South Asia’s strategic location has become more pivotal because of both the regional and global transformation taking place. One defining core of changing dynamics of South Asian power politics is China’s engagement with the South Asian Nations. It varies from infrastructure projects, investment support, strategic defense investment to oil & mineral exploration and trade. China’s rising economic and military strength, its ability to exercise strategic restraint and the tangible results of BRI investments has enabled it to significantly increase its influence in South Asia.
South Asia has emerged as an epicentre of shifting global power dynamics. The backdrop of this is the strategic convergence between Russia-China and their growing rivalry with the United States. India’s size, burgeoning population and economic growth gave it a position of prominence by default. India used the perception well both to influence the region and to pitch it to the International Community as an obvious choice.
The so-called ‘non-alignment’ mantra of India during the Cold War era was a farce to begin with, but more recently, it has openly pivoted towards hard hedging, the core principle of which is to both engage and resist. India was trying to act smart by playing both sides of the fence and finally got exposed. Therefore, India’s journey toward regional isolation didn’t happen overnight.
One of the most telling examples of India’s hard hedging was during the Russia-Ukraine war. As the US-led West scrambled to sanction Russia out of the global economy, India saw an opportunity and went for it, expanding trade ties with Moscow and buying billions of dollars’ worth of heavily discounted crude oil.
For the US-led West, which had been cheerleading India’s integration into the global order for years, India’s response was met with a mix of surprise and quiet dismay. To top it off, the Indian Foreign Minister arrogantly suggested that the West should move past the mindset that “Europe’s problems are the world’s problems.”
In all probability, the post-Pahalgam fence-sitting by the West sent a subtle message back to New Delhi: India’s problems, it seems, are not Europe’s problems either. India completely misread the global sentiment, overestimated its economic clout and underestimated global pragmatism.
The “Look East”, Act East policy of India was also a manifestation of the same, where it extended into having close relations with the United States as a defining feature of its foreign policy. The four-day war with Pakistan in May 2025, threw a spanner into this big time. India was enjoying its good space with the United States to get leverages 360 degree, becoming the self-proclaimed net security provider for the West and the core pillar of United States Indo Pacific strategy.
This allowed India to get all the benefits, whether it was defense equipment or literally getting away with murder in Kashmir and impunity with human rights violation and minority persecution, all the while conveniently trading with China and imposing tariffs on trade with the United States. China was India’s second-largest trading partner in FY2024–25.
India’s role in the Indo-Pacific region has often been projected as central, even indispensable. Washington has long viewed New Delhi as a natural counterweight to Beijing, applauding its democratic credentials and regional heft. India, for its part, has skillfully leveraged this perception, positioning itself as a key partner in initiatives like the Quad and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), all while guarding its strategic autonomy. Despite signing a series of defense agreements with the U.S.—LEMOA, COMCASA, and BECA, India has consistently walked a tightrope, maintaining close ties with Russia and refusing to be drawn into formal alliances.
Its participation in the Indo-Pacific strategy thus reflects less of a firm commitment to shared strategic objectives, and more of a well-executed diplomatic balancing act, one that allows New Delhi to extract geopolitical value while avoiding full alignment. In this sense, India’s role in the U.S. Asia-Pacific vision is emblematic of its broader foreign policy: hedging hard, speaking of multilateralism, but playing by its own rules.
India’s foreign policy deception has exploded in its face. Russia and Iran had already distanced themselves from India, China is enjoying the moment, and at the same time, consolidating relations with Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Afghanistan, and Iran. The subtle culling out of India from the region is not so subtle anymore. I wonder if it is fair to say if South Asian politics was to be a binary between the two protagonists of the region, Pakistan is in; India is out.
The fronts of embarrassment for India are expanding from airspace violations to narrative defeats, to the exposure of false flag dramas and the overused “violence-to-votes” playbook. The pattern is familiar: deadly violence erupts in Indian-occupied territories, the Indian media whips up a war frenzy against Pakistan, and the Indian government promptly points fingers across the border. Prime Minister Modi vows retaliation and then authorizes strikes against Pakistan. The Modi government, repeatedly, has used such crises to fuel an anti-Pakistan, jingoistic wave to secure votes.
Pahalgam was no exception, the Bihar elections were around the corner. India had expected the usual scheme of things to come into play: it cooks up a scenario of a terror attack in Kashmir, blames Pakistan for it, and the international community falls in line and follows suit. In at least nine major incidents, ranging from the 2001 Indian Parliament attack to the 2019 Pulwama attack and the Pahalgam attack in 2025, India has falsely blamed Pakistan, often before any evidence was fully examined. Subsequent inquiries revealed contradictory findings, consistent with a troubling “false-flag pattern”.
New Delhi’s narrative received zero endorsement. At best, just neutrality even from India’s backers and friends. The U.S. wanted to be the mediator; both Russia and France refrained from blaming Pakistan. The UK also pursued a balanced diplomatic role in defusing tensions but definitely did not take sides. This pattern of neutrality was replicated in BRICS and SCO. From being in a good space, Modi’s India finds itself between a rock and a hard place.
The post-Pahalgam crisis turned into a diplomatic fiasco for India, an internal humiliation that continues to haunt the Modi government. Operation Mahadev was a sorry attempt at damage control, one that nobody took seriously, not even the Indians. The effort to link Pakistan to the crisis reached absurd levels, with Pakistani chocolate wrappers paraded as “evidence” in the Indian Lok Sabha.
The diplomatic fall of India is triggered by the Modi-Jaishankar arrogance and can be traced back to India maltreating and harassing every single neighbour. From Bangladesh to Sri Lanka to Nepal and the Maldives, it was always “my way or the highway.” Thus, making India a regional hegemon without a region.
India ignored the emerging web of shifting alliances and the evolving regional geo-economics and thus made strategic blunders. Pakistan was surrounded by friends and tangible support from China, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, and Iran. On the other hand, India was left out in the cold, even the QUAD nations did not openly come out to support the Indian stance.
India’s arrogance backfired in a big way. The entire global focus has shifted from counterterrorism to the prospects of a regional war on the second most dangerous border on the face of the Earth. India’s so called “new normal” did not fly. From Vishwamitra (विश्वमित्र), the self-declared “friend of the world” in August 2023, India is now Nirmitra (निर्मित्र)—the friendless one in August of 2025.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in the article are of the author and do not necessarily represent the institute’s policy.
Authored by: Dr Huma Baqai, Rector MiTE.
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