Despite being obtrusively friendly with the incumbent Sheikh Hasina regime of Bangladesh, the Narendra Modi regime in India seems to have overplayed its Bangladesh card to the extent of spoiling the broth.
Lately, Bangladesh’s National Security Intelligence (NSI) operatives have shown desperation in tracing and tracking the secret Indian operatives inside Bangladesh, many of whom work in disguise in various private companies and diplomatic outfits.
According to sources, secret Indian operatives have indulged inside Bangladesh in the acts of what one source said “sowing seeds of discord between Bangladesh and China,” the latter a friendly nation that has been funding, and offering technical supports, to most of the Bangladesh’s development projects.
Investigation reveals, a series of injurious and detrimental incidents had finally alerted Bangladesh’s security officials to tracing and tracking the Indian intelligence operatives acting in disguise inside Bangladesh.
For instance, it was discovered that the Indian external intelligence outfit, the RAW, had masterminded the murder of a leading Chinese technician, Lao Finn, near the site of the 8th Bangladesh-China friendship bridge in Ferozpur in October this year, by using a convicted rapist just out of prison.
In December 2019, a Chinese contractor, Jianhui Gao, involved in the supply of stones for the Padma bridge construction, was murdered in Dhaka’s Banani area by miscreants posing as robbers.
The arrests of the suspects in both the murders, and the information obtained from them through exhaustive interrogations, revealed shrilled facts of the killings having occurred under the RAW directives.
As these sensitive developments occurred on the heels of Dhaka’s frustration with Delhi’s explicit objection to the Chinese construction of the Sonadia deep sea port inside Bangladesh, citing it as a threat to Indian national security, and a number of other such machinations to retard Bangladesh’s quest to becoming a developed nation, Dhaka became determined to stop the Indians.
The murders of the Chinese nationals, and the objection to the construction of the deep sea port in Sonadia aside, Delhi also stood opposed to Bangladesh’s construction of a water management infrastructure on the Teesta river, the equitable share of water on which was denied to Bangladesh by India for decades under hoaxes and hubris.
Mindful of Bangladesh’s exasperation, Beijing agreed to offer $1 billion to help complete the Teesta project to mitigate Bangladesh’s perennial water shortage during the dry season, and, devastating flooding and river erosions during the monsoon.
As if what damages Delhi did weren’t enough, and amidst the simmering tensions and irritations between the two neighbours, the newly appointed Indian High Commissioner to Dhaka, Vikram Doraiswami, began to behave like a viceroy by undertaking a grisly mission of ‘spying’ that had witnessed his footprints virtually in every sensitive spots of Bangladesh over the last two months.
These and other ostensibly suspicious Indian activism began to spawn grapevine gossips, much of which looked profound and seemed sensible, that the RAW operatives in Bangladesh, and the incumbent Indian High Commissioner in Dhaka, were involved in crafting a design to destabilize Bangladesh to the extent of creating a suitable pretext for a physical military intervention.
Far fetched though it may seem, the Modi administration and its desperate strategic minds in Delhi may have found Bangladesh the softest target to orchestrate a military dramatics to restore a sullied image, following being browbeaten for months by China and Pakistan on one hand, and, Nepal too having been lost to Beijing, on the other.
Sources say, amidst Dhaka’s aggressiveness in chasing the Indian spies seen dotting the length and the breadth of Bangladesh, many of the spies might have already left the country, or, are on the way of packing up to quit their missions.
(Picture: The Indian High Commissioner to Bangladesh in the pose of a colonial viceroy).
Note: This article appeared on Facebook, dated 31 December 2020.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in the article are of the author and do not necessarily represent Institute’s policy.