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IPRI PAPER
ISBN 969-8721-02-9
Pak - US
Strategic Dialogue
Political and Diplomatic
Dimensions
Prior to 9/11 Pakistan was not accorded due respect and in many ways treated
as an insignificant minor regional actor. Following the tragic events of 9/11,
the Americans once again discovered that to prosecute the war against terrorism
and more specifically their Afghanistan war, revival of special relationships
with Pakistan was deemed an absolutely essential element of their new regional
policy. Not only Pakistan's participation in the international coalition against
terrorism was welcomed, the Americans also began to take increased interest
in the regional disputes including the ongoing Kashmir dispute.
The Brookings Institution (US) and the Islamabad Policy Research Institute
(Pakistan) jointly arranged a dialogue between the Pakistani and the American
scholars on 29th and 30th January 2002. The participants were requested to
prepare short papers focusing on present and future developments. They met
at Serena Hotel, Islamabad and exchanged views covering various aspects of
Pak-US Relations, Afghanistan, Nuclear related issues, Central Asia and Iran.
The second round of this strategic dialogue is likely to be held in Washington
during the summer.
The discussion was unusually frank and candid enabling both sides to fully
comprehend each other's sensitivities and difficulties. The basic thrust was
to overcome the visualized impediments and maintain a desired level of cordiality
of relationships. Although it was specifically requested to avoid dwelling
too much on the past, some references to the past were indeed inevitable.
Mr. Zafar Jaspal of IPRI who attempted to reflect the views of both the Pakistani
as well as the American participant as accurately as was possible, succinctly
recorded a summary of discussions. Dividing the discussions into separate
sections, he avoided mentioning the names of the participants. Instead he
grouped the views expressed into two categories of American and Pakistani
participants.
In the end it needs to be stressed that papers included in this IPRI publication
are reflective of authors' own thinking and do no represent the views of either
the sponsoring institutions or their respective governments.
Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema
May 2002
Pak - US Strategic Dialogue
January 29 - 30, 2002
Islamabad
Brief BIOS of Participants
American Scholars
1. Major General (Retired) William F. BURNS, US Army, Former Director, Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency and member, National Academy of Science, Committee
on International Security and Arms Control.
2. Dr Stephen Philip COHEN, Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution and
author of numerous books on South Asian security issues.
3. Ambassador Dennis KUX, former ambassador to the Ivory Coast, and Study
Director of the Asia Society project on India and Pakistan; author of two
outstanding books on American relations with India and Pakistan; presently
affiliated with the Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington, DC.
4. Ambassador Nicholas PLATT, President, The Asia Society, and former US
Ambassador to Pakistan and the Philippines.
5. Mr James STEINBERG, Vice-President and Director of the Foreign Policy Studies
Programme, The Brookings Institution, and former Director Policy Planning
Staff and Deputy National Security Advisor, Clinton administration.
6. Dr Marvin G WEINBAUM, Professor Emeritus, University of Illinois and Adjunct
Professor, Georgetown University; author of numerous books and articles on
Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran.
7. Ms Patricia WRIGHTSON (Observer), Staff Member, Committee on International
Security and Arms Control, the National Academy of Science, Washington, DC.
Pakistani Scholars
1. Dr Pervaiz Iqbal CHEEMA, President Islamabad Policy Research Institute
and former Chairman and Professor of International Relations, Quaid-e-Azam
University, Islamabad.
2. Dr Rifaat HUSSAIN, Chairman, Department of Defence and Strategic Studies,
Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad.
3. Dr Ijaz HUSSAIN, Professor of International Relations, currently working
as Dean, Faculty of Social Sciences, Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad.
4. Dr Azmat Hayat KHAN, Director, Area Study Centre for Central Asia, Peshawar
University, Peshawar.
5. General (Retired) Jehangir KARAMAT, former Chief of the Army Staff, Pakistan
Army.
6. Dr Shireen M MAZARI, Director General, Institute of Strategic Studies,
Islamabad, formerly, the Chairperson of Department of Defence and Strategic
Studies, Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad.
7. Lieutenant General (Retired) Kamal MATINUDDIN, Retired Lieutenant General
of Pakistan Army, formerly, Director General of Institute of Strategic Studies,
Islamabad, author of many books on regional issues.
8. Mr Najmuddin SHAIKH, former Secretary Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan
and Pakistan's Ambassador in the US.
9. Mr M ZIAUDDIN, senior journalist, currently working as Resident Editor,
daily The Dawn, Islamabad.
Rapporteur
10. Mr. Zafar Nawaz JASPAL, Research Fellow at Islamabad Policy Research Institute,
Islamabad.
Najmuddin Shaikh
I would like to start by joining you in according a warm welcome
to our American colleagues most of whom are old friends. I don't think it
would be an exaggeration to say that around this table we have some of the
most distinguished members of what is known as the community of South Asian
Scholars in the United States. They have had a role in shaping American policy
in South Asia but like their Pakistani counterparts, have never really been
satisfied by the extent to which decision makers have heeded their recommendations
even when they have been part of the official bureaucracy.
The subject I have been asked to speak on and the time that I have been allotted
would be rather difficult to reconcile if I were to enter into the sort of
detail that the subject would merit. I take heart, however, from the fact
that the audience I have is rather knowledgeable and I can afford to only
flag the items that would need to be discussed and even in the flagging to
touch most cursorily upon those elements of the relationship on which separate
sessions have been scheduled during the course of this conference.
Let me start with the obvious. The basis of the earlier relationship
was Pakistan's quest for security against the dangers it perceived to its
continued independent existence and the American desire for allies in Cold
War. This was expected to change following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan
and the subsequent disintegration of Soviet Union to a less intense relationship
based on common objectives (a strategic convergence) rather than Cold War
factors. The change, however, was far more dramatic than Pakistan anticipated.
Two factors brought this about
(a) the renewed American emphasis on the nuclear question and
(b) the perceived Pakistani ambivalence on the Gulf War. This second factor
impinged upon what had been discussed informally between American and Pakistani
officials as the "Strategic Convergence" viz:
i) common interest in stability in the Persian Gulf
ii)common interest in providing Central Asia alternate routes for its trade
iii) exploitation of Pakistan's location and availability of cheap skilled
labour by American investors for industries designed to serve the markets
of the Persian Gulf and Central Asia, which could become the basis for a durable
relationship after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the end of the
Cold War.
The American imposition of sanctions accentuated problems Pakistan faced internally.
There had been a radicalization of parts of Pakistan's internal polity partly
as a result of deliberate policy by the then rulers and partly as an inevitable
consequence of steps taken to support the Afghan Jihad against the Soviets.
When the Pressler Amendment sanctions and the American abandonment
of Afghanistan left Pakistan on its own to cope with the debris of the Afghan
conflict and its inevitable internal fallout, Pakistan's capacity to reverse
radicalization was severely circumscribed. On the strategic plane, Pak-US
relations became hostage to single "nuclear issue", while absence
of stable democratic polity in Pakistan became yet another factor contributing
to keeping relations at an abysmally low level. Strategic convergence of interests
in Central Asia, the basis for initial support by US of perceived stabilizing
influence of Taliban in Afghanistan, also fell by wayside as Afghanistan remained
embroiled in conflict and as Osama and his ilk gained greater say in Taliban
policies making. America also saw the role of Talibanised Afghanistan and
its perceived Pakistan backers as creating problems rather than providing
a boost to stability in Central Asia. The American focus on terrorism, particularly
after the bombings of American embassies in East Africa, gave a greater and
more adverse salience to Pakistan's relations with the Taliban and the direction
in which
Pakistan's internal political dispensation was appearing to
move as a result of this relationship.
On the other hand India, having seen the value of its anchor relationship
with the Soviet Union undermined moved haltingly but inexorably towards a
closer relationship with a receptive United States using in part the importance
the Indian community had acquired in key economic sectors in the United States
and in part the desire expressed in parts of the American establishment about
the key role India could play in "containing China". It is worth
noting that India sought to capitalize on this "desire" offering
the Chinese "threat" as the principal justification for its nuclear
tests of May 98.
Despite American protestations to the contrary the triangle
of Pak-US and Indo-US relations was still seen as a zero-sum game. Pakistan
felt it could no longer depend on even-handed American approach to Indo-Pak
issues notably Kashmir, leave alone the famous so-called "tilt"
towards Pakistan. India, it was clear, had acquired greater significance both
on the South Asian and global plane in American strategic and economic thinking,
a fact emphasised by the consultations undertaken at a high level with India-as
one of a select band of countries- on the Ballistic Missile Defense Initiative.
On the eve of the radical changes brought about by the horrendous
events of 11th September American evolving policy towards Pakistan appeared
to be
(a) seek a relationship with Pakistan, which is about Pakistan and not against
something and thus prevent Talibanisation of Pakistan. In other words the
principal American preoccupation was not to identify common geo-political
objectives but to support such internal changes in Pakistan as would prevent
it from becoming, like Taliban Afghanistan, a haven for extremists and terrorists.
(b) Lift the sanctions imposed after nuclear explosions of 98 but retain democracy
sanctions. This decision was not, it seemed to me, totally firm. There was,
in my view a debate in Washington on whether the maintenance of these sanctions,
which would have meant restoring full bilateral cooperation with India while
permitting cooperation with Pakistan only through International Financial
institutions, would help or hinder the stabilization of Pakistan's internal
polity. The debate was still on when 11th September happened.
The tragedy of 11th September brought changes in the US-Pak relationship that
were pushed primarily by the need felt in Washington for Pakistan's unstinted
cooperation in pursuing the military campaign against the Al-Qaeda and the
Taliban in Afghanistan.
" Pakistan's internal transformation, presaged by steps taken earlier,
has acquired new rapidity. While it will take time public reaction suggests
that rot had not set in as deeply as originally feared.
" Changes in electoral practice suggest transition to democracy of a
more liberal variety is on course. Significance of restoration of Joint Electorate,
added seats for women and proportional representation for technocrats and
impact on process of liberalization should not be underestimated.
" America committed to assisting transformation. $100 million assistance
for education reform was a good step in that direction.
" Significant that while US is not balking at defence cooperation Pakistan
has not suggested any additional spending on this account or demanded acquisition
of new weapon systems. Request for F-16s was important as an effort to secure
an affirmation of a political commitment rather than an effort to acquire
new weapon platforms.
Stage is set for enhanced US-Pak relations, which go on beyond current provision
of logistic facilities for American operations in Afghanistan. These facilities
will not be needed after a while but there is good reason to believe that
American interest in the region and in Pakistan relationship will, in Powell's
words be for a long time. Pakistan has good reason to accept this assurance
since, in my view, the campaign against terrorism will significantly influence
American policies at least for the next decade. Pakistan's independent existence
is important to the United States. Powell's comments on President Musharraf's
speech-it will have resonance in the rest of the Islamic world-suggests that
the US hopes Pakistan will once again be able to take the lead in Islamic
Councils as a voice of moderation and tolerance.
Current Indo-Pak crisis will abate. Kashmir problem will remain a minefield
for both countries. Terrorism may go but indigenous resistance and therefore
violence will continue. Root causes of such violence by Indian forces as much
as by Kashmiri resistance will have to be addressed. My feeling that while
US is happy about the effect current Indo-Pak crisis has had in hastening
transformation within Pakistan it is not happy with the thought that India
is seeking to be the local bully and is risking nuclear confrontation to avoid
the need to address root cause of Indo-Pak tensions.
Nuclear related issues will have lower salience in US-Pak relations because
of current American policies and because Pakistan is an advocate of strategic
restraint conventional and nuclear in South Asia. Once an environment of greater
trust is established the US apprehensions about nuclear technology export
from Pakistan will also decrease. The problem will be India's perception of
its nuclear needs and the impact this has on Pakistan. Similarly the pursuit
of National Missile Defence (NMD) by the USA and its domino effect on China,
India and then Pakistan will need to be watched. On another plane, there will
be an impact on Pakistan if India continues to acquire large amounts of new
and more sophisticated weapon platforms, surveillance systems and delivery
vehicles and if such acquisitions invite no criticism or pressure form the
United States. It has been noted in Pakistan that the proposed Indian purchase
of Israeli Phalcon early warning radar system, is being opposed by USA currently
but only with regard to timing, and not with regard to the destabilizing impact
it may have on regional security picture. Note has also been taken of Powell's
statement that defence cooperation will be facet of development of relations
with both India and Pakistan but USA was not poised to permit such cooperation
as could prove detrimental to security of region. Pakistanis are not sure
of what this would mean in practice.
Afghanistan will continue to be an area of uncertainty. The Pakistani commitment
to non-interference is probably firm, because this serves Pakistan's economic
and security interests. American interests would appear to be the same. The
same cannot, however, be said, of Afghanistan's other neighbours, who may
find Afghanistan's stability and consequent ability to provide transit routes
for Central Asian energy resources and other trade inimical to their interests?
In large measure how things turn out will depend on how far the current wielders
of power in Afghanistan can be persuaded to forsake old loyalties and focus
on their own country's interests?
Looking to the future, as Pakistan's return to a more liberal democratic polity
continues apace one principal American concern will have been addressed. This
currently appears to be the dominant element in the relationship (apart from
the role Pakistan is required to play in the anti-terrorism campaign). There
are however other areas of strategic convergence and one will have to see
how far the two countries will wish to resurrect cooperation in these areas.
These could be identified as being peace and stability in the Gulf States,
offering new openings to the Central Asian States for their energy exports
and their trade with the rest of the world, and US-Pak private sector cooperation
to exploit through Pak based production facilities the markets of the GCC,
South and Central Asia. Separately I would suggest also an enhanced role for
Pakistan's armed forces in peacekeeping operations.
Currently USA has base facilities or pre-positioning of supplies agreements
with each of the GCC countries. As the regional threat is seen to abate the
US presence may serve to exacerbate internal tensions. Could a Pakistan presence
provide security in a less abrasive fashion? Would this not serve to strengthen
Pakistan's role as a voice of moderation in Islamic Councils?
US energy companies are the dominant force in the exploitation and export
of Caspian Area energy resources. The use of Afghan/Pakistan transit route
for such exports particularly of Turkmenistan gas resources is currently stymied
by Afghan instability. Once there is peace in the areas through which pipelines
would need to pass, would Pakistan and USA cooperate to bring idea of a gas
pipeline from Turkmenistan to the South Asian market and to Pakistani ports
for exports to markets in East Asia? The strategic advantages, in terms of
the new freedom of action the Central Asian states would enjoy, are obvious.
Profitability for American energy companies would be huge. It could provide
an incentive to Afghans for genuine unity. Apart from transit royalties Afghanistan
could also benefit from the construction of a spur for the main pipeline to
bring Afghan gas from Mazar-e-Sharif to the export market further enhancing
Afghan revenues and generating considerable new employment. In South Asia
such a pipeline, which would serve the Pakistan market but would rely largely
for volume on the Indian market could serve as an economic link between India
and Pakistan and help ease political tensions.
The liberalisation of political climate and the consequent restoration of
business confidence combined with strict adherence to economic reform programme
and emphasis on developing the social sector offers real prospect for far-reaching
economic cooperation between the US and Pakistan private sector for Pakistan
based production to serve nearby markets in the GCC, South and Central Asia.
Even during difficult phases of US-Pak relations, Pakistan's willingness to
provide contingents for UN peacekeeping operations around the world's trouble
spots has been welcomed by the United States because they bring expertise,
discipline and commitment to such assignments. An enhanced role could enable
the Armed Forces to maintain their readiness even while the share of defence
in the overall GNP of Pakistan shrinks to make more funds available for social
sector programmes.
The foregoing are essentially ideas needing further discussion on the direction
US relations with Pakistan could take. It is admittedly an optimistic scenario,
which has set aside other factors that, will be at play in American global
strategy. They do deserve, however further examination by this distinguished
panel.
Pak - US Relations
The Military Dimension
General (retd) Jehangir Karamat
The military dimension of the US-Pakistan relationship is an intrinsic part
of the overall relationship. It is linked to the other strands of this relationship
and it cannot be isolated or separated for study. It has to be discussed in
the context of the entire spectrum of relations between the US and Pakistan.
The roller coaster feature of US-Pakistan relations has inevitably impacted
on military contacts and these have also had their ups and downs. However,
if considered from an overview, the military relationship has had much more
consistency and engagement. Even when US-Pakistan relations were under stress
and at a low ebb the militaries on both sides worked hard to maintain contacts.
For example, when IMET and military assistance programmes were suspended the
militaries moved towards joint training exercises and reciprocal visits.
There is, therefore, a requirement to review the historical context of the
US-Pakistan military relationship but I will simply flag a few events because
they define the evolutionary trends. You are already aware of the history.
During the Cold War in the 50's and early 60's there was an extremely co-operative
relationship with Pakistan firmly on the US side and a member of the SEATO
and CENTO Pacts. This was when Pakistan received massive economic and military
assistance. The direct military assistance meant that Pakistan had the option
of diverting minimum funds for the military. A lesser known feature of the
military interaction in this period is the fact that Pakistan received state
of the art equipment -the latest F86 and F-104 aircraft and M47 and the M48
Main Battle tanks besides artillery guns, helicopters and radars. The US also
assisted with training and large numbers of officers were trained at US military
service schools and staff colleges. The US military also assisted in setting
up intelligence and special operations facilities. The US-Pakistan relationship
in this period really laid the foundations of the Pakistan military and gave
it a professional orientation that has endured. The Pakistan military also
got a qualitative boost.
The 1965 Indo-Pakistan War was the first real effort to internationalise the
Kashmir issue. This war came in the wake of the Indian defeat by China and
Pakistan's military build-up with US assistance. It also has to be seen in
the context of the Cold War confrontation between the US and Russia and the
growing Indo-Russian defence relationship. After the 1965 War, India went
through a very deliberate phase of building up and upgrading its military
capabilities with Russian assistance and aid. The US response was to curtail
and even stop military assistance to Pakistan and it re-evaluated its policies
and level of interest in South Asia. Pakistan turned to China for military
equipment and assistance. The 1971 Indo-Pakistan War came after the balance
of power had tilted decisively in India's favour and after India had concluded
the Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation with Russia. India also preceded
its aggression by a prolonged period of covert intervention and diplomatic
manoeuvres fully exploiting Pakistan's lapses and the consequent vulnerabilities.
The 70's and 80's were eventful years-a spell of democracy and elected government
with a return to a decade of military rule. This was also when the revolution
in Iran triggered responses in the Muslim world with consequences for Pakistan.
Then the Russian intervention in Afghanistan led to a close military and intelligence
relationship between the US and Pakistan. The US also relented in the pressure
on Pakistan's nascent nuclear programme that had started after the lessons
learnt from Indian actions before, during and after the Indo - Pakistan War
of 1971 and the US attitude and policies in this period. US diplomacy also
helped to defuse the 1987 crisis created by India under the pretext of Exercise
Brass Tacks and the so- called "1990 nuclear crisis".
The early 90's saw the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the US decision
to leave Pakistan to cope with the situation in Afghanistan and its internal
blow back within Pakistan. The Pressler Amendment was invoked with disastrous
consequences for Pakistan's military. The pressure was resumed on Pakistan's
nuclear and missile programmes. This inevitably altered perceptions of the
US within the military as it did in Pakistan as a whole. These events also
need to be seen in the context of the indigenous freedom struggle surfacing
in Indian Held Kashmir in the wake of India's failed intervention in Sri Lanka
and the Sikh insurgency in Indian Punjab. This was also the early part of
the decade of democracy in Pakistan-when the elected governments needed support
and guidance from the US and not renewed pressures on nuclear issues, drugs
and terrorism. The Pakistan military responded to US pressures by engaging
in continuous talks on all international regimes to check nuclear and missile
proliferation, by making its resources available to create the Anti Narcotics
Force that co-operated with the US DEA and also worked with the US on anti
terrorism. In this period, as indeed all along, the military in Pakistan relied
heavily on the stable and enduring relationship with China particularly in
achieving self- reliance goals. The termination of the IMET programme was
also having an effect in terms of the military linkages with the US at all
levels of the military. In Afghanistan, Pakistan was confronted with a situation
of civil war with six or seven countries interfering directly or indirectly
severely limiting its options.
In the late 90's the US and Pakistan militaries evolved joint training exercises
of various categories to keep the relationship alive and ticking. Considerable
rapport was established with US CENTCOM through the personal efforts of military
commanders on both sides. The pressures from the US continued unabated and
the US also voiced concerns through various channels on the Pakistan-China
strategic weapons relationship in the context of various international regimes
that existed or were being negotiated. Then came the US Cruise Missile attack
on Afghanistan through Pakistan without any prior interaction with Pakistan.
This, in my opinion, had a profound effect on perceptions and attitudes within
the Pakistan military towards the US. This, in fact, conditioned subsequent
decisions on missile tests and the response to India's nuclear tests in 1998
as well as the level and extent of interaction with the US on such matters.
After the 1998 nuclear tests came US sanctions and actions that impacted on
Pakistan's economic stability. Pakistan was also under severe pressure for
its support of the Taliban regime. Throughout this period there was interaction
with the US and there were discussions on Pakistan's own problems with Afghanistan
and the options available. There were some positive developments-the Brown
Amendment and the US decision to return the money paid by Pakistan for the
F-16's that were not delivered. There was no break in US CENTCOM and Pakistan
contacts but more important than contacts is the depth of understanding and
range of discussions and these were curtailed because of the overall low in
the relations.
In late 1999 military government returned to Pakistan and, like all such events,
with no interaction with the US. This inevitably complicated relations with
the US because of the mandated democracy sanctions that came into effect and
the new pressures for a return to democracy. Pakistan also saw with concern
the developing ties between the US and India and India and Israel and in fact
identified a definite tilt towards India by the US at the strategic level.
The US also started identifying elements within the military and the ISI as
fundamentalist hard line groups opposed to any policy changes in Afghanistan,
Kashmir and co-operation with the US. Various studies by US "think tanks"
projected Pakistan as a failing state on the brink of disaster. The military
government worked hard to maintain a working relationship with the US and
in some ways this was easier because there was no confusion as to who was
in charge. The military government also began addressing US concerns and also
tried to explain the various constraints and compulsions. Throughout this
period the Indian effort was to keep Pakistan isolated through propaganda
and actions.
This was the situation when September 11 happened. The stark choice given
to the military government was to either come on board or be dealt with as
part of the problem. Pakistan had no difficulty in making the right choice
considering its own perception of the environment before September 11 and
the national interest. Since then a new relationship has emerged characterised
by co-operation and in-depth discussion at the highest levels. Pakistan's
strategic direction has been indicated by President Musharaff in his speech
of December 12. There is now a convergence of interests and views with the
US on most issues. Pakistan is very clear on the actions it needs to take
over a period of time in its own interest and these will also address US concerns.
There are also indications that this time there will be consistency in US
policy towards Pakistan on the basis of institutionalised arrangements. Pakistan
sees CENTCOM assuming the US Pacific Command type of role in Central Asia,
West Asia and South Asia and it is for this that the facilities will be established
and maintained. This time around the expectations are likely to be much more
realistic with both sides saying and hearing the same things -unlike in the
past. We are therefore seeing the evolution of a new and better military relationship
and this is important because the military is likely to remain a key player
at the policy level in Pakistan. Much, of course, will depend on the stability
in Afghanistan and its political neutralisation from outside intervention.
This will be a long and difficult process and no one will want a "southern
alliance" to replace the old Northern Alliance. The India-Pakistan relationship
is also going to be important and if the present inexplicable confrontation
is anything to go by then this will also be a long tortuous process. The US
role in South Asia will determine the course and pace of events. It will have
to ensure that it does not become an unbalancing factor, because the balance
or the imbalance of power between India and Pakistan has to remain at an acceptable
level especially because both are now nuclear powers.
To conclude let me say that in the Cold War period there was a divergence
in perceptions and expectations. In the post Cold War period there has been
a sense of betrayal and many events led to a negative effect on the military
relationship. This has been enhanced because of the long term effects of the
termination of the IMET programme. According to a BBC Online report India
is projected to spend an estimated $95 billion over 15 years on modernisation
and up gradation of its military. This will lead to a serious imbalance in
conventional forces and the focus will shift to the nuclear weapons. A restraint
regime, perhaps on the lines proposed by Pakistan, and recourse to bilateral
or multilateral dialogue for conflict resolution are options that need to
be facilitated by the US. The emphasis has to shift to economic and political
stability for meaningful deterrence though military power will remain a key
factor. A most important facet of the evolving environment is Pakistan's new
direction -internally and externally. The stage for this has been set by Pakistan's
military government therefore the military dimension of the US- Pakistan relationship
in the changing strategic environment will continue to be of great significance.
Pak - US Relations
The Economic Dimension:
Trading for Mutual Prosperity
M.Ziauddin
Introduction
Nations help each other in their respective self-interests. There is indeed,
no such thing as a "free lunch" especially in the context of bilateral
economic cooperation. When the US launched its post-war European reconstruction
programme or when it crossed the Pacific to help rebuild a war-torn Japan,
in both cases, it had a solitary national objective-to contain communism.
According to one theory capitalism in its coarsest form was already on its
way out under the onslaught of the then aggressive socialist Eastern Europe.
And in most of the East Asian countries the Chinese socialist ideas were gaining
ground.
To contain this onslaught, Washington helped these two entities become front-liners
of capitalism by providing them investment capital, technologies, markets
and ideas on social welfare (ism). An element of economic quid pro quo was
also dominant in this arrangement, as the expanding economies of Europe and
East Asia helped the US prosperity to attain newer heights almost within a
lifetime.
The US objective in offering a generous helping hand to Pakistan to overcome
its economic birth pangs in 1952 was also the same-to contain communism. But
the instrument of assistance used here was concessional loans, grants, commodity
assistance and concessional military sales rather than investment and trade.
Even when Pakistan was actually designated as a front-line state in 1981 and
it started serving as a conduit for the war between capitalism and communism
in Afghanistan, the instrument of assistance used by the US had remained aid
and there was little or no attempt to help Pakistan stand on its own feet
through investment and trade.
Perhaps the US had reasons of its own for denying Pakistan what it had offered
to Europe and East Asia to compensate for their role in the long drawn war
between capitalism and communism. Probably Pakistan itself did not have the
socio-economic wherewithal, which both Europe and Japan had possessed even
after having been destroyed by a world war, to take advantage of US investment
and markets if Washington had offered them to this country in the 1950s and
1960s.
And perhaps trade itself was not such a priority in the economic scheme of
things in the Pakistan of 1950s. Perhaps Pakistan's number one national objective
of acquiring the needed defensive capacity to ward off the perceived aggressive
designs of India was being adequately met by the US economic and military
assistance. The elitist feudal and the comprador-oriented traders turned industrialists
were seemingly more interested in short term gains offered by trade and light
industry i.e. assembly plants. Therefore, in those days the emphasis was on
import substitution rather than export growth. The import substitution policy
had sprung out of the self-defeating concept of universal self-sufficiency.
So, aid was being used by Pakistan to sustain costly and inefficient domestic
manufacturing sectors and for subsidizing import by keeping the value of the
currency at an artificially high level. And exports were confined to a couple
of primary products led by cotton, the earnings from which were hardly enough
to pay for our escalating import needs. For obvious reasons this policy became
unsustainable when the US stopped its generous assistance after the 1965 Indo-Pak
war. Perhaps this was one of the factors, which led to Pakistan's dismemberment
in 1971.
The First Encounter
US economic aid to Pakistan in the shape of technical assistance and PL 480
had begun in 1952. But a strategic meaning to this relationship was accorded
by the Mutual Defense Agreement signed between the two countries in 1954.
This opened the way for large-scale military and economic assistance. During
the first three year (1955-58) economic assistance had totaled 500 million
dollars or 2.8 per cent of GDP. The real value of the US military assistance
in the late 1950s probably approached that of the economic assistance, which
greatly relieved the pressure on Pakistan's own fiscal resources. The nominal
value of this assistance was around 100 million dollars annually for ten years,
but this definitely understates the real value of this assistance because
the prices at which the military equipment was transferred were deliberately
kept low. The military assistance had the effect of increasing the effective
defense budget by at least 50 per cent in the Second half of 1950s. The defense
spending in that period was in real terms significantly below the level in
the first half. By the late 1950s, defense spending had been reduced to about
25 per cent of the total central government expenditure, thanks largely to
the US military assistance.
In the second half of 1950s, the bulk of imports of food grains were financed
by the concessional PL 480 assistance from the United States. This reduced
the urgency of increasing domestic food grain production and compounded the
neglect of agriculture. And it was between 1958 and 1965 that the country
experienced what in the words of USAID were its "take-off" years
but which actually was the time when Pakistan truly became addicted to external
aid.
Most of the military equipment, which Pakistan received during the decade
of 1960s, was almost free. One whole armoured division was raised during this
period when Pakistan received a huge quantity of Second World War vintage
Patton tanks. During the same period the country also received a number of
squadrons of F-86s. One entire military cantonment was established in Northern
Pakistan at Kharian by the US aid during this period.
During the second five-year Plan period (1960-65) the US provided 55 per cent
of all aid received by Pakistan, covering 35 per cent of government's development
budget and 45 per cent of its import bill. Several factors had made this remarkable
expansion possible. Expenditure on Indus Basin works replacement, which amounted
to 1.5 billion dollars during the 1960s alone, were financed either directly
by foreign assistance or indirectly by counterpart funds generated by the
sale of PL 480 commodity assistance. The availability of 800 million dollars
of non-project assistance during 1960-65, nearly 90 per cent from the US,
was the second major factor in expanding foreign flows. A key element was
the multi-year agreement in October 1961 on an expanded PL 480 programme with
the US, totaling 621.5 million dollars for the remaining period of Second
Plan; more than half the amount was for wheat imports and about 20 per cent
was for vegetable oil imports.
The US support for Pakistan's industrialization efforts consisted of expanded
capital assistance for infrastructure development, increased technical aid
to ease "skills shortage" and PL 480 concessional sales, which generated
local currency foe public investment and made it easier for Pakistan to finance
industrialization by keeping agriculture prices low and thereby extracting
an invisible surplus from agriculture. The short-term results of these efforts
were in degree surprising. The industrial sector, dominated by textiles and
large-scale industry, grew at annual rates approaching 24 per cent while agriculture
stagnated, barely keeping pace with population growth. In the longer term
the pace of growth in the industrial sector could not hold for obvious reasons
and it too began stagnating like the agricultural sector.
A USAID document making an assessment of these years had tried to explain
this away in this manner: "The size of the program, its administrative
instability, the paucity of US knowledge about Pakistan and about the role
of foreign aid in development, the equivocating and uncertain commitment within
the US to foreign aid program, in combination with political instability and
the lack of an orderly approach to development within Pakistan, all worked
to minimize the effectiveness of aid utilization."
The US aid was stopped after the 1965 war with India only to be resumed quickly
but it never reached the pre-war level. The rapid reduction in foreign aid
in combination with a growth in defense expenditure made it difficult for
the GOP to finance the imports associated with the liberalization programme.
Equally serious were the consequences of ample aid availability for exchange
and trade policy which sustained an overvalued exchange rate and provided
levels of protection and subsidy for the private sector which were inimical
to a search for greater industrial efficiency, deepening of industrial structure,
and progress towards self-sustaining growth. And that large scale and assured
food grain supplies, virtually on grant basis, did not help agricultural incentives
was obvious.
During the post-1965 war period in addition to finding sizable external funds
to meet the resource gap, Pakistan also had to contend during the 1970s with
rising debt servicing burden of the existing debt. Reflecting the large foreign
inflows during the second and third plans, the disbursed and outstanding external
debt of Pakistan had risen to over 4 billion dollars at the end of 1970. As
the terms of external assistance had hardened over time, the debt service
ratio to foreign exchange earnings had risen steadily from 10 per cent in
1964-65 to nearly 20 per cent in 1969-70. In absolute terms, the debt service
payment had risen from 62 million dollars in 1965 to 275 million in1971.
Consequently in May 1971, Pakistan faced a default situation (the first taste
of what we once again faced in 1998-99 as a result of stoppage of US aid in
1990) and requested for a debt moratorium from the aid consortium. Following
this there were three rounds of protracted debt negotiations over 1971-74
(similar to what we had in 1999-2000, 2000-2001 and 2001-2002). The final
long term rescheduling arrangement with the consortium countries were agreed
at the end of June 1974. The relief amount was to carry interest rate of 2.5
per cent and was to be repaid over a period of 30 years including a grace
period of ten years. Does not this ring a bell? These are almost exactly the
same term, which we have been allowed in the last round of debt rescheduling
negotiations, which we had with the Paris Club in December 2001.
The Second Encounter
Just as President Jimmy Carter was beginning to emphasize respect for human
and democratic rights in countries receiving American aid, Pakistan happened
to be ruled by, once again, a military regime. In 1979, citing Pakistan's
nuclear quest, the Carter administration terminated all assistance to Pakistan.
Washington began instantly to treat its erstwhile "most allied ally"
as a pariah state. For about two years 1979-81 Pakistan received almost nothing
from outside world and the country had to go running to the IMF as the foreign
exchange reserves in April 1979 had tumbled to less than 100 million dollars.
But just about the time an IMF programme was being launched the US decided
to ignore Pakistan's nuclear programme and the fact that the country was being
ruled by a military junta and enlisted Islamabad's services once again for
those-called free world. The Soviet Union had invaded the neighbouring Afghanistan.
And the US selected Pakistan as the "conduit" for supplying guns
and gold to the Afghan resistance groups. Taking into account its "potential
role as an important element in the defense of the Persian Gulf region",
the Carter administration expressed the desire to resuscitate the alliance
with Pakistan in some form. Admiral Robert Long, Commander of the US Pacific
Fleet, said in a congressional testimony that "Pakistan's strategic location
requires us to strengthen our security relationship." As a result of
difficult negotiations lasting about three months, a 3.2 billion dollar five
year package, divided almost equally between economic and security assistance
to Pakistan, was announced on June 15, 1981. A measure of the front-line state's
revived strategic value was the US readiness to sell to Pakistan forty F-16
fighter inceptors for its air force.
In approving the aid, Congress granted Pakistan a six-year exemption from
the US non-proliferation law known as Symington Amendment, which had brought
about the 1979 aid suspension. A second six-year package for Pakistan worth
4.02 billion dollars, to begin in October 1987, was announced by the Reagan
administration in March 1986. Soon thereafter a "Special National Intelligence
estimate" concluded that Pakistan had crossed the nuclear threshold.
But, as required by the Pressler Amendment in order to permit the disbursement
of funds to Pakistan, President Reagan certified in October 1986 that Pakistan
did not "possess a nuclear explosive device". In 1988 also President
Reagan gave the necessary certificate despite a widespread belief that Pakistan
had become a de facto nuclear power. In October 1989, like his predecessor,
President George Bush also certified that Pakistan did not "possess a
nuclear explosive".
In the period between 1989 and 1990 when President George Bush finally refused
to issue the needed certificate and most of the international aid including
the US aid was cut off, Pakistan had probably received economic and military
assistance amounting to as much as an estimated 25 billion dollars.
This includes about 900 million dollars annually from the US, 500 million
dollars from Japan, 500 million dollars from Western and multilateral sources,
150 million dollars from China and about 500 million dollars from Muslim countries.
A lot of dollars and military equipment, which were meant for Afghan "Mujahideen"
fighting inside Afghanistan was also siphoned off by the conduit enrooted.
It is very difficult to reach even an approximate figure for the amount of
money and arms that Pakistan received during this period because a lot of
cash also went into the pockets of those in Pakistan who were supposed to
transport them to their final destination. And if this amount is estimated
conservatively at about 250 million dollars annually and added to the 3 billion
dollars of remittances coming home from overseas Pakistanis annually, you
reach another 25 billion dollars bringing the grand total of most of the concessional
dollars that Pakistan received during the ten years of Afghan war to about
50 billion dollars.
During this period again Pakistan's priority seemed to have remained the same
- improving its security and defence capacity against India's perceived aggressive
designs. So the aid was used to buy weapons, finance imports and sustain costly
domestic manufacturing sector in the name of import substitution. And when
the Soviet Union collapsed at the turn of the decade of 1980s, US swiftly
walked away from Pakistan once again, and by 1990 it had found a valid reason
too to impose strict sanctions under the Pressler Amendment. Gradually concessional
aid flows came down to a trickle. This is considered to be the major factor
contributing to the rise of jihadi culture in the country in the 1990s and
the subsequent military take over in 1999.
Nobody knows now where all the billions, which this country had received during
the ten-year long Afghan war, had gone. Mind you, politicians were not ruling
the country during this period.
When President General Zia who had held absolute power in the country even
after an elected parliament had been put in place in 1985, died in an air
crash in August 1988 the country was left with nothing on the ground or in
the kitty to show for those billions except a heavy debt, both foreign and
domestic. In fact the then caretaker finance minister, the late Dr. Mehbubul
Haq had to rush to the IMF in October 1988 for a paltry 270 million dollars'
emergency aid under the Standby Arrangement.
During the next ten years when almost all concessional assistance to Pakistan
had stopped except regular emergency assistance from the IMF and World Bank
and about 500 million dollars annually from Japan the country for the first
time in its history had to go to the commercial market and borrow at highly
punishing rates to help meet both ends, which had become almost impossible
because of the rising burden of repaying the debt acquired during General
Zia's years. Thus the debt kept doubling and trebling with net outflows going
up steeply. And like in the early 1970s the country faced as a result of total
cut off of the US assistance, an imminent default situation in 1998-99 and
was forced to ask for debt rescheduling from the Paris Club. And like in the
1970s, it has since been allowed three rescheduling.
The Third Encounter
US has come back to Pakistan once again with generous offers of aid to reward
Islamabad for its role in the war against terrorism following the terrorist
attacks on World Trade Center. As the past experience has shown, simple aid
no matter how generous has done nothing to reduce Pakistan's dependence on
dole. As a matter of fact, the more generous the aid the more adverse has
been its impact on the overall national economy. Aid has in fact rendered
Pakistan's economy totally fragile and has caused most of the distortions
that afflict the national economy today. That is the reason why whenever the
flows of concessional aid slow down or stop for one reason or the other we
find ourselves facing a default situation. And when desperate attempts are
made to seek donor help to avoid the ignominy of default we have known to
have been forced to compromise on our national objectives, even sovereignty
and economic independence. So, the official economic managers who are now
engaged in discussing the aid modalities with the donors, especially the US
would do well to keep the past experience of the country with the aid, which
was confined to concessional loans and grants only as against that of Europe
and East Asia which along with aid had also received investment and technology
as well as generous access to markets.
While Pakistan would like in its self interest to get the nature of US aid
changed from dole alone to investment and market access as well, how would
this change serve the interests of the US? In other words what US national
objectives would be served by such a change in the nature of US aid? Well,
the past experience has shown that no matter how generous the US aid to Pakistan
had been, it has continued to fall short in helping Washington to achieve
its three national objectives, namely eradication of drug trafficking from
the area, elimination of fundamentalism and nuclear non-proliferation. Pakistan
is still an important source of narcotics. Secondly, the threat of resurgence
of extremism in Pakistan in forms other than jihad cannot be ruled out as
long as the country continues to remain socio-economically hard up. Thirdly,
simple dole to Pakistan has been known to be diverted in the past from special
and other sectors to military purposes and to line private pockets. And this
practice has been known to have distorted national priorities forcing the
ruling elite in this country to maintain a perpetual eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation
with India. This has already resulted in two full-fledged wars and one serious
conflict.
Elimination of narcotics and religious extremism continues to be a part of
the US national objectives. And in recent weeks the US has made it very clear
time and again that it would not let the two nuclear powers of South Asia
to go to war. All these US objectives would be served if Washington were to
re-orient its economic relations with Pakistan on the basis of investment
and trade rather than concessional loans and military sales, grants, commodity
assistance and frequent debt rescheduling. With the private sectors in the
two countries joining hands to generate wealth, a political lobby would be
created within the ruling elite in Pakistan against wars and within the US
business circles a lobby for investing in Pakistan and importing goods from
this country. And at the same time the US promise that it would not let the
two nuclear powers to go to war should minimize, even eliminate Pakistan's
concerns about India's military intentions in the region.
Pak - US Relations
The Nuclear Issue
Nuclear Weapons, the United States, and Pakistan
William F. Burns
Maj General, US Army, Retired
Introduction
Over the past fifty-odd years, thinking about nuclear weapons and their effects
has evolved dramatically. When the United States first used nuclear weapons
over the Japanese Empire, knowledge of long-term effects was limited. The
purpose - to end the war without an invasion of the Japanese home islands
- was to be achieved simply by making the effects of strategic bombing felt
in a very short period of time. In this paper, I will provide some thoughts
on the development of nuclear strategy and structure with specific reference
to future US-Pakistan relations.
Why Nuclear Weapons?
World War II concluded with the United Nations supreme in all theatres. Until
the final weeks of the war, the Allies and Axis powers did not resort to weapons
of mass destruction. They did not use chemical agents even though they were
in the arsenals of the major combatants. Beginning in the immediate aftermath
of the war, however, the tremendous destructive power of the two nuclear weapons
used over Hiroshima and Nagasaki caused strategic thinkers and planners to
examine the future use of such weapons of mass destruction. The natural abhorrence
of the international community to the destructive effect on non-combatants
and the infrastructure of society was obvious and various international agreements
were arranged to curtail and prohibit possession and use of some weapons of
mass destruction. However, the military utility of nuclear weapons in an operational
sense was still to be proven. It was readily apparent that there was still
much to be learned about such weapons and their effects.
The Soviet Union matched the US in developing a nuclear capability in the
early 1950's and Britain, France, and China joined the club by the early 1960's.
A quarter of a century of testing followed to improve knowledge and to determine
the technical breadth of possibilities for a nuclear arsenal. Ultimately,
nuclear powers determined that the mutually destructive power of large-yield
nuclear weapons and the intercontinental capability to deliver them made them
useful primarily as a deterrent threat. The question of credibility, of course,
was paramount. The strategic concept of nuclear deterrence emerged in which
the five nuclear powers tacitly agreed that a nuclear arsenal of even modest
size could effect unacceptable damage. Mutual assured destruction, therefore,
created an environment in which the nuclear powers - and others - perceived
that a precarious but stable international environment existed.
At the same time, both the US and the USSR developed shorter range tactical
nuclear weapons that both sides believed for a time could be used in a limited
sense to achieve tactical or operational objectives on the battlefield. These
weapons ranged from hundreds of kiloton nuclear devices on missiles capable
of thousand mile ranges or more to extremely low yield, short-range devices
fired from a recoilless rifle. Although, in theory, tactical nuclear weapons
were a force-multiplier on the battlefield and were an economical way to deal
with conventional superiority on the other side, the concern that any use
of nuclear weapons could rapidly escalate to a full-scale strategic exchange
(and concomitant unacceptable damage) made their use theoretically possible
but operationally impractical. It is significant to note than none of the
five declared nuclear powers, each possessing a significant non-strategic
nuclear capability ever resorted to nuclear weapons in any of the regional
conflicts of the post World War II of the 20th Century.
This is not to say that tactical nuclear weapons did not play a role. However,
the dangers of escalation plus the development of technological advances in
more conventional weapons of war, made reliance on the use of nuclear weapons
problematical. Thus, both the US and the USSR withdrew most of their non-strategic
nuclear weapons from Central Europe in the early 1990's. Both sides have eliminated
some of the remaining stockpiles and the US has withdrawn all tactical weapons
from its ground forces.
In recent years, Russia has adopted a stated strategy of using its non-strategic
nuclear arsenal to deter a conventional attack on its territory. This is similar
to the Cold War US strategy to use non-strategic nuclear weapons in the same
way to deter attack on NATO territory.
Application to South Asia
For the past thirty years, the five original nuclear powers have increased
controls on nuclear weapons and improved their safety and security. Some have
made dramatic reductions in both their nuclear weapons and their delivery
systems. Additionally, the international efforts to curb proliferation of
nuclear weapons to other states and regions has been generally successful.
Predictions of two decades ago that there would be at least twenty nuclear
states by the year 2000 have proven unfounded. Even the advent of nuclear
weapons in parts of the world heretofore free of them seems to have been accomplished
in an orderly and responsible manner with careful attention to the principles
of nuclear deterrence that have evolved. Where these principles are universally
applicable in all regions of the world or not is still to be demonstrated.
Since 1998, the presence of nuclear weapons in South Asia has and further
complicated the already existing tense relations. At the same time, in a curious
way the introduction of nuclear weapons could provide the necessary stability
and incentives to resolve half a century of conflict.
The future will ultimately tell us whether these weapons will prove to be
a boon or a terrible miscalculation. However, we must address the situation
as it exists, relying on both India and Pakistan to use judicious restraint
in their calculations. Undoubtedly, both countries will continue to exercise
their sovereign rights to determine their own course to achieve national security.
The United States can use its good offices from time to time, and can offer
incentives to reduce the danger of the possibility of nuclear conflict in
South Asia, but it is ultimately up to the two states themselves to resolve
outstanding differences.
Within this context, India and Pakistan as nuclear powers remain directly
responsible to the international community to safeguard and protect their
nuclear weapons against accidental detonation or theft by other states or
entities in addition to the adoption of rational nuclear strategies. Here,
the United States can be of assistance. The final segment of this paper will
discuss briefly the assistance programme the United States offered to Russia
and how it has help to insure the safety and security of Russian nuclear weapons.
The Nunn-Lugar, Comprehensive Threat Reduction Initiative
By the late 1980's Soviet nuclear weapons stockpiles achieved their zenith
of some 45,000 warheads of all types. The United States possessed more than
30,000 warheads in the early 1960s, but that number steadily declined over
the next three decades as technological advances permitted fewer individual
weapons. During this period, both sides retired obsolete weapons and reused
nuclear material in more modern designs. The manufacturing process differed
between the sides and neither side had high confidence that its estimates
of the other's total warhead inventory were entirely accurate. This indeterminacy
made verification of data provided under arms control agreements difficult
at best.
Thus, as the Soviet Union moved closer to oblivion, policies and agreements
of the preceding ten years created a growing surplus of nuclear warheads and
their associated equipment. Treaty limited items were eliminated through a
sometimes costly but verifiable process. The glut of nuclear warheads determined
by each side to be surplus, however, required expansion of the existing process
of dismantlement. The United States had the technical and industrial capacity
--- and the money --- to meet the demand. The Soviet Union did not have equal
flexibility or resources to devote to such process. It was not until late
in the day that the United States realized fully the plight of the Soviet
Union in this regard.
The problem of how to deal with the massive Soviet nuclear capability built
up over forty years of conflict and competition became evident in the final
weeks before Soviet collapse. President Gorbachev attempted to achieve a soft
political and economic landing after almost three-quarters of a century of
Communist rule. Cold War attitudes of suspicion and doubt did not give way
easily on either side. The nuclear relationship, the bedrock upon which the
survival of both states rested, was of particular concern.
Both sides took careful steps to maintain stability in the nuclear relationship
in the months and years immediately following the Soviet Union's collapse.
This was accomplished successfully through a cooperative effort of those involved
in policy making, science and technology on both sides in a programme known
by various names: Nunn-Lugar, Safe and Secure Reductions (SSD) and finally
Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR).
The sudden collapse of the Soviet Union raised fears that the potential loss
of control of thousand of deployed strategic and non strategic nuclear weapons
and hundreds of metric tons of nuclear explosive material (NEM) could become
the scenario for a proliferation nightmare. In the late fall of 1991, a bipartisan
effort by Senators Nunn and Richard Lugar to address these dangers passed
the Senate and the final bill became law late in the year. This legislation
authorized the President to transfer up to $400 million from the already-appropriated
defense budget for 1992, making the Department of Defense the key agency engaged
with a period. The Nunn-Lugar programme was a remarkable initiative in response
to extraordinary circumstances. Through the Programme, the United States became
directly engaged in programmes to insure the security of nuclear warheads
and nuclear explosive material in the former Soviet Union, particularly that
made excess to the current needs of Russia. Thus, CTR represents an essential
part of the foundation for a stable U.S. - Russian relationship in the years
ahead.
After a year of negotiations, the sides agreed on a number of individuals
initiatives under the CTR programme. None of these initiatives were perceived
by either party to compromise national security interests:
" Accident Response Equipment: The Russians asked for access to equipment
currently in use by the United States to respond to nuclear accidents or incidents,
particularly those that would involve nuclear weapons themselves. The United
States has provided several million dollars worth of such equipment.
" Rail Car Upgrade: The Soviet Union had long used rail cars for movement
of nuclear weapons. The United States, possessing a greater capability to
move such devices over modern highways, abandoned rail movement decades ago.
Russia requested assistance to upgrade the safety and security of its current
fleet of about 100 rail cars designed for movement of nuclear weapons. This
programme has been successfully completed for more than 100 railcars."
Nuclear Materials Containers: Russia had identified a need for a minimum of
50,000 new containers for nuclear weapons material to be generated by the
dismantlement of nuclear weapons under the START treaties. More than 10,000
containers of agreed design have been fabricated in the United States and
delivered to Russia and more are on the way.
" Nuclear Materials Storage Facility: Russian Minister of Atomic Energy,
Michailov argued early in the process that the Russian Government needed assistance
to build a modern storage facility for nuclear materials removed from weapons
being dismantled in accordance with treaties. At first examination, it appeared
undesirable for the United States to help Russia store such materials, even
for a short period of time. Retention of nuclear materials, even if permitted
by current arms control treaties, would provide Russia with a certain breakout
potential if it determined in the future that the arms limits were not to
its advantage. Thus, the United States was slow to react to this request by
Michailov. However, visits by U.S. officials to certain facilities used in
Russia for the storage and processing of nuclear materials made it evident
that safety and security of the materials were in question. Bechtel Corporation,
the US general contractor for this project, has virtually completed the first
phase of construction and outfitting with total US expenditures in excess
of $ 250 million.
" Transportation Vehicles: Russian officials described the need for armored
vehicles able to transport nuclear weapons from railheads to storage facilities.
Through a NATO consultative process in 1992, the United Kingdom agreed to
provide such vehicles and they have been provided.
" Armoured Blankets: Nuclear weapons were vulnerable to terrorist attack
by relatively unsophisticated weapons during movement from trains to wheeled
vehicles and to and from storage facilities. The Russian side stated the need
for several hundred "armoured blankets" to secure weapons during
this procedure. These armoured blankets have been provided.
" Accounting and Control: Russia recognized the need to establish a state
system of accounting and control for nuclear material. After intense consultations,
an agreed support programme was established using technology supplied by the
United States.
Conclusion
Based upon the United States - Russian experience, there appear to be fruitful
areas for cooperation concerning nuclear armaments between Pakistan and the
United States. Others could be developed considering Pakistan's unique circumstances.
They would provide increased assurance for Pakistan that its nuclear weapons
were safe and secure without compromising its own nuclear doctrine or practice.
For the United States, it would achieve an important non-proliferation objective
to insure that nuclear weapons were protected from inadvertent or accidental
use, or theft by a third party.
Pak - US Relations
The Nuclear Issue
Pakistan 's Nuclear Programme & the
Pak-US Relationship
Dr Shireen M Mazari
The US-Pakistan relationship on the issue of nuclear weapons reflects the
macro-level history of overall US-Pakistan relations.
From the fifties to the sixties, as Pakistan became enmeshed in the US containment
alliances, it also became the recipient of aid and assistance in the field
of nuclear energy. The US Atoms For Peace programme of the fifties allowed
Pakistan not only to become a recipient of a research reactor from the US
but also provided for the training of Pakistani manpower in the nuclear field.
So, the US was not opposed to Pakistan's commitment to nuclear energy - nor
did Pakistan formulate a long-term comprehensive nuclear programme with a
sight to developing nuclear weapons capability - as India had done as early
as 1946 under the able guidance of nuclear scientist Dr Homi Bhabha and the
support of Nehru.
Pakistan, on its part, was an active supporter of the non-proliferation treaty
(NPT) that was being formulated through the UN. However, there was a constant
fear that was expressed by Pakistan - the possibility of India acquiring nuclear
capability and being able to blackmail Pakistan. Hence, Pakistan began seeking
international security guarantees (both negative and positive), which it hoped
would be linked to the NPT. When that did not happen- the sought-after Conference
on the security of non-nuclear weapon states was not allowed to be held till
after the approval of the NPT draft - and the NPT was opened for signature,
Pakistan chose to link its accession with that of India.
The suspension of US military assistance and supply of spares during and after
the 1965 Pakistan-India war was the beginning of the end of the Pak-US alliance
- although in practical terms it has ended during the Sino-Indian conflict
of 1962 after which India received more military and economic assistance from
the US than the latter's formal ally Pakistan. This illustrated the long-term
aim of the US - to make inroads into India given any opportunity, an aim that
is being fulfilled since the disintegration of the Soviet Union.
However, it was the loss of East Pakistan that really brought home to Pakistan
its vulnerability in the face of Indian aggression. The acceptance of Bangladesh
notwithstanding, the trauma of 1971 pervades the psyche of the elite in Pakistan
- just as 9/11 will pervade the US psyche for decades to come. The Indian
nuclear test that followed in 1974 illustrated for Pakistan the extent to
which the Pakistan-US relationship had soured. Although it was India that
had tested, the US and its allies focused on the issue of "what if Pakistan
moves in the nuclear direction?". So India's de facto nuclear status
was ignored and pressure began to be brought against Pakistan in an effort
to get it to sign and ratify the NPT. This was the beginning of the conflict
between Pakistan and the US over the NPT.
Yet Pakistan's search for protection against the nuclear threat from India
made no headway internationally despite a frenzied diplomatic offensive by
Pakistan. Similarly, Pakistan failed to move the international community into
pressurising India on accepting a nuclear-weapon-free-zone (NWFZ) in South
Asia. So Pakistan realised that developing a nuclear weapons capability had
become a necessity given the historical experience and the continuing Indian
threat. The first move in this direction was the signing of the reprocessing
agreement with France in March 1976.
This agreement was seen as a test case for the US and its allies in terms
of the proliferation issue. To begin with, Canada immediately withdrew its
assistance on Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP) despite the fact that this
nuclear power facility was subject of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
safeguards. The US also reacted strongly and put pressure on both France and
Pakistan to cancel the deal. Pressure was put on Pakistan to reconsider its
entire nuclear policy while the US tried to pressurise France into unilaterally
cancelling the deal. In 1976, an election year, President Ford and Kissinger
were under acute pressure to show some influence over Pakistan - especially
from Senators Glen, Chirch, Perry and Ribicoff. Also the India factor played
a critical role since only a year earlier, Ford had lifted the arms embargo
against Pakistan. Kissinger paid the now-infamous visit to Bhutto in August
1976 failed to undermine Pakistan's determination to go ahead with its nuclear
programme - a result of the arms embargoes and the growing perception, that
the US was an unreliable ally. Bhutto's assertion that the nuclear issue was
related to national security and was in any case an "internal matter"
was countered by Kissinger threatening that if the Republicans were undermined
because of their inability to influence Pakistan on the nuclear issue, Carter
would "make a horrible example of you."1 Kissinger did apparently
offer Pakistan 100 A-7s but a formal offer from the US never materialised.
Since Pakistan was unmoved on the reprocessing deal, the US turned to France.
Here, as long as the Gaullists and Chirac were in power, the US was unable
to influence France. However, with Chirac's resignation in August 1976, and
French participation in the London Suppliers' Club, President Giscard immediately
clamped controls on nuclear exports and a new nuclear export policy was announced
in October 1976, after Giscard's visit to the US. In December 1976, the French
government issued an order discontinuing all exports of reprocessing facilities.
Carter's commitment to non-proliferation led the US to target Pakistan in
a manner, which ensured that the nuclear issue became an emotive national
issue within Pakistan and civil society developed an awareness that would
eventually make it difficult for any government to overtly compromise on the
nuclear weapons capability. The French tried to offer alternate technology
still under development and eventually tried a form of economic blackmail
demanding that Pakistan fulfil its economic needs solely from France if it
wanted the reprocessing deal to go through. Pakistan stood firm and the anti-US
sentiment in the country grew, especially since Pakistan had fulfilled all
IAEA safeguard demands regarding the reprocessing facility and there was a
growing awareness of the Carter Administration's total focus on Pakistan and
complete acquiescence to India's nuclear programme.
When the Zia military coup led to Bhutto's overthrow, it was immediately seen
as being the result of Bhutto's commitment to the nuclear programme - and
many in Pakistan still view it in that light - since Bhutto had received direct
warnings to this effect from not only the US ambassador to Pakistan but also
US Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance. Fortunately for Pakistan, the military
could not move away from this programme either, given the highly sensitised
political nature of the issue within Pakistan's domestic polity. Eventually,
the French had to come clean and admit that the reprocessing deal was a non-starter
- although the announcement to the effect finally came from Pakistan. From
this point on, Pakistan realised the need to go the indigenous route - as
India to some degree had done decades earlier - in order to develop a nuclear
capability. In this process it was singled out for punitive actions, one after
another, from the US which had left a legacy of mistrust and suspicion for
the US within the Pakistani state and civil society. Beginning with the Symington-Glenn
Amendment to the International Assistance Act of 1977 and ending with the
sanctions imposed after the 1998 tests, the failure of these punitive actions
in terms of deterring a country from going nuclear were made abundantly clear
as Pakistan went over with its nuclear capability in 1998, in response to
the Indian tests. Of course, by the time the Symington Glenn Amendment came
into being2, Pakistan was not getting any new aid from the US, since the latter
had not signed any new aid agreement with Pakistan after July 1977.
As Pakistan embarked on an indigenous and at times clandestine route to nuclear
capability, in August 1979 there was real fear in Pakistan that the US - through
its commandos or through Israel or India - would attempt to take out the country's
nuclear capability by attacking Kahuta and Nilore so the PAF was put on high
alert. Ironically, India faced no punitive actions for its continuing nuclear
development.
The Soviet incursion into Afghanistan altered the regional situation with
the US having to accept the need for Pakistan's support in building up the
fight against the Soviets in Afghanistan. So the nuclear issue was allowed
to recede into the background. But India too was appeased and shipments of
enriched uranium, that had earlier been held-up, were now allowed for Tarapur
- despite India's no acceptance of full-scope IAEA safeguards. By the time
Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan, Pakistan had become one of the most US-sanctioned-against
country. But, its nuclear programme had developed enough for there to be a
tacit recognition of a basic nuclear capability. Even the advent of Ms Bhutto
to power and her policy of appeasing the West did little to rollback the nuclear
programme although she did cap it for a while.
It was the tests of 1998 that compelled the US to make a major shift in its
non-proliferation policy in terms of a more even-handed approach to the nuclear
issue in South Asia. Since both India and Pakistan had tested overtly, both
would have to be subject to sanctions. In fact, there is a feeling - based
on the growing strategic cooperation between the US and India that has followed
the Indian tests - that had Pakistan not tested, India's tests would have
been accepted by the US and Indian may even have gained some legitimacy for
its nuclear weapon status.
In any event, following the removal of the sanctions in the wake of 9/11,
just as the Pakistan-US macro-level relationship is entering a new phase,
so the relationship on the nuclear issue will also have to be redefined. This
is especially relevant given the US's own shifts on non-proliferation - with
the rejection of the CTBT. There is also a need for the US to have a more
balanced approach to sanctions in relation to weapons development in this
region. Imposing missile sanctions only on Pakistan - as was done in November
2000 - will simply mean a continuing lack of accessibility and mistrust for
the US within Pakistan. The fact that Pakistan is cooperating with the US
in its war on terrorism should not be taken as a signal that Pakistan is now
prepared to re-evolve a strategic partnership with the US. Too many questions
still remain and it is still not politically viable for any Pakistani government
to make an indefinite, long-term commitment to providing the US with military
bases, etc.
In the nuclear field, there is a need to separate the issue of nuclear proliferation
from the issue of nuclear safety and risk reduction - at least within the
context of Pakistan and India, since neither state is going to renounce its
nuclear capability.
There are two levels at which conditionalities have to be created if nuclear
risk reduction is to become a feasible proposition. There is the political
level and there is the technical level. Within these parameters one can put
forward 9 conditions that would be critical for nuclear risk reduction in
South Asia.
One: Moves towards resolution of the most sensitive issue - Kashmir - through
tripartite dialogue between Pakistan, India and the Kashmiris. In the case
of the latter, it would primarily mean the All Parties Hurriat Conference
(APHC) which India has now recognised, de facto, as the representatives of
the Kashmiris in Indian Held Kashmir (IHK) - but Pakistan and the APHC can
be accommodating on this score to include other groups of Kashmiris as well.
Two: Until the conflict is resolved through dialogue - taking into consideration
the realities on the ground in IHK - the maintenance of an effective cease-fire
agreement along the (LoC) becomes an essential condition. For this purpose,
the LoC as prevailed at the end of the 1971 war and as agreed to at Simla,
needs to be reaffirmed in toto which required Indian evacuation of Siachin
and all other territorial grabs made beyond the LoC, since 1972. For until
that is done there is no viable LoC which can be asserted. Without an enduring
cease-fire there will always be the risk of escalation of conflict.
Three: Following from the above, in order to ensure the strict maintenance
of a cease-fire and to prevent infiltration so as to establish trust on both
sides there must be an agreement to place international observers (UN or SAARC)
on both sides of the LoC.
Four: A nuclear dialogue with India aiming to establish nuclear stability.
This would require agreement on limitations in relation to missile deployments
and warheads. In the case of India, Pakistan would be focusing on Pakistan-specific
missiles, and seeking proportional equity in numbers within the Indian triad
spectrum.
Five: Avoidance of military brinkmanship and dangerous military practices
- a condition also identified by Krepon of the Stimson Centre. This would
include restraint from military attacks across the LoC and threatening military
manoeuvres close to the border and LoC. In this context, while nuclear capability
has made limited war a feasible notion for both Pakistan and India, to propagate
such a war also reflects a dangerous adventurism, which must be resisted.
Six: Strengthen existing lines of communication between the two sides and
enforce military CBMs already in place.
Seven: Develop nuclear transparency and national technical means of verification.
With regard to the latter, the US could provide technical know-how which would
allow both sides to develop their own national technical means, which become
crucial for nuclear risk reduction in an environment where trust will be minimal
in the immediate future. Here, not only is there a need for both India and
Pakistan to develop secure command and control structures but to make these
public and thereby transparent. Pakistan has already done so (see attached
chart) but little is known about India's command and control structure - and
India has long lines of communications to secure.
Eight: Secure nuclear systems against accidental war. Here again, the US could
provide the technical assistance.Nine: Institute a permanent nuclear strategic
dialogue structure, which would strengthen trust between the two sides as
well as deal with critical issue rapidly.
In this field of nuclear risk reduction, the US-Russian experience in cooperative
threat reduction can be a viable starting point. The reality on the ground
demands a change in the US approach to the nuclear issue in South Asia and
this needs a shift in the US nuclear policy towards Pakistan. The failed punitive
US policy of the last three decades needs to be replaced by a more pragmatic
approach, which accepts the nuclear reality of South Asia.
Pak - US Relations
Kashmir: Another Fifty Years of Nothing?
Dr Stephen Philip Cohen
A Dismal Future
The most likely future of the Kashmir dispute/conflict is one of hesitant
movements towards dialogue, punctuated by attempts on both sides to unilaterally
press their advantage in Kashmir and in international fora, with a continuing
risk that the conflict will escalate into another limited war, and conceivably
a large scale conventional war with a nuclear holocaust at the end of the
road. It is also likely that the conflict will continue to drain Pakistan
of its most vital resources, and will retard India's emergence as a significant
Asian state. This is a dispute that Pakistan cannot win and India cannot lose,
a "hurting stalemate." Without some fundamental policy changes in
India or Pakistan, the stalemate is likely to continue indefinitely.
Reinforcing this unhappy prospect is the fact that stalemate is more attractive
to each side than most of the many solutions that have been put forward. From
the perspective of some Pakistanis India is being bled, punished for 1971,
and its forces are tied down in Kashmir; cynically, it could be said that
Pakistan is willing to fight India to the last Kashmiri. While President Musharraf
has announced that the various jehadi groups will be wound up - for Pakistan's
own sake can he actually implement such a policy? Afghanistan is one thing
reforming Pakistan at home is another, but Kashmir? It is unlikely that a
state that has made this issue a central focus of its foreign policy for decades
with domestic ramifications throughout the country can spin around quickly
enough to convince a skeptical India that policies have really changed.
For India, Kashmir has so many links to India's secular political order -
especially the place of Muslims - any settlement that appeared to compromise
this order is unacceptable. Kashmir is also linked to broader issues of the
military balance between India and Pakistan, and the very identity of the
two states. While more could be done to ease the suffering of the Kashmiri
people no lasting settlement is possible without dealing with these larger
strategic and ideological concerns.
Ironically, both states have much to gain by a normal relationship. With Kashmir
behind it, India could assume a place among the major Asian and even global
powers. A UN seat would not be out of the question, although it is unlikely
even then. It would not be a matter, as it is now, of Indian power minus Pakistani
power, but of an India free to exercise its influence without the distraction
and the cost of a conflict with a still powerful Pakistan.
For Pakistan, a resolution even a successful management - of Kashmir would
liberate this state from its obsession with history. Pakistan has slipped
rapidly down the ranks of major states; while it will soon be the world's
fifth most populous state, it has the educational and technical resources
of a poor, third world country. It also has the misfortune of being surrounded
by other major states with which it cannot easily compete economically, ideologically,
or strategically. Recently, Pakistan's greatest claim on the resources and
support of others is its threat to come apart or slip into extremism.
In recent years there has been a regional summit, a war, a coup in Pakistan,
another summit, and a major American war in Afghanistan. This war forced Islamabad
to abandon its extremist Taliban allies, with potential far reaching consequences
for Pakistan's domestic politics and support for the radical jehadis in Kashmir.
Yet India seems to have responded to the crisis in Afghanistan by reverting
to an earlier strategy of encirclement of Pakistan, hoping that its relationship
with the United States plus a revived tie with the new Afghan government will
again put it in a strategically dominant position. In the present crisis it
has engaged in a strategy of compellence first used against Pakistani in Kargil
a strategy that involves the threat of the use of force to compel an adversary
to change or modify a policy. However, compellence, even if the results are
beneficial to Pakistan itself, is a strategy likely to reinforce suspicions
of India.
The prognosis, then, is yet another decade of deadlock. Kashmir remains at
the core, but there are other points of conflict. Both states will continue
to acquire and probably deploy nuclear weapons. India is likely to remain
resistant to outside mediation or facilitation of the Kashmir dispute, and
domestic political turmoil in both countries will make it even more difficult
for the next generation of Indian and Pakistani leaders to forge a relationship
that is not grounded on distrust, hostility, and, now, the nuclear threat.
The most problematic issue is not whether Indians or Pakistanis can be trusted
to fulfill obligations incurred in agreements where they had little incentive
to comply, but whether, under the influence of a pessimistic vision of the
region's destiny, they can be trusted in cases where it is in their self interest
to comply.
At best Pakistan may conclude that persistent hostility towards India and
an obsession with Kashmir has done great damage to itself, and Indian leaders
will conclude that some normalization with Pakistan is necessary. This is
the basis for a truce between the two countries, but not the basis for a peace.
For that to occur, there will have to be more profound changes in their deeper
relationship, for they will remain two states allergic to each other without
the development of strong economic, cultural and political ties.
The New American Engagement
The war in Afghanistan against Al Qaeda and the Taliban led, inexorably, to
a new role for the United States in South Asia. Before 9/11 one mid level
American official told me that Washington had "no dog in this fight,
and Washington regarded Pakistan as a minor, even failing state. After the
attack on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center it was discovered that Afghanistan
could not be approached, politically or militarily, without a new relationship
with Pakistan. This, in turn, led to an American interest in India Pakistan
relations, including Kashmir. Numerous presidential phone calls, extensive
cabinet level visits, and an active diplomacy attempted to avert an India
Pakistan conflict while assuring the cooperation of each state in America's
"war on terrorism."
Unsurprisingly, India and Pakistan have exploited American concerns over terrorism
to the point where Washington has become a factor in their rivalry. While
the new India US relationship gave America leverage over Islamabad, the revived
US Pakistan relationship has provided India with the opportunity to practice
coercive diplomacy aimed at both the United States and Pakistan. Pakistan
also has benefited in the form of economic assistance, a higher profile in
Washington, and the revival of its special relationship with America.
However, this situation could be intolerable for the United States. If India
continues its unprecedented military buildup against Pakistan risking an accident
or miscalculation that could quickly escalate to a nuclear war and if Pakistan
does not act decisively to round up groups that have committed terrible atrocities
in India, then Washington should reconsider the fast evolving relationship
with each, and leave them to another 50 years of ruinous rivalry. This is
not the message that either India or Pakistan wants to hear. They are engaged
in a regional blame game, each holding the other accountable for past, present
and future bad deeds and each refusing to accept responsibility for its own
misguided policies in Kashmir.
Pakistanis fear that any compromise on Kashmir, without reciprocal Indian
actions, will lead to more and more Indian demands. Pakistanis do not want
to become "West Bangladesh," a militarily weak state subordinate
to a hegemonic India. India's strategy of compellence runs the risk of precipitating
a Pakistani counter strategy. This could suck the United States into a nasty
regional rivalry with no end in sight.
As for the Indians, they are legitimately angry with Pakistan over the latter's
support for separatist and terrorist groups operating in Kashmir and in India
proper. Yet New Delhi has misgoverned Kashmir for more than 40 years, leading
to a massive popular uprising in the 1980s. Some Indian politicians now talk
of finishing Pakistan off once and for all despite the risk of nuclear war
on the grounds that Pakistan is a "theocracy" and that Islamic Pakistan
is bent on undercutting secular India. Others would like to ignore Pakistan.
Dangerously for Islamabad, the lobby for accommodating Pakistan has shrunk
dramatically, and the attack on Parliament has put enormous pressure on a
BJP led government which came to power offering enhanced security to the people
of India, not more Kargils, hijackings, and terrorist attacks .
A New American Policy
It is not enough, although it is essential, for the United States to point
out the folly of either India or Pakistan pressing the current confrontation
to the point of war. Washington is now engaged in intense crisis aversion
diplomacy, including sharing intelligence with both countries.i This should
be continued, but more is required from America, as well as from India and
Pakistan.
No U.S. administration has addressed the broader India Pakistan problem, including
Kashmir, since 1962 63. The goal of American engagement now should be the
establishment of a South Asia peace process. This need not mean U.S. "mediation,"
which is opposed by New Delhi, but Washington could play a facilitating role
in negotiations that could last for years. This engagement should feature
a special emissary with presidential authority.
Future strategic collaboration with India and Pakistan should be based on
their individual willingness to participate in this process. Besides short
term proposals cessation of support for terrorist groups and Kashmiri separatists
by Pakistan, and the declaration of a cease fire and holding free elections
in Kashmir later this year the United States should not be shy about offering
its own ideas about what the end point in Kashmir would look like. It needs
to encourage debate within India and Pakistan on the Kashmir issue, as a prelude
to dialogue between the two states. India has long had such a debate, one
is now emerging in Pakistan itself.
This paper will not offer a detailed Kashmir "proposal"-there are
already almost as many such proposals as there are Kashmiris. However, it
is clear to almost all observers of the scene that both Pakistan and India
will have to make some concessions if they are to avoid another fifty years
of fruitless confrontation.
The new Pakistani interest in the rights and freedoms of Kashmiris as opposed
to the exhausted legalistic arguments about accession offer one way forward.
India can be held to a high standard on this count, and one could envisage
a semi autonomous Valley, formally within the Indian state, in which international
guarantees protected the rights of Kashmiris (including the now terrorized
Hindu minority).
India will have to take into account legitimate Pakistani concerns about access
to vital resources-e.g. water and the present LOC could be adjusted to give
Pakistan access to Wular lake. A settlement would also have to include a provision
for the demilitarization of the state, and the introduction of limited police
and paramilitary forces to patrol the international border that would replace
the LOC. In all of this China's consent will be important, since it has some
physical and legal investment in the state, and the United States can play
a useful role (beyond that of facilitator) in providing technical and intelligence
assurances that the forces of both states have withdrawn to agreed upon positions.
Indeed, the United States and other major powers should endorse a final agreement
with substantial assistance for the reconstruction of Kashmir's economy.
This, and related proposals, come under the rubric of the "Third Way"
solutions that were discussed widely in India and Pakistan about eleven years
ago. A combination of Pakistan's increased support for jehadi (and non Kashmiri)
groups, and India's brutally repressive response to the uprising in the Valley,
made such solutions seem academic.
It is time that they are revived, this time with American encouragement. This
could be the initial steps in a peace process that down the road might lead
to a fruitful conclusion. If India and Pakistan are not prepared to undertake
such steps, then Washington must reconsider the value of the strategic relationship
with each. A strategic partnership which drags America into an interminable
dispute where there are no vital interests of its own is unsustainable.
Pak - US Relations
Resolving Kashmir Dispute
Dr Ijaz Hussain
Before laying down a prescription on how to resolve the Kashmir dispute, one
needs to understand the true nature of the dispute itself in the present day
context. This is necessary because the issue has got confused as, following
the September 11 terrorist attack on the World Trade Centre, any freedom movement
associated with Islam has become suspect. The issue of Kashmir has come to
be increasingly viewed by the West, particularly the US, from India's perspective
who regards the armed resistance taking place in the Indian administered Kashmir
as "cross border terrorism" pure and simple rather than that of
Pakistan and Kashmiris who regard it as a genuine freedom struggle. Here the
question arises as to what is the true nature of the armed resistance going
on in Kashmir? Is it a terrorist activity or a freedom struggle? To answer
this question, one needs to go back in history.
The Kashmir dispute from the time it was taken to the United Nations at the
Indian behest was required under the UNCIP resolutions of 13 August 1948 and
5 January 1949 [It is noteworthy that these resolutions are legally binding
because though adopted under Chapter V1 of the UN Charter they were negotiated
as bilaterally binding agreement by India and Pakistan. India declared them
as a solemn treaty and further accepted this interpretation in a UN Security
Council debate in 1957] to be resolved though the exercise of the right of
self-determination by Kashmiris under an UN-administered plebiscite. Fearing
debacle in case of a plebiscite India tried to wriggle out of its commitment
on a number of grounds including the contention that the right was duly exercised
by Kashmiris through their representatives when the latter put their seal
of approval on Kashmir's accession to India in the State Assembly. The UN
Security Council rejected the latter contention on two occasions in 1951 and
1957 on the ground of the latter's lack of authority to decide the future
affiliation of the State.
Another attempt to deny Kashmiris their right of self-determination has been
made by India on the ground that by making the settlement of the future of
Jammu and Kashmir exclusively a matter for bilateral negotiations between
India and Pakistan, the Simla Agreement thereby effectively excluded any exercise
of the right of self-determination by Kashmiris except to the extent that
it was agreed upon by both India and Pakistan. The International Commission
of Jurists, a Geneva-based independent body in a major study on Kashmir published
in 1995 rejected the Indian contention in these words: "However, the
peoples of Jammu and Kashmir were not parties to the [Simla] Agreement and
neither India nor Pakistan, both of which had conflicts of interest with the
peoples of Jammu and Kashmir can be regarded as having authority to bind them.
The members of the ICJ mission do not see, therefore, how the Simla Agreement
can be regarded as having deprived the peoples of Jammu and Kashmir of any
rights of self-determination to which they were entitled at the time of the
Agreement".
Always anxious to repudiate its obligation to implement the Kashmiris' right
of self-determination, India tried to paint the armed resistance which broke
out in 1989 against the Indian rule in Kashmir as a terrorist activity. In
the beginning it did not have much success. However, in the wake of the end
of the Cold War, things started cheering up for India as the West, particularly
the US, was getting weary of the right of the self-determination. During the
1990s subsequent to the emergence of new States on the ashes of the Soviet
Union the West was inclined towards maintenance of the status quo as part
of the new world order by opposing the further fragmentation of the existing
State system. Perhaps the best evidence of the changed political order was
the statement made by President Clinton in the year 2000 in which he warned
Pakistan against trying to change borders with blood. The destruction of the
twin towers on 11 September further strengthened the US resolve in the matter
as under their debris got buried the right of self-determination. India which
had started harping on the theme of "cross border terrorism" in
Kashmir soon often the Kargil crisis in 1999 seems to be one of the major
beneficiaries of the tectonic shift in the prevailing political order. The
terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament on 13 December whether stage-managed
by the Indians or engineered by the jihadi parties from Pakistan seems to
have provided India with sufficient grist to denounce the militancy in Kashmir
as nothing but terrorism.
Despite the apparent Indian success in selling the armed resistance in Kashmir
as a terrorist activity, the fact remains that waged in pursuance of Kashmiris'
yet to be exercised right of self-determination it is a genuine freedom struggle.
Additionally it is intrinsically indigenous and if there has been support
from outside, Jihadi or otherwise, that alone cannot render it a terrorist
activity except if we believe that the Islamic character of the armed resistance
renders it a terrorist activity as seems to be the thinking in the US today?
Incidentally such support is legitimate by virtue of the UN General Assembly
resolution 2625 of 1970 which authorizes armed resistance against the repressive
machinery of the State concerned to seek and receive support from outside
in accordance with the principles and purposes of the charter. The shrieking
example in this respect is the support received during the Soviet occupation
of Afghanistan when an estimated 25,000 outsiders joined the Afghan resistance.
In any case, the ultimate touchstone of any genuine freedom struggle is the
quantum of support it receives from the masses. In the case of Kashmir, serious
and knowledgeable observers including those from India agree that the armed
resistance there has an overwhelming support of the masses who are totally
alienated from India. Consequently, the armed resistance in Kashmir is undeniably
a freedom struggle and not a terrorist activity.
Having discovered and identified the nature of the armed resistance in Kashmir,
we propose to spell out the process that the two countries should approach
to move things forward in Kashmir. Following the resumption of talks which
the two countries are bound to undertake sooner or later, India needs to acknowledge
the disputed character of Kashmir. Such a declaration would constitute a quantum
jump in the march towards peace in South Asia, as it would completely transform
the chemistry of relationship between the two countries. Secondly, the two
countries would need to go beyond their officially stated positions on Kashmir
as settlement on the basis of their traditional positions is out of the question.
This is so, for example, because a unitary plebiscite for the whole State
of Jammu and Kashmir as it existed in 1947 envisaged under the UN Kashmir
resolutions in view of the existing ground realities is not possible. What
is however possible is regional plebiscites as envisaged under the Sir Owen
Dixon formula.
The settlement which seems to be finding favour in the West is the so-called
"Andorra solution" which has been proposed by Alastair Lamb in the
last book of his trilogy on Kashmir entitled "Incomplete Partition".
He favours retention without plebiscite of Ladakh and Jammu by India and of
Northern Areas by Pakistan because in view of the composition of the population
of these areas he deems the outcome of plebiscites as obvious. Next he proposes
that both Azad Kashmir and the Vale should be declared autonomous regions,
each with its internal self-government but with defence and external relations
in the hands of Pakistan in the case of Azad Kashmir and India in the case
of the Vale. He wants the degree of external military presence in both to
be carefully defined by a joint Indo-Pakistani agreement, which would also
guarantee the autonomy of two regions. He argues this Indo-Pakistani agreement
to be supplemented by an Azad Kashmir-Vale of Kashmir agreement defining a
special relationship between the two autonomous regions. In one or other,
or perhaps both, of these agreements such matters as right of entry and exit
(from and to India and Pakistan), citizenship, foreign trade, economic development
and the like could be laid down. Local elections in the two autonomous regions
could, first, ratify the arrangement and, second, provide an outlet for the
frequently expressed wish of Kashmiris for free and unfettered self-government,
at least in domestic matters.
The problem with this solution is that it is more or less a rehash of the
Indian proposal for internal autonomy that has been on the table for Kashmiris
and Pakistan since long. The former Indian Prime Minister Narasima Rao is
on record having said that sky was the limit that India was prepared to go
for autonomy in Kashmir. It is obvious that the Indian promise of the grant
of autonomy is a tactical concession that will most certainly evaporate with
the passage of time as it happened in the past. In the Indian case the saying
that once is too many holds true. Otherwise too resort to this solution would
signify reversion to the nineteenth century politics whereby territorial settlements
were made taking into considerations the interests of the colonial powers
rather than those of the inhabitants of the territories in question. This
is totally unacceptable today at the start of the new millenium, particularly
when the right of self-determination is accepted as a principle of jus cogens
or simply put as a peremptory norm from which there cannot be any departure.
Now it is a fact that Kashmiris have been denied the right of self-determination
that was promised to them by the Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and
by the United Nations. It is also a fact that they have struggled for the
realization of this right through an armed resistance for more than a decade
for which they have made enormous sacrifices. It is an undeniable fact that
Muslim Kashmiris of the Vale who are in overwhelming majority they do not
regard themselves as Indians [It is worth recalling that Sheikh Abdullah in
the 1960s when Kashmiris were not alienated as today wrote the word "Kashmiri"
in the nationality column when applying for the passport for Haj purposes].
In view of the foregoing how can the "Andorra solution" be accepted?
Perhaps a way out could be that for the sake of peace the proposed solution
is accepted contingent on the condition that a plebiscite is held after a
period of ten years in order to determine whether Kashmiris would like to
continue under the existing dispensation or they would like some other arrangement
like independence or accession to Pakistan or India.
Pak - US Relations
Afghanistan and Pakistan in the Three Asias
Dr Marvin G. Weinbaum
Afghan reconstruction occupies center stage for the international community
in the post Taliban era. Without progress in humanitarian relief efforts leading
toward rehabilitation of the economy and physical infrastructure, it is doubtful
that a stable, peaceful Afghanistan can emerge. But a meaningful recovery
for the country requires, along with progress within its borders, greater
regional prosperity and strengthened linkages with its neighbors. For Afghanistan,
in effect, belongs in three Asias - West, Central, and Southern compassing
most of the states of the Middle East's northern tier, the subcontinent, and
the largely Muslim states of the former Soviet Union. The three regions have
shown increasing interdependence, and their potential for further integration
is considerable. What happens in Afghanistan could be determinant. At the
same time, the economic improvement and progressive political developments
within countries within the region will affect the prospects for Afghanistan's
recovery. No state is more critical to Afghanistan's future than Pakistan.
While the Taliban remained in power, the three Asias and much of the international
community were concerned about issues of security, narcotics, human rights,
and radical ideology in Afghanistan. These concerns have not entirely disappeared,
but each now stands some chance of improvement. In the shadow of Taliban rule,
neighboring countries' preoccupation with defensive, coping strategies delayed
and distorted economic developments long underway across the wide region,
created new cleavages among ethnic groups, and suspicions across borders.
But many of these tensions and antagonisms resulting from Taliban rule are
now expected to ease. In their place, a greater degree of cooperation appears
feasible.
Pakistan as Stake Holder
In view of Afghanistan is pivotal regional role, Pakistan has an enormous
stake in the success of the political formula formulated for Afghanistan in
Bonn. This stake is far different than Islamabad's military motivated investment
in strategic depth that for two decades dictated a manipulative relationship.
What is unchanged is the recognition that the futures of the two countries
remain closely bound. Neither can feel secure or expect to prosper if the
other fails. If the process begun at Bonn falters badly, other states in the
broad region will also feel the impact, but none will bear the consequences
so heavily. Or should Musharraf's vision for a de radicalized Pakistan be
upended, the prospects for moderate, progressive, Islamic states elsewhere
will dim, but nowhere more than in Kabul.
If Islamabad hopes to see a positive outcome in a post Taliban Afghanistan,
its approach must differ sharply from the recent past. There can be no repeat
of the kind of relationship that existed when Pakistan orchestrated the jihad
and, in the 1990s, sought to create a dependable client state. In the end,
it did not work for the interests of Pakistan, certainly not for Afghanistan.
The future relationship must be based on a greater mutuality of interests.
The results will not always fit Pakistan preferences, but, on balance, they
will not be threatening to Pakistan and could offer new opportunities. To
break from the past, the instrument of Pakistan policy will surely have to
be its diplomats and not its security services. The demise of the Taliban
severed most of the connections between those services and radical elements
in Afghanistan. But a more thorough ISI housecleaning is probably in order
to prevent old ties, based on ideology, ethnicity, and personal gain, from
reappearing.
The current set of leaders in Afghanistan appear anxious to develop a constructive
relationship with Pakistan. This is notwithstanding the personal ties that
several of them have with India and a historic inclination of Afghan governments
to see India as a counterweight to an overbearing Pakistan. The new generation
of leaders appreciate the necessity of cooperative policies with Pakistan
in order to consolidate power and lead a recovery. At the same time, they
are understandably wary of actions from Pakistan that might be interpreted
as undermining their government. Pakistan has to appreciate this and strive
to allay these concerns.
There are of course many ways in which the Islamabad government could place
its relationship with Kabul on a sound footing. Some of these steps have already
been taken in the way that the Musharraf government accepted the Bonn accord
and has since sought to normalize diplomatic ties. Pakistan has also made
tentative offers of economic cooperation and assistance. But much more is
called for, some of it symbolic, more of it measurable. The relationship will
be judged by how Pakistan handles the problem of the refugees. Both countries
can work in concert to facilitate their repatriation. Pakistan and Afghanistan
can cooperate in the area of drug enforcement. Most important is the good
faith shown in trade and transit arrangements that have so often irritated
bilateral relations in the past.
The benefits will not be one sided. Over the next ten years, if reconstruction
proceeds as planned, enormous capital investment will flow to Afghanistan.
The staging area for much of this will be Pakistan, which can serve as the
source of much of the needed resources, human and material. Much as during
the 1980s, for very different reasons, Pakistan stands to prosper. Merely
being relieved of the burden of Afghan refugees will be welcomed news for
Pakistan budget.
But even if the economic and political outcomes in Afghanistan are largely
positive, Pakistan cannot be merely a derivative beneficiary. The same international
players that are focused on aiding Afghanistan can ill afford to lose sight
of the way in which the country's future is contingent on the stability and
economic growth among its neighbors, Pakistan most of all. Parallel with assistance
to Kabul governments, there must be programmes for Pakistan that allow for
its own economic recovery and lay the foundation for political continuity
under democratic institutions. In order to attract this assistance, Pakistan
will need to demonstrate its own determination to pursue an open society in
which economic freedom and the rule of law are realized far more than at present.
Improved governance must include sorting out constitutional issues that assure
minority rights and establish a better balance between the powers of the military
and the political class. Even then the country may not succeed unless both
realism and principal point the way to new policies o
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