India’s Increased Involvement in Afghanistan and Central Asia: Implications for Pakistan
 

Aly Zaman*

Introduction

n November 2001, the US launched a massive bombing campaign against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, which had been exercising control over a major portion of the country for the preceding five years. In spite of being the predominant political force in the country, however, the Taliban had been ostracized by almost the entire world community due to their rigid interpretation and implementation of Shari’a law and their apparent intention of exporting their obscurantist brand of Islam beyond the borders of Afghanistan. But the American campaign against the Taliban was not motivated by concern for the latter’s violations of human rights in Afghanistan; instead, the Americans were incensed by the refusal of the Taliban to hand over Osama bin Laden, whom they believed to have masterminded the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington on 11 September 2001. Soon after, President Bush issued a curt ultimatum to the nations of the world that they were either with the US or against it in its “war on terrorism”.

             Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates were the only countries that had recognized the Taliban regime. Following the American ultimatum, the latter two nations immediately withdrew their recognition. Pakistan took slightly longer to do so, mainly because it had been the principal sponsor of the Taliban and stood to lose the most from their ouster from power. Ever since the ignominious exit of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan, Pakistan had striven to fill the power vacuum left behind, motivated primarily by the desire to install a malleable government in Kabul that would provide invaluable strategic depth against its arch-rival, India. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the subsequent independence of the energy-rich Muslim republics of Central Asia, Afghanistan, the gateway to that region, assumed even greater importance for policy-makers in Pakistan. Concerted attempts were made to cultivate relations with the newly independent republics, but the incessant internecine fighting in Afghanistan prevented Pakistan from making any real headway in Central Asia, particularly with regard to energy resources and trade. Islamabad’s covert assistance to the extremist Taliban also angered traditional allies like Iran and China, and provided India a chance to insinuate itself into the region by forming an axis with Iran and Russia against Pakistan and the Taliban. India actively supported the opposition Northern Alliance in its struggle against the Taliban, fearing that an Afghanistan under total Taliban control could be exploited by Pakistan to assist the struggle for self-determination in Indian-held Kashmir.

            With the Taliban having now been removed from power, and with a government in Kabul manned heavily by members of the Northern Alliance, India has dramatically increased its involvement in Afghanistan and is seeking to marginalize Pakistan’s role in the political and economic reconstruction of the latter’s war-ravaged neighbour. At the same time, India has taken a determined stride into Central Asia by establishing a military base in Tajikistan and extending its economic and diplomatic activities throughout the region.

            The aim of this paper is to examine the evolving nature of India’s role in Afghanistan and Central Asia, particularly over the course of the last decade. It is an attempt to analyse not only the extent to which India’s involvement in the region has increased following the ouster of the Taliban regime, but also to assess the motives that have compelled India to adopt a proactive policy in Afghanistan and Central Asia. Finally, the paper identifies the implications for Pakistan of increased Indian involvement in a region that is vital to Pakistan’s own security, and suggests the possible counter-measures that Pakistan can take in this regard.

India’s Evolving Role in Afghanistan

Afghanistan’s ties with the Indian subcontinent go a long way back in history, mainly because it lies astride the route taken by invaders from Europe and Central Asia to India. Great conquerors of yore, from Alexander the Great to Tamerlane to Babur, all passed through Afghanistan en route to India. Several Afghan rulers also made forays into India, the most prominent among them being Sultan Mahmud Ghazni (ad 971–1030), founder of the Turkic Ghaznavid dynasty, who is believed to have invaded the subcontinent seventeen times.[1] His empire originally comprised present-day Afghanistan alone but was eventually expanded to include northwestern India and most of Iran.[2] The Mughals in India, who too were of Turkic origin, ruled over Afghanistan until their empire began to decay.  The Persian ruler, Nadir Shah (ad 1688–1747), generally considered the last of the great Asian conquerors, invaded India in 1738 and sacked the key Mughal strongholds of Delhi and Lahore.[3] One of Nadir Shah’s foremost generals, Ahmed Shah Abdali (ad 1722–1773), founded the Kingdom of Afghanistan in 1747 and led his Pashtun subjects on no fewer than nine expeditions to India, in the process annexing most of present-day Pakistan. At the apogee of his reign, Abdali’s empire extended from eastern Persia to northern India, and from the Amu Darya in Central Asia to the Indian Ocean.[4]

            During the nineteenth century, Afghanistan became the chessboard upon which the “Great Game” was played out between the British in India and the rapidly expanding Russian empire. British concerns about Russian advances in Central Asia and Iran led to increased interference in Afghanistan and precipitated three Anglo-Afghan wars, the last of which, fought in 1919, resulted in the total relinquishment of British control over Afghan affairs.[5] However, although direct Indian involvement in Afghanistan ceased from that time, the destinies of Afghanistan and north-west India, bound together by centuries of religious, ethnic, cultural and linguistic affiliations, remained inextricably intertwined.

            When the subcontinent was partitioned in 1947, it appeared likely that the newly created state of Pakistan–half of which comprised the entire Muslim north-western portion of the erstwhile British India–would continue to play an important role in Afghanistan, whereas India, without any geographical contiguity with Afghanistan, would be reduced to a peripheral position. However, relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan were initially marred by the latter’s refusal to accept the Durand Line, the boundary drawn by the British to divide Pashtun and Baluch areas in Pakistan from Afghanistan. In fact, relations between the two neighbours were seldom cordial and there came a particularly low point, lasting from 1961 to 1963, during which diplomatic, trade, transit and consular relations were suspended. It was from this time on that the Afghans turned increasingly to the Soviet Union for trade and transit.[6]

            Pakistan did, however, become critically important to Afghanistan once the Soviet Union invaded the latter in 1979. For almost ten years, it was the primary conduit for logistical support for the Afghan resistance, besides giving shelter to 3.2 million Afghan refugees.[7] During this period, India did not exactly endear itself to the Afghan freedom fighters as it received numerous arms shipments from the Soviets in exchange for its silence regarding the invasion.[8] This decision to provide implicit support to the Soviets in what was clearly an act of aggression against a sovereign country undermined India’s much touted non-aligned credentials and ensured that its role in Afghanistan would be a marginal one, once the Soviets left the country.

            In 1982, under the auspices of a joint commission, India launched a range of developmental activities in Afghanistan, including the setting up of a small industries estate on the outskirts of Kabul, collaboration in irrigation and hydro-electric projects near Herat, and other micro-hydel projects in Bamyan, Samangam, and Faizabad.[9] Although the scale of economic assistance was nowhere near that being provided by the Soviets, India’s attempts to bolster the Afghan economy gave rise to a perception amongst those countries opposed to the Soviet invasion that New Delhi was firmly in the Soviet camp as far as Afghanistan was concerned. This perception was further strengthened by India’s pointed abstention on a UN resolution condemning the Soviet Union.[10] By forming a triple axis with the Soviets and their puppet regime in Kabul, India wanted to contain Pakistan in the west as well as the east; however, by providing tacit support to the Soviets, it deprived itself of maintaining meaningful relations with the mujahiddin. This proved a costly error, because once the Geneva process had been initiated in 1981, there had been an ever-increasing realization in New Delhi itself that a Soviet withdrawal was inevitable.[11]

            The invasion of Afghanistan turned out to be one of the Soviet Union’s costliest blunders. After almost a decade of conflict, approximately 15000 Soviet servicemen had been killed and tens of thousands left permanently disabled. The economic losses sustained were even more formidable and put immense stress on an economy already creaking beneath the combined weight of over-centralization and excessive military spending. Within two years after the last Soviet tank rolled out of Afghanistan in February 1989, the Soviet empire had evaporated.

            On account of its pro-Soviet stance during the war, India’s role in post-Soviet Afghanistan was always going to be a marginal one. It was not allowed to attend the Geneva talks that finally bailed the Soviets out of Afghanistan, while its initiatives within the Non-Aligned Movement to resolve the Afghan problem also resulted in failure. Even after the Soviets had departed, India continued to support the Soviet-installed Najibullah regime, not realizing that its days were numbered. After its collapse in 1992, the provisional government of Sibghatullah Mujadidi was formed with the support of seven parties, none of them partial to India.[12] To avoid complete isolation, India began to woo the same mujahiddin groups that it had ignored during the Soviet invasion. Initial contacts were established with the non-Pashtun ethnic groups, such as the Uzbeks and Ismailis in the north and the Shi’a Hizb-e-Wahdat faction in central Afghanistan.[13] But much to its consternation, India could not reduce Pakistan’s influence in the region: the immensely important role played by the latter during the war against the Soviets ensured that it would be the dominant external player in post-Soviet Afghanistan, particularly considering the fact that, once the Soviets had been defeated, Afghanistan was relegated to the distant backwaters of America’s foreign policy.

            Mujadidi’s government remained in charge for only a couple of months before power was handed over to Burhanuddin Rabbani, leader of the predominantly non-Pashtun Jamiat-e-Islami. From 1992 until the emergence of the Taliban in 1995, there was a state of almost ceaseless conflict between two major factions: the Jamiat-e-Islami led by Rabbani and his foremost general, Ahmed Shah Masoud–both of whom were Tajiks–and the Hizb-e-Islami of Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, who was a Pashtun and was widely believed to be the candidate most favoured by Pakistan. Other players, such as Ismail Khan, the Shi’a strongman of Herat, and Abdul Rashid Dostum, the Uzbek warlord in Mazar-e-Sharif, regularly switched allegiances, thereby prolonging the violence and instability. External interference exacerbated an already volatile situation, with Pakistan generally supporting Hikmatyar and Iran assisting the Rabbani government as well as the Shi’a Hazaras.[14] During this period, India, still desperate to have an anti-Pakistan government in Kabul, provided technical and financial support to Rabbani and Masoud, albeit on a modest scale.[15] However, its involvement in Afghan affairs increased dramatically during the Taliban era.

The Rise of the Taliban

The meteoric rise of the Taliban–a group of war veterans and religious students based in Pakistani seminaries–from virtual obscurity to a position of predominance over all the other more established factions–owed much to the internecine fighting between the rival Afghan factions, which had dashed all hopes of a secure and independent post-Soviet Afghanistan and created a state of political anarchy and ethnic fragmentation. Increasingly disillusioned by the seemingly endless cycle of violence, Pakistan began to view the Taliban as the only force in the country capable of restoring the tranquility that it so desperately required after over a decade and a half of war.[16] Besides, a friendly Pashtun-dominated government in Kabul would provide Pakistan the strategic depth that it required to buttress its defence against India, as well as facilitate its moves to extend its influence in the energy-rich Central Asian Republics (CARs).

            The dramatic ascent of the Taliban began in 1994, when they freed a 30-truck convoy from Pakistan that had been captured by a warlord in southern Afghanistan. The Pakistan government of the time considered the fierce fighting qualities and fanatical religious zeal of the Taliban the ideal combination required to gain ascendancy over the other Afghan factions. What made the situation even better was that the Taliban were Pashtuns and already had intimate ties with Pakistan, thereby giving rise to an expectation amongst Pakistan’s decision-makers that, should the Taliban gain control over Afghanistan, strategic depth against India would finally be achieved.

            Thanks to the support from Pakistan, the Taliban had, by June 1997, brought two-thirds of the country under their control.[17] But for the other main regional players, this was a most unwelcome development. Iran, in particular, bitterly opposed the Taliban on account of their rigidly orthodox implementation of the Shari’a, their doctrinal opposition to the Shi’a minority in Afghanistan, and their threat of exporting their brand of Islam to the CARs. Russia too was worried that the Taliban would export radicalism to the CARs and actively assist in the separatist struggle being waged in its breakaway Muslim republic of Chechnya. India was fearful that Pakistan would use Afghan territory to set up training camps for jihadis, who would then be sent to fuel the liberation movement in Indian-held Kashmir. The conflicting interests of the regional powers led to another proxy war in Afghanistan, with Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE supporting the Taliban, and Iran, Russia and India supporting the Northern Alliance, a loose grouping formed by Masoud, Dostum and Karim Khalili of the Shi’a Hizb-e-Wahdat to check the relentless advance of the Taliban.[18]

            India’s assistance to the Northern Alliance was substantial, reflecting its belief that the situation in Afghanistan had a direct bearing on Kashmir and that the elimination of the Northern Alliance would be “disastrous for India”.[19] In 1997–8, it provided $70 million in aid to the Northern Alliance, which included two Mi-17 helicopters.[20] Another three helicopters were provided in 2000.[21] By 2001, India was supplying high-altitude military equipment to Masoud worth around $8 million, its defence advisers were providing tactical advice in anti-Taliban operations, and 25 Indian army doctors and male nurses were treating Northern Alliance troops at a 20-bed hospital at Farkhor in Tajikistan, close to the Afghan-Tajik border.[22] Some military sources indicated that Tajikistan and Uzbekistan were being used as bases by India and Russia to launch operations against the Taliban.[23]

            In spite of receiving generous support from Iran, India and Russia, the Northern Alliance could not make any real headway against the Taliban. On 9 September 2001, Masoud was assassinated, leaving the Alliance bereft of its ablest general. Two days later, however, came the terrorist attacks in America, which eventually led to a total turnaround in Afghanistan’s power equation. The US laid the blame for the attacks squarely on Saudi dissident Osama bin Laden, who had taken refuge with the Taliban; they, however, refused to turn him over without adequate proof of his involvement in the attacks. This demand effectively sealed the fate of the Taliban. Afghanistan was subjected to a relentless American bombing campaign that routed the Taliban and eventually paved the way for an interim administration to take over. This interim government has a Pashtun, Hamid Karzai, as the President, but the cabinet is dominated by members of the Northern Alliance, most of whom are openly hostile towards Pakistan and clearly desirous of improving ties with India at Pakistan’s expense.

India’s Increasing Involvement in post-Taliban Afghanistan

Hamid Karzai’s interim administration took charge on 22 December 2001 for a period of six months, after which a loya jirga, a traditional Afghan decision-making body of tribal elders, was to be convened to determine Afghanistan’s future political dispensation. As early as November, however, India sent a high-level diplomatic mission to Kabul to resurrect an Afghan policy that had been in the doldrums ever since the Taliban ejected the pro-India Rabbani regime from Kabul in 1996. Apart from a couple of senior diplomatic officials, the delegation included eight doctors and security personnel who were to remain in Afghanistan.[24] During the visit, an Indian liaison office was set up as a prelude to the reopening of the Indian embassy, which had been evacuated only hours before the Taliban made their triumphant entry into Kabul in September 1996, and had remained closed ever since.[25] The embassy’s formal reopening took place in December with Jaswant Singh, then India’s Minister for External Affairs, performing the honours, and terming the period of its closure “a painful gap of more than five years.” [26] The “pain” he referred to had been inflicted mainly by Pakistan. For over two decades, Pakistan had managed to keep India out of Afghanistan, particularly while the Taliban were in charge. For India, the speedy reopening of its embassy in Kabul symbolized the beginning of a new era in its relations with Afghanistan. With the Northern Alliance expected to play a dominant role in the future administration, India could look forward to getting even with Pakistan for having compelled it to remain on the sidelines in Afghan matters for such a long time.

            To demonstrate its support for the new government in Kabul, India immediately earmarked $100 million towards the reconstruction of Afghanistan, whilst also offering assistance in the development of infrastructure, health facilities, educational institutions and information technology.[27] Even before the interim administration formally assumed control on 22 December 2001, planeloads of relief material from New Delhi had been dispatched to Kabul. Along with tea, blankets and medicines, the relief cargo also contained Hindi music and film cassettes, demonstrating India’s desire to use its cultural weapons in the battle for influence in post-Taliban Afghanistan.[28]

            Several members of the Northern Alliance who were part of the interim administration were quick to respond to the Indian overtures. Foreign Minister Abdullah Abdullah, Interior Minister Younus Qanooni, and Minister for Labour and Local Affairs Mirwaiz Sadiq, all paid visits to New Delhi prior to 22 December. Abdullah met Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee on 13 December and held constructive discussions on a wide range of topics, including Afghanistan’s reconstruction needs, internal security and the conduct of elections.[29] Sadiq solicited India’s assistance in setting up medical services and reopening schools and colleges in the country. Qanooni’s visit was probably the most significant of all and reflected the pro-India inclinations of the new regime. Just a day after the 5 December signing of the Bonn accords that were to establish the interim administration, Qanooni flew into India for a six-day visit.[30] During his stay, he examined India’s judicial and law enforcement system and requested India’s assistance in establishing a national security force in Afghanistan.[31] On 12 December 2001, India announced that senior police officials would be sent to Afghanistan to serve as advisers on the establishment of law-enforcement institutions.[32] While in India, Qanooni was openly critical of Pakistan, accusing it of having contributed to Afghanistan’s devastation through its “interference”. [33] He also claimed that there were still 5000 foreign fighters in Afghanistan, including an unspecified number of Pakistani army irregulars.[34] But what must have been of particular satisfaction to India was Qanooni’s warning to Pakistan to desist from any further interference in Afghanistan or Indian-held Kashmir. [35]

            Indo-Afghan relations continued to improve after the interim administration assumed formal control. India promised to supply a million tons of wheat by the end of 2001 and Indian airlines resumed flights to Kabul and Mazar-e-Sharif. [36] Ariana, the Afghan national carrier, reciprocated by starting flights to New Delhi in the three planes that it possessed, all gifts from India itself.[37] Several Indian training programmes for the Afghans were initiated, including courses in journalism, accounting, and policing.[38] There were also proposals for a cold chain to be established in Kandahar and for improving the road from Bandar Abbas in Iran to Kabul, so that Indian goods could transit the country more rapidly.[39]

            In February 2002, Hamid Karzai paid his first visit to India where he was accorded a red-carpet welcome, an indication of New Delhi’s desire to cultivate Karzai, an ethnic Pashtun, and to win him over to its side at Pakistan’s expense. Karzai was thought not to be as favourably disposed towards India as the powerful Northern Alliance troika of Qanooni, Abdullah, and Muhammad Qasim Fahim, and had chosen to visit Pakistan before coming to India.[40] Indian analysts, however, justified his decision on the basis that Karzai wished to press upon Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf the need to keep pro-Taliban elements in his government under control.[41] Karzai’s visit to India was a success: in addition to the substantial assistance it had already provided to the interim administration, New Delhi announced a grant of $10 million for immediate utilization by Afghanistan.[42] It also promised to assist Kabul in the fields of education, health, agriculture and information technology. [43]

            On 10 June 2002, as stipulated in the Bonn Accords, a loya jirga was convened; the 1500 delegates present elected Hamid Karzai to preside over the transitional government. Defence Minister Fahim was confirmed in his cabinet post and was given an additional responsibility as one of the new government’s three vice-presidents. His confirmation was openly welcomed by India as, after Masoud’s assassination, Fahim had become the main conduit for India’s overt and covert assistance to the Northern Alliance in its struggle against the Taliban.[44] He was considered one of India’s “staunchest friends” and had been a frequent visitor to New Delhi.[45] During his most recent trip there in May 2002, he met the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, and the services chiefs, and sought their assistance in training Afghan’s new national army.[46] He was assured of all possible support, including the supply of material assistance as well as the provision of instructors.[47] Another of India’s friends in the interim administration, Foreign Minister Abdullah Abdullah, also retained his position, but the Interior Minister, Younus Qanooni, had to make way for the ethnic Pashtun governor of Paktia province, Taj Muhammad Wardak. Qanooni was, however, appointed as special presidential adviser for internal security and education minister.[48]     

            Military assistance and humanitarian relief were by no means the only points on India’s Afghan agenda: fostering greater economic ties was equally important. In September 2002, the Confederation of Indian Industries (CII) held the biggest ever four-day fair that Kabul had witnessed since 1977, with India becoming the first country to market its wares in post-Taliban Afghanistan.[49] The response to the Made-in-India show was enthusiastic; over 25000 people visited it, out of which 8700 were business visitors.[50] All the exhibits, from tractors, generators and ambulances to tea and implements for everyday use, were sold out. The total business transactions added up to an impressive Rs 250 million.[51] Of the 170 exhibitors from top Indian companies, almost 60 per cent managed to appoint dealers in Afghanistan, while another 10 per cent initiated the setting up of their own offices in Kabul.[52] Two agreements with Afghan partners were also signed, one for the production of industrial and medical gas and the other for the establishment of a mineral water plant. Both these products had previously been imported from Pakistan.[53]

            Encouraged by the success of the trade fair, India has drafted a Preferential Trading Agreement (PTA) with Afghanistan to promote the export of Afghan goods to India and to facilitate the Indian private sector’s efforts to participate in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Under the terms of the PTA, India plans to build a 130-200 km road from Chabahar in Iran to Kabul, which will not only accelerate the transit of Indian goods to Afghanistan but also solve India’s current problem of having to transport its goods via Pakistan. This was recently announced by the Afghan Minister for Commerce, Sayed Mustafa Kazmi, while addressing a seminar in New Delhi arranged by the CII.[54] According to Kazmi, the PTA would cover the export of three items from Afghanistan: dry fruits, fresh fruits, and medicines and herbs. A joint working group has been set up between the Ministers of Commerce of the two countries to work out the finer details of the agreement and examine the possibility of removing some of the duties imposed on the aforementioned items.[55] Arun Singh, Joint Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs, said that by March 2003, the Indian government would have provided $31.5 million towards Afghanistan’s reconstruction. In the second phase, starting from April 2003 and continuing over the next two financial years, India would provide another $68.5 million.[56] It seems fairly evident that, in the economic sphere too, India’s star in Afghanistan is no less on the ascendant than it is in the political one.

India in Central Asia: The Latest Entrant to the ‘New Great Game’

Central Asia, or Turkestan as it was formerly known, has been of considerable geopolitical importance for many centuries. It constituted part of the historic silk route from China to Byzantium, and then onwards to Rome.[57] Scores of invaders, including the Turks, the Mongols, and the Chinese, swept through the region into Afghanistan on their way to seizing the riches of lands that lay beyond such as India, Iran, Iraq, Turkey and Egypt.[58] After the discovery of the maritime route to the Far East and China, Central Asia’s importance waned considerably. However, it rose to prominence once again in the nineteenth century, owing to the intense competition for regional supremacy between imperial Britain and the rapidly expanding Russian empire. Britain was seriously concerned that the rampaging Russian forces, unless checked, would not stop at Central Asia but would move on into India, the British empire’s most cherished overseas possession. The ensuing struggle for political ascendancy took place over a vast expanse of territory, stretching from the snow-capped peaks of the Caucasus, across the imposing deserts and mountain ranges of Central Asia, to Chinese Turkestan and Tibet in the east.[59] It was called the “Great Game”, an appellation not coined, as is widely presumed, by the renowned English novelist Rudyard Kipling, but nevertheless immortalized by him in his epic novel Kim.[60]

            In 1917, the Communist deluge swept away the Russian empire and brought all its territories under the hammer and sickle of the Soviet Union. The republics of Central Asia, namely, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan–all predominantly Muslim and non-Russian–were transformed into Soviet socialist republics and remained so until the Soviet empire disintegrated in 1991. The consequent independence of the Central Asian Republics (CARs) saw another frantic struggle for influence in the region, one that is presently in progress and shows no signs of abatement, at least in the foreseeable future. While the foremost objective of the original “Great Game” was to control the mountain passes into India, the “New Great Game” is fuelled by a totally different factor: access to the potentially enormous energy resources of the CARs. The current tussle involves the USA, Russia, China, Pakistan, Iran and Turkey, each one of them driven in the main by tantalizing prospects of oil pipelines and cheap markets for their exports. Another actor has, however, also entered the fray. Following the removal of the Taliban and the installation of a pro-India regime in Afghanistan, India too has stepped up efforts to increase its involvement in Central Asia, motivated not just by the need to address its pressing energy needs but also by the desire to further erode Pakistan’s concept of strategic depth by encircling it from the west. In pursuance of this objective, it opened a military base in Tajikistan in May 2002, the first such facility outside its own territorial confines. This move unambiguously heralded India’s entry into the “New Great Game”.

            Owing to its nexus with the Soviet Union during the Cold War, India managed to maintain fairly strong links with the Central Asian region at a time when it was completely isolated from its more immediate neighbours, including Iran and Pakistan. Those links allowed it to maintain friendly relations with the CARs, even after they became independent. New Delhi regards Afghanistan and the CARs as parts of its “extended neighbourhood”[61] and is keen to promote its interests in the region, preferably at Pakistan’s expense.[62] While the Taliban were in control of Afghanistan, India strove to form a common front with Iran, Russia, and the CARs against the religiously inspired “terrorism” purportedly being propagated by Pakistan and the Taliban. All these countries banded together against the hard-line policies and seemingly expansionist agenda of the Taliban, and supported the Northern Alliance against them. India was deeply concerned about the presence of a pro-Pakistani government in Kabul, and tried to counter a thoroughly unwelcome development by accusing Pakistan of running training camps in Afghanistan for militants who were then sent to fuel the struggle for self-determination being waged in Indian-held Kashmir. It also raised the bogey of Pakistan-sponsored “militant Islam” sweeping through Central Asia to sufficiently frighten the leaders of the CARs into distancing themselves from Pakistan.

            With the Taliban ousted and a pro-India government installed in Kabul, India can gaze upon the present state of affairs with a degree of equanimity denied to it as long as the Taliban ruled. It realizes that the present is the most auspicious time for it to adopt a more dynamic and forward-looking policy in one of the most resource-rich and politically critical regions of the world. Not only can it then address some of its pressing energy concerns but greater involvement on its part can undermine the interests of its two greatest rivals, Pakistan and China, in a region of tremendous importance to both countries, and one that both visualize as their own backyard.

            The setting up of the military base in Tajikistan is an unambiguous indication of India’s desire to have a greater say in Central Asian affairs. Located at Farkhor, an area close to the border with Afghanistan, the base has been operational since May 2002 and is presently being used to transport the relief assistance that India had pledged to Afghanistan following the ouster of the Taliban.[63] The base was set up under a bilateral agreement signed by India’s Minister for Defence, George Fernandes, during a visit to Dushanbe in April 2002.[64] It was also agreed that India would train Tajik defence personnel, service and repair their Soviet-era military equipment, and even teach some of the Tajik officers the English language.[65] The two sides also agreed to make joint efforts to curb drug-trafficking.[66]

            Tajikistan’s decision to allow India the use of its territory for military purposes demonstrates the close ties between the two countries, and also emphasizes India’s desire to have a physical presence in the region, not only to safeguard its economic interests but also to keep a close eye on Pakistan and China. While Tajikistan is being used for security purposes, India, in pursuit of the energy resources that it so desperately requires, is also assiduously wooing Kazakhstan, which, in terms of oil and gas, is the most liberally endowed of all the five republics. And its efforts seem to be paying off. In February 2002, the Kazakh President, Nursultan Nazarbayev, paid a five-day state visit to India. During his stay, he signed a joint declaration with the Indian Prime Minister stating that India’s membership of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)–an important regional grouping comprising Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, besides China and Russia–would “add to the strength of the organization.” [67] In exchange for this support, Kazakhstan sought India’s expertise in information technology for the development of software parks and the initiation of collective efforts in other software-related ventures.[68] It also evinced keen interest in boosting trade with New Delhi and gave sufficient proof of that interest at a subsequent Indian industrial fair held in Almaty in April, with Indian companies securing orders for civilian goods worth $28 million.[69] In the sphere of security, the two countries agreed to set up a forum to counter terrorism and decided in favour of “early action” whilst finalizing agreements on military and technical co-operation.[70] This “co-operation” includes upgrading Kazakhstan’s military hardware, which, like most of India’s own equipment, is of Soviet and Russian origin.[71] Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee in turn visited Almaty in June to take part in the Conference for Co-operation and Trust-building Measures in Asia. Following talks with Mr Nazarbayev, he expressed India’s willingness to invest in Kazakhstan’s oil and gas industry.[72] The Kazakh President identified four areas where the two countries could co-operate: military-technical, oil and gas, pharmaceuticals and information technology.[73]

            Kazakhstan was not the only CAR to voice its support for India’s entry to the SCO. In August 2002, Kyrgyz President Askar Akaev echoed the sentiments of his Kazakh counterpart, saying that the SCO would be better off with India in it; moreover, he backed India’s claim to a seat as a permanent member of the UN Security Council.[74] The two countries also expressed their determination to set up a Kyrgyz-Indian Inter-Government Joint Working Group on international terrorism and other types of crimes.[75] As far as trade and economic ties were concerned, India conveyed its willingness to set up a software training and development centre in Kyrgyzstan.[76] Later that month, a highly successful “Enterprise India” show was staged in Bishkek, where thirty Indian companies, representing sectors such as electronics, textiles, garments, light engineering, food processing and pharmaceuticals, displayed their wares before enthusiastic customers.[77]

            There is no doubt that, to all the present competitors in the “New Great Game”, the CARs present a veritable economic bonanza. Kazakhstan has huge amounts of oil, iron ore and other minerals.[78] As recently as May 2002, yet another oilfield was discovered in the northern Caspian Sea just off Kazakhstan, possibly ranging in size from 7 billion to 9 billion barrels.[79] Uzbekistan, although not abundant in terms of energy resources, nevertheless possesses large gold deposits and is a major producer of cotton.[80] Turkmenistan contains considerable amounts of natural gas, while Tajikistan boasts substantial aluminum reserves.[81]

            India is making serious efforts to increase trade with the CARs and tap the region’s extensive energy resources. However, its adoption of a more aggressive Central Asian policy has not been dictated solely by economic imperatives; it also has definite political interests, such as preventing any major strategic gains to Pakistan and keeping a check on its influence in the region. For instance, in June 2002, the leaders of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Turkmenistan agreed to revive interest in the construction of the 890-mile long, $2 billion gas pipeline, originally initiated by Unocal, the US energy giant.[82] Unocal had been forced to abandon its plans in 1998, as the unending civil strife in Afghanistan made progress almost impossible. The pipeline was designed to connect the gas fields of Eastern Turkmenistan through Afghanistan to Pakistan, and then extended onwards to India.[83] Immediately after the agreement was signed, however, India announced a counter-proposal for a Russia–China–India (RCI) pipeline stretching from Russia through Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, and onwards to Kashgar in Chinese Xinjiang.[84] It would then enter Indian-held Kashmir via Ladakh to supply gas to northern India. The pipeline could cost as much as $15 billion and would have to cover a vast expanse of diverse and difficult terrain.[85] Despite its apparent lack of feasibility, and in spite of the security guarantees given by a number of Pakistani leaders over the past ten years about any pipeline passing through Pakistan into India, the present Indian leadership seems keen to pursue the RCI option.[86] India evidently wishes to avoid placing itself in a situation where it becomes dependent on Pakistan for the uninterrupted supply of desperately needed energy resources. It is also afraid that if the Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan pipeline becomes a reality, the revenues accruing from it to Pakistan would shore up its impoverished economy, which would result in strengthening its military even further and allow it to resurrect its fortunes in Afghanistan and the CARs.

            Another move designed to reduce Pakistan’s role in Central Asia is the North-South Corridor Agreement, signed between India, Iran and Russia in September 2000. The Corridor aims to connect Mumbai with St Petersburg, via Tehran and Moscow. First linking the Indian commercial heartland of Mumbai with the bustling Iranian port city of Bandar Abbas by maritime transport, the Corridor will then rely on road and rail networks to connect Bandar Abbas with the Caspian Sea ports of Bandar Anzali and Bandar Amirabad, via Tehran.[87] From there, cargo will be shipped across the Caspian Sea to the Russian port of Astrakhan.[88] The Corridor will culminate in a long stretch of road and rail leading to St Petersburg.[89] Through the Corridor, India hopes to shore up relations with Central Asia and tap its energy reserves without having to use the Afghanistan–Pakistan route, thereby killing two birds with one stone.

            Undermining Pakistan’s interests in the region, however, is not the sole reason for India’s accelerated push into Central Asia: containing China is almost as important a concern. Both India and China are major regional competitors, locked in a frequently acrimonious contest for leadership of the Asian continent. However, where China’s booming economy and military potential have already ensured for it a powerful voice in world affairs, India’s acute poverty and other internal problems have compelled it to lag behind. Driven by its own rapidly growing demand for energy, the Chinese government has made securing access to the untapped energy reserves of Central Asia a cornerstone of its economic policy for the next two decades.[90] As far back as 1997, the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) had acquired the right to develop two potentially lucrative oilfields in Kazakhstan, outbidding more resourceful US and European oil conglomerates.[91] In exchange for development rights, it undertook to build pipelines to Xinjiang to make possible the export of up to 50 million tonnes of Kazakh oil to China each year.[92] China is also a major supplier of arms to the CARs and has even offered its own forces under the aegis of the SCO Treaty of 2001 to assist in the defence of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states against terrorist and secessionist movements.[93] India is wary of increased Chinese penetration into Central Asia, particularly at a time when it is in desperate need of the region’s energy resources. Its eagerness to obtain membership of the SCO is indicative of its desire to closely monitor Chinese activities in Central Asia. At the same time, India also wishes to enter the burgeoning regional arms export market in order to dilute China’s influence on the one hand, and to increase the market for its rapidly growing indigenous arms industry on the other.[94] In pursuance of these aims, India has recently signed deals with Kazakhstan and Tajikistan under which it will sell Ilysuhin-76 military transports to the former and helicopters to the latter.[95] It also considers it vital to its own interests that the Central Asian governments be provided the means to protect themselves against radical Islamic movements such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and the Hizb-e-Tahrir.

            There can be little doubt that India’s involvement in Central Asia, a region not geographically contiguous to it but nevertheless of considerable strategic importance, will continue to increase, particularly as long as the present government in Kabul remains in power. New Delhi is acutely aware of the need to have some alternative to the supply of oil from the volatile Middle East, particularly now that the US has invaded Iraq. Apart from oil and gas, India’s other main economic interest would be to increase trade with the CARs, particularly in relation to the lucrative arms-export market. From a strategic point of view, India will try to undermine Pakistan’s interests in the region, not just through the use of its base in Tajikistan but also by continuing its campaign to malign Pakistan as a sponsor of extremist Islamist organizations. It will also try to reduce Chinese influence in the region, a task that will be very difficult to accomplish as China not only has land borders with three CARs–Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan–but also has extensive economic and strategic interests in the whole Central Asian region.

Implications for Pakistan

The duration of India’s currently increased level of involvement in Afghanistan and Central Asia is primarily contingent upon the continued existence of the Northern Alliance-dominated government in Kabul. With Afghanistan being the gateway to the CARs, any country with influence in Afghanistan will be strongly placed to make inroads into Central Asia. As long as key ministries like foreign affairs and defence remain in the hands of known Indian sympathizers such as Abdullah Abdullah and Qasim Fahim, Pakistan will be hard-pressed to regain even a modicum of the ground that it has lost in Afghanistan since the removal of the Taliban. Even before the announcement of the Bonn Accords that created Karzai’s interim administration, Pakistan’s diminished role in the new Afghanistan was evident: “Three months ago, Kabul was Islamabad’s backyard; it called all the shots there. In just a fortnight of Kabul’s fall, Pakistan is the only one of Afghanistan’s six neighbours that doesn’t have a presence there.”[96] And no less troubling for Pakistan than its overnight marginalization was its dramatic reversal of fortunes with India: “Nothing illustrates the fact that New Delhi has been able to inveigle itself successfully into the diplomatic matrix that surrounds Afghanistan’s politics better than a post-midnight meeting, the day before the declaration on Afghanistan was signed in Bonn on December 5, after twelve days of protracted wrangling. Those who attended the meeting had to make a last-minute decision on whether or not there was going to be a declaration. The list of the countries that participated in that last-minute meeting indicated the new strategic confluence on Afghanistan: the US, Russia, Germany, Iran and India. Not Pakistan.” [97]

            The fact that several members of the present Afghan government, including Hamid Karzai himself, studied at Indian universities has also gone in India’s favour, as has the fact that some of them, including Abdullah Abdullah and Younus Qanooni, still have their families living in India.[98] It is hardly surprising, therefore, that India’s standing in Afghanistan has improved immeasurably since the departure of the Taliban. Pakistan should consider this an extremely worrying development; with defence and foreign affairs in the firm grip of the Northern Alliance, it cannot possibly hope for any diplomatic or material support in case war breaks out with India. In fact, there is every likelihood that, at best, the government in Kabul will maintain an uneasy neutrality, but at worst, it could actively assist the Indians against Pakistan. As long as the Northern Alliance remains in control of vital ministries, India’s influence in the country will increase, while Pakistan’s interests will remain unfulfilled.

            Another disquieting development for Pakistan is the nexus forged between India and Iran over Afghanistan. The two countries collaborated closely in propping up the Northern Alliance against the Taliban, and both now seem determined to continue their co-operation in post-Taliban Afghanistan. The secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran Hassan Rouhani, visited India in June 2002 and emphasized that India, Iran, and Afghanistan had to work together to deal with Al Qaeda.[99] He also expressed Iran’s willingness to sign a document with India for bilateral security co-operation, and suggested that the North-South Corridor could be extended to include Afghanistan. The implication was that India could gain access to Afghanistan and the CARs through Iran by making Kabul a partner in the Corridor project.[100] A year earlier, during a trip to Pakistan, Rouhani had told Islamabad in no uncertain terms that there was a need for India’s involvement in future efforts to resolve the Afghan imbroglio. He had also emphatically declared that the Kashmir dispute could not be equated with the Palestinian problem.[101] It is evident that Iran and India, and Russia as the third member of the axis, have formally banded together to counter Pakistan’s attempts to regain influence in Afghanistan.[102]

            In the CARs, India’s decision to play a more intrusive role has serious implications for Pakistan. The base at Farkhor will allow a permanent Indian military presence in a country that not only borders Afghanistan but also shares a short border with Pakistan. From a strategic point of view, India could not have found itself in a better situation. In case Afghanistan slides back into civil war at some point in the future and external competitors are again compelled to take sides, India will now be in a far better logistical position to influence the course of events than it was during the Taliban era. India will also continue to use the bogey of religiously-inspired “terrorism” emanating from Pakistan to mar the latter’s relations with the CARs and hinder it from making progress on oil and gas pipelines and export markets.

            As mentioned before, Pakistan is not India’s sole competitor in the region; China too has to be dealt with. India’s desire to contain both countries might compel it to adopt a two-pronged approach: teaming up with Iran and Russia against Pakistan and allying with the USA against China.

            As far as Pakistan is concerned, it cannot view India’s presence in its strategic backyard with complacency. For the last two decades, Pakistan has sought effective control over Afghanistan, or at least a strong friendship with it, in order to secure strategic depth against India and obviate the possibility of a two-front military situation. In pursuit of this ambitious plan, it facilitated the dramatic rise of the Taliban and continued supporting them, despite their blatantly obscurantist policies. For its pains in Afghanistan, all Pakistan received were the rebukes of almost the entire world community. Nevertheless, its policy remained unchanged. Pakistan’s generals–the framers and sustainers of the country’s Afghan policy–felt sure that, in the end, strategic depth would be secured. Unfortunately for Pakistan, that has not happened. When confronted by the “with us or against us” ultimatum given by President Bush, Pakistan found itself with no choice but to renounce its policy of the previous two decades within a matter of days, if not hours. The Taliban were disowned virtually overnight and unstinted assistance was provided to the USA in its Afghan campaign.

            If Pakistan had hoped that its alacrity in ditching the Taliban would be rewarded with an opportunity for it to be involved in the formation of the new government, it was in for a rude shock. The government of Afghanistan, as it stands today, is admittedly headed by a Pashtun, but is actually dominated by mainly Tajik members of the Northern Alliance, all of whom hold Pakistan responsible for fomenting civil strife in Afghanistan, and even allege that that it was involved in the assassination of their inspirational general, Ahmed Shah Masoud. Having supported the Northern Alliance, both materially and diplomatically, against the Taliban, India’s influence in Afghanistan is now greater than it has been for several decades. And considering the frequently elevated level of animosity between India and Pakistan, the former would be very keen to keep the latter’s role in Afghanistan to the barest minimum and to ensure that its concept of strategic depth remains buried somewhere beneath the rubble that Afghanistan has become.

Policy Recommendations for Pakistan

Pakistan must be extremely wary of Indian attempts to mend ties with the Pashtuns in Afghanistan. There are clear signs that this time round, New Delhi intends to avoid putting all its eggs in one basket, as it did during the Soviet invasion and during the Taliban era. Pakistan must nip these reconciliatory efforts in their incipiency by reminding the Pashtuns not only of India’s support for the Soviet Union during its invasion of Afghanistan but also of its intimate relations with the non-Pashtun Northern Alliance.

It must counter Indian propaganda tactics designed to portray it as a sponsor of Islamic “terrorism”.

It must closely co-operate with China in Central Asia, in order to counter India’s growing presence in the region.

Pakistan must stop its attempts to play the Islamic card in Central Asia. Although the CARs are independent, Russia continues to wield extensive influence in the region and strongly opposes any attempts to desecularize it. The leaders of the CARs are all hardened ex-Communists, presiding over repressive and undemocratic governments and paying no more than lip-service to Islam. Central Asia is generally considered to be the most secular part of the Islamic world. It will be very difficult for Pakistan to make any inroads into Central Asia if it persists with the delusion of spearheading an Islamic “crescent”, particularly as long as the present regime continues to control Kabul. It would be far more profitable for it to confine itself to improving economic relations, which can only be possible if the CARs are convinced that Pakistan no longer harbours ambitions of creating a regional Islamic bloc and that it is not supporting radical elements in Afghanistan.

Conclusion

There can be little doubt that India has benefited enormously from the removal of the Taliban and has managed to resuscitate its fortunes in a region where they had been virtually moribund for over two decades. The presence of a friendly government in Kabul has allowed New Delhi to achieve a position of considerable influence in Afghanistan, while the establishment of a military base in Tajikistan has enabled it to secure a vital foothold in Central Asia. Following the ouster of the Taliban, Pakistan’s direct involvement in the region has diminished and the current ground realities in Afghanistan have compelled it to adopt a far more circumspect approach towards its western neighbour than it had during the previous two decades. Although the present dispensation in Afghanistan–as far as Pakistan is concerned–may not be “a consummation devoutly to be wished (for)”, there is no reason to be too despondent about the existing state of affairs. Admittedly, the Karzai government does contain elements that are hostile towards Pakistan, but even they cannot remain impervious to the compulsions of geography. Pakistan still remains Afghanistan’s closest route to the sea. With its road links and established transport routes, it enjoys a clear advantage over India, whose lack of geographical contiguity will impede its efforts to increase its influence in the region. But if Pakistan is to optimize the benefits accruing to it through geography, it must be careful not to repeat the mistakes of the past. For the past ten years, it wielded an enormous amount of influence in Afghanistan; instead of using that influence for the establishment of a truly representative government, it proceeded to take sides in a conflict that eventually facilitated the Talibanization of Afghanistan, at great cost not only to the Afghan people but also to Pakistan’s own security interests. Pakistan must realize that strategic depth will not last very long if its foundations rest on intervention and intrigue; it can only be made enduring by earning the gratitude and goodwill of the people of Afghanistan. And once that happens, the markets and energy resources of Central Asia will also become more attainable.