Pakistan and the Indian Quest for Hegemony

1947-2003

Noor ul Haq*

n an interview given to a Swiss journalist on 11 March 1948, in answer to a question whether there was any hope of India and Pakistan reaching a peaceful settlement, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah said, “Yes, provided the Indian Government sheds its superiority complex and deals with Pakistan on an equal footing and fully appreciates the realities.”[1] This statement gives us an insight into the underlying reason for the unending conflict between the two nations.

            Prior to independence, there was a conflict between the Hindu-dominated Indian National Congress (INC) and the All-India Muslim League (AIML) for an equitable share in power. The INC was determined to wield supreme authority on the basis of its absolute majority and was not prepared to accommodate the AIML. This attitude eventually alienated seventy-nine million Muslims,[2] who were not prepared to live as a permanent minority and second-class citizens in Hindu-dominated India. Initially, the AIML sought constitutional safeguards to attain equality with the Hindus in a united India. When this proved impossible, their quest turned towards the establishment of an independent state in regions where Muslims were in a majority.

            Muslim separatism was essentially a struggle for political and socio-economic emancipation from the clutches of British imperialists and the brute authority of upper-caste Hindus. Conceptually, the conflict between Hindus and Muslims was not a conflict between two religions but a struggle between the urge for equality in the Muslims and the Hindu desire for domination. Some Hindu leaders had gone so far as to state that they would avenge the 700 years of their “slavery” under Muslim rule in India.

The “fear of the domination of Hindus governed Muslim policies and actions; the Muslim minority in undivided India considered itself to be in perpetual domination by an intolerant majority.”[3] After independence in 1947, the belligerent mental attitude and posturing continued. India remained on course to dominate the South Asian region,[4] whereas Pakistan has been struggling for security and equality.

Indian Secularism

The concept of Hindu supremacy and dominance was demonstrated in the recent riots in the Gujarat state of India, where more than 2000 people–mostly Muslims–were killed and more than “a hundred thousand [were] in makeshift shelters”. “The central and state governments, both run by the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), have been disturbingly slow to curb Hindu retaliation”, writes Radha Kumar (Senior Fellow in Peace and Conflict Studies at the Council of Foreign Relations in United States).[5] She further adds that “[the] state’s chief minister makes no secret of his belief that Muslims must be second-class citizens in the Hindu nation”[6] (emphasis added). The BJP, contesting on the same slogan, won the December 2002 elections in the state of Gujarat with an overwhelming majority.

After the BJP’s victory in the Gujarat elections, the Prime Minister of India, Atal Behari Vajpayee, said, “[T]he real face of secularism has come out in the open after the recent elections in the State.” He further explained that “[T]he elections would not change the national political scenario but concepts such as [Indian] secularism were now being defined correctly.”[7] According to an Indian columnist, even the INC, which boasts of advocating secularism, has adopted the strategy of “soft-Hindutva” and has been described as “BJP’s B-team”, because both the INC and the BJP “believe that the Hindu voter is communal, and can only be persuaded by a communal dialectic.” Accordingly, Sonia Gandhi, as president of the INC, permitted her candidates “to treat Muslims as lepers. Congress candidates and leaders shy away from being seen with Muslims in localities that are predominantly or totally Hindu.”[8] Thus “religious nationalism [Hindutva or Hinduization] is reshaping the national agenda of the world’s largest democracy” and is being sponsored by several right wing parties, collectively known as Sangh Parivar (joint family).[9]

Animosity towards Pakistan

The enmity between India and Pakistan goes back to 1947, when the new state of Pakistan was created despite the intense opposition of the INC. Later, the INC accepted Pakistan in the hope that it would seek reunion with the rest of India.[10] Acharya Kripalani, the President of the INC, stated that Pakistan, after playing a fleeting role on the international stage, would be absorbed into India.[11] The Mahasabha voiced the claim that “India is one and indivisible and there will never be peace unless and until the separated areas are brought back into the Indian Union and made integral part thereof.”[12]

Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, who became the first Prime Minister of India, had already told General Frank Messervy, General-Officer-Commanding, Northern Command, India, that his “deliberate plan would be to allow Jinnah to have his Pakistan and then to make things so difficult for them that they would have to come on their bended knees and ask to be allowed back into India.”[13] It is therefore not surprising that, immediately after partition, Jinnah complained to the Chief of the Viceroy’s Staff, Lord Ismay, that events such as the influx of refugees, etc., showed that the Indians were determined to strangle Pakistan at birth.[14]

Indian Expansionism

The philosophy of Indian expansionism is enshrined in the concept of Akhand Bharat (i.e., undivided greater India). It refers to the cherished historic dream of Hindus to reconstitute a great Hindu empire from the headwaters of the Indus River to eastern Burma and from Tibet to Cape Camorin.[15] Currently, it is reported that:

[T]he geography books introduced by the BJP in the twenty thousand Sang Parivar schools show a new map of India with Pakistan, Bangladesh, Tibet, Myanmar, and the kingdoms of Nepal and Bhutan as integral parts of Akhand Bharat. [The] Indian Ocean is renamed as Hindu Mahasagar, the Arabian Sea as Sindhu Sagar, and [the] Bay of Bengal as Ganga Sagar.[16]

The ancient concept of Akhand Bharat is further strengthened by the Hindu belief that they are the inheritors of British imperialism east of Suez. It is in pursuance of this policy that India used its armed forces to occupy territories that did not accede or belong to it. First, the INC extracted several territorial favours from the last British Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten, while international borders between India and Pakistan were being drawn. Mountbatten tended to favour India. The reason, in his own words, was that “[The] Indian Union consisting of nearly three-fourths of India, and with its immense resources and its important strategic position in the Indian Ocean is a Dominion we cannot afford to estrange.”[17]

 Some of the territories that should have formed part of Pakistan (such as the districts of Gurdaspur and Ferozpur) were handed over to the Indian Union, though they had initially been included in Pakistan as they were Muslim majority areas.[18] The British did not disappoint Nehru, who wanted a “variation of the boundary line”.[19] Similarly, the Andaman and Nicobar Isands, which were initially included in the Free State of Bengal and not in India, were given to India in the revised partition plan of 3 June 1947.[20] Mountbatten paid no heed to the arguments advanced by Jinnah for their inclusion in Pakistan.[21]

            “The most alarming development was India’s resort to arms to settle the accession of three princely states: Junagadh, Hyderabad and Kashmir,” writes G. W. Choudhry.[22] The Government of Pakistan accepted the request of the ruler of Junagadh for accession of his state to Pakistan on 15 September 1947. Initially, Nehru, in his letter of 12 September 1947 to Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan of Pakistan, had suggested that the accession should be decided through a “referendum” in accordance with the “wishes of the people”, to which Government of Pakistan agreed.[23] Instead of a referendum, India resorted to arms.[24] Indian troops marched into the city of Junagadh on 9 November 1947, taking advantage of the superiority of their armed forces. Pakistan’s Foreign Minister was able only to retaliate in the Security Council:

Hundred of states, including . . . Kapurthala which has a Muslim majority in the population, acceded to the Indian Union, but in no case did the Pakistan Government intervene in any way. Junagadh was the first state to accede to Pakistan and at once the Indian Government started a campaign of vilification, threats and economic blockade . . . [and the Indian occupation of Junagadh was a] clear violation of Pakistan territory and breach of international law.[25]

            The New York Times commented that the Indian action was “extremely unwise and unfortunate.”[26]

Ian Stephens observes:

A technique of aggrandizement had been learnt to be repeated later elsewhere not only in 1961 successfully against Goa and in a modified form in 1950-51 and again in 1961-62 against Nepal, but in 1948 against another of three princely states which on Independence Day had remained undecided and a very much bigger and more important one, Hyderabad.[27]

            On 1 July 1947, the ruler of Hyderabad issued a farman (edict) declaring that after the departure of the British, the state would be independent.[28] Like Junagadh, Hyderabad had to suffer the consequences of Indian military aggression immediately after the death of Jinnah in September 1948. The Times of London observed:

[O]nce again a powerful Government by resort to arms has imposed its will upon a weaker neighbour . . .[The Indian Government] has, in the judgment of world opinion, violated the moral principles upon which hopes of international security must rest.[29]

The Security Council heard the Hyderabad complaint at several meetings in September 1948. It contented itself by keeping the question on its agenda without taking any action.[30] India camouflaged its military aggression by calling it “police action”.

The state of Jammu and Kashmir is a glaring example of how all other issues are sacrificed at the altar of the interests of the Indian Union. In June 1947, Nehru had formally asked Mountbatten to award the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India, in spite of the fact that Muslims formed 77.11 per cent of the population. The foremost reason for his demand was that the State was “of the first importance to India as a whole . . . because of the great strategic importance of that frontier state.”[31] There is ample evidence to prove that the people of Kashmir had revolted against their ruler, Hari Singh, who had fled from his capital, Srinagar. India reportedly sent its troops[32] into the Valley to secure Srinagar airfield; then armed forces in great numbers were airlifted to Srinagar and the signature of the fugitive ruler was obtained on the Instrument of Accession.[33] Thus the fate of the Kashmiris–more than seventy-five per cent of them Muslims–was settled not in accordance with popular demand but in pursuance of the expansionist policy of India. In October 1947, Pakistan’s armed forces were in a formative phase. Later, when the Pakistan Army was somewhat more organized, it prevented the Indian advance and forced India to seek a ceasefire. An editorial in The Times had this comment to make:

The course of events in Kashmir and Kathiawar [i.e. Junagadh] is steadily imperiling good relations between the Indian Union and Pakistan. Of the two Dominions . . . [Indian] action . . . seems . . . sheer exploitation of superior forces.[34]

            The practical manifestation of the concept of Akhand Bharat does not end with the Indian occupation of Hyderabad, Junagadh and Kashmir. India has had border conflicts with China, which led to the Sino–Indian War of October 1962; Indian armed forces occupied the Portuguese colony of Goa (1961) and the state of Sikkim (1975); they were enthusiastically sent to Sri Lanka in 1987, after a skewed Indo–Sri Lankan Accord was signed on 29 July1987. India withdrew its forces after about three years under the intense pressure of the Sri Lankan Government. It is in pursuance of its policy of Akhand Bharat that India continues to occupy Kashmir on one pretext or the other and not in accordance with the will of the people.

Pakistan seems to have reconciled itself to the forcible occupation of princely states and territories by India, except the State of Jammu and Kashmir. It is difficult for Pakistan to barter Kashmir away, against the dictates of geography, economy, ethnicity, religion and, above all, against the imperatives of its own security and survival.

Kashmir: A Stumbling Block to Peace

Since independence, Pakistan–India relations have revolved mainly around the issue of Kashmir. India is defying United Nations resolutions[35] that call for holding a plebiscite under UN auspices to determine “the final disposition of the State of Jammu and Kashmir.” It is in violation of these resolutions and its own commitments that India is continuing its unjust occupation of Kashmir, justifying its actions on various grounds. In 1947, when Indian leaders were demanding division of provinces on a communal basis, they claimed Kashmir for strategic reasons. Now they argue that since they believe in secularism, Kashmir should be theirs, as its accession to Pakistan would have a domino effect in other provinces that face ethnic unrest.

The Indians seem to have forgotten their own history: that it was with their consent that the whole of the subcontinent was partitioned on a communal basis; that it was on their insistence that the Punjab and Assam were bifurcated on a communal basis; that they refused to accept a secular “Free State of Bengal” and instead forced the partition of Bengal on a communal basis. When it comes to Kashmir, they try to wriggle out of their commitments to the UN and the people of Kashmir on the plea of secularism and pluralism–concepts they have rejected in the Punjab, Bengal and Assam.

 It is common knowledge that India maintains approximately half-a-million strong armed forces in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, using them to suppress the voice of the people; in the process, tens of thousands Kashmiris have been killed since 1989 and innumerable atrocities committed. The reports of several human rights organizations bear ample testimony to these violations.

Pakistan views India’s continued occupation of Kashmir as a threat to its security. The strategic northern areas and the vital railroad of Pakistan, linking Lahore-Islamabad-Peshawar, would be both under constant threat from India if it held Kashmir. All the rivers flowing into Pakistan originate in Kashmir. “The shutting off of water supplies to the canals leading to Pakistan in 1948 was indicative of the damage that India could inflict upon Pakistan . . .”[36]

The struggle for freedom that the people of Kashmir have been engaged in for fifty-five years was initially referred to by India as an “insurgency”; later, as “militancy”; now it is referred to as “terrorism”.[37] All these terms are used to mislead international opinion and to disguise the fact of the continued forcible Indian occupation of Kashmir.

Coercive Diplomacy

“India held the pistol at the head of Pakistan, until, in1954, the American alliance delivered the country from that nightmare,” says an Indian writer.[38] India has demonstrated its tendency towards coercive diplomacy time and again threatening to attack Pakistan, confident because of its superiority in resources and armed strength. In 1950, India moved its armed forces to the borders of East Pakistan. The situation was eased as a result of Liaquat Ali Khan’s visit to New Delhi. A declaration, subsequently referred to as Liaquat–Nehru Pact, was issued on 8 April 1950. Again, in 1951, there was a concentration of Indian troops on the ceasefire line in Kashmir. Both governments traded accusations of aggression, but eventually the tension subsided.

In August 1965, India and Pakistan clashed in Kashmir. Instead of limiting the conflict to the disputed territory of Kashmir, India escalated it and its forces crossed the international border on 6 September 1965 and a full-fledged war began. The intervention of the USA and the USSR made a ceasefire possible; in January 1966, the Tashkent agreement was concluded, restoring the status quo ante and requiring both countries to abjure the use of force to settle their disputes.

India flouted the Tashkent Declaration and the UN Charter again in 1971. Internal fighting and an insurgency in East Pakistan caused thousands of refugees to enter India. The then President of the United Sates, Richard Nixon, assured Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi of the American “intention to continue to carry the main financial burden for care of the refugees.”[39] But India did not wish to miss this opportunity to dismember Pakistan through the use of its military might. Like her father, Jawaharlal Nehru, Indira Gandhi also believed with great fervour in India’s role of leadership and predominance over the other states of South Asia.

In April 1984, in a clandestine move Indian forces occupied the Siachin Glacier in violation of the Tashkent Declaration (1966) requiring the settlement of “disputes through peaceful means”, and the Simla Agreement (1972), which barred both countries from unilaterally altering the Line of Control in Kashmir. India took advantage of the fact that there was no physical demarcation of the border at Siachin. The armed forces of both countries are still engaged in conflict on the highest battlefield in the world.

In 1999, Pakistan retaliated and occupied the Kargil peaks, which were part of Azad Kashmir according to the cease-fire line drawn in 1949, but were taken by India during the 1971 war. Pakistan’s purpose apparently was to dislodge Indian troops from Siachin, as the Kargil peaks dominate the Srinagar-Leh highway through which India supplies its troops on the Siachin Glacier. The intervention of the United States led to the withdrawal of Pakistani forces from the Kargil peaks but Indian troops continue to occupy Siachin.

In 2002, soon after an alleged terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament–which Pakistan forcefully condemned–India moved the bulk of its forces to the borders of Pakistan and Kashmir and remained there for ten months in an aggressive posture. Ari Fleischer, a White House spokesman, speaking on 20 December 2002 about the situation between India and Pakistan said:

[T]he tension reached alarming levels . . . As a result of the intervention of the President, the Secretary of State, and numerous leaders around the world including [Russian] President [Vladimir] Putin and [British] Prime Minister [Tony] Blair, there is now a markedly diminished point of tension.[40]

            What was the Indian objective? The identity of those who assailed the Indian Parliament is not known as all of them were killed. It is surprising that the so-called “trained terrorists” were not able to damage any part of the building; nor were they able to harm any of the legislators who, it is claimed, were their target. Recently, the Supreme Court of India arrested three Kashmiris (including a professor living in Delhi), accusing them of planning the attack. There were demonstrations in Srinagar against the sentences awarded to them. If Indian nationals were responsible, how was Pakistan involved. Whatever the truth maybe, immediately after the incident the Indian Prime Minister levelled the allegation that Pakistan was responsible for the attack, stating: “Yeh larai ab aar-par ki larai hai” (this will be a fight to the last).[41] As is the pattern with India, Pakistan was blamed even before any inquiry was initiated, let alone concluded.

The reported crime might well have been the work of the Indian intelligence agency, Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), in an attempt to forge a case of terrorism against Pakistan. It could have been an attack carried out by the Taliban or Al Qaeda, against whom India was actively supporting the Northern Alliance.[42] It may have been intended to put a strain on Pakistan’s economy. Perhaps the purpose was to find an excuse to suppress the Kashmiris’ struggle for self-determination.

According to Pakistan’s former Chief of Army Staff, General (retired) Mirza Aslam Beg, the objective was “to seek strategic relations with the US, force Pakistan to change [its] stand on Kashmir, to test [the] nuclear capability of Pakistan and to compel [the] Pakistan Army to control religious elements.”[43] In the opinion of Pakistan’s High Commissioner in India, the allegation was meant to provide an excuse for India to cross the Line of Control and destroy the terrorist training camps allegedly being run by Pakistan.[44] In any case, the amassing of troops by India on Pakistan borders was an extension of coercive diplomacy.

It is possible that the attack on the Indian Parliament was devised in order to start a fourth war against Pakistan: the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) indicated this possibility.[45] The Indians had already expressed their intention of starting a war: immediately after the explosion of their nuclear devices, Indian Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee, warned that his country was a “nuclear weapons state” and would not hesitate to use the bomb if attacked, and that they had “the capacity for a big bomb now.”[46] The Union Home Minister of India, L. K. Advani, told Pakistan that a “qualitatively new stage in Indo-Pak relations had been brought about by the country [India] becoming a nuclear weapons state.”[47] Union Minister for Parliamentary Affairs and Tourism, Madanlal Khurana, said, “India was ready to fight a fourth war with Pakistan.”[48] BJP’s Vice-President and spokesman, K. L. Sharma, was quoted as saying that if Pakistan continued its “anti-India” policy, “Pakistan should be prepared for India’s wrath.”[49] The president of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (an ally of the BJP), Ashok Singhal, termed the nuclear tests “Hindu revivalism”; he said that, “a war would be a better step to teach Pakistan a lesson”.[50]

To back up its coercive diplomacy, India is increasing its armed strength. In addition to bulk purchases of military hardware from Russia,[51] India is reported to have been offered a “lavish range of hardware, including F-16 fighter jets . . . technology transfers and joint ventures”,[52] by the US company, Lockheed Martin Aeronautics. India is expected to purchase six Scorpene SKK submarines from France, valued at $ 1.8 billion, as well as 18 Mirage2000H fighter planes; the remaining 108 planes are to be built indigenously by India at an estimated cost of $ 8 billion.[53] Israel is supplying sophisticated weapons and technology to India worth more than two billion dollars.[54] The Indian purchase of an aircraft carrier, its plans to build one indigenously, and its acquiring nuclear-powered submarines is part of a “strategy to build a blue-water navy capable of projecting power beyond Indian shores.”[55]

Moorthy Muthuswamy, a US-based nuclear physicist and a director of the Indian American Intellectuals Forum, a New York-based organization, summarizes Indian coercive thought: “India is no longer defendable and is almost ungovernable. It must take the war to the enemy both outside [Pakistan and Bangladesh] and inside [minorities].”[56] The Indian “Army wants war, but [the] US and Pakistan’s nuclear capability make the government favour coercive diplomacy,” says an article in Outlook India of 27 May 2002.

Isolating and Encircling Pakistan

The Indian policy of isolating, encircling, weakening and coercing Pakistan into a subordinate position is not new: it dates back to the time when Pakistan had not yet been established. In May 1947, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru requested Lord Mountbatten to make it obligatory for the new states (i.e., Pakistan and the Indian Union), once power was transferred, not to align themselves with any outside state or power. According to Mountbatten, Pandit Nehru was concerned that Pakistan “might be driven, by economic necessity” to align itself with the United States of America.[57] The British Secretary of State for India remarked that the Indian leaders were against Pakistan fortifying itself with outside assistance from Britain, America or any other country.[58] Even today, Indian leaders are pursuing the same policy: Nehru’s “Monroe Doctrine” for South Asia, aimed at establishing Indian hegemony over the region.

The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) was established in 1985 “for promoting peace, stability, amity and progress . . . and peaceful settlement of all disputes.”[59] One of the reasons that this organization has not made much headway is the structural imbalance amongst SAARC countries, i.e., the disparity between the size and resources of India and those of the other member states. The reason the last meeting of SAARC, scheduled for January 2003, was postponed was “India’s hegemonic policies and its constant bid to isolate Islamabad.”[60] In fact, India wants to “construct new regional associations based on economic ties”, excluding Pakistan. Thus, India wishes to “benefit from regionalism without allowing Pakistan to benefit” and to “further isolate Pakistan from other South Asian States.”[61]

India is encircling Pakistan on all sides, in a manner similar to the US encirclement of the USSR during the Cold War. It is partly in this perspective that India has demonstrated its eagerness to develop friendly relations with all the states adjoining Pakistan, namely, China, Russia, the Central Asian States, Afghanistan and Iran. Initially, India had established close ties with China, but these were strained due to the Sino–Indian border dispute. Now, in a bid to create a multi-polar world, relations between the two countries are improving. Premier Zhu Rongi visited India in January 2002 and reciprocated India’s desire for friendship.[62] In a recent visit to China, on 24 June 2003, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee signed a Joint Declaration on “comprehensive co-operation” between the two countries.

India has maintained close links with the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and since the breakup of the USSR, with Russia. Since 1965, about 75 per cent of the arms imported by India have come from the former Soviet Union. The climax of Indo–Soviet relations was reached in 1971 with the signing of the Indo–Soviet Treaty of Friendship.[63] It was in collaboration with that great power that India fought its 1971 war to dismember Pakistan.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, India has been striving to develop cordial relations with the Central Asian states adjacent to Pakistan. This is reflected in India’s signing of a treaty on the “Principles of Inter-State Co-operation” with Uzbekistan, and a “Declaration on Principles and Direction of Co-operation” with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. Besides, India has given “credit of US $20 million each to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan; US $15million to Turkmenistan, and US $5 million each to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.”[64] As a result of these growing ties, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan supported India’s entry into the Shanghai Co-operation Organization (SCO), a group that includes Russia, China and the Central Asian states; they also voiced support for a permanent seat for New Delhi in the UN Security Council.[65]

Since independence, India has successfully fostered closer ties with all those elements in Afghanistan who are against Pakistan, for whatever reason. In the case of Iran, India has recently managed to develop a very warm relationship. The President of Iran, Mohammad Khatami, was the Chief Guest at the Independence Day celebrations in India on 26 January 2003. A week before his visit, a defence pact between the two countries was signed by the Indian Naval Chief and the Iranian Defence Minister in Tehran.[66] “The Indo-Iran pact had shifted the strategic balance in South Asia and looked very much like an encirclement of Pakistan by India, putting Islamabad under overwhelming pressure.”[67] An Indian source has visualized the accord as giving India “the right to use Iranian military bases in the event of a war with neighbouring Pakistan, in exchange for India providing Tehran with military hardware, training, maintenance and modernization support.” In addition, an Indian Defence Ministry spokesman said, “Iran is very important for us in view of geopolitics . . . India will get a credible gateway to Central Asia.”[68] Indian defence co-operation with Iran may have an adverse impact on its relations with the US, but alliance with Iran will play an important role in the Indian policy of isolating and encircling Pakistan.

As mentioned earlier, India was “a virtual Soviet ally” during the Cold War, due to its extensive military reliance on Moscow. During the latter part of 1950s, “US-Indian relations became seriously strained on the Goa issue.”[69] However, after the Sino–Indian conflict (1962), relations improved and the US resumed military assistance to India.[70] At the present point in time, Washington finds Delhi a “durable partner”. The US Ambassador to India said, “The catalogue of intensified cooperation now included diplomatic collaboration, counter-terrorism, counter proliferation, defence and military-to-military teamwork, exchange of intelligence and law enforcement.”[71]

In a nutshell, India wishes to weaken Pakistan’s linkages with its traditional allies, its neighbours and its potential friends. Ian Stephens, former editor of The Statesman, Calcutta, is of the opinion that “a cardinal underlying purpose” of Indian foreign policy is “to keep her smaller neighbour weak and isolated for eventual absorption.”[72]

Strengthen Pakistan

To counter India’s hegemonic designs, Pakistan must strengthen itself, despite its disadvantages of size and resources. It cannot afford continuing confrontation and enmity with India. It has already suffered: in 1971, it lost its eastern wing and the majority of its population, due partly to its own faults but also because of Indian aggression. In the 1990s, on an average, Pakistan spent about five per cent of its annual GDP on its military, as against India, which spent around two per cent.[73] A projected comparison between India and Pakistan during the year 2003 is as follows:[74]

In spite of the disparity in their respective resources, Pakistan cannot accept Indian hegemony or its expansionist policy. “Every nation big or small has its honour and dignity,” said President Pervez Musharraf in his breakfast meeting with journalists in Agra on 16 July 2001.[75] Pakistan has to persevere with a two-pronged strategy: firstly, to strengthen itself internally; and secondly, to pursue a proactive foreign policy. A close nexus between internal strength and external relations is essential in ensuring the security of a nation.

Pakistan should be able to stand on its feet with dignity. It has shown improvement in the domain of macroeconomics and should now endeavour to increase its GDP growth from 5.1 per cent to something like that of China’s, i.e., about 8 to 9 per cent. This requires competitive scientific, technological and industrial capability, which in turn requires human development. The maximum possible funds should be made available for this purpose; meticulous planning and efficient utilization of resources will ensure progress.

In both India and Pakistan, vested interests deliberately misinterpret the two-nation theory of the AIML. What the AIML was advocating was that people of all religions living in Muslim-majority areas (now Pakistan and Bangladesh) would form a separate nation-state or states; and that all peoples, irrespective of their religion, living in Hindu-majority areas would form another nation-state (Hindustan). National unity and harmony among all Pakistanis, irrespective of their religion, caste or creed–as advocated by the Quaid-i-Azam in his speech to the Constituent Assembly on 11 August 1947[76]–is essential. This is possible through broad-based education, liberalism, strengthening the democratic process and establishing the rule of law.

Pakistan cannot enter into an arms race with India, but it should continue to maintain a credible level of nuclear deterrence and conventional preparedness to serve as a shield against aggression. Pakistan could benefit from the example of Israel, which maintains a well-trained and well-equipped regular force as well as a large reserve force that can be quickly mobilized during an emergency.

In foreign affairs, besides strengthening ties with its traditional allies, China and the United States, Pakistan should seek better relations with the European Union. Besides, instead of depending on assistance solely from western countries (which often impose sanctions), it should also look east for more dependable allies. The Russian attitude towards Pakistan is based on its resentment of the role Pakistan has played against the USSR during the Cold War, and in supporting the Afghan resistance to Soviet occupation. This perhaps is the reason why Russia supports “Indian hegemonic ambitions in the region.”[77] President Musharraf’s last visit to Russia did contribute towards assuaging their fears about Pakistan. It should be followed up because it is in the interest of Russia to have good relations with countries to its south, including Pakistan.

Efforts should be made to strengthen the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) and the Economic Co-operation Organization (ECO). To ensure better interaction amongst ECO countries, a communications network is an important prerequisite and must be given due consideration. Pakistan should also improve bilateral relations with all Muslim countries, especially those in its neighbourhood, such as Iran, Afghanistan, as well as those that are important in the global scenario such as Turkey, Egypt and Saudi Arabia (the OIC headquarters being located in the lattermost). The President of Iran, Mohammad Khatami, has already visited Pakistan (24-26 December 2002) and, in a joint communiqué, called for “enhanced strategic cooperation with Islamabad”; he proposed the enhancement of co-operation in all fields: political, defence, economic, commercial, cultural, and science and technology.[78]

Pakistan should actively seek closer ties with the newly independent states of Central Asia for co-operative economic security measures, especially as each of them is within range of Indian missiles. The signing of an agreement in Ashkabad on 27 December 2002 between Pakistan, Afghanistan and Turkmenistan for an oil and gas pipeline to Pakistan is an encouraging sign.  Pakistan should work towards the building of an Iran-Pak-India gas pipeline as well: Iran appears to be keen on the venture, though India is reluctant. These pipelines will promote peace and stability in the region besides giving a boost to the economy by meeting increasing energy needs in the foreseeable future.

Pakistan should strive to maintain, improve and strengthen brotherly relations with all SAARC countries. The ‘policy of bilateralism has failed in establishing an environment of peace and understanding’ in South Asia and SAARC is ‘a hopeful step’ towards achieving peace and security in the region.[79]

Strive for Détente with India

India will always have an ambivalent attitude towards Pakistan. If Pakistan submits to its wishes, India expresses its goodwill; if Pakistan demands justice in Kashmir, India will vilify Pakistan, and level several allegations–including that of terrorism–against it. The Muslim vision that the partitioning of the subcontinent would bring peace and security to the region seems an unattainable dream. However, efforts in the right direction should continue.

 Both India and Pakistan should learn from history. Through the centuries, the subcontinent was attacked and dominated by outside forces, i.e., the Aryans, Persians, Greeks, Sakas, Yue-chis (Kushans), Huns, Arabs, Turks and British. These invasions were made possible by the lack of unity amongst the people of the subcontinent.

Both India and Pakistan should be pragmatic and address the underlying causes of conflict and tension, with the intention of establishing a durable peace. India must renounce any notion it harbours of dismembering Pakistan. Whilst Pakistan cannot accept Indian hegemony, it should recognize the pre-eminence of India in South Asia because of its size and resources. Indian hegemony would imply that all states in South Asia are subordinated to India, whereas pre-eminence would simply mean primus inter pares.

India and Pakistan can learn much from the erstwhile Cold War. The United States and the USSR wasted about forty years before coming to the conclusion that they could not afford to be enemies. Europe also provides an example: the European states have, historically, fought amongst themselves; now, they are endeavouring to forge some kind of unity on the basis of equality. Since 1871, French foreign policy was dominated by ensuring its security against her powerful neighbour, Germany. The two countries fought over the territories of Alsace-Lorraine and Saar for almost a century, but eventually resolved their disputes amicably and established cordial relations. Nuclear weapons have brought an end to fighting in western Europe. Similarly, these weapons can help India and Pakistan in maintaining peace. Nuclearization demands maturity and responsibility.

India should realize that it can no longer pursue hegemonic or supremacist policies because of the world becoming a global village with little space for regional overlords. It should dispense with the notion that if the US can bombard Afghanistan or launch a pre-emptive strike against Iraq, so India, as the largest and strongest state in the region, can also act unilaterally. Seeking cover of the US doctrine of pre-emption, countries like India “are behaving more unilaterally.”[80] This is a dangerous omen for peace. The alternative course is for all countries in the region to co-operate with each other. India, being the biggest country, should “take the initiative to call for and work jointly with all the other states to make this region ‘a zone of peace’.”[81]

 South Asia is a strategically important region of the world. If its leaders show maturity and wisdom, it can benefit immensely and establish its prominent place in the global village. It must be realized that peace and security are in the supreme national interest of both India and Pakistan, and that to achieve peace and security, the resolution of all outstanding issues–including the Kashmir dispute–is essential. If we behave irresponsibly and do not demonstrate the necessary maturity, outside powers are likely to benefit at the expense of both countries. They will play the Indian or Pakistani card at will to further their objectives and interests. The strategic and economic interests of both states would be better served if they pursue a policy of peace and friendship towards each other. Jawaharlal Nehru’s observation is very pertinent:

India and Pakistan cannot help playing an important role in Asia . . . If India and Pakistan follow a contrary policy and are opposed to each other, they will obviously be neutralizing each other and cannot play the role . . . conflict and wasteful effort will wipe us out from the face of the earth.[82]

It might be argued that communal disharmony is the root cause affecting the development of relations between the two countries. Theoretically, the Indian constitution ensures equality of all citizens, as do Quaid-i-Azam’s inaugural address to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan and, later, the Constitution of Pakistan in this country.  But is equality seen in practice in either country? Hindu nationalism (Hindutva) and Muslim extremism are to be blamed for the continuing communal unrest. Recently, President Musharraf offered to join hands with India to fight extremism;[83] the Indian response is awaited.

            Two approaches can be taken for overcoming mutual antagonism. One is for the smaller, weaker nation to accept the domination of the other and submit to its dictates. This approach will lead to perpetual resentment. The second approach is that the larger nation should discard its mantle of superiority, shed its hegemonic designs, and create an atmosphere of mutual respect. The second is a more pragmatic approach in inter-state relations and should be acceptable to all.

Resolving the Kashmir Dispute

The issue of the accession of the state of Jammu and Kashmir cannot be resolved militarily, nor is the United Nations in a position to enforce its resolutions on Kashmir; nor is India prepared to grant self-determination under UN auspices to the people of Kashmir. India and Pakistan have taken extreme positions. Instead of playing the blame game, both countries should choose the path of peace and remove the cause of the insurgency in Kashmir. Although Pakistan cannot abandon its moral and political support to the Kashmir cause, it should redouble its efforts to stop anyone who wishes to cross the Line of Control. At the same time, India should take all necessary steps to stop human rights violations in Kashmir, violations which have increased during the past twelve years.

 Both countries must seek a modus vivendi on Kashmir. A number of solutions have been proposed and can be worked out. Firstly, there is the UN Security Resolution which calls for a plebiscite in Kashmir under UN auspices. This Resolution was accepted by the Indian representative in the Security Council and by Jawaharlal Nehru.[84] However, it is yet to be implemented.

Secondly, there is the possibility of third-party mediation. Pakistan and India have solved some of their most sensitive disputes through third-party involvement. These include: the determination of the international boundary through the Radcliffe Award (1947); the settlement of the dispute over the distribution of water through the Indus Basin Water Treaty (1962) with the involvement of the World Bank and the Great Powers of the time; resolution of the Rann of Kutch Dispute (1965) through arbitration; the Tashkent Declaration (1966) through the mediation of the President of the USSR, and the Kargil Conflict (1999) with the intervention of the President of the USA. Similarly, the Kashmir dispute could be resolved through a UN mechanism or with the involvement of a neutral country/countries, or individual/individuals such as Nelson Mandela. 

A workable solution can be found by ensuring the face-saving of the political leadership in both countries. Secret negotiations can be held amongst all concerned parties, i.e., the representatives of Pakistan, India, the people of Kashmir (representatives of the Governments of Indian-held Kashmir, Azad Kashmir and the All Parties Hurriyat Conference), supervised or facilitated by representatives from Russia and China (as neighbouring countries), and the USA, the only superpower. The solution thus arrived at should be enforced in the interest of the future prosperity of the people of Kashmir and of the subcontinent as a whole.

 If the models of the Camp David Peace Treaty (1979) or the Oslo Peace Accord (1993) are not considered suitable, a multi-party solution on the lines of the Belfast Agreement (1998) should be considered. The opening paragraph of the Agreement says:

The two Governments [the Governments of the UK and of Ireland] (i) recognize the legitimacy of whatever choice is freely exercised by a majority of the people of Northern Ireland with regard to its status whether they prefer to continue to support the Union with Great Britain or a sovereign united Ireland; recognize that it is for the people of the island of Ireland alone . . . [85]

            The Chinese approach also bears consideration: they are patiently waiting for the resolution of the status of Taiwan at an appropriate time. New Delhi and Beijing are seeking to resolve their problems including the Himalayan border dispute peacefully through bilateral negotiations.

The problem with the bilateral approach between India and Pakistan is that India believes that the best way to strike a peace deal is through Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) and enhanced trade ties, while Kashmir is kept on the back burner.[86] (Incidentally, India initiated the first trade cut-off in 1949.)[87] On the other hand, Pakistan feels that without the settlement of the Kashmir issue, there can be no real friendship between the two countries. A sane approach would be for both countries to start bilateral talks on all issues raised by either side.

President Musharraf’s four-step mechanism[88] is worthy of consideration: the first step is to keep the dialogue between the leaders of the two countries alive; step two should be the acceptance that Kashmir is the main issue to be resolved; step three would be to look at all possible solutions to the Kashmir problem and agree on which ones can be mutually discarded as unworkable. The fourth step would be to go on to further discussion with a view to arriving at some reasonable solution acceptable to all parties concerned.

There have been Government initiatives in the past. From the inception of the two states, their Presidents and Prime Ministers have met time and again but they have been unable to make any headway so far as the Kashmir dispute is concerned. Recently, Prime Minister Vajpayee visited Lahore (1999) and President Musharraf went to Agra (2001). There was no substantive progress made and the opportunities for reconciliation were squandered. The political parties, leaders and governments in both countries have their own agenda–their vested interests and the lure of popularity amongst the masses–in keeping the Kashmir dispute alive. As a consequence, after more than half a century, we are nowhere near a solution.

 An alternative course is people-to-people contact, which is minimal at present. This is possible if both countries are liberal in granting visas to intellectuals, journalists, sportsmen and the tourists. A former Indian Prime Minister, Inder Kumar Gujral, promoted the idea of people-to-people relations. According to him, “the civil society in all countries has come of age”, and that there were “extremely good relations between the Indian and Pakistani people.”[89] Fortunately, in both countries there is no dearth of people who desire amity and peace and resolution of all disputes. Such people can promote goodwill on both sides of the international border and the Line of Control. They should attempt to influence their governments and media to exercise maximum restraint and avoid acrimonious rhetoric against each other.

Positive Trends

There are some positive indications. Recently, in February 2003, the BJP’s anti-Pakistan oratory did not work in the elections in Himachal Pradesh as it had in Gujarat. On 20 February 2003, Prime Minister Vajpayee ruled out the possibility of war with Pakistan and, two months later on 18 April, he announced his readiness for a dialogue to settle “all issues”. Encouraged by this, Pakistan’s Prime Minister spoke to Vajpayee on 28 April, breaking the 18-month-old deadlock; on 5 May, Prime Minister Jamali announced a number of confidence-building measures. President Pervez Musharraf and Foreign Minister Kasuri have been insisting for a dialogue with India.  It seems even the conservative opposition leaders are of the same view. On 1 March 2003, the Jamaat-i-Islami Chief, Qazi Hussain Ahmed, stated his preference for normalization of relations with India rather than “submitting to the dictates of the US.”

Earlier, both countries have offered “no-war pacts” and “joint defence” to each other. For instance, in April 1947, Quaid-i-Azam had pleaded for a common defence policy between India and Pakistan, but the INC did not respond.[90] Again, on 11 March 1948, he said:

[I]t is of vital importance to Pakistan and India as independent sovereign states to collaborate in a friendly way jointly to defend their frontiers both on land and sea against any aggression. But this depends entirely on whether Pakistan and India can resolve their own differences.[91]

In March 1949, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Liaquat Ali Khan, suggested an offensive–defensive alliance. Later the same year, Pandit Nehru proposed a no-war pact. In March 1956, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Chaudhry Muhammad Ali,  and President Ziaul Haq in September 1981 made similar offers.[92] On 17 July 1959, President Ayub Khan had offered joint defence but Prime Minister Nehru had rejected the suggestion with the remark, “Defence against whom?”[93] Prior to the Agra Summit on 14-16 July 2001, President Musharraf proposed a no-war pact, but India rejected the suggestion out of hand.[94]

The principal reason why these proposals have made no headway is the lingering Kashmir dispute. This dispute needs to be dealt with in a progressive and humanistic way, even if that approach involves a fundamental shift in strategies. On 20 December 2000, Prime Minister Vajpayee made a statesmanlike offer, saying, “We shall not traverse solely on the beaten track of the past. Instead we shall be bold and innovative designers of a future architecture of peace and prosperity for the entire South Asian region.”

The US President and other world leaders have shown interest in the peace process. They have asked the two countries to resume a dialogue and have offered their assistance, should it be required. On 26 January 2003, while addressing the World Economic Forum in Davos (Switzerland), US Secretary of State, Colin L. Powell, said, “[I]it is crucial that they both take risks for peace on the subcontinent and work to normalize their relations.” Referring to US efforts to reduce tensions between India and Pakistan in 2002, he said, “The United Sates has extended a helping hand to both India and Pakistan; we stand ready to do so again.”[95] Most important of all, there is no dearth of enlightened and peace-loving people in both countries: they are raising their voices calling for closer relations and resolution of disputes peacefully through dialogue.

Conclusion

The present conflict between India and Pakistan is a legacy of the past. Since independence, India has been pursuing an expansionist, hegemonic policy, occupying several territories–including the state of Jammu and Kashmir–through military force. Some Indian politicians want their country to follow in the footsteps of an imperialist power.[96] But “India is destined to be compared with Pakistan until it can accommodate Islamabad or Pakistan ‘withers away’,” writes Stephen P. Cohen.[97] Since the latter idea will not bear consideration, there are little chances of peace between these two countries unless the Indian Government discards its pseudo-imperialistic designs and deals with Pakistan fairly and on an equal footing. Peace lies in discarding hegemonic designs, abandoning the politics of hatred and hostility, having faith in fundamental human rights, and accepting the internationally-recognized principles of tolerance, justice and equity. Otherwise, the consequences are bound to be disastrous. As Pandit Nehru rightly observed: “The conflict [between India and Pakistan] will wipe us out from the face of the earth.” [98]n