| |
|
|
| |
|
         
|
IPRI PAPER 7
Rise of Extremism in
|
|
T |
he South Asian region currently faces grave security threats due to the increasing extremism and terrorist activities within its states. The politics of violence and extremist trends in South Asia can be linked to the contradictions arising out of faulty national policies. In each case, the nature and the political economy of the state have been instrumental in one way or another in the creation of current crisis. The South Asian states tend to function in the interests of a coalition of classes and ethnic groups or the military-bureaucratic oligarchy, which directly influence national development policies and the distribution of resources. The dynamics of the uneven development patterns in South Asia has been among the predominant causes of violence in the region.[1] Interference from the external powers, from neighbouring and extra-regional elements (both as official sponsorship and by independent groups) has given a dangerous tilt to the existing volatile situation.
South Asia accounts for one fifth of the world population in seven distinctive states, housing around 43 per cent of the global poverty. The per capita GNP of the region is around $440, which is among the lowest in the world and its share in global income remains less then 2 per cent.[2] Even though it is a resource-rich region, whose potential has yet to be fully tapped, the human development sector remains a low priority, and according to a survey approximately 46 per cent of world’s illiterate population lives in South Asia.[3] With such a human development index, the region remains one of the most explosive regions of the world.
Presently, South Asia is facing multi-faceted challenges, both as a region and as inter-state relations. Apart from the dominant Indo-Pak conflictual relationship, the region remains trapped in a mosaic of crisis ranging from the quest for autonomy, terrorism, conflicting political interests, ethnic and sectarian conflicts. The region’s vast potential is hostage to unresolved inter-state and intra-state conflicts. In addition to such conflicts, the states of the region are also locked in a host of bilateral territorial disputes, as well as disputes over water sharing of common rivers, refugee and migration problems.[4] In most of the states, democracy and democratic institutions have failed to strengthen and other social problems such as unemployment, social injustice, poverty along with self-interest politics have obstructed socio-economic development of the region. Besides, the slow transition to modernity, among these South Asian states, political culture has also led to ethnic solidarities and identification with religion and culture.[5]
The most potent threat to security of the region emanates from the complex interplay of domestic, regional and international factors. These factors deepen the crisis in the region, where societies are already fragmented along with caste and community; and with linguistic, regional and cultural differences. Many of the internal security crisis that plague South Asian states, have cross-border implications and are inter-related with ramifications for regional security.[6] The worsening of the security situation and the rise in extremism in many of South Asian states is also related to the outside interference. The recent years have also witnessed marked rise of extremist elements and terrorist activities in most of the regional states. The spread of the ‘spheres of extremism’ in South Asia has created an immensely complicated situation in an already turmoil-ridden environment. The rise of extremism has lead to greater terrorist incidents, and terrorism, as broadly understood, has been playing a critical role in influencing the current thrust of bilateral relations in the region.[7]
Before analysing the on-ground realities of the region, it will be pertinent to define and identify the types of extremism prevalent in the region, while also trying to understand the concept of terrorism in the context of South Asia and its ramifications on the regional security. “Extremism”, as defined in Merriam Webster dictionary, “is a quality or state of being extreme, especially advocacy of extreme political measures”. It can also be described as a, “political theory savouring immoderate, uncompromising policies”.[8] Extremism is closely associated with terrorism, as the rise of extremism can also lead to increase in terrorist agendas. Terrorism can be understood, as “a series of acts intended to spread intimidation, panic, and destruction in a population”.[9] It can also be defined as “threat or use of violence, often against civilian population and social ends to intimidate opponents or to publicize grievances”.[10]
Rise of extremism and terrorism has taken place in South Asia for a variety of reasons, like political and social perpetration by tyrannical and aggressive governments and groups of rebels, within a socio-political environment of oppressive cultural norms, social injustice, ideological contradictions, rigid religious beliefs and foreign interference. While, socio-economic factors like poverty, unequal job opportunities, hunger, backwardness and unemployment have added in the worsening of situation.[11] However, the contributory factors of terrorism have roots in the socio-economic inequalities and politically manipulative processes.[12]
Terrorism and its political consequences have directly and visibly affected interstate relations in South Asia and have also lead to destabilization in the region. With marked rise of extremism and increasing terrorist activities, particularly in the past decade, the South Asian region has the highest annual number of fatalities as a result of acts of terrorist violence in the world. Ethnic, ideological and political conflicts, which are consolidating along with the worsening socio-economic conditions, pose a serious threat to internal stability and interstate relations. [13]
Since the early 1990s, ideology-based violence has increased all over the region. This entails religious dimensions such as the ‘Hindutva’ ideology of the RSS and its Sangh Parivar in India, as well as political ideologies such as the Moasit movement in Nepal, with its cross-border linkages to the Naxalite movement in India. Hindu nationalism, in India, has given rise to its brand of politico-religious fundamentalism and this has been exploited by the ‘political entrepreneurs’ to gain political mileage.[14] However, this Hindu ‘nationalism’ has been religious only in the sense that Hindu ‘nationalists’ have made use of religion for their political ends. The role of religion-based organizations such as Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) and Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh (RSS) has been pre-dominant one in inciting the religious confrontation in the Indian political scene. This religion-based politics helped Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in getting more votes from the Hindu majority,[15] and it enabled BJP and its parent organization - RSS[16]- to use extremism to further their political interests. The rise of the Hindutva ideological political party to power has not only promoted violence against minorities but also set an agenda for the re-conversion of Muslims and Christians.[17]
In Pakistan, the roots for ‘Islamic Fundamentalism’ were laid during Zia’s rule, when the government funds collected as ‘zakat’ were provided for establishing madrassas (religious schools), leading to rapid growth of militant religious organizations. During the same period foreign funded sectarian madrassas also grew all around the country. This process was catalysed by the Afghan war and the US support for Jihad.[18] Zia also initiated the process of Islamisation of society and his policies encouraged the formation of militant groups to fight Afghan war, against Soviets. After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the shift in US interests left Pakistan’s government alone to deal with the increased militancy in the country.
The subsequent governments in the post-Zia period did not have means or the political will to curtail the activities of and deweaponize the militant outfits. Later the influence of the religious parties and militant organizations was further accelerated by the US led war on terrorism and Pakistan’s decision of joining it. This also politically favoured religious parties, which had earlier remained in background and had failed to achieve any prominent political position, to come into power as a result of October 2002 elections. They are main opposition in centre and have formed governments in North West Frontier province (NWFP) and Baluchistan. These parties have capitalised on anti-Americanism, particularly in NWFP and Baluchistan, and have pursued a radical political, social and cultural agenda.[19]
This ideological extremism and use of religion in politics has created a very dangerous situation for the region. The extremist parties are using religion and ideology to ignite public sentiments and are creating instability with in societies. This has also led to rise of sectarianism in Pakistan and communalism in India. The unprecedented sectarian violence against the Sikhs in Delhi and other parts of India, following the assassination of Indira Gandhi by her Sikh bodyguards in October 1984, resulted in killing of 2,000 people.[20] Later following the Godhra train incident, the communal riots in Indian Gujarat in 2002 left almost 2,000 Muslims dead, at the hands of right wing Hindus. The Gujarat state government was accused of complicity in the program by the appointed investigation tribunal, but BJP reaped the benefit of stirring extremist Hindu passion in a huge win in state elections in mid-December 2002.[21] The political parties for their vested interests utilized these events.
In the early years, there had been clashes between Ahmadiyya community and other politico-religious groups in Pakistan, especially in 1953 most violent confrontation among Ahmadies and other sects took place,[22] which was mainly the result of political manipulation of different political agents. The formation and consolidation of Shia and Sunni militant organizations in 1980s has intensified the sectarian clashes, which began as a result of Zia’s Islamic policies and Iranian revolution of 1979. With Pakistan’s participation in US led war on terrorism since September 2001, these sectarian clashes have regained momentum, while the madrassa culture has also accentuated existing sectarian cleavages.[23] Since 9/11, there had been violent attacks against the Shia community in different parts of the country, particularly in Baluchistan, which had been relatively peaceful, as far as sectarian harmony is concerned.
In Bangladesh too, Islamic elements are on the rise in Bangladesh and extremist influence is growing, especially in the countryside[24] and ‘political Islam’, envisaged by General Zia in late 1970s, seems to be paying rich dividends. With the influx of alumni from the estimated 64,000 madrassas in Bangladesh, and lesser opportunities available in employment sector, militant Islam is on increase.[25] As a result of the October 2001 elections, religious parties have come into power. Bangladesh National Party (BNP) has formed government in coalition with Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI). Although these religious militants are not as strong as in Pakistan or in India, but their inclusion in government is certainly a change in the traditional government formation style. This has indirectly strengthened the radical groups, which now act as if they have gained impunity to operate.[26]
In Nepal the Maoist uprising, which began in 1996, is now the major security challenge for Nepal, having affected most of the 75 districts of the state. In November 2001, the government imposed emergency in the country.[27] The Maoist insurgency is an outcome of political instability and socio-economic backwardness. The increasing violence has led to killing of more then 7,800 people since 1996 and devastated the Nepalese economy, which was heavily dependent on tourism.[28] The Maoist guerrillas have been successful in attracting the frustrated rural poor, and have become a major challenge to the present government.
Another type of extremism plaguing South Asia is of ethnic dimension. The worst victim of ethnic violence has been Sri Lanka, where since 1983 ethnic clashes among Sinhalese and Tamil, has grown in ferocity, leading to Indian interference in the island through Indian Peace Keeping Forces (IPKF) in 1987. The Liberation of Tamil Tigers Eelam (LTTE) has strengthened since then and the ethnic clash has claimed over 60,000 civilian lives.[29] Despite several rounds of talks between government and the Tamil guerrillas, no compromise could be reached and with the current political crisis in the island, even the renewed peace talks have again come to a halt. No chances apparently exist to resolve the issue in near future.
Ethnic violence has also been a feature in the politics of other South Asian
countries. There had been from time to time clashes in both states on ethnic
differences. In Pakistan, Karachi has been the main target of ethnic clashes.
Particularly in early 1990s, with Muhajir Quami Movement (MQM), (which was
created by the intelligence agencies during Gen. Zia’s period, to counter
Bhutto’s political hold in Sindh), taking up violent means, the law and order
situation worsened. The ethnic divide also sharply exists among the smaller
provinces over the share Punjab province enjoys in governance and resources.
India, has also, from time to time, faced ethnic violence in different areas,
such as, Nagaland, Manipur, Mizoram and Assam. There had been widespread riots
in Assam in 1983 against the ‘aliens’ (the Bangladeshi migrants), in which
1,200 were killed. Bangladesh has also been facing problems in the Chittagong
Hill Tracks (CHT) and also in other parts of the country. The issue of
Rohingyas community has also created ethnic problem for the state. In Bhutan,
the illegal immigration from Nepal has also become a thorny issue and
Bhutanese government is making efforts along with the Nepalese government to
resolve the issue peacefully.[30]
The next section
discusses the causes and the factors that have led to the rise of extremism in
South Asia.
Rise of
Extremism: The leading factors in South Asia
The governments of South
Asian states have not been able to provide their people with the basic,
minimum human security since these states became independent. Governments and
ruling classes, instead of focusing on dealing with the issues of human
survival and development, embarked upon perpetuating their power and
influence. Subsequently, no South Asian country has been able to free itself
from discriminatory and exploitative policies, which increased insecurity and
led to the rising number of communal and terrorist outfits. Despite the
problems these outfits have created, no serious government efforts were made
to curtail the rise in extremist trends.
In the post-independence decades no South Asian state has been able to resolve the dilemma in the relationship between religion and politics.[31] Rather the crisis is getting severe because of the inability of states to establish stable governance, and create sustainable economic conditions, giving the extremist elements chance of taking advantage of the situation. The break up of colonial empire has also left these multi-ethnic states with the legacy unnatural boundaries resulting in intensified ethnic disturbances. This ethnic diversity that characterizes South Asian states, also at times translated into conflict as the result of manipulation by different groups for their own interest.[32]
There exists a clear linkage between the lack of security and the phenomenon of terrorism in South Asian states. All of the regional states are facing the menace of terrorism in one or another form. The state actors in South Asia have been unable to deal with pending issues in a just, fair and professional manner, which has translated into frustration and anger among certain section of societies, leading to various acts of terrorism. In addition to these, exploitation and persecution of minorities and other weaker sections of society by the majority and the state forces for political gains, also creates conditions for growth of terrorism.[33]
Indian social scientist, Rajni Kothari identifies three factors, which consolidated the process of tyranny in Indian state, in 1970s. These are: the equation of electoral process with democratic politics, the decline of state from an adjudicator of national interests to a criminal persona, and the perception that development is a techno-bureaucratic enterprise. Basic to all these aspects is the marked decline in the importance and authenticity of institutions. This also reflects the inability of politics to translate the diversity of interests. Although, he looks at this issue in the context of the pluralism of Indian society, it has relevance to other South Asian countries, where diversity exists in a different way. This phenomena has led to rise of communalism in India, while, its manifestation in Pakistan has been sectarian and ethnic in nature. In Sri Lanka, language as an issue has reflected into ethnic-based differences in Sinhala-Tamil confrontation beside economic inequality. Bangla nationalism has given rise to political factionalism and now the threat of religious extremism is also gaining momentum. In all these countries, these issues have created a serious situation because of rising violent movements and terrorist incidents.[34]
The violent campaigns in the South Asian countries today, led by a variety of parties and organizations appear to enjoy ideological sanctions. This has facilitated the political parties and the ruling elite to take advantage of the situation, for their vested political interests. Along with religion, politics and ethnicity another element that has played an important role in the mix of religion and politics in South Asia is ethnicity. Although the ethnic and religious nationalist movements have been powerful throughout South Asia’s history but the governments of these states too have failed to envisage policies to curtail the momentum of these movements.[35]
Another dimension of the internal security problems of the regional states is that of illegal immigration, the proliferation of small arms alongside the menace of drug trafficking and narco-terrorism. Each of these issues has significant trans-national dimensions. This feature not only complicates the situation for the respective countries but also negatively affects the inter-state relations.
There are similarities in the domestic and external dimensions of terrorism, threatening the South Asian states. Internally suppression of political rights, poverty, economic backwardness, use of religion and ethnicity in politics and poor governance on the part of the state regarding the issues of human security has led to an increase in violence. The external dimension has been foreign patronage to local organizations training and supporting the terrorist groups, and also their indirect support to terrorist groups by using non-governmental groups and media.[36] Many of the South Asian countries blame each other for supporting the terrorist groups within their territories. Unresolved domestic issues create a fertile ground for terrorism to take root, while the external interference and support has further strengthened the terrorist networks. This phenomenon is true for all the states in South Asia and is explained in details in the subsequent sections.
Three main factors can be identified as being responsible for the growth of extremism in the region. The worsening economic conditions, with a very high population, which is around 1366 million, growing at the rate of 1.7 per cent[37], is creating frustration and insecurity among the masses. Poor governance and foreign interference have added to the instability and insecurity of the region. This is happening through out South Asia, although the time periods, dynamics and importance of these factors may vary, but these basic factors are present in all of the countries. These aspects are discussed in details below:
Deteriorating Economic Conditions
During 1990s, South Asia has witnessed a marked rise in poverty because of deteriorating economic conditions. The region is home to the poorest with 43 per cent of the worlds’ poor surviving with less than a dollar a day and the rapid urbanization is giving an explosive dimension to the widespread poverty and human deprivation. With rapidly growing population, the governments have failed to develop the social sectors and in providing basic human security to their populations. Although the estimates of the incidence of poverty vary widely in the region, however, the basic fact remains that all the South Asian countries are deeply entrenched in increasing poverty. According to UNDP’s report for year 2000, there has been an increase in number of poor during the 1990s, with the exception of Sri Lanka.[38]
Although there has been an overall annual average GDP growth rate of 5.7 per cent, in the region during 1990-96, but this was not very different from the one experienced during 1980-90. Except in Pakistan, where GDP growth has been lower in 1990s compared to 1980s, other South Asian countries experienced gains in their GDP growth rates during 1990s. However, the rate of GDP growth since 1997 has shown deceleration in overall growth in the region.[39] Hence even after more then a decade not much substantial economic development took place in the region, while the economic disparity widened.
Poor economic growth in the region, led to the problems of mass unemployment, hunger and malnutrition, health problems and income inequality all of which are growing and alongside the increase in population growth. The key human development indicators show a dismal picture of the region.[40] South Asia’s share in world’s adult population in year 2001 was 22 per cent, while its share in world’s adult illiteracy by year 2000 was 50 per cent.[41] The region is among the most illiterate regions with over 614 million illiterate adults, and also most malnourished with around 50 per cent of the region’s children under the age of 5 years are malnourished.[42] During the period of 1990-2001, 32.2 per cent of the total population of the region lives under poverty line with less than $1 a day.[43]
The multi-dimensional profile of poverty and human development index had a far-reaching impact on the society and its behaviour. South Asia has become a breeding ground of crime and violence[44] and with increasing insecurity and vulnerability; the competing interests have pitted caste and communal groups against each other. The economic inequalities and deprivation has created frustration and insecurity among the masses, leading to an increasing criminalisation of society in which there are available targets for exploitation by the extremist elements in and outside governments.
Government Policies
Along with the deteriorating economies of South Asia, governmental policies have accentuated the extremist trend in all these states. Governments, in these countries, whether civil or military, have used the religion and ethnic card, in order to prolong and strengthen their rule, further strengthening the fundamentalists and extremists in the society. Many of the ruling parties are known to have links with the extremist elements and have covertly supported them, as well as used them to create violence for conducting manipulative politics. Each South Asian state manifests the impact of mal-governance in one way or another.
India, hailed as the largest democracy of the world, is like other South Asian states facing the frightening trend of criminalisation of its modern state. Indian social scientists have pointed to the inequalities in the society and the developmental divide, which has provided the environment for the criminalisation of politics and the resultant terrorism within sections of Indian society. The decades of unending inequality, misery and poverty has created a feeling of deprivation among the masses, leading to the communally-based or regionally-based demands.[45] The political process instead of dealing with the inequality has further widened the gap and the political parties have exploited the situation for their political ends.
Pakistan till today is facing the crisis of determining a relationship between the state and the religion, often leading to crisis of governance. This confusion has helped political parties to take advantage of the situation according to their respective interests. The use of religion in national politics was present since the independence, as the partition of sub-continent was on the basis of a religious identity. Though over the following decades, the role of religion remained ever-present, however, the politicisation of religion was inducted in Zia’s period, when in order to legitimise and prolong his rule, Zia introduced Islamic laws, such as Hudood ordinance, Shariat Act and established Islamic courts with powers to declare any law repugnant to the injunctions of Islam. Later during the government sponsored madrassas, this later became a training ground of religious militants. Subsequent governments also used religion to varying degrees, and with the deteriorating human, economic and security conditions, fundamentalism grew often translating into terrorist activities.
Bangladesh is
also witnessing the consequences of the Gen. Zia-ur-Reman’s politicisation of
religion, which eventually led to the surfacing of the Jamat-i-Islami.
Religion as a political weapon is becoming more and more influential in
politics as well as in society. Most of the political parties, whether in
power or not, despite their commitment to the secular nature of the State, use
the religion card in electoral politics.[46]
Similar trends are visible in Sri Lanka and Nepal, where government policies
instead of dealing with the lack of human security have used the deprived
class, using religion and ethnic identities to consolidate their hold and same
card is used by the opponent political forces.
External Interference
The extremist trends have been boosted in the South Asian countries due to the interference by the extra-regional and neighbouring countries in the internal affairs of the states. The outside powers have either supported the governments or a particular communal or ethnic group or extremist elements, in pursuit of their interests. And this has been a major factor affecting South Asian politics since the early years of these states. The impact of the colonial masters, the British Empire’s policies on the political and social dynamics of the region are still very much evident. The partition of the states without giving due consideration to the ethnic and communal diversification, which being an indigenous character existed even at the district level, sharpened the ethnic divisions and is to a great extend responsible for the separatist movements and the ethnic crisis, which the region is facing today. The present day South Asia is also facing the interference from the external powers, which has accelerated the process of radicalisation of the societies and politics.
Most of the ethnic movements in South Asia are cross-border and inter-related, exacerbating the intensity of these movements. The inter-state demographic migration and displacement intensified the ethnic identities within these sates. The separatist and ethnic movements have also been supported from across the border, by the governments or any particular group, for its interests. Like the Tamil rebels group in Sri Lanka, is known to have links and has received support and been sponsored by the Indian government and the ethnic Tamil population in India. Similarly the Maoist in Nepal is known to have collaboration and sponsorship from India. The Kashmiri separatist movement in India has received support from the Pakistan. And the Bangla national movement, which, resulted in partition of Pakistan and formation of Bangladesh, was also strongly aided by Indian government.
Extra-regional actors have also played an important role in accelerating extremism in the region. To counter Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979, the United States supported and sponsored the Pakistani government and also the Jihadi groups during the period 1979-1989, which in post-1990 period became a threat for the security and stability of Pakistan. Similarly Iran after Iranian revolution of 1979 has openly been supporting the elements in Pakistan and also in Bangladesh to promote their version of Islam. Saudi Arabia has also been involved in similar activities. This led to strengthening of religious parties with extremist leaning and boosted the madrassa culture in Pakistan. After Soviet withdrawal and diminishing of US interests in the region, Pakistan was left in a complete lurch for dealing with the menace of terrorism and extremism spread over the decade of its war against Soviets. With the 9/11 incident, Pakistan once again became a frontline state in the war against terrorism. The renewed interference by US in Pakistan, and Pakistan’s support against Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan once again aggravated the extremist and anti-US elements, having extensive implications on internal security situation.
Although the foreign interference in each of the South Asian countries varies in intensity, nevertheless, this has been a strong factor in creating and strengthening of the problem. Direct and indirect external support to the separatist and extremist groups, and also to governments in their policies has prolonged these movements and has created instability in the region, as a whole.
Hence, the economic conditions, government policies and outside interference (along with supplementary domestic factors such as poor governance and lack of human security) have led to the rise of extremism in South Asia and terrorism as a result, has became a menace for the region. Although these have been the basic factors behind the rise of extremism in South Asia but the role played by these factors varies in importance in all the regional countries. Therefore it would be helpful to hold a comparative analysis in the following section to give a comprehensive illustration of the extremism phenomena and the reasons for the rise, in the individual country.
SECTION II
Country-Wise Scenario
India
India, despite its global image of the world’s largest democracy and a secular constitution, is marked by extreme social backwardness with the sizeable segments of population excluded from the economic, political and social mainstream. The untouchables and religious minorities, along with certain underdeveloped regions remain deprived of the economic and social opportunities and benefits, resulting in social friction and disparity, with around 34.7 per cent of the population living below the income poverty line. The GNP per capita remains US$460 and unemployment level at 7.3 per cent of the labour force.[47] Such economic situation has resulted in social and political deterioration of society, which consequently has led to repeated crisis.
Sharp regional disparities also exist in the country, for instance, Punjab, the richest Indian state, has a per capita income 4.3 times that of Bihar, the poorest state. What is creating resentment among the masses is the increase in economic disparity, since independence. Such economic variations also results in inter-state labour migration, which not only burdens the recipient state but also creates political and social friction between the locals and migrants and in long run results in ethnic friction and violence.
There has also been a process of steady communalisation of Indian state ever since the Hindutva forces have come to the fore, particularly since the 1980s. According to a scholar, “What is particularly striking about the present phase is the role of state in communalising the political process in overt and covert ways”.[48] However, this trend of state-sponsored communalism is hardly a new factor in India, as it was true even during the British colonial rule. The situation has worsened since 1947, with the communal forces occupying a central place with more and more political parties veering around one form of communalism or another. There has been a sustained political mobilization by religion-based groups regarding communal issues over an expanding geographical area.[49] Increasing communalism has led to the emergence of extremist, militant organizations, enjoying close relations with governments in power at Central and Provincial levels, who use their clout, adding to the deteriorating situation.
Political conflicts in India today wrap around religion, caste and regional identities and have multiplied in number. Communalism, which had traditionally been associated with Hindu-Muslim relations, has since 1980s became wider phenomena including other religious communities, castes and classes. There have been widespread clashes between Hindus and Christians and also the bloody clashes between Sikhs and Hindus in Punjab,[50] further exacerbated by the political parties in power or in opposition. The multiplicity of crisis in India has created a situation in which overall human rights are threatened and the neglect by the state, of its basic political and economic tasks, has led to increased polarization among the masses resulting in increasing secessionist and sectarian demands. Some key issues and developments that have emerged in the recent decades are discussed below:
The religious and caste-based violence is increasing at an alarming rate in India. Particularly, since the 1980s and 1990s, as a result of changing electoral strategies by parties, with an increasing emphasis on religion and caste in politics, greater sense of insecurity has arisen among the various classes and the minorities.[51]
However, communalism has wider connotations than just politics, and also refers to the perception of mutual differences among the members of different religious communities, which give rise to conflict situations from time to time. The historically -inherited perceptions of mutual conflict has sometimes played a role in sustaining and consolidating differences within religious communities. This is particularly true about Hindus and Muslims.[52] The historical roots of the Hindu Muslim animosities can be traced back to the Mughal rule, which the traditional Hindu nationalists regard as a period of Hindu decline, ruthless Muslim political domination, and the acceptance of Islam by the low caste Hindus and demolition of sacred Hindu places.[53] Such views are often used by the extremist organizations for mobilizing public support for their respective political interests. For instance, during the Babri Masjid conflict, the Hindu nationalists were able to transform the site, into a symbol of Muslim military invasion and aggression against Hindus.
An objective view of Indian politics today, suggests that it is becoming more and more Hinduised at the cost of other minorities and this rise of Hindu chauvinism is far more dangerous then the extremism of other minorities. This is because of the fact that Hindus constitute the majority of the population, whereas the ethnic groups, which demand right of self-determination, form minorities within the national context.[54]
The Hindu-Muslim conflict in India has now become a weapon of political engineering wielded by the Hindu militant leaders bent on transforming India into a Hindu religious state.[55] Today the magnitude of inter-religious and inter-ethnic clashes is staggering: there are Hindu-Muslim, Hindu-Sikh, Hindu-Christian confrontations and also many sub-nationalist movements for greater autonomy. Whereas, the militant Hindutva forces have played a significant role in fuelling these conflicts, political parties in power have used their position in the government to play the religion card for their particular ends. The rise in violence has also helped the government in acquiring greater emergency powers for itself, and an increased use of force and intimidation,[56] thus perpetuating a climate of violence. Adding to these is the declining socio-economic conditions, which provides a breeding ground for the frustrated youth to be transformed into recruits for militant organizations. The steady rise of the Hindutva ideology, sponsored and protected by the state itself, has created an unprecedented environment of violence in India.
The rise of Hindutva forces as a political phenomenon in India was initially a north Indian manifestation, based in the Hindi-speaking areas, which later spread throughout the country with the help of the extremist forces.[57] Hindutva is the basic ideology of Sangh Parivar headed by Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), and includes organizations like the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), Bajrang Dal and the former ruling party Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP); has grown rapidly over the period of time. The basic aim of Hindutva is to unify India’s Hindus into a dominant political force.[58] This movement is based on the premise that Hindus alone constitute the Indian nation as they are the original inhabitants of this land and have created this society and its culture. The Hindu nation has been repeatedly conquered by aliens, particularly the Muslims and then the Christian British and must acquire strength through RSS Sangathan to counter all present and future threats.[59]
The basis of the Sangh Parivar was laid in 1925, with the foundation of the RSS, which had its antecedents in the earlier Hindu Mahasabha. It was established as a paramilitary Hindu organization emphasising discipline and education, which caught the imagination of the Hindu masses. Between 1931 and 1933 the membership of the RSS rose to 12, 000 and by the time of partition it had grown to 600,000.[60] Although, the organization was banned in 1948, when one of its members assassinated Gandhi in January 1948, however, the organization continued to promote the Hindutva ideology by establishing many other subsidiary wings. VHP was established by an RSS conference in 1964 as a vehicle for religious propagation. Bajrang Dal, another militant wing came into the forefront during the anti-Sikh violence wave of 1983-84. Later it also played a key role in demolition of the Babri Masjid in 1992. [61] The BJP was founded in 1980s as the electoral wing of the RSS, which was to serve as a Hindu nationalist alternative to India’s major secular nationalist party, the Congress party. The establishment of the political wing was a part of RSS strategy for coming into state power. With the rise of BJP into political prominence, RSS has been able to expand the locus of its activities from civil society to the state structure.[62]
The Sangh Parivar has an impressive network of affiliated organizations including cultural and educational institutions. It also publishes a large number of publications in vernacular languages, thus influencing a large segment of society.[63] It has also established an extended overseas network, which derives significant revenue for its propaganda from the expatriate communities. As the population of Indian emigrants settled in United States, Britain, and elsewhere has grown significantly, especially during the last decade, so has the flow of money to Hindu extremist causes in India.[64] Shev Sena has been working as an active wing of Sangh Parivar since its inception in 1966, while being based at Maharashtra province, has also participated in nation-wide militant activities. Its members are also known to have actively participated in the demolition of Babri Masjid.[65]
The spread of such religious and regionally-based militant organizations has not only led to rise of communal extremism but has also provoked ethnic clashes amongst different ethnic groups. Hence, it can be asserted that this current rise in Hindu-Muslim violence is directly proportional to the rise of the Sangh Parivar mentality, advocating the ideology of Hindutva.
The ongoing process of socio-political change in India and the increased competition for scarce resources are placing enormous pressure on the existing social relations and the political system. Communal and caste-based violence has become more frequent, as well as erupting into incidents of ghastly violence as well. India has witnessed a gory history of Hindu-Muslim riots since independence. Around 6,000 such incidents have taken place over the past five decades.[66] Religious fundamentalism has intensified with the introduction of criminal elements in politics, providing the politicians with an opportunity to manipulate existing communal and class divisions for their vested political interests.[67] Politics today is in the grip of politically-motivated violence led by opposing factions.
Inter-communal and inter-classes clashes and, the intensification of religious extremism in current day India was a phenomenon introduced in 1960s with the creation of Sangh Parivar. Hindu fundamentalism became a challenge for secular order of Indian state. With the increase in communal and caste violence in 1980s, the Hindu revivalist ideology had spread throughout North India and was no longer limited to the Sangh Parivar and Arya Samaj circles.[68]
The government policies also resulted in the intensification of communal and religion-based conflicts. Many governments have either indirectly supported the extremist groups or have been unable to take any action against these groups. And at times government has tried to benefit from the use of religion for political purposes. The Congress party in 1980s, to win over extremist Hindu votes, established covert relations with the RSS. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi refused to condemn the Shiv Sena for its role in provoking the Bhiwandi riots and even stated that the minorities should “learn to adjust in India”. RSS also supported Indira Gandhi in Delhi and Kerala state elections. A leading Congress spokesman even refused to recognise the RSS as a communal organization. Through indirect alliance, the RSS was able to diversify its activities and establish a variety of front organizations in various regions, where earlier it did not have a presence. When the assault on the Sikh community took place, it also fanned extremism among the Sikhs.[69] To understand the different reasons and dimensions of the rise of religion and ethnic-based violence and extremism, it would be helpful to study a few cases of communal and ethno-centred movements.
Punjab politics had a marginal communal dimension even before independence. Certain Sikh leaders raised voices for a separate state for Sikhs in the pre-partition period. Even after independence, there was demand for an autonomous Sikh state within the Indian Union. However, Punjab province till the 1960s was marked by the absence of hardened religious identities. Since the 1970s, the situation began to change considerably. Religion became politicised and politics was communalised to an extent never witnessed before. The major political parties reflected the communalisation of Punjab politics in the increasing use of religion as a medium of mobilization.[70] Sikh nationalism became a powerful political force in the state throughout 1980s, with the demands of various Sikh groups varying ranging from greater political and economic control within the Indian federation, to secession from India and the creation of a sovereign state.
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, especially during 1980s actively sought to divide and rule the Sikhs. The strategy backfired and some Sikh groups turned sharply militant, and in turn, the central government responded with force. Militant nationalists and a repressive state thus confronted each other in a vicious cycle of growing violence. The Akali Dal - the dominant political party representing Sikhs - also pursued militant politics for its interests. The Akali militancy was aimed at mobilizing as many Sikhs as possible around the platform of Sikh Nationalism. Being closely associated with the Sikh religious organizations, it periodically utilized religious organizations to use the influence of the Sikh laity for political ends. It had also become a constituent of the government, in coalition with the Jan Sangh, the predecessor of BJP. In retrospect, it is clear how Indira Gandhi’s commitment to dominate Punjab politics pushed Akalis into an aggressive mobilization. Over the next several years, the militancy took on a political life of its own and increasingly went out of control of both the central government and the Akalis. As the cycle of militancy and repression set in, Punjab, one of India’s most prosperous states became engulfed in violence for a decade. [71]
While, the Congress government and Akalis created a vicious circle expanding considerably the importance of religious idiom in Punjab politics, they also indirectly strengthened the forces of counter-communalism, leading to parties like the BJP tightening its grip over the Hindu community. With the storming of Golden temple in 1984, followed by the assassination in reprisal of Indira Gandhi and then by the slaughtering of Sikhs in its aftermath, communal estrangement widened while the militant wings of Sangh Parivar, such as Bajrang Dal, further strengthened their hold. Militant organizations mushroomed with Punjab and other states. It is estimated that nearly 1000 people died every year, through out 1980s, peaking the toll in 1990 when some 4000 people were killed.[72]
While such political communalisation capitalized on already existing cleavages between Hindus and Sikhs, the process of its intensification hardened such identities, enlarging considerable alienation between the two communities. Although over time, militants were suppressed and certain concessions were granted by the central government, but the handling of the political situation by the national government and the local political parties, certainly worsened the situation and gave rise to militant Sikh nationalism.
Kashmir:
Crisis of Governance
The unresolved nature of settlement at the time of partition and the ongoing Indo-Pak rivalry over the territory explains to a great extent the nature of conflict in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). However, the spread of communal violence and separatist movement in Kashmir is largely a result of the power struggle between the state and the central government, while the socio-economic conditions have also played a part. Kashmir is a case of horizontal spread of communalism, both social and geographical. Communalism has not been a violent phenomenon in Kashmir, even till 1980s. The penetration of communalism in Kashmir politics can be attributed to the policies pursed by Congress. The poor record of democracy in J&K, characterized by the constant rigging of elections and by various forms of intervention by the central government, prevented the development of fair and autonomous political competition between the parties.[73]
The wars with Pakistan in 1947, 1965 and 1971 made the J&K a sensitive border state in India. As a result, the Congress-led central government viewed any political opposition in the state with increasing suspicion and used various means to curtail the freedom movement. Democracy and state institutions were never allowed to work and corrupt electoral processes plagued the state-building process. The cycle of repression in Kashmir mainly began with the power conflict when Indira Gandhi dislodged the elected government of Farooq Abdullah, precipitating a legitimacy crisis. Religion and region, as a result of the power struggle between the state and central governments, began to play a bigger part in attracting political support. By 1987, the political situation so deteriorated that political allegiances were defined and expressed in religious terms.[74]
Hence, the power struggle that began in 1980s led to such internal conditions, which motivated and created conditions which led to massive uprising in the Valley in 1990s. In addition to the political instability, the economic stagnation fuelled the grievances of the educated unemployed youth. The armed insurgency which, gathered momentum after the 1987 elections was given impetus by the exiled Kashmiri nationalists.[75]
With the popular Muslim uprising, the Hindu minority, which had earlier been living peacefully in the valley, began to feel threatened and many migrated to Jammu and Delhi. These Hindu migrants huddled in the refugee camps fell straight into the lap of RSS-VHP who, in the course of conducting relief work, also initiated a Muslim-hate campaign.[76] Although it was evident later, that the departure of Hindus from Kashmir was not necessary and the government attempted to give the Kashmir problem a communal profile by facilitating and encouraging the departure of Hindus, even by providing government transport.[77] Such governmental policies exacerbated the law and order situation and intensified the freedom struggle.
The Government instead of redressing the grievances opted for the militant technique of tackling with the problem. It deployed over half a million army and paramilitary troops, which got involved in violence and government resorted to massive human rights violations to terrorize the population into submission.[78] A fact-finding mission of the Indian People’s Front (IPF) visited Kashmir in June 1990 and reported very serious violations and found the conditions nearing a point of no return.[79] Amnesty International has voiced serious concerns regarding the human rights situation in Indian held Kashmir. According to the Amnesty international Testimony of Human Rights in Kashmir and Disputed territory, presented on 12 May 2004, total causalities since 1989 are believed to be around 38,000. In 2001 an average of 100 civilians died every month as a result of either targeted or indiscriminate violence.[80] Human rights abuses in the state are facilitated by laws, which provide the security forces with virtual immunity from prosecution for acts done in good faith. These include the Disturbed Areas Act and the Armed Forces (J&K) Special powers Act, which also allow the security forces to shoot and kill. Such laws have allowed the police and security forces to use force excessively.[81]
Indian government accused Pakistan for supporting and sponsoring these freedom fighters. Although the Pakistani and the Azad Kashmir governments denied that they were providing any material support to the militants, nevertheless the activities of the exiled Kashmiris and their (militant) sympathisers can not be firmly restricted.[82] Despite Indian government’ assertions of Pakistani involvement, it can be asserted that the primary cause of the Kashmir insurgency must be found in India’s domestic failures and Pakistani support for the militants can only be viewed as a secondary factor in the Kashmir imbroglio.[83]
Ayodhya - The Babri Masjid Affair
Ayodhya, in Uttar Pradesh was the site of sixteenth century Babri Mosque erected during Mughal rule, under Emperor Babar. It was believed by Hindus that the site is also the place where the god Ram was born. From the mid-1980s, the site of Ayodhya became controversial on these conflicting claims and dominated relations between Hindus and Muslims in the public sphere. In 1984, the VHP started an agitation campaign for the ‘liberation’ of Ramjanmabhoomi (birthplace of Ram), as claimed by Hindu nationalists.[84] Vested groups like the BJP, RSS (etc) ensured through their political campaigns that the site soon became a symbol of Hindu identity, and stood for the suppression of Hindus under the Muslim rule in India. The Sangh Parivrar took the opportunity and aggressively propagated the theory that the destruction of the mosque and the construction of Ram temple would avenge the historical indignity related to the Hindus.[85] The Babri mosque became a strategic site for political conflicts for the Sangh Parivar, which it used to draw attention to itself, in order to expand its membership for its militant activities and also to gain votes for its political party, the BJP. Babri mosque was a convenient target because it was located in an RSS bastion, centrally located in India itself and had a history, which became controversial enough to bring some political gains for the organization.[86]
The agitation attained its peak in 1989, when the number of riot victims reached levels unprecedented in India since 1947. The religious processions organized by the VHP on the occasion of Ram Shilan Puja (literally, Ram brick’s worship), led to major riots. Even though the BJP was not directly in the forefront, its leaders, especially at the local levels, took an active part in the processions, to gain political advantage from these popular mobilizations before the Lok Sabha elections, which were then for late 1989. The wave of rioting in the autumn of 1989 was provoked by militant Hindu nationalists employing processions to mobilize their community and instigate communal violence.[87] The communal riots also polarized the electorates along religious lines with the Hindu majority more inclined to vote for the BJP. The campaign waged by the Hindu militants reached its climax in 1991, with the rath yatra led by L K. Advani. The impact of Hindu extremism on Indian society was clearly illustrated when in December 1992 the destruction of Babri Mosque was followed by countrywide Hindu-Muslim riots that left at least 2,000 people dead.[88]
As Muslims in various parts of India demonstrated against the destruction of the historic mosque and the killings of Muslims, the Hindu extremists went on the rampage, especially in Bombay, leading to further large-scale riots. The Hindu nationalist crusade to demolish the Babri mosque had a significant impact on both internal and regional changes, for it polarized the Indian society, intensified animosity between of Hindus and Muslims within India and also contributed to the rise of a ‘militaristic-inclined’ government, hostile to Muslims.[89] Communal violence also instigated violent confrontations in different regions around local issues such as economic rivalries and political differences over local matters. During the election campaign for general elections 2004, the BJP adopted the construction of Ram Temple in Ayodhya, as an election slogan,[90] which unlike past did not picked up well among the voters.
The Gujarat Holocaust of 2002
Gujarat carries a history of communal and caste-based violence. Religious festivals involving Hindus and Muslims particularly in the state’s largest city, Ahmedabad, usually precipitated riots. During 1980s, with the implementation of the state government’s policy for ‘Other Backward Classes’, the thrust of violence was mainly inter-caste. However, Hindu-Muslim violence also grew out of the conflict over reservation and was incited by the political actors who used the initial tension over reservations to rekindle dormant religious disputes.
Later, in 1992, with the demolition of Babri mosque, religion-based conflicts also erupted in Gujarat, raising memory of partition.[91] Earlier Hindus had been more powerful in the state than Muslims, but over the preceding decades, the Muslim situation improved economically, in turn creating suspicions and mistrust amongst Hindus. In this climate the Sangh Parivar’s Hindutva ideology touched a chord in the Hindu community and generated incidents of Hindu-Muslim conflicts. In February 2002, in response to the incident at Godhra railway station when a group of Hindu militants coming back from a trip to Ayodhya were killed by Muslim mob over the abduction of a Muslim girl, a pogrom of terror was unleashed against the Muslim population.[92] The spread of violence carried clear signs of premeditation and appeared to be part of a methodical effort to demonise and ghettoise Muslims.
According to an estimate more then a thousand Muslims were murdered during the last days of February and the first ten days of March 2002. The violence continued for months and left more then 2,000 Muslims dead, over 100,000 made homeless and more then 600,000 were estimated to have left Gujarat.[93] The terror was heightened by the fact that the BJP-dominated government of Gujarat state demonstrably failed to restrain this deadly, days-long pogrom and was in fact spreading the violence. And even as the killings continued, the central government did not take any concrete steps to stop the violence.[94] Though the government claimed that ten columns of the army were moved out of the 7th Corps headquarters in Ahmadabad and positioned to prevent further deterioration of situation, but army sources were quoted in the Indian media, revealing that the army deployment was confined to flag marches and were given no orders to intervene in the rioting.[95]
The Gujarat carnage was especially notable for the extent and the nature of state complicity in the violence, as premeditated planning against the lives, dignity, livelihood, businesses and properties of Gujarati Muslims through a selective assault on their religious and cultural places of worship as well as homes and businesses. Economic and social boycott of the Muslim community was openly encouraged and continued in many parts of Gujarat. The Chief Minister of Gujarat, Narendra Modi was held by the investigation tribunal, as directly responsible, along with his other cabinet members and the organizations that he belongs to namely - the BJP, RSS, and VHP.[96] According to a rough estimate at least 270 Muslim religious and cultural monuments were razed to ground, during the riots with the active support of the administration practically supported the destruction of the historical sites.[97]
Inter-caste and Ethnic Violence in India
Under the impact of the centuries old caste system, Indian political system has also followed caste based imperatives. The majority of the Hindu society comprises of ‘backward classes’, and with the passage of time, the number of these backward categories grew, from 39 in 1875 to 128 in 1950, and 175 by 1960.[98] As the Hindu nationalism grew, the Hindu elite class focused increasing attention to religious revival. This led to increase in inter-caste discrimination and this often erupted into violence.
The main theatre of conflict between higher castes and scheduled castes has followed different patterns in different states. In the state of Bihar, there has been confrontation between landless scheduled class and left-wing activists (Maoist). In Tamil Nadu, caste and class conflicts have spread over economic disparities between those who have grown richer and the many that have became poorer.[99] Caste riots in urban areas have mainly been directed against the quota system in government jobs and against the practise of reserving seats in professional colleges for the members of backward castes.
There have been efforts to redress the lower caste grievances, through important steps such as the Mandal Commission Report presented in 1980, reserving quotas for lower castes in the government jobs. Because of its symbolic importance to the critical middle class vote blocs, every major political party acknowledged it and supported its implementation. But the political interests of the parties and the vote bloc of high caste did not let them carry out their promise of implementing this Report. The V. P. Singh government in 1989 announced that it would implement the Mandal Commission recommendations. This announcement led to a major crisis resulting in downfall of the Singh’s government. Later, the Supreme Court of India upheld the constitutionality of the report in 1992 and the Congress government announced that it would abide by the court’s decision. To date, it has no
