On August 31, 2025, in the Chinese city of Tianjin, an unlikely diplomatic chapter was written. Pakistan, the sole United Nations member state that for decades refused to recognise Armenia, finally established formal diplomatic ties with Yerevan. The joint communiqué signed by Foreign Ministers Ishaq Dar and Ararat Mirzoyan was more than a perfunctory document, it was the symbolic dismantling of a deliberate policy of non-recognition that had cast a shadow over South Caucasus-South Asia relations for three decades.
The move surprised many observers. Islamabad’s position on Armenia was not an accident of history but a conscious strategy: it was the most demonstrative expression of Pakistan’s unwavering solidarity with Azerbaijan in the protracted Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Against that backdrop, normalization signals not just a recalibration but a recognition that Pakistan can no longer afford rigid diplomatic dead ends in a rapidly shifting Eurasian order.
For years, Pakistan’s posture was shaped by a simple binary: defend Azerbaijan’s territorial claims, refuse Armenia recognition. This position won Islamabad political favour in Baku, occasional gestures of solidarity from Turkiye, and a place in the rhetoric of Islamic unity. But the cost was structural: it foreclosed opportunities with Armenia and narrowed Pakistan’s diplomatic flexibility in the South Caucasus, a region increasingly contested by Russia, Turkiye, Iran, and the West.
The Karabakh wars of 2020 and 2023, culminating in Azerbaijan’s consolidation of control, altered the strategic equation. With Baku triumphant and the conflict effectively settled on Azerbaijan’s terms, Pakistan’s non-recognition policy lost its immediate strategic justification. The timing of normalization in 2025 is therefore less a rupture than an overdue recalibration. Islamabad is acknowledging the new facts on the ground while hedging against diplomatic overdependence on one regional actor.
For Yerevan, normalization with Islamabad is part of a broader strategy of diversifying partnerships in the face of regional isolation. Armenia is landlocked, hemmed in by Turkiye and Azerbaijan, and reliant on Georgia and Iran for external access. Establishing ties with Pakistan does not instantly change this geography. But it serves two critical purposes.
First, it allows Armenia to soften its image in the Islamic world, where support for Azerbaijan has been near universal. Second, it expands Yerevan’s diplomatic options beyond its growing alignment with India. Over the past decade, Armenia has drawn closer to New Delhi, purchasing Indian weaponry and deepening political cooperation. Recognition by Pakistan provides Yerevan with additional flexibility: instead of depending on India alone, Armenia now has multiple diplomatic avenues in South Asia.
This is consistent with Armenia’s broader balancing act. In recent years, Yerevan has shown signs of drifting away from Moscow’s traditional sphere of influence and inching closer to Washington. Yet its active participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Summit as a dialogue partner, its outreach to Pakistan, a full member of the SCO and a long-standing ally of Azerbaijan and , signal that Armenia is not abandoning Eurasia. Rather, it is recalibrating by triangulating between the United States, Russia, and China, thereby keeping its options open.
The Pakistan-Armenia thaw cannot be analysed without reference to India. New Delhi has cultivated Yerevan with an eye to countering Turkish-Azerbaijani influence and projecting presence into the South Caucasus. Indian-supplied weaponry bolstered Armenian capabilities during its standoff with Azerbaijan, and high-level exchanges underscored growing strategic intimacy.
Islamabad’s move complicates this equation. By normalizing with Armenia, Pakistan inserts itself directly into a theatre where India has sought uncontested space. While Islamabad is unlikely to match India’s defence footprint in Yerevan, the mere act of recognition denies New Delhi the luxury of operating unopposed. For Armenia, this triangulation is deliberate: keeping both South Asian states engaged dilutes the risk of overdependence on one.
The Tianjin signing was not incidental. Taking place on the margins of the SCO Summit, the announcement underscored the role of China as a convening power in Eurasian diplomacy. Beijing did not broker the deal, but its presence created a geopolitical theatre where such moves are possible. The SCO, increasingly functioning as a platform for pragmatic encounters, enabled both sides to recalibrate without Western mediation.
More importantly, the symbolism extends beyond optics: China’s centrality demonstrates that Beijing is increasingly capable of playing a peace-making role in Eurasia akin to the United States, though through different methods, facilitating convergence rather than imposing settlements.
Iran was quick to welcome the development. Tehran has long positioned itself as Armenia’s economic lifeline while also maintaining close ties with Pakistan. For Iran, the normalization offers an opportunity to imagine more integrated regional connectivity projects, particularly if Yerevan and Islamabad coordinate within multilateral frameworks.
Symbolism Versus Substance: The Case for Low Politics
The key question is whether this diplomatic breakthrough will transcend symbolism. Neither country currently maintains an embassy in the other’s capital; the communiqué commits them to “exchange diplomatic representatives” but without a timeline. Trade prospects are limited by geography, lack of direct routes, and Armenia’s isolation behind Turkish and Azerbaijani borders. Security cooperation is improbable, given Pakistan’s entrenched defence ties with Baku.
The most pragmatic path forward is to begin with low politics, economic, cultural, academic, and people-to-people exchanges. Incremental engagement on these fronts can lay the groundwork for trust and reduce the risk of political backlash. Over time, such initiatives could serve as stepping stones toward deeper cooperation.
Strategic Risks and Contradictions
A couple of key challenges deserve attention.
First, Pakistan must strike a delicate balance between its long-standing alliance with Azerbaijan and its new diplomatic opening with Armenia. Even limited gestures of goodwill toward Yerevan could generate discomfort in Baku, where Islamabad is regarded as a steadfast partner.
Second, geography imposes hard limits. Since Armenia’s borders with Turkey and Azerbaijan remain closed, any meaningful engagement must move through Iran or Georgia. This dependence ties the relationship to broader regional dynamics that are beyond the immediate control of either Islamabad or Yerevan.
Eurasian Integration: The EAEU Dimension
An often-overlooked aspect of the Tianjin communiqué lies in the realm of Eurasian institutional politics. As a member of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), Armenia’s non-recognition by Pakistan had effectively complicated any serious conversation about Islamabad’s potential engagement with that bloc. By normalizing ties, this specific hurdle has now been lifted, creating at least the political space for Pakistan to explore avenues of cooperation with the EAEU in the future.
While full membership remains a distant prospect and would depend on a host of economic and geopolitical considerations, the possibility is now more conceivable than before. At a minimum, improved relations with Yerevan could allow Islamabad to broaden its dialogue on regional trade frameworks and consider modest steps toward Eurasian connectivity, thereby complementing, rather than replacing its existing economic focus on the Gulf and China.
What the Tianjin signing reveals most clearly is the logic of multipolar diplomacy. For Pakistan, it is a modest but important step in diversifying partnerships beyond entrenched alignments. For Armenia, it is an attempt to widen its diplomatic aperture and mitigate dependence on traditional allies. For SCO founding members, it showcases their convening capacity in reshaping Eurasia’s diplomatic map.
The normalization may not yield dramatic economic dividends or security partnerships, but it is emblematic of a world where even entrenched disputes are increasingly subject to pragmatic rethinking. The age of rigid diplomatic boycotts is giving way to transactional engagements, where symbolic recognition itself becomes a form of strategic currency.
Conclusion
Pakistan and Armenia’s establishment of diplomatic relations is unlikely to rewrite regional geopolitics overnight. But it is far from trivial. By closing one of the most conspicuous gaps in global diplomatic recognition, Islamabad has signalled a willingness to privilege pragmatism over ideology. Yerevan, for its part, has demonstrated that even modest openings can erode isolation.
In a South Caucasus marked by shifting alliances, and in a South Asia where rivalry shapes foreign policy, the Tianjin communiqué offers a rare moment of recalibration. Whether it matures into substance remains uncertain. Yet, in its symbolism, it reflects the very essence of contemporary diplomacy: the search for new partners in a world increasingly defined not by absolutes, but by fluid alignments.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in the article are of the author and do not necessarily represent the institute’s policy.
Authored by: Muhammad Taimur Fahad Khan is a Research Associate at the Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad (ISSI)
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