulnerable weapons such as SLBMs, hardening of silos, dispersion of a large number of bomber bases and missile sites) and destabilizing measures (i.e., improved war-head accuracy and yield, vulnerable offensive systems such as soft ICBMs). This is the route of negotiations and arms control which the South Asians rivals need to pursue.

An asymmetric balance in India’s favour raises many fundamental questions about the deterrent value of nuclear weapons as well as about the stability of the balance. Pakistan’s assumption that its ability to deliver a few nuclear weapons will deter India from both nuclear blackmail and nuclear confrontation needs careful evaluation. First, some Pakistani analysts believe that the country merely needs to convey to India that it has the capability and the political will to make its nuclear threat credible. This thinking is simplistic and fraught with danger. Second, as credible deterrence is based on second- strike capability, this option will clearly depend on Pakistan’s ability to successfully survive an Indian preventive or pre-emptive first strike. This is a highly significant component of strategic stability. Third, the present Indo‑Pakistan balance is not a situation of MAD and is, therefore, inherently unstable. With its limited strike‑back capability, the utility of Pakistani nuclear weapons lie only in a pre-emptive strike. Thus, the responsibility of initiating a nuclear war in South Asia would rest on Pakistan’s decision‑makers. Fourth, with fewer missiles and with most of its strategic targets within range of India’s Prithvis, which have a launch-to-target time of a little over three minutes, Pakistan may be faced with a “use it or lose it” dilemma. For the Indian decision‑makers, with superiority in numbers and awareness of Pakistan’s compulsion for pre-emptive use of its nuclear assets, a rational and prudent course of action would be to use their nuclear weapons to pre-empt Pakistani pre‑emption. This spiral will result in an extreme crisis instability, leaving open the possibility of nuclear weapons being used in the initial stages of a crisis rather than in the later stages as weapons of last resort, as several influential strategic thinkers posit.

What the leaders of South Asia do or fail to do will decide the fate of one-fifth of humanity. For arms control to succeed in South Asia, one of the two conditions must be met: first, if the would-be-winner of an arms race is willing to curtail its programme, an agreement is possible. The self-interest of the potential loser will carry it along the path of negotiations. Second, if each of the two powers can consider its mutual interests and fears, without factoring in how the capabilities of the other affect it, an agreement may be possible.[20] To meet either of Waltz’s two conditions for arms control in South Asia, the onus is on India, as it is the likely winner[21] and can keep Chinese military capability out of the South Asian calculus. In an asymmetric balance of power, as is the case in South Asia, a move by Pakistan would be perceived by India as an indication of weakness and an opportune time for putting greater pressure and not moving towards reconciliation. A substantive gesture from India would be taken by its smaller neighbours as an act of good faith, creating the right climate for reciprocal gestures. That is the proper role for India: a “team-captain” to guide South Asia away from a likely nuclear showdown and from “rags to riches”.

Enemy Two: Poverty

At the time of independence in 1947, the subcontinent inherited a secular democratic tradition and a thriving free-market economy, while their contemporaries in the Far East lay in ruins following the ravages of the Second World War. Both India and Pakistan were well on the path to industrial development by the 1960s, but then a series of wars, during the decade of 1961-1971, changed the scenario. The opportunity-cost of this policy of war and conflict can be surmised by comparing the state of development of South Asia with that of the “tiger” economies of the Pacific Rim.

This unending fratricidal conflict is the major cause of poverty in the region, which is the second “common enemy”. Almost 56 years of conflict have turned South Asia into one of the world’s poorest regions–a virtual “poverty bowl”. Turning the conflict qualitatively into a capital‑intensive nuclear arms race will only widen the rich‑poor divide, at both the national and the international level. India can argue that their defence expenditure is low, compared to other crisis‑ridden regions, and that it does not affect allocations for the social sector. However, statistics relating to the state of development of the social sector in South Asia tell a different story. This situation is not peculiar to India alone: generally, statements on defence expenditure in South Asia do not tell the whole story. What they reveal is interesting, but what they actually conceal is vital, as substantial amounts meant for defence purposes are often budgeted under civil sector heads. The Human Development Report 2003 of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) points out that South Asia “is the place where 40 per cent of the population lives on less than a dollar a day, and 35 per cent of children do not get proper primary education”.[22] The Report adds that, “Hunger has been reduced in South Asia, but 43 per cent of the world’s hungry are still in South Asia…. And it still has a very large number of the undernourished.”[23]  Pakistan has a population of 31 per cent living on less than one dollar a day, while India has 44.2 per cent.[24] In terms of the Human Development Index, India is placed at 127 and Pakistan at 144 out of 175 countries.[25] The implications of this dire state of poverty cannot be emphasized too much and need to be fully grasped by the leaders of South Asia.

It is time to realize that “foreign direct investments” (FDIs) bring capital and technology, resulting in the setting up of factories that can create employment opportunities. These crucial investments could bring about real socio-economic changes in the countries concerned. It goes without saying that investment goes where there is profit and stays where it is safe. At present, South Asia, with its menacing nuclear rivalry and the emerging power of the radical right with its attendant risks, is not an attractive region for investment, notwithstanding the availability of skilled manpower and a huge potential market. For combating poverty, FDIs are the most effective weapon, as has been so successfully demonstrated by China in recent years.

Poverty provides a breeding ground for the radical right that has virtually hijacked the domestic and, in certain cases, even foreign policy of South Asian countries. The poorer sections of society teem with semi-skilled and semi-educated youth who cannot find gainful employments and thus become easy targets for those preaching religious extremism–Hindu or Muslim. These extremist organizations assuage bruised egos by giving these disgruntled young people not just sustenance but also identity, recognition, a sense of belonging, self-esteem and, most importantly, protection. By turning to violence, these elements have nothing to lose and much to gain. However, the violence and terrorist acts which can result from this radicalism create a climate of fear and uncertainty that deters potential investors and slows economic activity. It is truly a Catch-22 situation: economic development alone can break the back of terrorism, but terrorism scares away foreign investment that is so vital for development.

If Indian decision‑makers are working on the assumption that heavy defence spending will force Pakistan to the same, beyond its economic capacity, and thus in the long run succeed in establishing Indian hegemony in the region, theirs is a myopic approach. Furthermore, it will work manifestly against India’s own national interests. A nuclear‑armed Pakistan in political turmoil, in economic distress and possibly heading for a government by the radical right can be neither in the interest of India nor that of the region.

Selling the Concept of Adverse Partnership

Showing the two neighbours a route away from mutual hara-kiri should be an easy sell. That is what most rational thinkers believe. But history does not prove them right. The Indian thinking and policies of the last 56 years tend to suggest that “acquiring so much more weaponry”, “isolating Pakistan from such-and-such ally” and “blocking such-and-such supplier of defence equipment” will bring Pakistan to its knees. What was a rational and perhaps justifiable policy when the two were conventional-weapons powers may not be as rational and justifiable when they have taken the leap towards nuclear weapons status. Now, there has to be a profound reversal in the guiding philosophy from fighting and winning a war to preventing a nuclear holocaust. The sooner India grasps this bitter truth and sees the dangers ahead, the better and safer it will be for South Asia. Being a smaller country, it will be easier for Pakistan to reciprocate if India makes the first move.

If adverse partnership is to succeed, it can only be through bilateralism, though not on the lines of the 1972 Simla Agreement, where the principle of bilateralism was put forward but was ineffective as there was no follow-up for a resolution of the Kashmir conflict. In fact, there was no subsequent meeting between the leaders of India and Pakistan after the signing ceremony. Now, there has to be a genuine desire and firm commitment to meet the demands of adverse partnership as the space for gamesmanship or one-upmanship does not exist any more.

            Another constituency where the concept of adverse partnership needs to be sold is the international arena, where the policy interests of major players will ensure that they have a stake in the success of the concept. Their policies can ensure that deterrence is not allowed to fail. It is for this role that international actors will have to find an effective strategy to “buy” and “sell” the concept. This aspect is dealt with at greater length later.

For adverse partnership to succeed, it has to be sold not only to the decision-makers, who must embrace it before any breakthrough can be expected, but also to the people of both countries. In this task, the two governments would be required to devise strategies for “selling” the concept to their respective peoples. One of the ingredients of that strategy would obviously be measures for creating mass awareness of the dangers and costs of a possible nuclear conflict. It must be admitted that the people of the subcontinent seem blissfully ignorant of the devastating effects of nuclear bombs and think that “nukes” are just another kind of bomb that boosts their macho image.

Another major initiative which the two countries need to take, if and when they meet next, is an agreement emphasizing sustained dialogue. A nucleus of peace advocates exists in both countries. It is time they expand and energize their role and activities and spread their message. Peace, of course, will return only when conflicts are resolved; in the meantime, the contribution of pacifists towards avoidance of war will be helpful. Their efforts could contribute to creating an environment conducive to the ultimate resolution of conflicts. These national groups and organizations will need support from outside actors to broaden their bases and effectively spread their message of normalization of relations and avoidance of war.

Role of Extra-Regional Powers

The non-proliferation policies of the West, particularly the United States, resulted in the opposite of what they were supposed to prevent: proliferation of nuclear weapons. Their policies failed because they were based on faulty assumptions and were applied in a discriminatory manner. Now, with a nuclear-armed South Asia, the Western powers cannot afford to go wrong again as the cost will be simply prohibitive.

The relations of the major powers with India and Pakistan must now be determined by one overriding objective: the prevention of a nuclear war. The route to that objective is through strengthening of the stability of the strategic balance. All other considerations should be secondary. Apparently, this vital consideration does not seem to figure much in the policy formulation of major powers, as other factors such as commerce, trade or geopolitics play a more dominant role.

The present policies of some of the major powers, such as the United States, Israel and the Russian Republic are adversely impinging on strategic stability in South Asia. If the deleterious effects of these policies are not appreciated in time, these could increase the probability of a serious nuclear crisis. Irrespective of who wins or loses, South Asia as a whole, and adjoining regions to a lesser degree, would suffer the horrendous consequences of a nuclear Armageddon.

In the present international order, the United States, as the sole surviving superpower, has great responsibility and must fully appreciate what is at stake. After the gravity of the situation has been understood, it needs to forge a bipartisan policy that clearly states the promotion of nuclear stability in South Asia as an important foreign policy goal. Professor Ganguly affirms that, “What the United States needs to do is enhance long-term crisis stability in the region. At the broadest level, the pursuit of such goals will require Washington to remain engaged in South Asia long after bin Laden and his followers are brought to justice.”[26] He goes on to suggest that the United States “must re-engage Pakistan”.[27]

            The United States should echo the sagacious words of India’s strategic guru, Mr Subrahmanyam, expressed on the day Pakistan responded to Indian nuclear tests, that “a nuclear war could not be won and, therefore, should not be initiated”.[28] He further observed that India acquired nuclear weapons mainly to deter nuclear blackmail. Now that India has them, playing adverse partners with Pakistan will not detract from the basic objective of acquiring them. That is the message the United States should convey to India for the sake of strengthening nuclear stability. The United States should also be prepared to invest the requisite political capital in pursuit of this important foreign policy goal. Recently, it asked Israel to freeze all arms sale to India–including that of the Phalcon early-warning systems–but strengthening strategic stability was not the driving force behind the request.[29] The United States needs to provide this kind of leadership to save South Asia from itself. It needs to remember that it alone can provide leadership in shaping policy and organizing international efforts on issues of global significance. Consequently, it will get the acclaim or blame for whatever happens or fails to happen in the region.

Other linked efforts of the major powers should include bringing about a realization of the costs of nuclear weapons acquisition and of their likely use in war. In South Asia, for example, a conflict involving about a dozen nuclear weapons would certainly cause unprecedented disaster for both countries.[30] Even a single nuclear bomb dropped over a major city in South Asia would cause about 100,000-150,000 deaths.[31]  There is a need for the UN to co-ordinate its efforts with Washington and other major actors for initiating research on the dangers inherent in a nuclear arms race and to disseminate the results of these studies to the decision-makers in South Asia. This will also result in heightened awareness amongst the masses of the destructive power of nuclear weapons and the disastrous consequences of their use.[32]  Apart from the potential for enormous damage, Pakistan and India can be made aware about the huge economic, scientific, industrial and environmental costs of producing and maintaining nuclear weapons. These affect South Asia adversely as it happens to be one of the poorest regions of the world. The resources which should be spent on social sector development are currently being spent on the development of missile and nuclear weapons. Through heightened awareness, people’s support for nuclear weapons should be transformed into support for non-proliferation. This is the role which Western powers and Japan could play in South Asia, helping to steer these countries towards peace and security.

The major world powers should undertake sincere and determined efforts for the resolution of the conflicts which fuel and intensify the regional arms race, which has recently acquired a nuclear dimension. Vigorous support for adopting the model of adverse partnership should figure prominently as part of their foreign policy agenda. Only sustained efforts to persuade Pakistan and India to interact as adverse partners hold the prospect of success. And succeed they must: failure would be simply catastrophic.

Conclusion

The qualitative leap by Pakistan and India from conventional to nuclear weapons has revolutionized the way South Asia needs to relate to itself. The region has been mired in war and poverty since independence and is hostage to history at the cost of its future. The two rivals need to sit on the same side of the table as “adverse partners” and find an answer to fight their two common foes: nuclear weapons and poverty.  It is fatal to nurse the illusion that nuclear weapons, through deterrence, have rendered war obsolete. Strategic stability, the sine qua non for the success of deterrence, has to be expertly crafted and assiduously maintained jointly by Pakistan and India. It is a war which the two will either win or lose together.

Adverse partnership is an exercise in mature bilateralism. With nuclear weapons, there is no place for gamesmanship. Extra-regional actors can facilitate the process in various ways but only the motivation of the leaders of India and Pakistan can ensure success. Major international actors, particularly the United States, can help prevent a nuclear war in South Asia by defining such prevention as a major foreign policy objective and by according it priority over commercial or political objectives. They can ensure the realization of this objective through economic and military assistance, if required, and by investing political capital to strengthen strategic stability. Only by creating a peaceful environment will programmes for poverty alleviation yield the desired results. Normal relations between India and Pakistan will also attract FDIs, an important tool for fighting poverty.

India and Pakistan have fought a number of wars. Now, they need to learn to wage peace since war is no longer a rational policy option. Nuclear weapons have finally led to the demise of Clausewitz’s doctrine for South Asia. The leaders of India and Pakistan need to give it a decent burial by initiating a process of détente, while recognizing entente as the ultimate objective: the state of peace that can be attained, once the Kashmir dispute, along with other irritants, is resolved.