

ARTICLES

COLD START IN STRATEGIC CALCULUS

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Abstract

The Cold Start Doctrine formulated by Indian strategists in the wake of South Asia's nuclearisation and the Kargil episode can be described as a product of the 2001-02 military stand-off with Pakistan. It is designed to exploit the strategic space between a nuclear and a Low Intensity Conflict termed as a "limited war under nuclear overhang." The doctrine envisages a mechanized blitzkrieg operation by integrated battle groups launching a short land incursion of 72-96 hours duration. It is a theoretical construct of tactics employed by NATO and Israel in different conflicts. For such an exercise the Indian armed forces would need to develop capabilities to be able to execute a synchronized manoeuvre that disrupts enemy lines of communication and forces them into a distorted and chaotic response. In the pursuit of this doctrine India is facing many military hardware challenges. The paper analyzes the doctrine in the framework of Deterrence and Compellence theories keeping in view the crises between India and Pakistan and throws light on the strategic stability of South Asia after the induction of the Cold Start chapter in India-Pakistan relations.

Key Words: Cold Start Doctrine, Deterrence, Compellence, Strategy, Pakistan, India.

Introduction

The origin of the hostility between Pakistan and India lies in the historical legacy of the British Empire. The partition of 1947 left some territorial issues that have not been resolved to this day. Unfortunately the struggle to resolve those conflicts has shifted from the political arena to the battlefield making the region highly volatile and unstable.

The development and use of atomic bomb operationalised the concept of Deterrence as part of the US Nuclear Strategy during the Cold War era. Nuclear weapons deterred any hot war between the Superpowers and also mitigated the crisis situations. After the success of nuclear deterrence in Cold

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War days many analysts and theoreticians tend to believe that the concept of deterrence will continue to remain dominant as part of military strategy between rival nuclear weapon states.

“Nuclear South Asia” represents a different case than US-Soviet rivalry due to several differences between the two cases. The years preceding the post 1998 period witnessed one Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) of Kargil and the crisis involving the role of international community in preventing the outbreak of war. South Asia under the umbrella of nuclear deterrence still has suspicions regarding the stability of the region. The “Stability-Instability Paradox” is critical in defining the relations between two nuclear neighbours.

In this context, it has to be remembered that India and Pakistan occasionally resort to the compellence pattern under the umbrella of nuclear deterrence. The study will be an endeavour to throw light on the theoretical construct of compellence, applying it on the India-Pakistan situation. The paper will also examine whether limited war is possible under the nuclear overhang and how serious is the Cold Start threat vis-à-vis Pakistan.

Theoretical Framework – Compellence Theory

The idea of compellence is as old as military history itself. Compellence as a strategy has been discussed by Clausewitz, Byman, Freeman, George, Jakobsen, Mueller, Pape and Schelling. The US has used compellence in counter-insurgency operations of Iraq and Vietnam War.¹

In case of South Asia, the strategies of compellence and nuclear deterrence have remained operative from time to time. In order to better understand compellence, it would be helpful to first define and differentiate the term from other similar terminologies that are often used interchangeably.

Compellence is defined as: “behavior established to compel an adversary to carry out an action that do not want or stop doing something.”² On the other hand, deterrence is the ability to persuade the behaviour of an adversary to stop from doing what it intends to do. Schelling defined compellence as “the threat that compels rather than deters often requires that the punishment be administered until the other acts, rather than if the other

¹ Michael T. Plehn, “The Sharpest Swords: Compellance, Clausewitz and Counterinsurgency” (thesis, School of Advanced Airpower Studies (SAAS), Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, May 2005).

² David García Cantalapiedra, “Engagement or Compellence: US Policy Choices in the North Korea Crisis,” *UNISCI Discussion Papers*, May 2003, <http://redalyc.uaemex.mx/redalyc/pdf/767/76711296002.pdf> (accessed August 2, 2011).

acts”³. According to Schelling the use of compellence strategies is observed in conventional wars as in nuclear war this concept would be ludicrous. He distinguishes deterrence from compellence: “There is typically a difference between a threat intended to make an adversary do something and a threat intended to keep him from starting something. The distinction is in the timing in who has to make the first move, and whose initiative is put to the test.”⁴

In deterrence the target audience is known and the threat is communicated in order to make deterrence work unlike comepellence in which the actual demonstration of use of force is expressed to prevent further action that usually involves military exercises, testing missiles and several multiple missions of war games etc.⁵

The practice of compellence theory has not yielded positive results as such keeping in view the case studies of the Serbian conflict, Iraq war 2002-03, and Vietnam⁶. The underlying fact is that compellence has brought states to exercise restraint although the temptation to begin war was a zero-sum calculus. The chart below illustrates the path from the coercer to threaten an adversary to fulfill its demands by either use of force or through bargaining, thereby making compellence functional; whereas non-use of force or using force without fulfillment of the objective or denial by the target to attain its aims, leads to the malfunctioning of compellence.


³ William S. Huggins, “Deterrence after the Cold War: Conventional Arms and the Prevention of War,” *Airpower Journal* (Summer 1993), <http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj93/sum93/huggins.htm> (accessed July 22, 2011).

⁴ Patrick Bratton, “Signals and Orchestration: India’s Use of Compellence in the 2001-02 Crisis,” *Strategic Analysis* vol. 34, issue 4 (July 2010): 594-610.

⁵ William S. Huggins, “Deterrence after the Cold War.”

⁶ Jan van Angeren, “Opportunities and Limits of Compellence Strategies: The Quest for a Framework for Analysis” (Diss., Leiden University Repository), <https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/1887/4276/3/Proefschrift.pdf> (accessed July 28, 2011).

Gradations of Success and Failure of Compellence



Source: <https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/1887/4276/3/Proefschrift.pdf>

Pakistan never had any hegemonic designs to display either inside or outside the region. Moreover it only pursued policies to secure its defence vis-à-vis India. It was India that set the stage for nuclear ambition which Pakistan was reluctant to follow until all its options⁷ were exhausted. The realist paradigm and strategic realities⁸ compelled Pakistan to develop its nuclear capability.

India opting for a nuclear status assumed that its regional power status would influence all regional (south Asian) countries including Pakistan. However, the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Pakistan changed India's stance to that of a global player. India stretched its influence outward by improving diplomatic ties with the great powers and enhanced its military posture by exaggerating the security fears vis-à-vis Pakistan and China. The Indian defence expenditure is rising in order to maintain the 'credible minimum deterrence'.

⁷ Pakistan, year after year in the UN, called for establishing South Asia as Nuclear Weapon Free Zone, also raised voice for zero-missile regime. When all tides went against Pakistan, it went for nuclear detonation of 1998, later it also drafted Strategic Restraint Regime but faced inflexible response from India.

⁸ Pakistan with relative conventional inferiority, border/territorial disputes with its nuclear neighbours, history of wars with promising future crises demanded Pakistan to bring strategic stability to South Asia.

According to the Indian “Budget Estimates (BE) proposed for the year 2010-11, the total expenditure of Central government will be Rs. 11,08,749 crore, which is an increase of 8.6 per cent over total expenditure in BE of 2009-10.”⁹ Instead of enhancing peace, stability and security, a great chunk of GDP being spent on developing BMD systems and increasing stockpiles may have the opposite effect of bringing more instability and insecurity.¹⁰

How real is China’s threat to India? The question is important as the inter-state rivalry revolves around the security triangle of India-Pakistan and China. India holds responsible the 1962 Sino-India war as break-through for its nuclear decision. Although some theoreticians argue that China’s withdrawal from the captured land within two months symbolizes China’s foreign policy intentions. History reveals that ambivalence has a key role in determining China’s international relations with countries around the world. China has never shown a hostile attitude towards India and believes in peaceful coexistence to promote regional peace and harmony.¹¹ Believing in the cliché that when capabilities are there, intentions can change over-night; India cannot rule out the Chinese threat. Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh explicitly declared China as a threat to India; he further added that “China would like to have a foothold in South Asia, and we have to reflect on this reality.”¹²

⁹ Arvind Kadyan, “India’s Defence Budget (2010-2011): Wake up Call for Defence Managers,” *Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis*, http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/IndiasDefenceBudget2010-2011_akadyan_030310 (accessed August 8, 2011).

¹⁰ Muhammad B. Alam, “India’s Nuclear Doctrine: Context and Constraints,” *Heidelberg Papers in South Asian and Comparative Politics*, Working Paper no. 11 (October 2001), <http://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/volltexte/2003/4122/pdf/hpsacp11.pdf> (accessed August 15, 2010).

¹¹ Herold Leelawardena, “The China Bogey and the Real Threat to India,” *Lankaweb*, June 28, 2010, <http://www.lankaweb.com/news/items/2010/06/28/the-china-bogey-and-the-real-threat-to-india/> (accessed September 15, 2011).

¹³ Mr. Singh connected China’s threat to India with historical grievances over Arunachal Pradesh with its rising concerns about “the presence of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) personnel in Pakistan-administered Kashmir” believing that “presence of a PLA infantry battalion at the 15,397-ft high Khunjerab pass in Pakistan-administered Kashmir’s Gilgit-Baltistan region, there to provide security for Chinese workers building a road and high-speed railway in the area.”¹² This infrastructure development is likely to link China’s Xinjiang to the Gwadar port in Balochistan. The basic premise that threatens India is the economic prosperity of two countries through joint venture that will facilitate China’s access to Persian Gulf from where it gets 60 per cent of its oil supplies. Stephen P. Cohen, “South Asia,” *Brookings*,

From the Chinese perspective the “China Threat” is a propaganda waged by few lobbyists in India who intend to gain benefits from other countries by intensifying the magnitude of the abnormal diplomatic relations. They also believe that “to a large extent, the ‘China threat’ theory is more like a weapon used in public opinion and psychological wars as an attempt to contain China’s international diplomacy.”¹³

India-Pakistan Bilateral Relations and History of Crises

The US has remained a key balancer in Pakistan-India relations but always with the intent to mitigate crises but never to address the need to sustain the dialogue process between them.¹⁴ The virtual effect of this intervention has subsequently led to hiccups of crises and a negative peace that never produced a significant outcome from these incidents. The frequency of these events had gained momentum when both states were pursuing their nuclear programme clandestinely.

1986-87 Operation Brasstacks

During Operation Brasstacks, India mobilized its 150,000-400,000 troops in its province of Rajasthan, 100 miles away from the international border during November 1986-March 1987. It was a huge military exercise, bigger than NATO’s since WWII.¹⁵ It was a well-planned operation to test the Indian army’s electronic warfare equipment and demonstration of its computerized/mechanized units.¹⁶

Pakistan’s fear was that India was planning to invade its province of Sindh in order to dismember the country. Pakistan reciprocated by mobilizing its forces along the Indian Punjab province. The crisis reached a climax when Dr A.Q. Khan in his interview with an Indian journalist disclosed that

¹³ http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/files/rc/articles/2004/11southasia_cohen/20041101.pdf (accessed September 24, 2011).

¹⁴ Dang Jianjun, “How to Respond to India’s ‘China threat’ Theory?,” *China Org.*, June 3, 2009, http://www.china.org.cn/international/2009-06/03/content_17883584.htm (accessed September 12, 2011).

¹⁵ Stephen P. Cohen, “South Asia.”

¹⁶ “Brass Tacks,” *Global security*, April 27, 2005, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/brass-tacks.htm> (accessed August 2, 2011).

¹⁷ Steven R. Weisman, “On India’s Border, A Huge Mock War,” *New York Times*, March 6, 1987, <http://www.nytimes.com/1987/03/06/world/on-india-s-border-a-huge-mock-war.html>, last (accessed September 18, 2011).

Pakistan had developed the capability to develop a nuclear bomb.¹⁷ The hotline channel decreased the intensity of tensions later paving the way for Gen. Zia ul Haq's cricket diplomacy. The Operation Brasstacks was followed by CBMs between the two countries. The most important CBM signed on December 31, 1988 by the two foreign ministers was "Agreement on the Prohibition of Attack against Nuclear Installations and Facilities."

Kashmir Uprising 1990

The denial of the rights of Kashmiri people and occupation of the state by India led to the first India-Pakistan war of 1947-1948. Subsequently Indian atrocities in Occupied Kashmir resulted in the surge of freedom movement by the Kashmiris in the late eighties when the Indian forces tried to crush the freedom struggle. Being disappointed by the international community and the UN (despite its resolutions) to resolve the protracted conflict, Pakistan then resorted to the compellence strategy by supporting the freedom movement in Kashmir. India accuses these active militant groups of having links with Pakistan's intelligence agency.¹⁸ During Gen. Musharraf's time many of those organizations were banned.¹⁹ On the contrary there was no let up in gross violations of human rights by Indian armed forces²⁰ in the Valley which they tried to hide by banning the entry of neutral observers and media persons in the troubled state. But Indian oppression could not subdue the struggle which continued to simmer.

After the 9/11 events, India was able to exploit the environment, that had become extremely sensitive to violence and the difference between a freedom struggle and terrorism had become rather tenuous, to put the Kashmir issue on the backburner reiterating that the major issue between India and Pakistan was to tackle terrorism and Pakistan cease to support 'state-sponsored terrorism'. Eventually the compellence strategy worked.

¹⁷ "The End of the A.Q.Khan Network: Case Closed?," [chapter four] in *Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q.Khan and the Rise of Proliferation Networks* (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies), <http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-dossiers/nbm/nuclear-black-market-dossier-a-net-assesment/the-end-of-the-aq-network/#crimes> (accessed October 29, 2011).

¹⁸ Syed Shoaib Hasan, "Why Pakistan is Boosting Kashmir Militants," March 3, 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4416771.stm (accessed November 21, 2011).

¹⁹ Sardar Muhammad Anwar Khan, "Indian Suppression" in 57th session of General Assembly, http://www.ajk.gov.pk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=65&Itemid=23 (accessed November 20, 2011)

1999 Kargil

A few Indian analysts hold that it was the Kargil action by Pakistan that prompted India to think of limited war options that could be exercised without escalating the engagement to a nuclear level. Indian Defence Minister George Fernandes declared that “Kargil war has shown that the nuclearization of India and Pakistan has not made conventional war obsolete; rather it simply imposed another dimension on the way warfare could be conducted.”²⁰ The 1999 Kargil conflict deterred India from enlarging the conflict to an all-out war.

According to Mr. K. Subramanyam, Pakistan used compellence vis-à-vis India in the Kargil war of 1999.²¹ It could be surmised that Pakistan miscalculated the Indian response to Kargil in pursuing compellence in preference to the stability-instability paradox; as being the weaker contestant Pakistan expected to combine the advantages of its strategic position and surprise attack to achieve victory in Kargil.

2001-02 Nuclear Stand-off

Five terrorists attacked the Indian Parliament on December 31, 2001 that resulted in the death of nine Indians, although all five of them were killed in the raid by the armed forces. By late night Indian investigations had come up with findings alleging involvement of Pakistani agencies in launching the attack through the Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad network that was active in Occupied Kashmir. It was probably a hunch of the Indian military to connect the attack to Pakistan. India retaliated by deploying the bulk of its forces on Pakistan’s borders in an offensive posture in eye ball to eye ball confrontation with Pakistan that lasted for almost a year.

India raised the level of the media hype on the Parliament attack. But the event could not get the kind of attention in the West that India wanted as US was then busy making plans for its Afghan invasion.²²

Colonel David Smith, the US Army attaché in Islamabad believed that the Indian Parliament attack was even used by Blackwill, US ambassador in New Delhi, to converge US-India concerns on the issue of terrorism when he stated that jihadi organizations operative in Kashmir were a looming threat to

²⁰ M.V. Ramana, “The Climate in South Asia,” *Lines*, August 2001.

²¹ Conference on “Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia: Crises of 1999, 2002 and Beyond,” held at New Delhi, September 26-27, 2002.

²² Steve Coll, “The Stand-off,” *New Yorker*, February 13, 2006,
http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2006/02/13/060213fa_fact_coll
 (accessed August 26, 2011).

international security due to their linkage with al Qaeda network. According to Col. Smith:

There was a clear perception both in Islamabad and in some quarters in Washington that Blackwill was using the crisis as a vehicle to attain his own goals for US-Indian relations, and that little consideration was being given to the potential adverse impact on the war on terrorism.²³

Pakistan remained instrumental in supporting “Mujahideens” but it does not support all the terrorists’ activities taking place across the border. Brig. Feroz Hassan Khan (retd), former Director Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs (ACDA), also reiterated that “India regularly cooks up such incidents for international effect.” India uses international pressure as a tool in its compellence strategies against Pakistan.

Mumbai Crisis 2008

In 2005, US and India entered into Strategic Cooperation by signing the Indo-US Nuclear Deal. The deal is discriminatory in nature as it has opened avenues for India to gain strategic advantage over Pakistan as it recognizes the de facto status of India (non-NPT state). Subsequently India has been given special waiver by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) that led India to conclude an agreement to receive nuclear fuel supply. On the one hand, Pakistan is being pressurized for signing the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), while on the other US-India ties are steering new trends for the international community to dilute the essence of the non-proliferation regime.²⁴

On November 26, 2008 terrorists’ attacks took place in Mumbai involving shooting and bombing at different locations across the city. The Mumbai attacks caused a media hype in India that tended to equate the Mumbai blasts of 26/11 with the US 9/11 and raised a hue and cry about Pakistan’s involvement in the attacks. The investigation said that during the attack telephonic calls were intercepted through satellite that traced their linkage with Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) operating from Pakistan.²⁵ Subsequently

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Maleeha Lodhi, “FMCT and Strategic Stability,” *South Asian News Agency* (SANA), January 26, 2010, <http://www.sananews.net/english/2010/01/26/fmct-and-strategic-stability/> (accessed July 26, 2011).

²⁵ Robert F. Worth, “In Wake of Attacks, India-Pakistan Tensions Grow,” *New York Times*, December 1, 2008, <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/02/world/asia/02mumbai.html> (accessed September 17, 2011).

India started threatening Pakistan that if it did not prevent such threats emanating from its soil, India would use other means to prevent such acts of terrorism. The relations worsened when India's External Affairs Minister, Pranab Mukherjee, warned Pakistan on December 19, 2008, by stating: "All our pleas have been ignored till date. Pakistan's inaction will force us to consider all options." Indian Air Force threatened Pakistan with surgical strikes by flying Indian Hawks on India-Pakistan international border.²⁶

The Mumbai incident resulted in the deadlock of the composite dialogue that was already moving at a snail's pace. India upon resuming the dialogue process conditioned terrorism as a core issue demanding full assurance from Pakistan that it would not allow its soil to be used by terrorists against India. Pakistan - which is witnessing events like 9/11 or 26/11 almost daily - obviously cannot assure anything of this kind. The Indian objective was achieved since many of the suspected organizations operating inside Pakistan were declared "banned" and their offices sealed.

India's 'Pakistan-Specific' Cold Start Doctrine

The new Indian Army Chief, Gen. V.K. Singh, renounced the existence of the Cold Start Doctrine (CSD) as part of Indian defence strategy by stating that Indian Army never articulated such a doctrine.²⁷ This U-turn in the Indian position is difficult to understand unless it means the CSD has been found to be flawed on practical grounds. Gen. V.K. Singh emphasized that the doctrine was a fabrication of the think tanks, as he said: "There is nothing called "Cold Start."...In the recent years, we have been improving our systems with respect to mobilization but our basic military posture is defensive."²⁸

However, this reversal in Indian army's position runs counter to earlier statements about the doctrine. The former Army Chief, Gen. Kapoor, had not only mentioned it but explained its main features on April 28, 2004, some two months after the commencement of the composite dialogue between India and Pakistan. Gen. Kapoor pointed out five major pillars on which the Cold Start Doctrine rested: One, for the Indian army to wage conventional war it must be prepared to face a "two-front war" creating balance in its army command at both western as well north-eastern border. Second, the Indian

²⁶ Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, "Paradox of Deterrence: India-Pakistan Strategic Relations," *Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad (ISSI)*, http://www.issi.org.pk/ss_Detail.php?dataId=507 (accessed August 28, 2011).

²⁷ "No Cold Start Doctrine, India Tells US," *Indian Express*, September 9, 2010, www.indianexpress.com (accessed July 24, 2011).

²⁸ Ibid.

army should take into account both military and non-military aspects in strategically fighting the war including measures to deal with WMDs from sub-conventional warfare, cyber warfare, electronic and information warfare. Third, the Indian Army should have enough military strength to take war into the enemy's territory and protect India's geo-political interests in the region by protecting the littoral states in the Indian Ocean. Fourth, enhanced interdependence among the three branches of services, i.e., Air, Naval and Army in order to devise comprehensive war strategy. Fifth, technological advancement is the critical factor for India incorporating electronic warfare in planning and executing future wars.²⁹

The CSD aims at making land incursion into Pakistan's territory through forward mobilization of eight integrated battle groups (IBG's) with the support of Navy and Air force in facilitating Indian army to conduct tactical manoeuvres within 72-96 hours. The political objective of this war strategy is to bring war into the enemy's territory under the nuclear overhang before the international community intervenes to enforce a cease-fire. The military objective is to destroy Pakistan's Army Reserve (North) and Army Reserve (South) during which 3-5 of the Indian strike divisions will penetrate by crossing the international border by keeping simultaneity with the holding corps, thereby creating confusion for Pakistan army to make mistakes by dividing their cohesive strength.³⁰ The CSD prevents Pakistan's conventional response without crossing the nuclear threshold. Brig. (Retd) Gurmeet Kanwal believes:

The only sensible option for India would be to call Pakistan's nuclear bluff and plan to launch strike corps offensive operations to achieve strategic gains in as early a time frame as is militarily possible. This approach will need to be combined with a declaratory policy that a nuclear strike against Indian soldiers, even if they are deep inside Pakistani territory, will constitute the use of nuclear weapons against India and will invite massive counter-value and counter-force punitive retaliation against Pakistan.³¹

The Indian army consists of three strike corps: I Corps, II Corps and XXI Corps located in Mathura, Ambala and Bhopal respectively. The Cold Start recognizes that each of these large strike corps would be divided into

²⁹ "India Army Ready for War against China, Pakistan," *Geo TV*, December 30, 2009, <http://www.geo.tv/12-30-2009/55835.htm> (accessed September 23, 2011).

³⁰ Gurmeet Kanwal, *Indian Army Vision 2020* (New Delhi: Harper Collins, 2008), 86.

³¹ Ibid., 81.

eight smaller division-sized ‘integrated battle groups’ (IBG’s) supported by mechanized infantry, artillery and armour to launch offence.³²

The current strength of the Indian Army is more than 1,200,000 consisting of 38 divisions, subdivided into 5 tactical commands: the Northern Command (stationed at Udhampur is responsible for Indian Occupied Kashmir), Western Command (situated at Chandimandi covers Punjab), Southern Command (headquartered at Poona surrounds Gujrat and Maharashtra), Eastern Command (posted at Calcutta takes account of counter-insurgency operations in Assam and defence of border with Bangladesh) and the Central Command (in Luckhnow; consisting of Indian army’s strike elements to take offensive against Pakistan).³³ In recent years a new tactical command named South-Western command has been created and has been formally operative since 18th April 2005 (with its Headquarters at Jaipur). This command will operate in conjunction with the Udhampur-based Northern Command and Chandimandir-based Western Command.³⁴

The military objective³⁵ based on Cold Start is to make ‘shallow territorial gains of 50-80 km’ through speedy mobilization of IBG’s within 72-96 hours. The idea of ‘bite-and hold’ strategy is to “extract concessions from Islamabad”.³⁶ Brig. Feroz Hassan Khan (retd.), former Director ACDA, reiterated that the aim of CSD of targeting a thin line of Pakistani territory is of strategic value (to Pakistan) as most of the major cities lie within that limited range. The map below demonstrates the target points and cities at stake in case of Cold Start incursion by the Indian Army.³⁷

³² Walter C. Ladwig III, “A Cold Start for Hot Wars: The Indian Army’s New Limited War Doctrine,” *International Security* vol. 32, no.3 (Winter 2007/08): 160-164.

³³ Muhammad Bilal Iftikhar Khan, “From Cold Start to AZM-e-NOU III,” *Ground Report*, April 10, 2010, <http://www.groundreport.com/World/From-Cold-Start-to-AZM-e-NOU-III/2921666> (accessed September 27, 2011).

³⁴ “Northern Command,” *Global Security*, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/india/northcom.htm> (accessed August 18, 2011).

³⁵ One of the military objectives through Cold Start Doctrine hints at many.

³⁶ Ladwig III, “A Cold Start for Hot Wars.”

³⁷ Thanks to Brig. Feroz for sharing this slide.




It is in the interest of India that Pakistan defines its red lines so that Pakistan's readiness to use nuclear weapons any time could be publicized against the belief that nuclear weapons were meant for no-use but to deter. Assumptions apart, it seems difficult to presume that a limited war between nuclear weapon states with conventional asymmetry along with the designs to capture a few miles of territory across the border could be contained within limits and conflict escalation could be avoided. The doctrine gives no significant strategic war fighting approach that could help prevent escalation from Pakistan side.

Cold Start Doctrine is a Mode of Network Centric Warfare

The Cold Start carries the blend of different war strategies of modern times. Some academicians regard it as the replica of Israeli war strategy being practised in Lebanon based on a blitzkrieg offensive operation³⁸ whereas

³⁸ It involves a mechanized move of tanks, infantry, artillery and air power, concentrating with overwhelming magnitude of force at high speed to break through enemy lines. Through constant motion, the blitzkrieg attempts to keep its enemy off-balance, making it difficult to respond effectively at any given point.

others regard it carrying the chunk of the US war strategy against Iraq. CSD is a “combination of Information or Network Centric Warfare with Shock-and-Awe Strategy tactics.”³⁹ “Network Centric Warfare” aims to exploit situational awareness in order to make swift operations by increasing the speed of command to get into the enemy’s “OODA loop”⁴⁰ i.e., Observation, Orientation, Decision and Action.



Source: Berndt Brehmer, “The Dynamic OODA Loop: Amalgamating Boyd’s OODA Loop and the Cybernetic Approach to Command and Control,” 10th International Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium, http://www.dodccrp.org/events/10th_ICCRTS/CD/papers/365.pdf

The Network Centric Warfare (NCW) aims at designing the conduct of war by complementing the military/battlefield strategy based on a result-oriented strategy that will paralyse the enemy’s response options. NCW makes


³⁹ Shock and awe strategic tactics is also technically known as ‘rapid dominance’ written by Harlan K. Ullman and James P. Wade in 1996. It is a military doctrine that involves the use of overwhelming power in the battlefield utilizing all sources of intelligence to understand battlefield situation and moves of an adversary and exercise dominant maneuvers in response to them with displays of force to paralyze an adversary’s perception of the battlefield through chaos thereby exhausting adversary’s will to fight back. Ladwig III, “A Cold Start for Hot Wars,” 183.

⁴⁰ OODA loop stands for Observation-Orientation-Decision-Action time cycle or loop. In order to win, some strategies are operated at a faster rhythm than their adversaries so that they get inside the enemy’s territory in order to destroy adversary’s Observation-Orientation-Decision-Action time cycle or loop. ...Such activity will make the offender army appear ambiguous (unpredictable) thereby generate confusion and fuss simultaneously creating divide among adversary’s command. In this situation the adversaries will be unable to stay in compliance with faster transient rhythm of changing moves of adversary they are competing against.

use of technology as a force multiplier⁴¹; for instance the technologies like sensors and information processing⁴² etc., work hand in hand in assisting the work of the military forces in making use of information in an automatic correlation form in the battlefield as per changing war dynamics.

According to Admiral Cebrowski, the military assault takes place in a phased manner starting from planning a mission and then mobilizing the forces in a coordinated manner to launch the offense. This entire process takes time and affects the ability to act because of fatigue. During the 2001-02 stand-off the Indian army got fatigued while bringing its troops close to the international border. The use of network centric approach before launching an offense will give the Indian troops enough time to wait and see the adversary's response and then accordingly manoeuvre in accordance with John Boyd's OODA loop. The availability of information about the adversaries' manouvrability at command level will facilitate the coercer to orient and plan their possible move which is termed as "empowered self-synchronized" operation instead of preplanned move termed as "well-planned synchronized" operation.⁴³ The following figure shows the path of empowered self-synchronization shown by a thick arrow that facilitates the speed of forces at command level:

Self-Synchronization and Speed of Command



Source: <http://www.iwar.org.uk/rma/resources/ncw smith.htm>

⁴¹ Raza Muhammad, "Indian Cold Start Doctrine: A Brief Review," *The Citadel* vol. XXVII, no.1 (2009): 78.

⁴² The sensors are usually satellite borne that give aerial view for surveillance whereas information technologies provide means for processing and analyzing sensor data.

⁴³ Dr. Edward A. Smith, "Network Centric Warfare: Where's the beef?," *Information Warfare Site (IWS)*, <http://www.iwar.org.uk/rma/resources/ncw smith.htm> (accessed September 25, 2011).

The Cold Start Strategy (CSS) believes that by using Network Centric Warfare the adversary command will face chaos and divide under panic, giving enough room to Indian air borne troops and cavalry units to destroy Pakistan army's defense lines and infrastructure and minimizing its reaction capacity. Therefore the 8-10 IBG's will be facilitated to undertake a blitzkrieg action which will be coherent due to available information sharing at the troop level and keeping the options open for flexible changes as per the information requirements by commanders in the battlefield. In this way the doctrine will achieve its objectives of surprise and speedy mobility.

Indian Defence Procurements Supporting NCW Concept

India is allocating huge chunk of its GDP to defence budget and most of the recent defence agreements with Israel and Russia contribute in the employment of new weapon systems that aim at enhancing NCW capabilities.⁴⁴ Running short of artillery to materialize the CSS, the Indian Army is paving way to improve its access to conclude defense agreements.⁴⁵ Moreover India is also acquiring Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) technology to achieve air dominance. These AWACS are of Russian-Israeli origin with effective radar capabilities that aim to detect and intercept enemy fighters and surface-to-air missiles.⁴⁶

The acquisition of AWACS and effective satellites are force multiplier systems which will boost the effectiveness of both offensive and defensive operations executed by Indian Army. The growing Indian military capabilities are hallmark of strengthening the swift mode of operations in lieu of changing war patterns that can be achieved either by the pre-delegation of power at division/brigade level or through synchronization of command. "The Ilyushin-76 gives India the capability to track hundreds of aircraft and potential threats at sea and on the ground, at considerable distances."⁴⁷

Satellite surveillance facilitating the ground maneuvers was being practised during Indian military exercise Divya Astra (March 2004) that

⁴⁴ Walter C. Ladwig III, "A Cold Start for Hot Wars: The Indian Army's New Limited War Doctrine," 183.

⁴⁵ India plans to induct 4000 new 155mm artillery pieces worth contracts of more than US \$4 billion. "Murky Competitions for Indian Howitzer Orders May End Soon... Or Not," *Defense Industry Daily*, January 27, 2011, <http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/murky-competition-for-2b-india-howitzer-order-may-end-soon-0805/> (accessed September 15, 2011).

⁴⁶ "India Set to Buy Additional Russian-Israeli AWACS Planes," *RiaNovosti*, November 9, 2011, http://en.rian.ru/military_news/20111109/168530024.html (accessed November 24, 2011).

⁴⁷ "Indian Air Force Gets Awacs Plane," *BBC News*, May 28, 2009, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8072143.stm> (accessed November 23, 2011).

conducted 90 minutes battle where mechanized formations were integrated by air support whereby Long Range Observer System (LOROS) and ELM-2140 Surveillance Radars with range of 14km and 40 km respectively provided “thermal imagers intermeshed with weapon systems. This was the first step towards NCW and the use of devastating firepower to replace casualty intensive...an important prerequisite of CSD.”⁴⁸

‘Myth of Nuclear Deterrence’ in South Asia

A total war of nuclear exchange is both theoretically and practically impossible as no nuclear weapon state (NWS) would be so irrational in its decision-making as to push the nuclear button and commit suicide. The concept of limited war is at odds with nuclear deterrence that demands communication of threat of use of nuclear weapons to prevent the adversary from pursuing the same course of action. A limited war if it begins will set the stage for both countries to advance on the escalation ladder from where crossing the nuclear threshold will not be an impossible stage. The deterrence theory needs to broaden its horizon in view of the dynamic war innovations. Nuclear deterrence does not encompass a limited war in its ambit.

Gen. Butler describes “deterrence as a dialogue of the blind with the deaf. He said deterrence failed completely as a guide for setting rational limits on the size and composition of military forces. The appetite of deterrence theory was voracious, its capacity to justify new weapons and large stocks unrestrained.”⁴⁹

Bernard Brodie opines that the possession of nuclear weapons is not enough unless it specifies the conditions under which they would be used in order to make deterrence work. According to him, “it would be tactically and factually wrong to assure the enemy in advance...that we would in no case move against him until we had felt some bombs on our cities and airfields.”⁵⁰ Brodie’s version clarifies India’s second strike and recessed deterrence. The notion of launching preemptive strike by India has never been ruled out although the main emphasis of its doctrine rests on the second strike capability⁵¹ with punitive, preventive retaliation. Pakistan - with its linear geo-strategic location - has categorically articulated through its higher official

⁴⁸ Raza Muhammad, “Indian Cold Start Doctrine: A Brief Review,” 78.

⁴⁹ V. N. Khanna, *India’s Nuclear Doctrine* (New Delhi: Samskiti, 2000), 262.

⁵⁰ Bernard Brodie, *Strategy in the Missile Age* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1959), 397.

⁵¹ V. N. Khanna, *India’s Nuclear Doctrine*, 245.

statements⁵² that it cannot afford to wait for a nuclear war to be imposed upon it. Pakistan's robust Command and Control is responsible enough not to allow any accidental/unauthorized use of nuclear weapons, whereby it keeps the option of first strike open to secure its sovereignty. The strategic outlook extracted from this presumption makes the credibility of deterrence in case of India and Pakistan doubtful when both parties-to-the-conflict are considering the preemptive attacks option from the other side. Therefore it is impossible to predict with absolute assurance about the adversaries' behavior under provocative circumstances.

Easy to strategize, war is hard to calibrate. Nuclear weapons deter both nuclear wars as well as conventional wars because war is a continuum, not a discreet set of actions. Cold Start attempts to compartmentalise war.⁵³

Nuclear Deterrence and CSD

India has postulated CSD as a "limited war under the nuclear umbrella." Limited warfare as part of Indian Defence policy vis-à-vis its nuclear neighbours, Pakistan and China, is a challenging task that requires advanced conventional war fighting military capabilities.⁵⁴ On paper India articulated the Cold Start Doctrine nicely based on NATO's "come as you are" war pattern⁵⁵ but on ground the Indian force posture stands no comparison to NATO's even after six years of the doctrine announcement.

The limited war theory to be applied in case of South Asia needs to involve the China factor. The conventional wars waged by India either with Pakistan or China at one time can be provocative for a third party's (indirect) involvement in the conflict keeping in view the Sino-Pakistan and Sino-India

⁵² Pakistan has not published its nuclear doctrine. The main aspects of the doctrine have been explained at several places by Pakistani higher officials. The guiding principle is minimum credible nuclear deterrence; some officials also refer four policy objectives for Pakistan's nuclear weapons; 1) deter all forms of external aggression; 2) deter through a combination of conventional and strategic forces; 3) deter counterforce strategies by securing strategic assets and threatening nuclear retaliation; 4) stabilize strategic deterrence in South Asia. Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin, "Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues," *Congressional Research Service*, June 12, 2009, <http://www.usembassy.it/pdf/other/RL34248.pdf> (accessed September 20, 2011).

⁵³ Yogesh Joshi, "The Cold End of Cold Start Doctrine?," *Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies* (IPCS), October 13, 2010, www.ipcs.org (accessed July 27, 2011).

⁵⁴ Ashley J. Tellis, "Future Fire: Challenges Facing Indian Defense Policy in the New Century," *India Today Conclave*, March 13, 2004, <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/futurefire.pdf> (accessed September 5, 2011).

⁵⁵ Adnan Gill, "Cold Start or a Cold Myth?," *Asian Tribune*, January 26, 2009, <http://www.asiantribune.com/node/15311> (accessed September 19, 2011).

relations; while on the other hand Indian Defence capability for a simultaneous war with Pakistan and China is yet to figure in the realm of possibility. The divergence of perceptions and immense level of mistrust due to historical baggage have made both countries to draft their nuclear doctrine and respective force postures in contrasting patterns. This notion determines the future course of action vis-à-vis each other.

Terestita C. Schaffer believes that in nuclear environment, the limited conventional war concept propagated by India is not logical. She said it is not possible to quantify the concept of limited war in terms of geography, weapons or political objectives in the Indo-Pakistan equation. A limited war from Indian point of view may not be limited from Pakistani perspective.⁵⁶

The continuous state of turbulence in South Asia along with the development of nuclear weapons have made conventional wars a risky game, since both countries have no history of arms control agreements and the success of CBMs has also remained confined on paper. After the 9/11 attacks, all India has done is projected Pakistan as the hub of terrorism; this perception persists in the West as well. Without realizing that the country itself was the worst victim of the terrorism and insurgencies spillover across borders, which is a known fact, India has persistently disregarded the regional dynamics and pressurized Pakistan with the charge of state sponsored acts creating confrontational issues and advanced its strategic motives using compellence. Pakistan COAS, Gen. Ashfaq Pervaiz Kayani expressed this apprehension when he said that “proponents of conventional application of military forces, in a ‘nuclear overhang’ are chartering an adventurous and dangerous path; the consequences of which could be both unintended and uncontrollable.”⁵⁷

Indian Military Hardware Challenges Confronting CSD

The doctrine is exhaustive in its insistence on maintaining the military fully prepared with all facilities to launch such an offensive operation. Presently India is confronted with a number of issues to practically perform this doctrine.

War preparedness of a high order at all times in terms of strategic reserves of weapons, equipment, ammunition, accessories and petroleum,

⁵⁶ Khurshid Khan, “Limited War under the Nuclear Umbrella and its Implications for South Asia,” *Stimson*, <http://beta.stimson.org/southasia/pdf/khurshidkhan.pdf> (accessed August 17, 2011).

⁵⁷ “Press Release,” *Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR)*, January 1, 2010, http://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&id=1082 (accessed September 27, 2011).

diesel and aviation fuel is required. Cold Start War Doctrine offensive operations cannot be launched on incomplete inventories.⁵⁸

According to the war plan laid down by CSD, India will convert its defence corps into strike corps. The moment these defence corps will be mobilized in a forward move to launch a penetrative land incursion into Pakistan territory, one brigade of Pakistan army would be able to take the other route to attack India causing heavy damage since India's IBG corps would have got stuck inside Pakistan while the rest of the Indian territory will be having no defence corps providing greater room to Pakistan to inflict damage.

To act under the unified command as postulated by CSD all the three services need to have optimal level of coordination which is important for the success of a blitzkrieg type of action. India is still lagging behind in such manoeuverability and requires a “revolution in military affairs” to upgrade its air force for better coordination in battlefield in terms of logistics.

Pakistan's Responses to the Cold Start

Pakistan, on 19 April 2011, conducted the first flight test of its tactical nuclear weapon, the Multi Tube Ballistic Missile Hatf IX (NASR). The NASR has a range of 60 km, capable of carrying nuclear warhead of appropriate yield with high accuracy and “shoot & scoot attributes, which can deter evolving threats.” The Director General Strategic Plans Division (SPD), Lt. Gen. Khalid Ahmed Kidwai (retd), announced that “the test was a very important milestone in consolidating Pakistan’s strategic deterrence capability at all levels of the threat spectrum.”⁵⁹ The development of tactical nuclear weapons has lowered the nuclear threshold as believed by many analysts. India wishes to keep the war option open in South Asia between the “strategic space of Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) and Nuclear Threshold.”

The NASR missile test was advertised as Pakistan's latest response to India's Cold Start doctrine, which is itself provocative.... Pakistani military planners evidently believe the NASR missile system will close a nuclear deterrence gap that has been opened up by the Indian doctrine.... With little geographic depth but still locally formidable ground and air defenses, Pakistan

⁵⁸ Subhash Kapila, “Indian Army Validates its Cold Start War Doctrine,” *South Asian Analysis*, June 7, 2005, <http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers15/paper1408.html> (accessed June 15, 2011).

⁵⁹ “Press Release,” *Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR)*, April 19, 2011, http://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&id=1721 (accessed August 24, 2011).

will not be passive in defense but will rather react with escalatory, punitive manoeuvres of its own.”⁶⁰

The NASR is capable of targeting “mechanized forces like armed brigades and divisions envisaged in India’s Cold Start Doctrine.”⁶¹ The flight test of NASR has proved that Pakistan addresses Indian conventional superiority with its tactical nuclear option.

Earlier Pakistan Army conducted its Azm-e-Nau III as the largest military exercise after Zarb-e-Momin of 1998 in the backdrop of external and internal security threats challenging its security. The exercise began on 10 April 2010 and focused on war tactics of “Dispersal Techniques” in which 20,000 troops of all services participated aiming to demonstrate Pakistan’s enhanced defence capabilities. In the words of Army Chief General Kayani, “We are focused to the defense of Pakistan and fully capable of defending Pakistan today.”⁶²

The basic contour of this exercise was comprehensive to address the wider range of threats of terrorism and extremism also. Therefore, Pakistan Army tailored its doctrine to respond to a two-front alarm emanating from both eastern and western borders.⁶³ Pakistan’s defence posture is in up-stream particularly its missile capabilities that are fully accomplished to counter any strategic threat. The map below shows that the range of Hatf IV is capable of targeting Indian western Air Force targets just within 3 minutes’ launch time.⁶⁴

⁶⁰ Rodney W Jones, “Pakistan’s Answer to Cold Start?”, *The Friday Times* vol. XXIII, no. 13 (May 13-19, 2011), <http://www.thefridaytimes.com/13052011/page7.shtml> (accessed September 23, 2011).


⁶¹ Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, “NASR (Hatf IX) Counteracts India’s Cold Start Doctrine,” *Weekly Pulse*, April 22, 2011, <http://www.weeklypulse.org/details.aspx?contentID=482&storylist=2> (accessed April 25, 2011).

⁶² Raja Muhammad Khan, “Pakistan: Exercises Azm-e-Nau III in the Perspective,” *Opinion Maker*, April 22, 2010, <http://www.opinion-maker.org/2010/04/pakistan-exercises-azm-e-nau-iii-in-the-perspective/> (accessed August 20, 2011).

⁶³ Lubna Umar, “Azm-e-Nau and Renewed Security Trends,” *Pakistan Observer*, <http://pakobserver.net/detailnews.asp?id=24748> (accessed September 24, 2011).

⁶⁴ “Pakistan’s Cold Start Strategy Response: India’s deployment of Mig-29 on Pakistan Border,” <http://pkkh.lefora.com/2009/10/05/pakistans-cold-start-strategy-response-indias-depl/> (accessed August 21, 2011).

Range of Pakistan's Ballistic Missile Arsenal



Source: Subhash Kapila, "Pakistan's Ballistic Missile Arsenal: Development and Acquisition Philosophy," *South Asia Analysis Group*, paper no. 148, <http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers2%5Cpaper148.html>

India calls Pakistan's Azm-e-Nau III exercise as "India-Threat Centric." The Indian strategists have notified that US military hardware supplies to Pakistan including the F-16s would be used against India, stating that the US F-16 aircraft have nothing to do with terrorism war-fighting strategy.⁶⁵ Due to trust deficit between India and Pakistan any military cooperation between Pakistan and the West looks alarming to India. She insists that no matter what the intended purpose ultimately all US supplies given to Pakistan will be used against India and therefore America should not support Pakistan militarily or financially; since US has its own national interests to protect and promote in the region.

Indian apprehensions regarding Azm-e-Nau III revolved around the geographic location where this exercise was held. Few Indian analysts believe that "operations extended from South Punjab to Sindh...that suggests that it is intended to defeat India's multiple thrusts as part of Cold Start War Doctrine and also an Indian diversionary Corps strike launched against

⁶⁵ Gurmeet Kanwal, *Indian Army Vision 2020* (New Delhi: HarperCollins, 2008).

Sialkot.”⁶⁶ Azm-e-Nau 2010 aims to facilitate the successful exit of US from Afghanistan so that Pakistan Army will again get the access to strategic depth in Afghanistan. All these presumptions show the myopia of Indian think tanks that are targeting improvement in US-Pakistan relations by undermining their trust and collaboration in counterinsurgency bilateral cooperative measures.⁶⁷

The war plans as the one being reflected through CSD is likely to thwart regional peace between India and Pakistan. The Cold Start has provided Pakistan reasonable grounds to develop and test tactical nuclear weapons to avert the option of conventional war. It is in the interest of Pakistan to increase the stakes of nuclear war in order to deter India with any conventional preemption strategy.⁶⁸

Apart from war the peace-time contingency plans are always in practice by Pakistan vis-à-vis Indian offensive. Pakistan being well aware of its less strategic depth is opening up other options to secure its defence. The construction of motorways also serves the strategic purpose of runways in order to wider the response options during wartimes. Both the Motorways (M-1 and the M-2) have four emergency runway sections. The Pakistan Air Force (PAF) has used the M-2 motorway as a runway twice during its exercises first in 2000 and later in 2010⁶⁹ named ‘High Mark-2010’.⁷⁰ It is believed that the use of road runways by the PAF during war-time would not only provide alternate link for the communication network in order to meet the need of any contingency but would also provide ‘flexibility of operations’. The Motorways are constructed deep inside the territory connecting the north to the south (from Peshawar to Gawadar).⁷¹

⁶⁶ Subhash Kapila, “Pakistan Army Sends Politico-Military Signals to India through ‘Ex Azm-e-Nau’,” *South Asian Analysis*, April 21, 2010, <http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers38%5Cpaper3772.html> (accessed July 16, 2011).

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Walter C. Ladwig III, “A Cold Start for Hot Wars: The Indian Army’s New Limited War Doctrine,” 72.

⁶⁹ PAF used the runway to land, refuel and take off its two fighter aircrafts Miraj III and F-7P (during High Mark-2010) apart from Super Mushak trainer and C-130.

⁷⁰ “PAF Conducts Fighter Operations from Motorway,” April 2, 2011, http://www.paf.gov.pk/press_release/uploaded/MOTORWAY-RELEASE02-04-10.pdf (accessed November 23, 2011).

⁷¹ “PAF Jets Undertake Landings on Motorway,” *Pakistan Tribune*, September 12, 2005 <http://paktribune.com/news/PAF-Jets-undertake-landings-on-Motorway-118826.html> (accessed November 24, 2011); “F-7 Mirage Makes Trial Landing on Motorway,” *Dawn*, November 21, 2002, <http://archives.dawn.com/2002/11/22/nat45.htm> (accessed November 23, 2011).

Future Implications of Cold Start on India-Pakistan Bilateral Relations

Many theoreticians believe that nuclear weapons in South Asia have made the strategic environment more alarming instead of bringing stability in the area. The main reason for this is the divergent doctrinal perspectives of the two countries which hamper the functioning of deterrence. Pakistan is not deterred by India's second strike threat and India, owing to international pressure, does not believe in Pakistan's political will to exercise the use of nuclear weapons. To make nuclear deterrence effective the threat to use nuclear weapons should be credible and well articulated. Since deterrence has psychological connotations, the threat of the use of weapons must be credible enough to deter the adversary's action.

Pakistan pursues "deterrence by denial" whereas India practices "deterrence by punishment." The asymmetry of perspectives on nuclear deterrence undermines its strength leaving the region more volatile and turbulent in the wake of any miscalculation of either side's intentions.

One of the WikiLeaks cable reveals that the Cold Start is the brain-child of the BJP government of the time and is not fully endorsed by the present Manmohan Singh government. It is believed that Indian military hawks do adhere to the concept of Cold Start to make it a reality but without the political commitment.⁷² If Cold Start is part of its military war games then why did the Indian forces conduct eleven major exercises near the Pakistan border to boost synergy in its defence forces. While conducting the six-day military exercise "Vihayee Bhav" - one of the Indian officials confirmed the objectives of the exercises by stating that...the battlefield tactics for warfare are being practiced in the exercise which aims at fine-tuning the concept of Cold Start doctrine.⁷³

Moreover, India's pursuit of developing a Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) system in the shape of Prithvi Air Defence (PAD) will raise Pakistan's security calculations in terms of reciprocity to maintain a minimum credible deterrence.

The prevailing trust deficit may erupt into another crisis and would jeopardize South Asian security if a non-state terrorist activity/attack is

⁷² "WikiLeaks: US on Indian Army's Cold Start Doctrine," *ND TV*, December 2, 2010, <http://www.ndtv.com/article/wikileaks-revelations/wikileaks-us-on-indian-army-s-cold-start-doctrine-69859?cp> (accessed September 21, 2011).

⁷³ "Indian Army, Air Force Begin Six-Day Joint Exercise along Western Deserts," May 9, 2011, <http://www.india-defence.com/reports-5098> (accessed September 16, 2011).

miscalculated by India. As Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC), General Tariq Majid said:

We have to be mindful of the blatant pursuit of military preponderance in our neighborhood. Growing power imbalance due to continuing build up of massive military machine, including both hi-tech conventional and nuclear forces, adoption of dangerous cold start doctrine and proactive strategy, more assertive posturing especially after very exceptional civil nuclear deal and notions of two front war are all destabilizing trends, carrying implications for Pakistan's security. Therefore, retention of essential nuclear capability to maintain credible minimum deterrence against any possible aggression is our compulsion and not a matter of choice.⁷⁴

Possible Options to Offset Cold Start Strategy

Pakistan Army needs restructuring/reorganization in view of the changing perceived threats. In order to improve its reconnaissance capability Pakistan has already purchased four Swedish Saab-2000AEW aircraft whereas four more (ZDK-03 AWACS) are expected to arrive from China.⁷⁵

Pakistan needs to restructure and reorganize its army during the peacetime by adoption of a comprehensive approach to resist and deter any offensive through the use of all available means of modern information technology including psychological or cyber warfare. All this requires incorporating new weapon systems strategized to open war on several fronts to deter any hostile advance of the enemy.

The use of satellite information can be used to detect the manoeuvres being made by the IBG's across the international border. India has acquired Remote Sensing Satellite Imagery⁷⁶ that "...will qualitatively enhance the battle-field transparency. Commanders in the field will be able to base their decisions on real-time accurate information. This will greatly assist in shaping the land battle in all its phases.⁷⁷

On the political front the focus should be on improving the economy as a good defence cannot be built on military aid; the economy has to be

⁷⁴ "Press Release," *Inter Services Public Relations* (ISPR), June 17, 2010, http://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&id=1333 (accessed September 21, 2011).

⁷⁵ "India Set to Buy Additional Russian-Israeli AWACS Planes."

⁷⁶ Remote Sensing Satellite Imagery with Requisite Technological Specifications of 1 Metre/sub-Metre.

⁷⁷ Satbir Singh, "Shaping the Land Battle through Remote Sensing and Satellite-Imagery," *IDS4*, <http://www.idsa-india.org/an-feb00-5.html> (accessed November 25, 2011).

placed on a sound footing to lend credibility to the defence posture. Resources have to be diverted to develop “combined arms operations” and coordination capabilities need enhancement to offset Cold Start’s mechanized operations which demand swift coordinated response.

Conclusion

The prospect of a nuclear war through escalation is not entirely excluded from the realm of possibility in South Asia. Stephen P. Cohen thinks that nuclear South Asia is a continuous source of concern for the US that regards nuclear war an “ever-present possibility” that can result either through escalation of conventional war, through misperception or miscalculation due to greater trust deficit or even through preemption.⁷⁸

The absolute functioning of deterrence is in the interest of Pakistan which neither has any hegemonic designs against India nor does it want any conventional outbreak. The nuclear parity is not advantageous to conventionally superior India with “global” political objectives. In Thomas Schelling’s view, “in strategy when both parties abhor collision the advantage goes often to the one who arranges the status quo in his favour and leaves to the other the ‘last clear chance’ to stop or turn aside.” If India continues to pursue such a doctrine it will provide Pakistan all the excuses to develop counter strategies in order to strengthen deterrence.

Pakistan supports peace since indulgence in any war is more costly to Pakistan than India. Therefore Pakistan uses the nuclear card in preventing war believing that a conventional war with India will provide greater room (to India) to inflict an unacceptable cost on Pakistan and put her in a bad bargaining position. The behaviour of decision making elites (of both India and Pakistan) is motivated by compellence strategy. The technological developments by India including BMD systems and its defence agreements with great powers including Israel and Russia for latest weapons’ procurement is compelling Pakistan to look for other options. If this trend continues, deterrence would seem to be moving towards compellence.

While the entire strategy under the CSD has been chalked out, the categorical denial by the Indian Army Chief Gen. V.K. Singh regarding the existence of “Cold Start” has raised questions. One wonders whether India has really abandoned its doctrine or because of the US pressure it is another effort to misguide the West about India’s covert designs or it is intended to compel Pakistan to act in an expected move.

⁷⁸ Stephen P. Cohen, “South Asia.”

The litmus test would be to analyse the on-ground situation and watch the Indian troops' mobility across the border. Any forward move or joint services exercises by Indian Armed Forces should alert Pakistan to readjust its defensive position.■