Newspaper Article 08/05/2022
India has maintained a complex neutral stance in the ongoing Ukrainian crisis, much to the chagrin of the U.S and many Western nations. There are many awkward questions arising from the Western capitals about the comradeship between democracies, which India also boasts about despite many eyebrows raised on India’s human rights record, especially about the Muslim minority and people of occupied Jammu and Kashmir.
India faces a dilemma in the ongoing tussle between Russia and US-led Europe. Its budding romance with the U.S. and Europe has many attractions, primarily access to military technology, which it has started acquiring from the U.S., France and Israel. Simultaneously, India doesn’t want to offend Russia. It needs arms from Russia, wants cheaper Russian oil, and hopes to increase its relatively small trade with Russia. Russia still caters for 45 percentrequirements of the Indian military hardware. (Indian dependence on Russian hardware has gradually reduced from 75 percentto 45 percent.
Paradoxically, Indian officials would be inclined to tilt towards the Western camp at the policy level. After ascension into power, Prime Minister Modi’s focus has shifted towards the U.S which is manifested in the exponential growth of Indian trade and military ties with the U.S. Modi’s neutral stance, however, faces a dilemma on the Ukraine issue. Firstly,if Russia is allowed to attack Ukraine and swallow its territory, then it could set a precedence and encourage other powers such as China to occupy the Indian territories. Commonly known as the Jaishankar doctrine (credited to Indian External Affairs Minister Subramanyam Jaishankar), the country has started boasting about “strategic autonomy” more vigorously than their predecessors. Such a doctrine implies not putting all eggs in one basket and keeping options open to approach other powers when needed.
Secondly, India’s candidature for the permanent seat in the U.N. Security Council may be jeopardized. If it supports Russia, it may lose American support for its candidature for the permanent seat. Suppose it supports the American position in Ukraine. In that case, it runs the risk of losing Russian support, and the China-Russia nexus may pose a veritable threat to its strategic interests in the region. India would be at a loss on both counts.
Thirdly, India is also concerned about losing Russian support on the Kashmir dispute, which it traditionally enjoyed. Former minister of state for external affairs, Shashi Tharoor, in his article in the latest issue of Foreign Affairs, maintains that the “Indian government has a history of relying on Russian support when problems with Pakistan and China—notably over Kashmir—come to a head. But support from the United States has meant that India no longer needs a Russian veto at the Security Council to keep Kashmir off the agenda.”
Fourthly, Indian trade with the U.S. has increased sixteen times during the past three decades. During this period, the trade balance has always been tilted in India’s favour. From a nominal $ 5.7 billion in 1992, the trade volume between the two countries in 2021 stood at $ 114 billion. Meanwhile, India-Russia trade from April 2021 to February 2022 was recorded at $ 11.87 billion, with Russian exports to India at $ 8.69 billion.
Given the volume of Indian trade with the U.S. and Russia, it is apparent that the volume of Indo-US trade is eleven times more than that with Russia. This points to emerging trends in bilateral relations between India and the U.S, on the one hand, and India-Russia on the other. However, despite the wide trade gap, India’s reluctance to condemn the Russian invasion of Ukraine has equally disturbed the Americans and Europeans.
The question arises as to why India’s Western allies tolerate its independent stance on the Russian action against Ukraine. There could be a host of factors that may have contributed to such an exception:
1. The U.S. and Europe display strategic patience towards India on the latter’s reluctance to criticize Russia.
2. The Indo-Pacific strategy is designed to counter the Chinese influence in the Indo-China Sea. India needed more to contain China than to drag it to the Ukrainian crisis. Therefore, India can play a vital role in containing Chinese expansion in the region.
3. India’s economic size offers a lucrative market to the U.S. and major European countries.
However, India is aware that its ambivalence may have a cost to pay. U.S President Joe Biden has warned: “Any nation that countenances Russia’s naked aggression against Ukraine will be stained by association.” In a virtual meeting with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in early April, he pressed India to align itself with the United States on this issue. Indian analysts believe that Western capitals may not be critical of India for expediency, but at the same time, India seems out of step with the passions felt in the West. According to the Indian publication, The Print, Germany is considering dis–inviting India to meetings on the sidelines of the G-7 summit solely because of its stance on Ukraine.
The Indian analysts are also concerned over growing intolerance in India which has badly dented India’s image as a democratic and secular state. According to Shashi Tharoor, “with Modi’s illiberalism—the respected V-Dem Institute has suggested that India had turned from a “liberal democracy” into an “elected autocracy”—the country’s stand on Ukraine has raised fresh questions as to whether this Indian government genuinely shares the democratic assumptions that merited Western support. An India behaving increasingly undemocratically at home could hardly be expected to make common cause with democracies worldwide.”
Concurrently, India’s growing relations with the U.S. have compromised its position as an influential member of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Therefore, it cannot use the NAM forum to play a mediatory role in the Ukrainian crisis.
With the foregoing in view, India will have to face difficult choices in the coming days and weeks. Still, the political nature of the India-Russia relationship seems to require that India maintain a distance from the United States and the West, where Russia is involved. Being aware of its economic size and the Western countries’ preference for the Indian market, India is most likely to maintain its neutrality. However, it may weigh its choices to nudge Russia and Ukraine to seek reconciliation in the future.
Note: This article appeared in BOL, dated 08 May 2022.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in the article are of the author and do not necessarily represent Institute’s policy.