India and Iran: Emerging Strategic Co-operation?

 Maqsudul Hasan Nuri*

Introduction

resident Mohammad Khatami of Iran paid a four-day official visit to India from 20-24 January 2003, and the two countries signed “The New Delhi Declaration” on 25 January. During Khatami’s visit, Iran and India formulated a vision of a “strategic partnership” for a more stable, secure and prosperous region; and for this objective, enhanced regional and global co-operation between the two countries was stressed.[1] Earlier on 19 January, a defence agreement between the two countries had been signed in Tehran, together with a related one on internal security, exchange of intelligence, extradition, police training, drug-trafficking and terrorist activities.[2]

President Khatami’s visit was especially significant because he was invited as the chief guest at India’s Republic Day military parade for 2003. He was therefore able to see for himself the display of India’s formidable military might, and could thereby assess the important role that India and Iran could together play in the region. More importantly, the visit took place in the shadows of the looming Iraq crisis.

            Iran and India signed seven agreements on economic exchanges, namely, on science and technology, information technology, educational training, the reconstruction of Afghanistan and anti-terrorism. They also agreed to “explore opportunities for co-operation in defence matters, including training and exchange of visits”, and pointed out the fact that this collaboration was “not aimed at any third country.”[3] The reference was, of course, to Pakistan. 

Background

Though Iran and India were closely linked through geography, history and culture in the distant past, a new era in their relationship began with the independence of India in August 1947. These relations have had their vicissitudes, with Indo–Iranian ties remaining lukewarm for decades. This was due principally to Reza Shah Pehlavi’s strongly pro-US policies, at a time when India was pro-Soviet and an active and outspoken member of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Following the 1979 Iranian Revolution, India–Iran relations continued to be strained until 1993. The 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and India’s support to Iraq in the 1980-86 Iran–Iraq war were sore points. During the 1991 Gulf war, India’s ambiguous posture of support to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait added yet another irritant to their existing relations.

Between 1978 and 1993, no Iranian head of state visited India. It was in 1993 that India took the initiative when the then Prime Minister, Narasimha Rao, made a historic visit to Iran; this was followed by President Hashemi Rafsanjani’s visit to India in 1995. It was, however, Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee’s April 2001 visit to Iran that brought about a breakthrough in Indo–Iranian relations.[4]

The present urge for collaboration flows from a set of complementarities in Indo-Iranian relations. India considers itself as heir to the British Empire and sees a role for itself in the Gulf region, where many non-resident Indian live and work. Besides, both Iran and India have keenly followed developments in the Middle East, Central Asia and the Gulf region.

Objective of Study

The objective of the study is to highlight the type and nature of the emerging security linkage between India and Iran. More specifically, the contention is that, despite some rhetoric and near-alarmist writings in some sections of Pakistani press in the last few months, the Indo–Iranian strategic understanding involves more of “security co-operation” rather than a longstanding strategic arrangement. This co-operation has limitations and liabilities in the emerging post-Iraq scenario as Iran is coming under increasing US pressure over its alleged nuclear buildup programme and harbouring of Al-Qaeda terrorists fleeing from Iraq.

Here it is pertinent to mention that that “alliance”, “partnership” and “co-operation” are often used interchangeably. In India–Iranian relations when the term “strategic co-operation” is used, it frequently implies consultations between the two nations on economic and security-related issues such as smuggling, terrorism, illegal arms, drug trafficking and signing of agreements. It may also encompass routine joint naval exercises as well as exchange of visits by higher defence officials of the two countries. While “alliance” is a strong, institutionalized arrangement of a longstanding nature, “strategic partnership” is at a lower level, and “strategic co-operation” comes at the bottom of this hierarchy.

Indo-Iranian Complementarities

India’s Perception of Iran

Indo–Iranian historical links go back several centuries. At the time of the Delhi Sultanate and, later, in the Mughal era, India and Iran were closely linked. Persian was the court language in the subcontinent till the British replaced it with English in the mid-nineteenth century.

At present, India perceives Iran as a major power in the Gulf region, and an important Islamic country of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). It is geo-strategically located at the tri-junction of the Gulf, Southwest Asia and Central Asia, and is endowed with an abundance of natural resources like oil and gas.

            India’s tremendous advances in information technology, computer software, engineering and other technologies, are attractive for Iran. In particular, Iran needs engineering and construction expertise for the development of its transportation network and port infrastructure to link it with Central Asia and Afghanistan.

The Importance of Hydrocarbon Resources

During Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee’s visit to Iran, the two leaders signed the Tehran Declaration on 10 April 2001. Considered a milestone in the relationship between the two countries, the Declaration mentioned the growing “strategic consensus” between India and Iran, underpinned by economic ties, including further prospects of trade and investment flows. In fact, the volume of trade between the two countries tripled after Vajpayee’s visit.[5] Moreover, the document underlines complementarities in strategic sectors: Iran’s abundant energy resources and India’s growing energy needs for its rapidly developing economy draw them closer as “natural partners”.[6]

            Iran forms part of the 11-member Oil and Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) organization. Iranian oil and gas reserves, as of March 2002, were estimated at nearly 270 billion barrels, of which 63 per cent consisted of natural gas and 37 per cent of crude oil reserves. Iran exports 3.665 million barrels of oil per day (bpd);[7] it has five per cent of the world’s crude oil and 14 per cent of the natural gas reserves. In fact, after Russia, it has the largest natural gas reserves in the world, estimated at 23 trillion cubic metres.[8]

            Iran is, therefore, keenly interested in exporting its surplus natural gas to South Asia. It floated a proposal for a regional pipeline in 1989, when major oil and gas discoveries were made in its territory, adjoining the Gulf state of Qatar. However, discussions for the construction of a $3.5 billion pipeline began in earnest in 1994. The planned regional Iran–Pakistan–India gas pipeline, termed the “peace pipeline”, will be approximately 2670 kilometres long. 

According to energy experts, in the previous two decades, the demand for natural gas in India and Pakistan has increased substantially. Estimates suggest that India’s demand for natural gas will increase four-fold by the year 2010, whereas Pakistan’s requirements could double. As a transit country, Pakistan would be a beneficiary of the pipeline, as it would get royalties amounting to $6 million a year. The projected gas pipeline will connect the Assaluyen gas and oil fields in southern Iran to the Hazira–Vijaipur–Jagdishpur (HVJ)[9] pipeline in India, with an intermediate focal point in Multan, southern Punjab, Pakistan.

As to the current status of the proposed pipeline, there is some uncertainty. Although it will benefit both India and Pakistan, the issues related to its security dominate Indian thinking. In this regard, the Iranian government tried to allay the Indian fears of possible stoppage of the gas by Pakistan, giving guarantees of uninterrupted supply.[10] The issue was also discussed when Vajpayee visited Tehran in early April 2002. The Iran–Pak–India project makes eminent economic sense and is a better option than others, such as a deep-water gas pipeline through the Arabian Sea, or the transportation of liquefied national gas in tankers.

For its part, the Iranian government has undertaken responsibility of the security aspect, i.e., safe delivery of gas to India. In this regard, Iran has firstly held out an assurance that it would ensure supply to India at its border; secondly, international consortia would be made responsible for the provision of adequate safeguards in case of any disruption.[11]

Indian concerns are understandable, though somewhat exaggerated. Their apprehension is that the gas pipeline passing through Pakistani territory might prove vulnerable to disruption or stoppage, since Pakistan will hold the lever. Added to this is the fear that the pipeline could be susceptible to subversion, sabotage or acts of terrorism by individuals or groups opposed to the normalization of relations between India and Pakistan. (Two incidents occurred in January 2003, when infighting between disgruntled warlords in Baluchistan led to unknown persons damaging the Sui Northern Gas Pipeline.) There is, in addition, the problem of an international consortium that would undertake to finance this costly project.

India, on its part, would prefer an interlocking arrangement, whereby the gas imported from Iran through Pakistan would be re-supplied to Pakistan. This would, in its view, minimize any chances of disruption through deliberate stoppage of supply or acts of sabotage.

Discoveries of gas deposits in eastern India along the Andhra Pradesh coastline seem to have reduced its earlier enthusiasm about the construction of the above-mentioned pipeline project. The new finds are estimated to be about five trillion cubic feet (tcf) of natural gas in the Krishna–Godavari basin, approximately 30 kilometres off the southeastern coast of India. Significantly, these are the world’s largest reserves of natural gas to be discovered in 2002.[12] CAIRN Energy, an Edinburgh-based firm, claims that it has found an additional 800 billion cubic feet of gas in an adjacent block of the sea floor.[13] If and when developed, this will have a great impact on the energy scenario in South Asia and the Gulf region.

This is not to suggest that India is an energy-starved country, dependent on imported gas and oil supplies. It favours a deep-sea pipeline through the Arabian Sea, but this is a mere expression of desire. Iran, on the other hand, is not very keen on the sea pipeline option since the enterprise will be too costly. This option remains quite murky. A Pakistani analyst, Khaled Ahmad, believes that the “[deep-sea] pipeline fires the imagination in the region, but it ignores the law and order situation both in Afghanistan and Pakistan and the peculiar nature of India–Pakistan confrontation.” He adds that, albeit a tantalizing economic proposition, the economics of the Cold War era may make it unfeasible in our region.[14]

Iran has been an ardent supporter of an extended South Asian economic community–sometimes termed the “Asian League”–comprising Iran, Afghanistan and the SAARC states. During the visit of the then Indian Prime Minister, Narasimha Rao, to Iran in September 1993, an op-ed article in an Iranian journal observed that while the nineteenth century belonged to Europe and the twentieth century was American, the twenty-first century would be an Asian century;[15] further, that, with the co-operation of China and the Central Asian Republics (CARs), Asia could “become the world’s largest economic power.”[16]

Being a member of the Economic Co-operation Organization (ECO), Iran has advocated links between the two groupings in order to lift the region out of its economic backwardness. India has been seeking a corridor through Pakistan for transit trade with Iran and Afghanistan, but this has not materialized due to the continuing hostile relations between India and Pakistan.

Common Interests in Afghanistan

India and Iran have been supporting the Northern Alliance and are currently extending all possible help to Hamid Karzai’s government. After the ouster of the Taliban regime, both countries wish to establish friendly relations with Afghanistan. For India, this means strategically outflanking Pakistan, while for Iran, it means securing its eastern border. In forging close political and economic ties, India has the advantage of exploiting its new links with the incumbent Tajik-dominated regime in Afghanistan that is strongly opposed to the ousted Taliban. Both Iran and India consider the early reconstruction and rehabilitation of Afghanistan highly desirable, and both have a stake in the durability and stability of the present government. Thus, India has established two consulates–at Kandhar and Jalalabad[17]– as has Iran. While Iran’s primary focus is on eastern Afghanistan and northern Afghanistan, India is concentrating on other regions of the country, including the capital, Kabul, and has established a regular satellite-based communications link with its embassy there. It has also extended humanitarian aid in the form of one million tonnes of wheat and a $100-million grant for reconstruction; it has also offered help in such diverse fields as civil aviation, transport, industry, health, education and agriculture.[18]

Forging Ties with ‘Democratic’ India

President Khatami’s January 2003 visit to India is significant in the sense that he chose to visit a democratic South Asian country, one which is now in the frontline of the international war on terrorism. Iran, meanwhile, is coming under US pressure and has even been included in the “axis of evil”. It is no wonder, therefore, that, during his visit to India, President Khatami included a declaration slamming “double standards” in the global campaign against terrorism and urged a widening of “co-operation against terrorism in bilateral and multilateral [ways]”, as well as the strengthening of “the international legal regime against terrorism”. Moreover, both countries agreed on an early finalization of a “comprehensive convention against international terrorism” at the United Nations.[19] By associating with India as a strategic partner–one which already has a close partnership with the USA–Iran wants to reduce its international isolation.

In recent years, there have been some positive trends in Iranian foreign policy. Iran’s acquiescence in the war against the Taliban, its assistance to the Karzai government, and its emphasis on a “dialogue of civilizations” are steps seen as positive indicators. Where Iraq is concerned, like so many western countries, it is opposed to the US attack on Iraq and the US policies of “unilateralism”; it does not, however, hold any brief for Saddam Hussein. India, on its part, views Iran as a country which has undergone a major Islamic revolution, a harbinger of cataclysmic change that ushered in its own brand of Islamic democracy in the Gulf region. These changes are looked upon with a mixture of envy and trepidation by some of its Arab neighbours, which are ruled by authoritarian rulers.

Diversification of Relations

Since the 1990s, diversification of its foreign relations has been the motivating impulse of Iranian foreign policy. Closer ties with India tend to reduce Iranian dependence on its northern neighbour, Russia, and on China. Incidentally, both these countries now have strong links with India.

During the Cold War, Iran was a Western ally and a pillar of US policy in the Gulf. At that time, the latter wished to contain pro-Soviet states, Iraq being one of them. Even at that juncture, Iran was desirous of normalizing relations with India in order to secure its eastern flank. As an advocate of India–Pak reconciliation, it floated some ideas for Asian security and regional co-operation. In Iran’s view, a rapprochement between the two countries would help Iran to avoid taking sides with either its traditional eastern Islamic neighbour, Pakistan, or with India, a pre-eminent economic, military and technological power in South Asia. It could, perhaps, lead to a weakening of Indian support for Iran’s erstwhile rival, Iraq.

Today, however, the evolving strategic understanding is underpinned by fears of Al Qaeda or Taliban elements regrouping in Pakistan after their defeat in Afghanistan. These elements could pose security problems for both countries. Hence, common points of interest between Iran and India include support for the Tajik-dominated Northern Alliance government in Afghanistan; shared interests and strategy in benefiting from the energy resources; and the stabilization and development of the Central Asian region.

The Central Asia Factor

India and Iran would like to see stability in Central Asia, as this would provide prospects for benefiting from the rich natural resources of the region. Although Iran has enough indigenous gas reserves for its own requirements, it is keen to use its relatively well-developed infrastructure to export gas to the region. India sees Iran as a gateway to the Persian Gulf and Central Asia. It is also keen to exploit the potential of the traditional North-South corridor from Iran to Southern Russia and Central Asia, bypassing Pakistan and Afghanistan. The Iranian Corridor, starting from its southern port of Bandar Abbas on the Persian Gulf and extending to the Caspian Sea and on into Russia, is an excellent outlet. It is because Afghanistan is still unstable and witnessing internal fighting by warlords. Iran could become a regional hub between the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf, if transit routes could link it up to the Caspian Sea region, Russia and the Caucasus.

The Indian Border Roads Organization is assigned to upgrade the 200-kilometre track between Zeranj and Delaran; this links with the Garland Road network in Afghanistan, and goes on into the CARs. Iran is also asking India to take up the construction of the Chahbahar–Fahraj–Bam railway link. The construction of these road and railway links would make it possible for both India and Iran to bypass Pakistani land route.[20]

Implications for Pakistan and the Gulf Region

Pakistan

President Khatami tried to achieve a balance in Iran’s relations with the two South Asian countries by first visiting Pakistan from 23-25 December 2002. During his visit, he signed four agreements and a Memorandum of Understanding for enhancing bilateral co-operation in oil and gas ventures, electricity, education, trade (including free trade zones), software technology, agriculture, improvement in communications and railways.[21] This was the first visit of the Iranian President to Pakistan after a gap of ten years, in which Khatami led a high-powered delegation of about one hundred members.

Iran and Pakistan have traditionally had friendly relations: Iran was the first country to recognize Pakistan on its independence in 1947. The heydays of the relationship were witnessed in the era of Reza Shah Pehlavi, when both countries were members of CENTO and both were also staunch US allies against communism. During the Indo–Pak wars of 1965 and 1971, Iran extended full diplomatic and military support to Pakistan. Relations remained cordial till the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan when both emerged as “frontline states” against Soviet aggression. Both had to bear the burden of Afghan refugees, then the largest number of refugees in the world.

However, Pakistan–Iran relations began to deteriorate after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989. The cooling off in relations continued and mutual ties were further strained during the 1980s, when both countries backed opposing groups in the internecine fighting in Afghanistan. During the Taliban regime in the mid-1990s–a regime which Pakistan recognized and supported–the relations between the two countries turned tense and sour.

The seismic events of 9/11 led to the removal of the Taliban regime by the use of US military force. The installation of the Northern Alliance-led government in Afghanistan assuaged Iran’s feelings to some extent. At present, both Iran and Pakistan strongly feel that, with Taliban factor out of the way, there is no impediment to a thaw in their frosty relations. In this regard, President Khatami observed that, with the removal of the Taliban, there was no reason for both countries not to improve aid and trade relations, and increase bilateral co-operation.[22]

Iran, for its part, wants to rebuild economic relations with the two important South Asian countries and wishes to see an end to the tension bedeviling Indo-Pak relations. It has, therefore, urged them to engage in talks and start early negotiations in order to amicably resolve their differences. Iran was the first country to contact India and Pakistan when there was an upsurge in hostilities between the two in late-2001. The Iranian Foreign Minister, Kamal Kharazi, called for “restraint” and “early dialogue” in order to break the “vicious cycle” in the Indo-Pak subcontinent.[23] Economic activities achieved through enhanced trade, technical, educational co-operation or the construction of pipelines, could serve as Confidence-building Measures (CBMs) that would benefit the entire region, including the Gulf.

Some quarters have alleged that Pakistan has transferred nuclear technologies to Iran and North Korea. These allegations have apparently been made in order to blackball Pakistan as a nuclear power. There are reports that Iran will soon be able to produce enriched uranium that could be used in manufacturing nuclear weapons at its facility in Natanz in Central Iran; the facility could become operational by 2005.[24] Iran, however, asserts that, as a member of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), it will take no irresponsible step and that its nuclear programme–for which it is receiving Russian assistance–is for peaceful purposes only.

Iran: A “Moderating” Influence?

Indo–Iranian relations could perhaps exert a moderating influence on Pakistan. It could be beneficial for the Arab Gulf states, too. Iran, through economic links and leverage, could exercise some sobering influence on Pakistan and India, and perhaps nudge their foreign policies towards realistic options, focusing on socio-economic development and an acceptable compromise over the festering and enervating Kashmir dispute. This view, however, is perhaps too optimistic.

A sizeable Indian and Pakistani community resides in the Persian Gulf states, contributing toward the economic development of the region. Normalization of ties between India and Pakistan would be a healthy development for these countries, as any increase in Indo–Pak tensions accentuate their foreign policy dilemmas. After all, both India and Pakistan are nuclear-armed states and are, for the present at least, locked in acrimonious enmity, proving a source of constant worry to the proximate Gulf region.

At the same time, any notion of Pakistan deliberately blocking or sabotaging the Iran–India pipeline are misplaced, as Pakistan also stands to gain substantially from Iranian gas supplies. Moreover, Iran is also helping to build an oil refinery in its eastern region. Thus, Pakistan can ill afford to risk poisoning its relations with its western neighbour–relations which have been on the mend for some years now. The “peace pipeline” could well prove to be a CBM; however, a minimum level of trust between India and Pakistan is a sine qua non for it to materialize. After all, history has shown that nations do not enter into economic ventures without a minimum level of normalcy and mutual trust.

After having reached their nadir, India–Pak relations now show a glimmer of hope, as demonstrated in Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee’s overtures for peace and his voicing an inclination for resumption of talks. However, any immediate prospect of embarking on economic collaboration between the two bitter rivals is, at best, bleak. The pipeline project will consequently remain in the doldrums until relations normalize; and this may not happen till after the Indian state elections in 2004. For the present, the BJP government is pressurizing Pakistan and is not willing to enter into negotiations until such time as the so-called “cross-border terrorism” is not completely stopped.[25]

Dependence on Gulf Oil

Despite reports of recent discoveries of recoverable gas in India, its dependence on Gulf oil will continue in the foreseeable future. Gas accounts for only about 4.3 per cent of India’s total energy consumption and the country is heavily dependent upon mined coal for its energy needs, which results in greater environmental pollution.

Although substantial gas reserves have been discovered in the Middle East (off the coast of the Persian Gulf) and in the Arctic Sea in recent years, they are located far from international markets and their exploitation is economically unfeasible. Besides, the construction of pipelines and the setting up of liquefying plants to make the transportation of gas possible causes much delay. Gas discoveries in deep-sea waters thus pose technical problems as well as proving costly to develop.

While some American companies have procured gas from deeper waters in the Gulf of Mexico, southeastern India lacks a comparable support network of drilling, supporting companies and pipelines through which it could benefit from the reserves discovered off its eastern seaboard. It is conjectured that development of deep-water gas wells will cost between $300-500 million, and an additional $500 million for laying of pipelines to Mumbai or New Delhi.[26] This may ultimately obviate the need to bring gas from Qatar and Bangladesh through deep-water pipelines. Although this may be bad news for Bangladesh and Qatar, the Indian Navy considers these new discoveries as grounds for upgrading its fleet for the development of these offshore deposits. China’s naval presence on the eastern seaboard of India, with listening posts in southern Burma, can perhaps also be attributed to the vast gas deposits.

The Iran–Pakistan–India pipeline project, a victim of the mutual distrust between India and Pakistan, has, as one writer puts it, been “quietly buried”, and “ended up as a pipedream”,[27] at least for the time being. The focus now is on shipping in liquefied natural gas (LNG), which India will decide to import from either Qatar or Iran, depending upon its cost-effectiveness. 

The Indo–Iranian Nexus

Although Iran has said that its “strategic consensus” and emerging relationship with India are not aimed at “any third country”, the incipient Indo–Iran nexus on strategic issues raises security concerns in Pakistan. It is feared that the cementing of Iran–India ties might well lead to a reduction of Iranian support to Pakistan in the event of another India–Pakistan war. Even in peacetime, Iran may tend to veer away from Pakistan.

The much talked about December 2002 Iran–India agreement is not a full-fledged defence agreement as such; it may, however, give India a subtle psychological advantage so far as the “operational” use of early warning systems, surveillance and military co-operation are concerned. Moreover, enhanced levels of scientific and technological collaboration could, over the years, impinge on Pakistani interests; the presence of Indian advisers in Afghanistan and Iran could also constitute a “holding threat” against its western border.[28]

The emerging Indo-Iranian nexus, if any, faces many impediments. For instance, the US and Israel might also find this connection rather uncomfortable, should it go beyond limits. Of late, the Indo–Israel military nexus has become more robust due to the strategic convergence between the two countries, as has the India–US strategic partnership. Today, Israel is the second largest supplier of military equipment and hardware to India after Russia. While Russia supplies heavy weaponry such as tanks, aircraft and ships, Israel supplies small weapons, electronic equipment, radars and high-tech add-ons.[29]

Iran is still one of the strongest opponents of Israel, a vociferous supporter of the Palestinian cause, and, as of now, a strong opponent of the Middle East peace process. It is difficult to comprehend how the Indo–Iranian linkage can be viable, taking into consideration the strategic matrix of the region. Of late, Iran is under threat by the US for allegedly building nuclear weapons and providing sanctuary to Al-Qaeda elements that might have been involved in the terrorist attacks in Riyadh in Saudi Arabia in early June 2003. One possibility, howsoever remote, since there is no love lost between Iran and the US, is that this emerging India–Iran nexus could eventually lead to a softening of attitudes between the US and Iran.

Factors of geographical and cultural and historical affinity should, in the nature of things, prove to be a bond between Iran and Pakistan. However, in actuality, the two countries have moved further apart in the last decade. As an illustration, during his visit to Pakistan, President Khatami did not make any forthright statement on Kashmir; instead, he underlined the need for an early settlement of the dispute through “dialogue and negotiations” between Pakistan and India.

Both Iran and Pakistan face some degree of international ire: the former as one of the countries the US chose to include in the “axis of evil”; the latter under perpetual threat of being declared a “terrorist state”, should the US find it dragging its feet on its commitments, or showing a lack of competence, or co-operation in the so-called war against international terrorism. In any case, Pakistan does need to curb “Islamic fundamentalism” in the country and to implement imaginative and multi-dimensional policies. In this connection, President Musharraf has taken some bold measures, but much remains to be done in enforcing those measures.

On the other hand, Iran and India had converging interests as early as the Reza Shah Pehlavi era. In the 1970s, Iran acquired the status of a regional power in the Persian Gulf, while India emerged as a pre-eminent power in South Asia, following the 1971 military defeat of Pakistan. At that juncture, Iran tried to bring home to Pakistan the fact that, if Islamabad could diversify its relations with the Gulf countries, Tehran, too, could widen its contacts in South Asia by cultivating links with India.[30]

Under the circumstances, Iran stands to gain by its inclination towards democratic India. The fact that India has the second largest Shia population after Iran is not lost on the Iranian leadership. For India, Iran is an important country, bordering the Middle East; as the gateway to India’s friends in the Islamic world, it could serve as a counterfoil to Pakistan’s influence in the region. However, the India factor should not be accorded undue importance as it could lose salience if US hostility against Iran gains intensity in the days ahead. 

An Evaluation

President Khatami’s January 2003 visit to India provided some insights into the evolving relationship, though one should not read too much strategic content and import into this relationship. The emerging “strategic consensus” between India and Iran is a move by the latter to break out of isolation and befriend important countries–such as India–which would enable it to secure its eastern flank.

Though there was never much love lost between Iran and Iraq, the two having fought a long drawn-out war (1980-1988), the US-led attack on the latter in March-April 2003 put Iran’s policy managers in a very problematic situation. However, it also provided Iran with an opportunity to break out of long international isolation, step up its visibility and be counted as an important actor in the region. Hence, from early February 2003, it pursued active “bridge-building diplomacy” with some of the Gulf states and with its immediate neighbours and the Arab countries to forestall the war in Iraq. Iran also actively forged links with the European Union (EU), trying its best to exercise “damage control” through a policy of “active neutrality”.

Iran has suffered under sanctions and is keen to end its isolation and join the mainstream of international politics. That is why, during his visit to Pakistan, President Khatami spoke of a “dialogue among civilizations.” In fact, over the last decade, the Iranian Revolution has lost its messianic quality and lustre as an ideological revolution; the revolutionary spirit is now tempered with pragmatism.

The possibility of an energy link-up between India and Iran is another strong incentive for future Pakistan–Iran co-operation. In this context, President Khatami called for building gas and oil “pipelines for peace” when he addressed a gathering of businessmen in Lahore.

The Iran–Pakistan–India pipeline plan will come to fruition only if and when normalcy prevails in the region. At present, relations between India and Pakistan are far from normal, though talk of economic co-operation is rife since Prime Minister Vajpayee’s overtures and the Pakistan government’s positive response. The process of normalizing Indo–Pakistan ties cannot be delayed much longer, as there are overriding economic compulsions on both sides that will eventually force regional co-operation.

 On the whole, expanding Indo–Iranian collaboration should not create undue concern in Pakistan. Nor should it perceive the relationship between its two neighbours as “collusion”, nor as a move directed against it. In fact, the Indo–Iranian link is geared to defence co-operation only and that too of a technical and advisory nature. Rumours of Indian bases in Iran have already been dismissed. Iran has formed neither a pact nor an alliance with India, as made out in certain sensationalist Indian writings.[31] In forging close relations with India, President Khatami noted that Iranian foreign policy is “to safeguard Indian and Pakistani national interests.”

It should be kept in mind that Pakistan had signed similar defence agreements with many Middle Eastern countries in the 1970s and 1980s. Today, Iran needs military assistance, technical expertise and skills from India. It needs to break out of its decades-old status of a pariah state. The destabilization of its western neighbour, Iraq, as a result of the US-led attack, is worrisome for its policy-makers; it is, therefore, natural for Iran to seek new alignments.

India, on its part, is keen to export military equipment to the Middle East and to share the latter’s energy resources; to open transit routes from Iran to the other Gulf countries, Central Asia and the Caucasus; and to assist in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Of course, it would also like to see a dilution of the traditional friendship between Pakistan and Iran.

Other Gulf states have no need to be concerned about the strengthening of Indo–Iranian ties, as they have themselves maintained steady economic and political links with India. Indo–Iranian defence co-operation is certainly in the offing and could possibly increase further. But to call it an “alliance” or a “pact”, as some journalists have done, would be misleading. An Iran–India alliance would indeed have a serious impact on Pak–Iran relations.

As it is, co-operation of any sort between India and Iran is not going to be an easy undertaking as certain elements could hamper the relationship. For one thing, it suffers from inherent limitations: US and Israeli reactions to a close Indo–Iran nexus will almost definitely be strongly unfavourable and, in the course of time, also more vocal, should the linkage be well-established. Iran cannot afford to totally ignore Pakistani sensitivities any more than India can ignore those of Israel, a country with which it has much stronger links than its ties with Iran.

Iran will have to work hard to make the new relationship with India both functional and durable, on the pattern of India’s strategic partnership with the US and Israel, a nexus which has become more robust over the last few years.

Conclusion

What is going to be the nature of Indo–Iranian relations in the immediate future, particularly after the US-led war against Iraq? Historically, India has had better relations with the Ba’athist regime in Iraq than with any other Islamic country; the two countries also had considerable commercial and trade relations. After the January 2002 State of the Union Address made by President Bush, the Indian government remarked that that it did not consider Iraq as part of the “axis of evil”;[32] it also opposed the US intention of attacking Iraq and expressed the hope that the US would choose to act in accordance with UN resolutions. Indian opposition parties accused the Vajpayee government of “passivity and inaction” in the pre-war scenario; but then many other countries in the world were caught in a similar dilemma and followed discreet policies of not openly criticizing the US in their perceived national interests. India would like to rebuild good relations with Iraq in the post-Saddam era. In fact, its “strategic partnership” with the US may prove to be a factor of acceptability in the “new” Iraq.

It may be a cliché, but it is nonetheless true that, in the world of realpolitik, there are no permanent friends or foes–merely permanent interests. Should some modicum of stability return to Iraq, many Arab countries will be willing to recognize the new regime and to establish diplomatic and trade ties with it.

India hopes that Iran and post-Saddam Iraq will be able to make some meaningful contribution to the future security of the Persian Gulf.[33] However, should Iran come under increased pressure from the US as the next target on the “axis of evil”, India may well distance itself from Iran. Chances are that Iran will follow a pragmatic course and avoid this dire eventuality. After all, Iran is not as isolated as Iraq, nor have the lessons of the recent American and British attack on Iraq been lost on it. [34]

In the early 1990s, an Iran–China–Russia axis was being talked about.[35] The recent fissures in the EU, and the opposition to US policy on Iraq voiced by major powers such as Russia, Germany and France, are encouraging trends for the Iranian leadership. Much will depend on how the US campaign against Iraq shapes up in months ahead: will it end quickly or become a protracted affair?

Should the US military problems in Iraq increase in the days and months ahead, the chances of the US striking at other targets of “evil” will become increasingly remote. Some observers are of the opinion that the US military preoccupation in Iraq will considerably divert its attention from maintaining peace in and rebuilding Afghanistan. Reports suggest that stabilizing Iraq is going to be a long, tough haul, although ultimately the allied forces–given their size and hi-tech weaponry–will be able to control, if not effectively govern Iraq for the foreseeable future.

To sum up, Indo–Iranian relations have the potential to grow, if conditions are favourable in south and southwest Asia. The reality is that the US and Israel still view Iran as an inimical state, a major roadblock to a settlement of the Palestinian issue, and, given its Islamic character, a staunch opponent of Israel and Zionism. Besides, if and when Pakistan decides to recognize the state of Israel, the latter’s hostility towards Pakistan will be diminished to a great extent. This, in turn, could dilute the “burgeoning” Indo–Israel axis, if any.

            What turn and shape Pakistani diplomacy–adept or maladroit–takes and how it fares in the process­–will have a crucial bearing on Indo-Iranian level cooperation. As of this time, the Indo–Iranian connection is neither as substantial nor as durable as some sections of the media in India and Pakistan have depicted it to be. As mentioned above, there are limitations to this evolving relationship, especially in view of the stepped up US hostility against Iran in the wake of the recent Iraq war. Be that as it may, Indo–Iranian ties need constant monitoring in view of the rapidly unfolding developments in the Gulf as well as in South Asia.