Imtiaz H. Bokhari* 

 

he world was still learning the rules of the game of a unipolar international order, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, when the events of 11 September 2001 (9/11) changed the game itself. The touchstone of this new game, as determined by President Bush, was that either “you are with us, or against us”. This worldview divided the world into black and white, ignoring the numerous shades of grey. No region of the world has been so profoundly affected by this American unilateralism in its foreign policy and pre-emption in its security policy as the Persian Gulf.

Writing shortly before the onset of American attack on Iraq, Robert Kagan viewed the second Gulf War in imperialistic terms, demonstrating a historical pattern. He described American operations and US penetration into the Persian Gulf and the Middle East as “the sixth American expansion.”[1] What are the driving forces behind this expansion? From the public pronouncements of the Bush administration, the following reasons can be deduced for their attack on Iraq: one, to eliminate Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD); two, to “liberate” the Iraqi people from Saddam’s brutal regime and to establish a liberal democratic order; and three, to facilitate the US in its fight against international terrorism. From the United States’ perspective, these were eminently worthy objectives for invading Iraq and had the support of the American people.

            There is, however, a group of critics who strongly argue that these Wilsonian ideals in support of the “sixth expansion” are a cover for the neo-conservative agenda of the Bush administration. In their opinion, of this group, “It’s the oil, stupid”, and empire, which are the main motives behind the American policy in the Greater Middle East region.[2]

This paper attempts to analyse these two sets of competing arguments regarding the American policy and to reflect on their international and regional implications.

 

The Bush Administration’s Logic

There is a need to evaluate each of the three arguments put forward by the Bush administration, supposedly providing the rationale for the American attack on Iraq. 

Weapons of Mass Destruction

There are many contradictions in United States’ policy on the question of Saddam’s WMD. During the Iran–Iraq war of the 1980s, the United States not only permitted their acquisition by Saddam, they actively assisted him in their employment against the Iranian people and troops. During that war: 

The Department of Defense, then headed by Caspar Weinberger, provided Iraq with secret satellite data on Iranian military positions. This information was provided to Saddam even though United States leaders were informed by senior State Department officials on November 1, 1983 that the Iraqis were using chemical weapons against the Iranians “almost daily”; they were also aware that United States satellite data could be used by Baghdad to pinpoint chemical weapons attacks on Iranian positions. Cheney, who succeeded Weinberger as secretary of defense in 1989, continued the practice of supplying Iraq with secret intelligence data.[3] 

Major decision-makers in the administration of President George W. Bush, including Vice President Cheney and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, were important voices during the Reagan era and none of them was a conscientious objector to the American role in Saddam’s use of chemical weapons. In fact, Saddam’s use of chemical weapons against his own Kurdish population, in which thousands of innocent people, including women and children died, hardly provoked a serious protest by the United States. At that time, Saddam was considered by the Americans as “my enemy’s enemy”.

            Apparently, Saddam Hussein had put an end to the acquisition of WMD capabilities and destroyed his stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons after the Gulf War of 1990-1. However, the Iraqi people continued to suffer sanctions for a decade, during which period, children were the worst-affected section of the population. If WMD are such an important determinant of American foreign policy, then how can the United States explain its North Korea policy? The perception is growing–even within the United States and the United Kingdom–that WMD as the basis for the decision to invade Iraq was, at best, made on very weak evidence and, at worst, was made in bad faith. Apparently the decision to invade Iraq had been made soon after 9/11; had the UN monitoring mission under Hans Blix been given the opportunity to complete its task and submit a report that there were no WMD, it would have deprived President Bush of the most potent argument for an offensive already decided upon.[4] Therefore, the UN mission had to be prevented from completing its mission. The rest is history. 

“Regime Change” for Promoting Democracy

Certainly, Saddam’s Iraq was not the only undemocratic country in the world, needing to be put on the road to enlightenment, with hundreds of thousands of American troops and tens or hundreds of billions of dollars required for  conquest, reconstruction, and re-engineering of the politico-social institutions of Iraq. It was the same Saddam whose victory over Iran was ensured by the United States through active naval co-operation,[5] and now, regime change was inevitable to “liberate” the Iraqis. Saddam Hussein had committed much greater sins during the 1980s, when he was a de facto ally of the United States which was fighting his war, than the sins he committed during the 1990s, for which his head was being demanded.

            Apart from this serious contradiction, the question is: can democracy be planted through force of arms? Can the United States commit so many troops and such huge resources for promoting democracy wherever it is needed? Obviously not.  Even if the United States could afford the price, the invasion of Iraq for the reason of regime change can be sustained neither on moral grounds nor legally justified.

 

Fight against International Terrorism

In November 1983, the United States removed Iraq from the list of “nations that support international terrorism”[6] and Donald Rumsfeld, as a special representative of President Ronald Reagan, personally conveyed this good news to Saddam Hussein. However, after 9/11, Saddam was accused of lending support to international terrorism–a justification for the attack in March 2003. No concrete evidence has been provided so far to the international community by intelligence agencies of the United States or the United Kingdom, linking Baghdad with Al Qaeda and its leader, Osama bin Laden. In fact, the contrary may be nearer the truth. The Report of the independent commission headed by Senator Pat Roberts (R-Kansas), investigating the 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center in New York, has stated that there is “no credible evidence that Iraq and Al-Qaeda cooperated in attacks against the United States.”[7]

            Contrary to their stated objective, the presence of American troops in the Persian Gulf region, particularly in Saudi Arabia, directly contributed to the increase of terrorist acts aimed at American interests and targets. Now, the presence of American troops scattered throughout Iraq provides a large number of targets to those determined to hit them, as well as those seen as their allies. Too close an association of the royal family with the United States may have contributed to the rise of anti-royal sentiment and the recent spate of terrorist activities in Saudi Arabia.

            It is difficult to believe that the United States could not have foreseen that their attack on Iraq could lead to an increase, not a decrease, in acts of terrorism against them. So an attack on Iraq must have had an objective beyond merely fighting international terrorism. 

The Competing Paradigm

On the basis of the foregoing analysis, those who viewed the Bush administration’s rationale for attacking Iraq with scepticism, did so on strong grounds. They argued that the main reasons for the operation were oil and geopolitics.
 

“It’s the Oil, Stupid!”

Johnny Angel has asserted that, “Oil has been the prime mover behind any and every political decision in that region since the First World War, when trucks, tanks and planes replaced horses and camels”.[8] It was Winston Churchill who first recognized the importance of oil as a strategic resource in 1912, when he ordered the conversion of battleship engines to oil from coal, as ships using oil were faster than those using coal and, in combat, speed is a vital advantage. Protecting key sources of oil and denying them to the Central Powers became one of Britain’s major strategic objectives in the First World War.

Since then, for many states oil has become a major strategic resource of such importance that it is a matter of national security, closely linked to national survival and well being, to the extent that the use of force to protect it is considered justifiable. “The national security of the United States depends on the reliable supply of energy to support our needs”, declared Representative Henry J. Hyde (R-Illinois) at a June 2002 hearing on United States’ oil requirements.[9] He further noted that, “Any interruption in the flow of oil will be considered a vital threat to the national security–and, if such interruption is engendered by the actions of a hostile state or guerrilla group, could be cited as a casus belli, a cause for war.” This position of the United States is not new.[10] It can also be seen as a mere restatement of the Carter Doctrine of 23 January 1980 when, in the wake of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, President Carter stated that any effort by a hostile power to obstruct the flow of Persian Gulf oil to the West would constitute a threat to America’s “vital interests and would be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.”[11]

            Oil is as important for sustaining the life style of the industrialized West as blood is to the human body. It is impossible to imagine the impact of a substantial reduction in oil supply to the West, where people consider their energy-dependent life style a matter of right. It is hard to imagine the consequences of a widespread, routine, or prolonged breakdown of oil supplies. Some of the world’s known major reservoirs have already peaked. It took nature almost 570 million years to create oil in the subterranean reservoirs, which we are likely to burn off in about 100 to 150 years. Disruption in the energy supply may be taken as an opportunity to effect structural changes in the energy sector, which powers so many of the things we take for granted.

Persian Gulf: “Swimming” in Oil

During the Second World War, the United States provided six out of the seven billion barrels of oil that the Allies consumed from its oil fields along the Gulf of Mexico and in its south-west region.. Realizing the role oil was to play in the future, President Roosevelt sent America’s most eminent geologist, Everette Lee DeGolyer, to the Middle East to seek an answer to the fundamental question: how important are the Persian Gulf oil reserves to the future of the world? His answer was startling: The centre of gravity of world oil production is shifting from the Gulf [of Mexico]–Caribbean area to the Middle East area, and is likely to continue to shift until it is firmly established in that area.[12] At that time, even Mr DeGolyer may not have fully realized how prophetic his answer was. According to BP Amoco, the Persian Gulf region possesses some 675 billion barrels of oil, that is, almost two-third of known world reserves. The Persian Gulf countries are also the world’s leading producers, jointly accounting for approximately 21 million barrels per day (bbl/d) or about 30 per cent of worldwide production.[13] Perhaps even more significantly, the Persian Gulf countries maintain around 90 per cent of the world excess production capacity, which can be brought on line in case of an oil supply disruption.

According to the Energy Information’s International Energy Outlook 2002, Persian Gulf oil production is expected to reach approximately 30.7  million bbl/d by 2010 and 42.9 million bbl/d by 2020, compared to 21.07 million bbl/d in 2000. This would increase Persian Gulf oil production capacity to 35 per cent of the world total by 2020, up from 28 per cent in 2000.[14] 

US Dependence on Gulf Oil

Historically, energy has been abundant and relatively inexpensive in the United States. Americans consume 70 per cent more energy per capita or per dollar of GDP than do people in most other developed countries. Americans drive bigger cars, travel farther, live in bigger houses, and heat, cool, and light them more than the Europeans. The availability of reliable supplies of cheap energy, especially gasoline, is viewed as a birthright by many Americans. In 2000, Americans spent (directly or indirectly) about $600 billion on energy of all kinds. About 38 per cent of US energy consumption comes from petroleum, 24 per cent from natural gas, 23 per cent from coal, eight per cent from nuclear power, and seven per cent from renewable energy, primarily conventional hydroelectric resources. In 2000, residential consumption accounted for 20 per cent, commercial 17 per cent, industrial 36 per cent, and transportation 27 per cent of the energy consumed.[15] Petroleum imports have steadily increased to the point where the United States now imports about 60 per cent of its petroleum supply from other countries. Many analysts expect petroleum imports to continue to grow to 75 per cent of the total consumption of petroleum by 2020.[16] In the last decade alone, from 1990 to 2000, total energy consumption increased by about 17 per cent.[17] Petroleum imports averaged 10.6 million bbl/d in 2001, to meet a total demand of 19.6 million bbl/d during 2001. The United States gross oil imports from the Persian Gulf showed a slight decline during 2002, to about 2.3 million bbl/d, down from 2.8 million bbl/d in 2001. Overall, the Persian Gulf accounted for about 22 per cent of US net oil imports, and 11 per cent of US oil demand.[18] This is a fairly high degree of dependence. In the years ahead, domestic production in the United States will decrease, while consumption is expected to increase, and the only region which can meet this shortfall is the Persian Gulf region. 

Oil and the US Attack on Iraq

In Professor Klare’s view, it is “oil and empire” that explain the United States’ war on Iraq. American leaders have become increasingly concerned about their country’s growing dependence on imported oil. This increasing “dependency is the Achilles’ heel of American power; unless Persian Gulf oil is kept under American control, the ability of the United States to remain the dominant world power will be put into question.”[19] To ensure continued free access to Gulf oil, the Carter Doctrine had clearly spelled out that United States would not permit a hostile power to achieve a position that allowed it to threaten America’s access to the Gulf.

Another motive behind the American actions is the pivotal role of the Persian Gulf in supplying oil to the rest of the world: whosoever gains control over Persian Gulf oil gets a stranglehold on the world economy. In addition, the United States’ dependence on Saudi Arabia was increasing, and Washington was desperate to find an alternative source.  Iraq’s oil reserves were the only ones that could meet the demand. In Vice President Dick Cheney’s view, Saddam Hussein, with 10 per cent of the world’s oil reserves, large armed forces, and WMD, could threaten his neighbours and clearly move to a position that gave him a stranglehold on the United States’ economy and on most of the other nations of the world as well. This, in essence, was a direct invocation of the Carter Doctrine and the main driving force behind the unilateral American attack on Iraq. 

US Quest for Control over Gulf Oil

It is not so much the American need as it is its greed for oil which is at the root of the problem. Ross Perot, hardly the voice of progressive politics, made the observation in the first presidential debate of 1992 that the “Gulf War was fought solely for control of oil and nothing more.” He further pointed out that it was not worth shedding American blood over something that Saddam would have been glad to sell to the Americans himself.[20] Of course, the Saddams, Sauds, Sabahs, Khalifas, al Nahyans, Khatamis, and Khameneis of the Persian Gulf would all be glad to sell oil to anyone, including the United States. The United States is perhaps not convinced that its need to buy the Gulf oil is exceeded by the Arabs need to sell it. The regimes in the Gulf are more dependent on the sale of oil than the US is on its procurement from them. Then why shed American blood for something that could be available on a commercial basis?

            Apparently, it is not the question of simple access to oil. So vital is this product to matters of national security that direct control is considered necessary. The ever-increasing requirement of imported energy will have a profound and lasting impact on American policy towards the oil-rich Persian Gulf region.  This control over oil gives America a stranglehold over the oil-dependent European and Japanese economies.  In the not-too-distant future, even China and India will fall in the same category. The American grip on the oil jugular stranglehold can be turned into political leverage over most economies of the world, including those endowed with oil wealth. Major countries whose oil taps are controlled by the United States would be vulnerable to political coercion.  The smaller countries would hardly matter in this game of high stakes. The European colonial powers did give something to their colonies but the sole neo-colonial power of today has only taken away and given nothing in return.
 

US and Geopolitics of the Gulf Region

Perhaps oil has drawn too much attention as a determinant of the US Persian Gulf policy to the neglect of some other factors. What has not drawn due attention is the geopolitical content of the decision to attack Iraq. The American military presence in Iraq sends a very powerful message to all neighbouring states who earn and spend hundreds of billions of petro dollars. These states can read the unspoken message in their politico-economic decision-making.

            With its presence in Iraq, the American policy of “dual containment” has been simplified to containment of one country only: Iran. The American presence is not only on Iran’s western borders; in fact, US military forces are deployed on all the three sides of Iran: Afghanistan in the west, Central Asian Republics in the north, and in Iraq in the west. In the south, the fourth side, is the sea, over which the US naval forces reign supreme. Perhaps no other country in the world today is surrounded from all sides by American troops.

            But it is the US presence in Iraq which heavily affects the power calculus in the region. It isolates Iran from Syria and Lebanon and has created uncertainty in Iran about the stability on the border along Kurdish-controlled Iraqi region.  The question of the Kurdish future in Iraq could bring Iran and Turkey, both countries with large Kurd minorities, closer to each other in search of a joint approach to finding a solution to this difficult problem.

            The most profound geopolitical fall-out of the American presence in Iraq is the direct and indirect security it provides to Israel. By taking over Iraq, the United States has eliminated the military threat to Israel from a country which was technically still at war with it. By occupying Iraq, it secured Israel from any hostile action from there. It also prevented Syria and Lebanon from supporting Iran in against any action Israel might decide to take against these two friends of Iran.

The US policy of containment has provided immeasurable security to Israel by its successful scuttling of the Iranian nuclear programme. Through coercive diplomacy, the US has managed to extract an additional protocol from Iran, permitting IAEA intrusive inspections of its nuclear installations and programme. After the pressure exerted on Iran, Libya’s Colonel Muammar Qaddafi has also decided to give up his quest for the nuclear bomb. This has ensured that no country in the Middle East, other than Israel, possesses nuclear weapons.

            The Persian Gulf will now be the centre of gravity of Pax Americana. Bush wants to make the Persian Gulf the “jewel in the crown” of the American empire. 

Trans-Atlantic Divide

One of the important consequences of the American attack on Iraq at the systemic level is the rift it has caused between the United States and its European allies. “It is too soon to tell whether Washington and Brussels will head down the same road as Rome and Constantinople–towards geopolitical rivalry–but the warning signs are certainly present.”[21]  There have been a number of references downplaying the present state of transatlantic relations as a temporary phenomenon, that relations will eventually return to normal as the United States and EU are the largest trading partners and are bound by culture and religion. 

There is also a need to understand what we mean when we say that transatlantic relations will become “normal”, or will remain “unfriendly”.  Those who think that the transatlantic relationship will turn adversarial, like the India–Pakistan “Cold War” will be disappointed, as will those who think of the relationship as it was during the heydays of the 1950s and 1960s, when it was based on the defence of Europe against the Soviet Union. The glue of the Soviet threat that bound the Europeans and Americans together is no longer there. The relationship now needs to be saved from the consequences of American unilateralism. The world has changed profoundly and a new equation, a new relationship is now in the making.

This divergence has been compounded by a perception that the United States was relying primarily on a military instrument to defeat terrorism, rather than focusing on political, diplomatic, and economic measures. The Europeans believed that the United States was failing to address the underlying causes of terrorism. These include the lack of political and economic opportunities in the Muslim world and, very importantly, the US failure to play a more assertive role in addressing the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. The United States’ refusal to challenge the Sharon government remains a source of serious division, even with the key US allies such as the United Kingdom.[22] 

The Challenge of American Intervention in the Persian Gulf: Systemic

Doctrine of Pre-emption

The term “pre-emption” has been explained by Adam Roberts as “preventing an attack by disabling a threatening enemy. It can encompass both anticipatory self-defence (military action against an absolutely imminent threat) and preventing military action (to nip a future threat in the bud).”[23] In the post-1945 period, the right of self-defence has been viewed as a right to act against actual attack. The international community, including the United States, has been opposed to anticipatory self-defence.[24] The 2002 National Security Strategy stated that international jurists often conditioned the “legitimacy of preemption on the existence of an imminent threat–most often a visible mobilization of armies, navies, and air forces preparing to attack.” It went further, justifying a radically different concept of pre-emption: “we must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries.”[25]

            The application of the Bush Doctrine of pre-emption in Iraq has very grave consequences for international relations, as it provides a precedent for major regional states to use force pre-emptively against smaller neighbours, without the existence of an imminent threat. The Bush Doctrine provides a license and justification to powerful states to use force against weaker states in pursuit of their objective of regional hegemony. In their use of force, they will act as the jury, the judge, and the executioner–all three rolled in to one. This obviously has grave implications at the systemic level. 

Unilateralism

The Bush Doctrine has another implication. It provides justification to powerful states to act unilaterally in pursuit of their own national agenda. Unilateralism is more of an arrogance of power, manifested in defying the will of the majority in international politics. Unilateralism or “going it alone”, in pursuit of national interests through the use of force can lead not only to the weakening of international institutions but also of international law. 

Weakening of the United Nations

American pre-emption and unilateralism in Iraq, without the approval of the UN Security Council, has created yet another debate. The United States forcibly cut short the work of Mr Hans Blix, head of UNMOVIC, by demanding withdrawal of UN weapons inspectors from Iraq. Impending military action by the United States obliged the UN Secretary General to recall the commission for their own safety. Obviously, this severely undermined the authority of the UN system as a whole.

            The UN Security Council has the responsibility for the maintenance of international peace. It is supposed to act if, in its opinion, there is a threat to peace. But if it happens to be the most powerful nation of the world, a permanent member of the Security Council, who acts contrary to the letter and spirit of the UN Charter, then the entire UN system would be adversely affected. The United States’ use of force, in spite of opposition in the Security Council, seriously dented its role as the custodian of international peace. 

Consequences of American Intervention in the Persian Gulf: Regional

Military Presence in the Persian Gulf

The American military presence in the Persian Gulf region, particularly in Saudi Arabia, has generated hatred against the Americans and resistance by the people of these nations against their own governments. Saudi Arabia was particularly vulnerable because radical Islamists aroused the anger of the people against them on the basis of presence of “non-Muslims” in the holy land. Others believe that the American soldiers are there for the protection of the ruling class and to suppress the  masses. This perception in itself creates a gulf between the rulers and the ruled. Still others believe that the continued presence of American troops among them would hurt their way of life. A direct consequence of the American military presence has been the rise of militancy and acts of terrorism, aimed at damaging Saudi–US relations.

In Iraq, the Americans are perceived as an occupation force, although the Americans think they came to liberate the Iraqi people from Saddam. The extent of resistance to their presence should leave no doubt in American minds as to which of the two premises is nearer to the truth.
           

Increased Terrorism

One did not need a crystal ball to predict that an attack on Iraq would lead to increased hatred against the United States in the entire Middle East region. The Bush administration has argued at great length that the ouster of Saddam Hussein would be a great success in the war against terrorism. The reason for this is not immediately apparent: if anything, the opposite is true. Replacing Saddam with an American-engineered secular regime will not diminish, but rather fuel the wrath of Islamic extremists. So, this too cannot be accepted as the rationale for the American attack on Iraq.

This leads to another implication of American control over strategic resources that belong to others: it is a recipe for generating increased anti-Americanism.  People will naturally resent someone controlling and benefiting from what rightfully belongs to them.  Obviously, their struggle to regain control over what rightfully belongs to them would be dubbed “terrorism” by the American forces and dealt with as such.   

Economic Effects

Another dimension to American control over oil needs to be considered, as it would lead to direct or indirect influence over the decision-making processes of states under the US control. This would result in reduced European access to those markets for their goods and services.  American multinationals will get preferential treatment and would force out any competition. This has even been enunciated recently by President Bush when he declared that those countries who opposed the American attack on Iraq would not be eligible to participate in contracts for reconstructing that country. At the same time, US oil, conglomerates will exploit the oil wealth, from exploration to distribution. Indeed, oil indeed generates huge wealth. This attitude of the United States has only deepened the impression of exploitation by the neo-colonial power. 
 

Conclusion

The United States’ publicly-stated reasons for invading Iraq–WMD, liberation of the Iraqi people, and fighting international terrorism–were a mere façade to hide their more mundane objectives: oil and empire. Seen in historical terms, it seems a great departure from Wilsonian idealism to crude pragmatism, and from isolationism to world hegemony.

As the world’s greatest military power, the United States relied on its military instrument, not for mere access but for control over the most strategic resource of the world: oil. Through this control over oil supplies, the United States has the jugular of the industrialized countries under its thumb, with immense potential for political leverage.

In geopolitical terms, the American military presence within the Muslim heartland contributes directly to the security of Israel. At the same time, this has resulted in increased anti-American feelings in the entire region. This is what is going to hurt the United States and its regional allies, long after the foreign troops leave the area. The American propensity to ‘go it alone’ on the basis of its military power has dented the Atlantic Alliance as well as weakened the United Nations system. It has set a precedent for unilateralism, which has serious implications for weak and small states. The international system has yet to find an answer to the basic question: who will guard international peace if the guardians themselves turn into violators?