

BOOK REVIEWS

The Nation's Voice: Achieving the Goal

(Volume VI of *Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah*)

Edited by Dr Waheed Ahmad

Quaid-i-Azam Academy, Karachi, 2002.

Pages: 732. Price: Rs 800.00

The present volume, just off the press, is the sixth in a series of seven volumes which cover nearly all of Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah's spoken and written words from 1935 onwards. Mr Jinnah never kept a diary and has left no notes. His thoughts, policies and strategies have to be deduced from his statements, interviews, correspondence, messages and the advice he tendered to his followers and lieutenants. Volume VI covers the short but crucial period from March to August 1947. By March 1947, the goal of the All-India Muslim League—freedom for India and its partition—had been decided. But a date for the transfer of power was yet to be set and a mechanism and machinery for implementing the plan were yet to be created. Consequently, it was a time of hectic diplomacy, moves and countermoves by the protagonists.

Dr Waheed Ahmad has painstakingly collected and annotated all the available documented evidence from three countries—Great Britain, India and Pakistan. His sources comprise newspapers, collected works, and the private diaries of the protagonists; records of the political parties involved; biographies and autobiographies; and works on the history and politics of the subcontinent. A glance at the list of contents will show that the work is indeed a labour of love.

Lord Listowel, the last Secretary of State for India, has contributed a Foreword to this volume. Assessing Jinnah's role, he writes that all the other actors in the political arena, including the viceroy, could have been replaced without there being any radical change in the final denouncement, but, "it a barely conceivable . . . that a new nation state of Pakistan would have been created but for the personality and leadership of one man, Mr Jinnah."

Dr Waheed Ahmad's extensive and penetrating introduction pieces together the varying materials, giving them coherence and meaning. His analysis of the roles played by the protagonists is both scholarly and objective. He reveals that Nehru laid the foundations of the Indian National Congress (INC)–Labour Party entente during his visit to England in 1938. The documents collected in the book show that Jinnah and Mountbatten operated on different wavelengths from the very beginning. Mountbatten pressed Jinnah to resurrect the Cabinet Mission Plan but Jinnah flatly refused and insisted that a “surgical operation” was the only way out of the impasse created by the INC. Mountbatten advanced the date of partition by ten months, from June 1948 to August 1947, with calamitous consequences. The documents are silent about the reasons for this haste but, interestingly, no party raised an objection. However, the complexity of the problems led all concerned to agree on 31 March 1948 as the date for the completion of the process of Partition.

The documents collected here show how deeply the INC leaders and their trusted Hindu bureaucrats, notably V. P. Menon, had penetrated decision-making circles both in London and Delhi. The AIML point of view on all issues was, not surprisingly, given an unsympathetic and even hostile reception.

In an obituary on V. P. Menon, Mountbatten wrote, “It did not take me five minutes conversation with him to decide that here was the adviser I needed. From that moment he became a trusted and well-beloved member of my small inner circle of advisers.” George Abell, Private Secretary to Mounbatten, wrote, “V. P., like all intelligent Hindus, was dead against Pakistan”, his every effort directed “to [making] Pakistan unworkable and the Muslims powerless. At this critical time, the existence of an additional and privileged channel between the Congress and Mountbatten was the cause of bedevilment of relations between India and Pakistan.” Dr Ahmad rightly dubs V. P. the Chanakya of Mountbatten.

The sixteen appendices in the book throw light on many a dark corner of pertinent issues such as the Punjab Boundary Award; the future of the princely states, notably Kashmir and Hyderabad; Mountbatten's proposal for joint Governor-Generalship of India and

Pakistan; the referendum in the North-west Frontier Province; the division of assets, etc.

From the outset, Pandit Nehru was determined to make Kashmir part of India and was never short of excuses to rationalize this ambition. In mid-June 1947, he wrote to Mountbatten that both the Maharaja and the National Conference wanted the State to accede to India. His claim was refuted by the Muslim Conference, which had the largest elected representation in the State Legislative Assembly. On 19 July 1947, the Muslim Conference passed a Resolution, advocating the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to Pakistan. Maharaja Hari Singh talked of holding a plebiscite to decide whether the State should join India or Pakistan, if the Boundary Commission gave him a land connection with India (i.e., Gurdaspur). This accounts for the changes made in the Punjab Boundary Award.

It seems there was a well-co-ordinated plan between the Maharaja, Nehru and Mountbatten to gift Kashmir to India. The report of the Quaid-i-Azam's personal secretary, K. H. Khurshid, to Jinnah from Srinagar on 12 October 1947 (before the tribal intrusion) clearly shows that the Maharaja was all set to accede to India. He had created a new post, that of Deputy Prime Minister, and nominated Sardar Patel for the position. He had also dismissed all Muslims from the State's Armed Forces. These papers make it abundantly clear that Nehru never intended to stand by his commitment of holding a plebiscite to ascertain the wishes of the people of Kashmir. In a tape-recorded interview with H. V. Hodson, Menon admitted: "As for plebiscite in Kashmir, we were absolutely, absolutely dishonest. We then held back Pakistan's share of assets of Rs 550 million to bargain over Kashmir."

This volume, like the five earlier ones in the series, is a rich source of vital information on the Pakistan movement. The production values are excellent. A comprehensive personality index with biographical notes at the end, followed by a subject index, make it easy for the reader to locate the desired information in the text and add to the value of the work. ■

Rais Ahmed Khan

The Post-Cold War World

Edited by Li Chauwen

Shanghai Institute for International Studies, Shanghai, China, 2000

Pages: 334. Price: not given.

In the recent past, the world witnessed the dismemberment of the former Soviet Union. The disappearance of the bi-polar world has led to a readjustment and realignment in relationships among the major powers. Simultaneously, we have witnessed the eruption of conflicts and contradictions—ethnic, political and religious—in a number of countries and areas. These conflicts had hitherto been suppressed or covered in the bi-polar global framework. As a concomitant of these developments, the post-Cold War world is far from being peaceful and secure.

The volume under review, *The Post-Cold War World*, we find views on and concerns about issues in the present-day global situation. We witness the contention between the tendencies towards multi-polarity and uni-polarity. The most important question is whether world affairs should be debated and decided upon in a multi-polar setting, i.e., the international community as a whole, or if they should be decided unilaterally, by the sole surviving superpower.

It is common knowledge that, given the complexity of international life, the desire that controversies, conflicts and confrontations should be resolved jointly by all nations, dealing on the basis of equality. As such, the idea of external pressure exercised arbitrarily by the sole superpower must be totally rejected. Viewed in this context, multi-polarity is an inexorable tendency in the development of international relations.

In a well-researched article, “China: Post-War Environment and External Relations”, Chen Peiyao states that towards the end of the Cold War, the West, led by the United States, exercised enormous political and economic pressure on socialist China. The purpose of the pressure tactics was to force China to change, as the former Soviet Union and other East European countries had done. However, China did not succumb to this pressure. Instead, during that, period, China maintained a rapid economic growth as well as political stability. Thus,

the West's policy, "to make China change by pressure", was totally frustrated. Instead, since 1993, China's achievements in the economic field have attracted much attention and appreciation throughout the world.

In view of China's spectacular success, the West had to change its strategy. To begin with, it adjusted its China policy and took the initiative in developing political and economic relations with that country, as it stood to gain substantial benefits. The West also entered the Chinese market, with its enormous potential for trade, while trying to integrate China in the obtaining international political and economic systems. At the same time, the West has not yet given up its policy of pressurizing China, and continues to trumpet the theory of a "China Threat", aimed at stifling China's emergence as a great power.

In the next article, Zhu Maju, discusses the features of Western civilization and their impact on China. He states that, since the end of the Cold War, the effect of cultural factors on international relations has been increasing. Among the rich cultures of the world, Western civilization apparently enjoys a dominant place and, as such, its influence is particularly significant. It is against this backdrop that the author explores the essence and features of Western civilization and their impact on international relations. Maju highlights the fact that there are over 200 countries in the world, each with its own cultural milieu, each contributing to the colour and vitality of our world. The confluence of Western and non-Western civilizations does not necessarily result in a clash. Rather, the consequence could well be integration, followed by evolution towards a new and higher level of civilization.

Maju maintains that different civilizations could seek common ground while preserving their ideological moorings, thus promoting good and eliminating the bad. At a time when Western civilization has failed to cure its own social ailments, it will be in the interest of the West to shed its arrogance and stop parading as the centre of the world. It should search for the common ground among different civilizations and learn from the positive aspects of other civilizations. This will lead to enhanced mutual respect between different civilizations.

In “Adjustment of Big Powers Relations and Development of World Multi-polarization Tendency”, Chen Qimao remarks that, since the end of the Cold War, struggles had become increasingly more prominent between “multi- polarization” tendencies throughout the world, and the “single polar” tendency of one or two countries that attempt to dominate world affairs. In the struggle between multi-polarization and uni-polar tendencies, it is pertinent to note that, in China’s perception, the multi-polarization is an irresistible global historical trend and its development is conducive to world peace. Multi-polarization advocates that all countries in the world must make common efforts to establish a just, rational and dynamic international political and economic order on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence.

Continuing his arguments, Qimao convincingly affirms that China opposes any global or regional power that promotes hegemony. This, however, does not mean that China regards such a country as its enemy. As a matter of fact, China is willing to develop friendly relations with any country that shows its willingness to shed its hegemonic designs. It is in accordance with this principle that China would like to conduct its relations with the US and the former Soviet Union.

Dilating on the “Sino–US Strategic Partnership”, Yang Jiemin states that, in the twenty-first century, China is striving for a favourable international political and economic order that will support its drive towards modernization. It is with this end in view that it is forging stable relations with major powers. China has established a strategic partnership with Russia; it has also entered into a comprehensive partnership with France and has become a dialogue partner of ASEAN. Currently, China is negotiating a “strategic partnership” with the United States. Incidentally, during the past quarter of a century, Sino–US relations have been successfully strengthened and have withstood severe tests. Now the two countries have to make an historic decision: whether they would like to become co-operative partners or confrontational adversaries.

As things stand, Sino–US relations are at a crossroad. Qimao is convinced that if the two countries are wise enough to see healthier

course in their bilateral relations in the post-Cold War era, their mutual relations could certainly overcome crises-management passivity.

Ding Xingao, writing on a similar theme, examines the possibility of a stable relationship between the United States and China. He maintains that the history of the past one hundred years shows that two elements in American foreign policy have been “consistent”: a strong sense of ideology and the trend of interference in the internal affairs of other countries. Interestingly, the US does temporarily put aside ideology when practical interests are taken into consideration; however, it will not be totally given up by any US administration.

Foreign policy statements made by US presidents in the past and in present times always highlight the promotion of democracy and human rights abroad. The United States, however, is often driven in its international behaviour by strategic and economic interests; hence, the US practice of double standards in dealing with foreign countries.

In the last article, Zhao Huashing examines the new framework of “Sino–Russian–US Triangular Relations”. He says that the triangle is merely one part of the emerging multi-polar configuration of the world. Many other power centres exist beyond this triangle. All these powers together form the current kaleidoscopic multi-polar world. The 1950s and 1960s witnessed a Sino–Soviet alliance against the US; Sino-US co-operation against the Soviet Union was the order of the day during the 1970s and 1980s. Currently, the three countries are moving towards a new structure of mutual relations. On the one hand, they share important common interests and have established a co-operative relationship; on the other hand, geopolitical competition among major powers continues.

There is a consensus among the writers included in this volume that in view of the great differences in the social systems, history, cultures and stages of economic development between China, Russia and the United States, the existence of problems amongst these countries is natural. What is important, however, is that all of them should view these problems realistically and make concerted efforts to find a workable solution. If these countries take a long-term view of the global situation and proceed realistically, their problems can be resolved

and the prospects for the development of mutual economic and trade relations would certainly be brighter. ■

Colonel (retired) Gbulam Sarwar

Conflict Unending: India–Pakistan Tensions since 1947

Sumit Ganguly¹

Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2002.

Sumit Ganguly's book, *Conflict Unending: India–Pakistan Tensions since 1947*, though a well-researched and well-written scholarly work, lacks objectivity. The book is divided into six chapters, all except one relating to the wars between India and Pakistan; the exception is a chapter that deals with the nuclearization of India and Pakistan.

The author's focus throughout the book is on the state of Jammu and Kashmir, where India and Pakistan have clashed four times since their creation. He claims objectivity, denying that his work is polemical; he is, nevertheless, prone to projecting the Indian point of view. He does not consider Kashmir "disputed territory": Pakistan is blamed for having initiated all the conflicts. He has chosen to add appendices that support the Indian case, choosing to ignore all the UN Security Council Resolutions, which require a plebiscite to be held in Kashmir under UN auspices. For instance, article 9 of UN Security Resolution no. S/2883, adopted on 10 November 1951 requires:

*a free and impartial plebiscite under United Nations auspices so that the people of the State can freely exercise their right of self-determination and decide the question of the accession of the State to India or to Pakistan.*² (Emphasis added.)

Ganguly says that "geographic location and demographic features" were the two requirements for the accession of the princely states to either India or Pakistan, at the time of Partition (p.15). This is not factually accurate, as the actual directive of the British Viceroy to the states was: "You cannot run away from the Dominion Government

¹ Dr Sumit Ganguly is Professor of Asian Studies and Government, University of Texas, Austin, USA.

² K. Sarwar Hasan, ed., *Documents on the Foreign Relations of Pakistan: The Kashmir Question* (Karachi: Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, 1996), p. 309.

which is your neighbour *any more than you can run away from the subjects* for whose welfare you are responsible.”³ (Emphasis added.) The word “subjects” refers to “the people”, but the author shies away from using either of these words.

He does, however, admit that the ruler of the State of Jammu and Kashmir had concluded a “standstill agreement” with Pakistan and not with India (p.16) but he nullifies the force of this agreement by saying that the Maharaja acceded to India and not to Pakistan. He fails to bring out the fact that the Maharaja had left his capital, Srinagar, and was on the run. It was in these circumstances that Indian troops were airlifted to Srinagar on 26 October 1947 and the instrument of accession was obtained from the fugitive ruler. Similarly, he has referred to the support of Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah, “the founder of a mass-based political party, the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference” (p.16), as giving “legitimacy” to the accession in the absence of a referendum (p.17). He does not cite the Resolution of the Working Committee of the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference passed on 19 July 1947 which says:

[I]n view the geographical conditions, 80 per cent Muslim majority out of the total population, the passage of important rivers of the Punjab through the State, the language, cultural, racial and economic connection of the people and the proximity of the borders of the State with Pakistan . . . the Jammu and Kashmir State should accede to Pakistan.⁴

While discussing the reasons for continuing conflict between India and Pakistan, he affirms that, “certain structural features of both polities, embodied in their nationalist agendas, predisposed them toward conflict over the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir.” India wants to hold the Muslim-majority State to demonstrate that “all minorities could thrive under the aegis of a plural and secular polity” (p.5). He ignores the fact that, even without Kashmir, India will have more than one hundred and fifty million Muslims as well as a substantial number of other minorities to justify the “plural and secular” claims of India. Ganguly asserts that the main cause of conflict is “ideological

³ Ibid., p. 16.

⁴ Ibid., pp. 42-3.

commitments of the dominant nationalist elites”, and “Pakistan’s irredentist claim of Kashmir” (pp.4-5). He thus attempts to refute the fundamental principle for the accession of states, i.e., geographical contiguity and the wishes of the people.

The author is treading on firmer ground when he says that, “The organizational and ideological bases” of the Indian National Congress and the All-India Muslim League were “diametrically opposed” visions of “nationalism and state-building”. However, his conclusion that this is the reason the two countries are “locked into a potential collision course” (p.10), is faulty. China and Pakistan are neighbours with divergent visions of nationalism and state-building, but there is no conflict between them. The cause of Pakistan–India tensions remains the denial of the right of self-determination to the people of Kashmir, a fact which Ganguly is loath to admit.

He also attempts to negate the *raison d’être* of Pakistan. According to him, “Pakistan was created as a homeland for the Muslims of South Asia.” (p.5). This is certainly not the whole truth: the basis for the creation of Pakistan, besides being ideological, was territorial. It was created in Muslim-majority areas in the northwest and northeast of the subcontinent, in accordance with the wishes of the majority of the people (both Muslims and non-Muslims) living in these regions. Pakistan’s claim to Kashmir is also based on the same democratic right of self-determination.

Ganguly considers Mohammad Ali Jinnah “responsible” for the creation of Pakistan because he “forged a mythical construct”, according to which Muslims were a nation and “only an independent Muslim-majority state could provide effective guarantees for their rights and privileges.” (p.3). Despite the establishment of a Muslim state, “millions of Muslims stayed on in India as loyal citizens.” (p.3). He refers to the breakup of Pakistan in 1971 as “giving the lie to the myth of primordial Muslim solidarity.” (p.3). He infers that a shared faith–Islam–“could not be the sole basis for state-building in South Asia.” (p. 71).

He is right in that religion alone cannot be the basis for state building. Perhaps his aim is to indicate that the two-nation theory (i.e., that Hindus and Muslim are two nations) was invalidated when East

Pakistan broke away from Pakistan to become Bangladesh. The author should have known that the two-nation theory of the Muslim League simply meant that the Muslims of the subcontinent, about one hundred million-strong, could not be subordinate to the Hindu majority and treated as a permanent religious minority. Thus, it was decided that the regions where about 70 million Muslims formed an absolute majority should be separated and declared independent from the rest of India. In fact, the Lahore Resolution of 1940 envisaged “independent and sovereign states” (in the plural); the creation of Bangladesh, therefore, in no way contradicted Jinnah’s two-nation theory, as the author perceives. In reality, it was the urge for an equitable share in power that caused Pakistan to separate from the rest of India: the same urge was at work in separating Bangladesh from Pakistan. Ganguly is, however, substantially correct when he says that Jinnah’s “successors failed to implement his vision of a religiously neutral but Muslim-majority state.” (p. 5).

All the major armed conflicts between India and Pakistan are discussed in the book and the author places the blame on Pakistan for almost all of them. He considers Pakistan responsible for the Kashmir conflict of 1947–1948, and for the wars in 1965 and 1999. He states that the reason for these conflicts was the fact that Pakistan “grossly underestimated Indian military prowess.” (p.7). In the discussion on the Kashmir War of 1947-8, he blames Pakistan, ignoring the fact that it was India and not Pakistan which sent its armed forces into Kashmir first.

The Indo–Pak War of 1965 is termed the Second Kashmir War by Ganguly. He assigns the blame entirely to Pakistan, stating that the purpose of the war was territorial gain. (p. 31). However, he does refer to amendments in the Indian Constitution that did away with the special status of Kashmir, by extending Articles 356 and 357 to the State, thus eroding its special status (p. 35). He refers to “Operation Gibraltar” and “Operation Grand-Slam”, carried out by Pakistan. He mentions infiltration from Azad Kashmir but does not say that the Indian forces were the first to cross the Cease-fire Line and, when Pakistan retaliated in Kashmir, the Indians were the first to cross the international border between the two countries on 6 September 1965.

He refers to the Pakistan–India War of 1971 as the Bangladesh War. Having recounted the grievances of East Pakistan against the military leadership of West Pakistan, he refers to the military action of 25 March 1971, which led to the migration of thousands of refugees to India. The cost of maintaining these refugees was made an excuse for aggression. He justifies the crossing of the international border by the Indian armed forces, saying that, “[I]t was cheaper to resort to war against their long-time adversary than to possibly absorb refugees.” (p. 51). He does not mention the fact that President Nixon had assured India of the American intention “to continue to carry the main financial burden for care of the refugees.”⁵

The author acknowledges the fact that India had armed, trained and provided sanctuary to the Mukti Bahini (liberation force) in East Pakistan. (p. 62). He also admits that Indian Artillery attacked Pakistani territory on 22 November 1971; the Pakistan Air Force retaliated on 3 December 1971, but ironically the author blames Pakistan for formally starting the war “with an Israeli-style pre-emptive air attack” on India’s northern air bases. (p. 67).

In the late 1980s, Indian Punjab witnessed a Sikh insurgency. Pakistan is accused by the author of fomenting the rising and for that reason “India launched a military exercise code-named ‘Brasstacks’ conducted in Rajasthan pointing towards Pakistan.” (p. 85). He admits that, “embedded in the Brasstacks military exercise was an element of coercive diplomacy.” (p. 85). Pakistan reacted by initiating its own scheduled winter exercise in November–December 1986 (p. 86). By January 1987, the armed forces of the two countries were face-to-face in the Punjab and Kashmir. The situation was defused by Secretary-level talks held from 31 January to 4 February 1987. It was about this time that Dr A. Q. Khan, Pakistan’s foremost nuclear scientist, warned, “Nobody can undo Pakistan or take us for granted. We are here to stay and let it be clear that we shall use the bomb if our existence is threatened.”⁶

⁵ Richard Nixon to Indira Gandhi, 17 December 1971. Cited in Roedad Khan, *The American Papers: Documents 1965-1973* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 746-7.

⁶ *Observer* (London), 1 March 1987.

Regarding the Indian occupation of the Siachin Glacier (about 10,000 sq miles) in 1984, in an area where the Line of Control between Azad Kashmir and Indian-held Kashmir is not marked, Ganguly argues on the authority of the Indian military, without presenting any independent evidence, that Pakistan plans to occupy the glacier resulted in the “pre-emptive Indian action . . . to establish its claim.” (p. 84). Since that time, the armed forces of both countries have remained locked in battle in Siachin.

According to the author, the “critical turning-point in Kashmir’s fortune came in the aftermath of the deeply-flawed local elections of 1987. Widespread fraud and skulduggery characterized this election.” (p. 90). He assesses the situation correctly when he says that, unlike past generations of Kashmiris who “tolerated similar malfeasances”, the younger generation has “proved far less willing to passively acquiesce . . . they resorted to violence . . . throughout much of 1988 and 1989 . . . and very soon the valley was aflame.” (p. 91). He thinks that the insurgency in Kashmir and the tough stance of the Indian governor of Kashmir “emboldened the Pakistani military to aid the insurgency in Kashmir.” (p. 92). Thus, Indo–Pakistan relations remained strained throughout the decade of the 1990s. (p. 95).

Regarding the Kargil War (1999), Ganguly believes that the Pakistan military planned the operation with the acquiescence of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, with a view to reviving the Kashmir issue. However, he fails to mention the fact that the Kargil peaks were part of Pakistan till the 1971 war and that they dominate the Indian road-link to Siachin. Capturing them would have facilitated the dislodging of Indian troops from the disputed Siachin Glacier.

Referring to the expenditure incurred on armed forces, he discriminates between India and Pakistan by stating that India spends on “substantial defence” while Pakistan spends on “occasional offence against its neighbour.” (p. 1) This would signify that all Indian offensive actions including those against Junagadh (the state which acceded to Pakistan), Hyderabad Deccan (which did not accede either to India or Pakistan), Portuguese Goa and China were defensive measures, as was the 1971 breakup of Pakistan.

While on the subject of the testing of a series of nuclear weapons in May 1998 by India and Pakistan, Ganguly does not indicate that India tested its weapons first and Pakistan retaliated. He debates whether or not the nuclear tests have made the “region more prone to war.” (p.110). Referring to a parallel situation during the Cold War, he feels that, “the overt nuclearization of the region may have contributed to nuclear security in the subcontinent while increasing the likelihood of lower-level engagements” (p. 110), concluding that limited wars, like the one in Kargil, are possible in the future.

In conclusion, Ganguly advises Pakistan to abandon its “quest to wrest Kashmir from India”, though he feels that, “the institutional interests of the armed forces” will not allow this to happen. Nor will India yield much ground on Kashmir, as it fears a domino effect. This is another conjectural argument, which the author advances against self-determination. According to him, the only practicable solution is the acceptance of the LoC as a permanent border (p.12). He asserts that Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Indira Gandhi had agreed in 1972 “to transform the LoC into a *de facto* international border.” (p. 71). He rightly concludes that, after the 1971 war, “India emerged as the dominant power in the subcontinent.” (p. 71).

In the epilogue, the author discusses post-September 11 events. According to him, “Prior to September 11, Pakistan had been consigned to the status of a virtual pariah state in the international system and especially in the US foreign policy calculus.” However, after September 11, “Pakistan became a ‘valued ally’ in the fight against terrorism.” (p. 138). He is critical of the American policy of ignoring India, which supported the US wholeheartedly, while, according to him, religious parties in Pakistan and “key members of the ISI actively worked to undermine the attempts at co-operation with the United States.” (p. 139).

Ganguly’s openly partisan work ends on an appropriately pessimistic note. His bleak prediction is that “There is little likelihood of any breakthrough in bilateral relations in the near future.” (p. 143).■

Noor ul Haq

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Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam

John L. Esposito

New York: Oxford University Press, 2002

Pages: 198. Price: US \$25.00

Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam examines several crucial questions raised about Islam and the Muslim world after the tragedy of 11 September 2001. It has become more important than ever to remove misperceptions about Islam and to attempt to identify the underlying reasons for terrorism. Questions now frequently asked are: Why is Islam more militant than other religions? Does the Quran condone violence and terrorism of the kind the world has witnessed? Is there a clash of civilizations between the West and the Muslim world? What does the Quran have to say about jihad or holy war?

John L. Esposito is among the few Western authors with the credibility to write on these issues. He is Professor of Religion and International Affairs, Georgetown University, and Director of the Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding: History and International Affairs at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service. Some of his other books are *Islam: the Straight Path*, *Voices of Resurgent Islam* and *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?* In the book under review, he has discussed objectively the major issues currently confronting the West and the Muslim world, and given logical arguments in support of his point of view.

Esposito believes that the twenty-first century will be dominated by a global encounter between the two major and rapidly-growing religions: Islam and Christianity. Simultaneously, the forces of globalization will strain relations between the West and the rest of the world. It is not a time for provoking a clash of civilizations; it is rather a time for global engagement and coalition-building to actively promote peaceful co-existence and co-operation. With the Western pressure for winning the global war against terrorism at any cost, how Islam and Muslim world are understood will affect the way in which the causes of terrorism and anti-Americanism are addressed.

The making of the most prominent modern terrorist, Osama bin Laden, has been discussed in detail. In giving bin Laden's

background, the author discusses how he played on the Muslim sense of historic oppression, occupation and injustice at the hands of the West. The core of bin Laden's jihad against America is formed by his outrage at the injustice in his homeland of Saudi Arabia—the infidel's occupation of sacred territory and its support for a corrupt, un-Islamic government. Osama bin Laden, like leaders of other terrorist organizations; has often used the past to legitimize his agenda and tactics. In the late-twentieth and twenty-first centuries the word 'jihad' gained currency with resistance, liberation and terrorist movements alike using it to legitimize their cause and motivate their followers.

Jihad is often simply translated as and equated with aggressive holy war. For many in the West, it has become the symbol of Islam as a religion of violence and fanaticism. Religious extremists and terrorists reinforce this belief as they freely declare jihad to justify attacks against all who disagree with them. Terrorists can attempt to hijack Islam and the doctrine of jihad; that is no more legitimate than Christian and Jewish extremists committing acts of terrorism in their own unholy wars in the name of Christianity or Judaism.

The author criticizes the US for its dubious policies regarding jihad, while citing the examples of Afghanistan and the Iranian revolution. The US government has judged jihad—whether a holy or an unholy war—and its warriors—whether extremists or liberators—by their goals and conduct. The litmus test is simply whether they were engaged in fighting America's Cold War adversary or an ally. With globalization, jihad movements attracted militants from many countries and the power of terrorist groups was enhanced, allowing them to harness modern technology to strike anywhere, at any time and in any place. Understanding the dynamics of Muslim politics today and the threats that exist requires a fuller understanding both of jihad itself and of why the US tops the hit list of Muslim terrorists.

The antagonistic feelings of Muslims towards West are a result of colonialism and Western imperialism. From the 1970s onwards, religious revivalism and Islamic movements have become a major force in Muslim politics. In Muslim societies, the trend towards Westernization has created a clash of cultures and divisions within the social entity, causing a crisis of identity and leading to a resurgence of

religion and a desire to overthrow Western supremacy. The creation of modern Muslim states brought with it high expectations. Nation-building in the Muslim world, with its artificially drawn borders, superficially uniting people with diverse identities and allegiances that were centuries old, was a fragile process that bore within it seeds for later crises of identity, legitimacy, power and authority. The powerful symbolism and revolutionary meaning of jihad dominates modern Muslims politics to an extent unparalleled in history.

In the aftermath of 9/11, the concept of a clash of civilizations has emerged again. The negative image of Islam—portrayed as being incompatible with modernity and democracy, with violence and terrorism integral to Muslim belief and practice—has gained currency. The fact remains that the West's knowledge of Islam, of the vast majority of Muslims, and of the connection between Islam and the Judaeo-Christian tradition is minimal or non-existent. An improved understanding of the Muslim faith requires that Islam should be judged by the totality of its teachings, not by the beliefs and actions of a radical few.

Terrorism has become a worldwide threat, affecting countries as dissimilar as Italy, Germany, Peru, Japan, Yemen, Turkey and Iraq. In recent years, radical groups have combined nationalism and ethnicity with religion and used violence and terrorism to achieve their goals: Hindu nationalists in India, Jewish fundamentalists in Israel and Christian extremists in US. However, the most widespread examples of religious terrorism have occurred in the Muslim world. Al Qaeda, for instance, represents a new form of terrorism, born of trans-nationalism and globalization.

Many critical US foreign policy issues, such as sanctions against Iraq (which have had the most serious impact on more than half a million innocent Iraqi children) and against Pakistan, while failing to 'punish' India and Israel for their nuclear programmes, create resentment among the affected peoples. A re-examination and, where necessary, reformation of US foreign policy is essential to effectively limit and contain global terrorism. If such foreign policy issues are not addressed, the discontent they create will continue to provide a breeding

ground for hatred and radicalism and for the rise of extremist movements and recruits to the cause of the bin Ladens of the world.

Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam addresses a vast audience and contributes to a better understanding of Islam and the concept of jihad for the uninformed. Esposito has made a successful effort to bridge the gap between the civilizations of Islam and the West, presenting an objective view of Islam and the issues that have arisen after 9/11. ■

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Pakistan and the Afghan Conflict 1979-1985

Frédéric Grare, Karachi, Oxford University Press, 2003

Pages: 222. Price: Rs 325

Frédéric Grare is the Director of the Centre de Sciences Humaines, New Delhi. His recent publications include *India and ASEAN: the Politics of India's Look East Policy* (co-edited with Amitabh Matto), *India's Energy: Essays on Sustainable Development* (co-edited with P. R. Shukla and Pierre Audinet), *Islamism and Security: Political Islam and Western World*, and *Tajikistan: The Trials of Independence* (co-authored with Shirin Akiner and Mohammad-Reza Djalili).

The book under review investigates the motives of Pakistan's Afghan policy in the structure of the South Asian security paradigm. Heavily documented, the book is divided into five chapters, each of which asks a specific question, the most important of them being whether or not Pakistan could have signed a peace agreement a couple of years earlier than it actually did. Grare questions whether Pakistani decision-makers deliberately prolonged the war to ensure the flow of economic and military assistance the country was receiving as a "frontline state".

The author is of the view that Pakistan saw itself as a vulnerable state, threatened by "vexatious" neighbours on its eastern and western borders. He analyses the role played by Pakistan in the perspective of the security dilemmas imposed on it by its geo-strategic location. The author explores Pak-Afghan relations in the historical perspective,

focusing on the Pushtun (Grare's spelling) issue and Afganistan's demand for the creation of Pushtunistan, a country which, according to the Afghans, stretched from "the Oxus to the Abasin". He briefly reviews the historical legacy of the "Great Game" and Afghanistan's role as buffer zone, separating the Russian and British empires. (This idea was put forward in 1942 by Nicholas Spykman; he was the proponent of the "Heartland Theory", according to which he demarcated coastal areas or buffer zones, which he termed as the key to controlling the world.)

While Grare places the Pushtunistan problem at the heart of Pakistan–Afghan relations, he chooses to make common animosity towards India the basis of the friendship between Pakistan and China. This is only partly correct, as other factors contributed towards Pak–Sino friendship: China's desire to play an active role in regional and international politics, Pakistan's policy of diversification of dependency, and common territorial and political interests.

Grare highlights the security dilemmas of Pakistan after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Pakistan moved "from a cautious condemnation" of the invasion to an offensive strategy, especially after US involvement, which changed the dimension of the conflict from regional to international. He grudgingly admits that the revolt against the communist government in Afghanistan was not instigated by Pakistan. "It was spawned by the actions of the communist government in Kabul which strung the rope with which to hang itself." He projects the hypothesis that communist rule destroyed the social structure of Afghanistan, mainly through their reform policies: land reform, literacy and making the state a stronger player in internal matters. He feels that the changing of the national flag from the traditionally green Islamic one to the red of the Russians was the "biggest mistake" of the Afghan communist leaders.

With the influx of refugees into its territory (2,375,000 of them by the end of 1980), Pakistan began to receive aid from United Nations agencies and also bilaterally from the international community. This was at a time when Pakistan had few friends in the global scenario. The Afghan resistance movement became an integral part of Pakistan policies: "To start with, it evolved a strategy articulated on two areas of

action. It tried to put an end to its isolation by embarking on active multilateral diplomacy, and it negotiated the acquisition of some economic and military assistance from a number of its allies.”

The arguments given by the author to explain Pakistan’s involvement in Afghan affairs are interesting. According to Grare, Pakistan had two policy options: to support the Soviet invasion—in which case it would have Russian-allied neighbours on its eastern and western borders—or to give all-out support to the Afghan resistance. It opted, however, for a third path: Pakistan expressed “grave concern” at the Russian invasion and tried to gain support in the Non-Aligned Movement, the Organization of Islamic Conference and in the UN General Assembly. Thus, it succeeded in internationalizing the situation. US President, Jimmy Carter, said of the Soviet invasion: “It is clear that the entire subcontinent of Asia, and specifically Pakistan is threatened.” But it was during the Reagan presidency that substantial aid, both military and economic, was given to Pakistan. The arms obtained under the agreement were, according to the author, far in excess of the danger of the Afghan threat, but the success really lay in Pakistan conserving its status as a “frontline state”.

Grare states that Ziaul Haq “legitimised” his coup, which overthrew Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, on the basis of establishing “Nizam-i-Mustafa” (system of the Prophet [PBUH]). He took advantage of the opposition of the Islamists to the Kabul–Delhi axis, in the hope that it would also provide support to Pakistan’s stand on Kashmir. The author also holds that the ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence) in Pakistan was the sole conduit of arms to the resistance, giving that institution the ability “to keep the intensity of the conflict at the desired level.”

As mentioned earlier, the most important question in the author’s mind is whether Pakistan had the option of signing a peace accord with USSR between 1983 and 1985. The details and critical analysis of the negotiation process, its obstacles and constraints are thought-provoking. Many previously obscured facts are disclosed, but they are yet to be authenticated through neutral and credible resources. At times, Grare appears to analyse Pakistan foreign policy from an Indian perspective, undermining the objectivity of the work. Perhaps because it has been translated from the original French, the book is not

always easily comprehensible, but it does thoroughly investigate the interests of the protagonists in the conflict and the reason it was (in Grare's view) unnecessarily prolonged. ■

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Perceptions, Politics and Security in South Asia

By P. R Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema and Stephen Philip Cohen

Published by RoutledgeCurzon, 2003

After a lapse of about two decades following the Pakistan–India War of 1971 and the secession of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), South Asia suddenly became the focus of the world's attention due to a series of events linked to relations between the two subcontinental rivals. Prominent among these developments was the eruption of a popular insurgency in the Kashmir valley towards the end of 1989 and in early 1990. It produced an “over-reaction” from the then Indian Government of Prime Minister V. P. Singh; tensions in South Asia in the early summer of 1990 were so high that some circles believed the two countries were on the verge of a war that could develop into a nuclear exchange. In view of the seriousness of the situation, the United States sent its Deputy National Security Adviser, Robert Gates, as a special envoy to the region. The objective of the Gates mission was to defuse the crisis between Pakistan and India caused by the eruptions in Kashmir, which India claimed had been instigated by Pakistan. Pakistan, however, denied the Indian claim and asserted that the insurgency in the Kashmir valley was indigenous.

The principal reason why the 1990 crisis in South Asia attracted unprecedented attention from statesmen, academicians and experts, both in the region and outside, was the widespread belief that Pakistan and India were nuclear-weapon states and a war between the two could easily escalate into a nuclear clash with incalculably disastrous effects, not only for the region but for the whole world. All concerned shared the view that Kashmir had the potential of triggering a nuclear war between Pakistan and India. The crisis, however, was so deep and multi-dimensional that it could not be fully understood in isolation from other

developments that had taken place in and around the region during the preceding years. In other words, the Pakistan–India crisis of 1990, primarily caused by the popular uprising in Kashmir, needed to be studied in a broader perspective, taking into account the linkages between the internal political dynamics of Pakistan and India and the external strategic environment with their cumulative impact.

The book under review meets this need, discussing and analysing the events of 1990 in a broader perspective, with a focus on Kashmir and the nuclear dimension of the crisis. As stated in the Introduction, one goal of the book “is to explain how domestic and international factors intersected in a crisis that was not merely complex, but one that was a composite of several sub-crises.” In line with this argument, the book terms the crisis of 1990 a “compound” crisis and studies it in all its important contexts: strategic, political, historical and contemporary.

The strategic context of the crisis (chapter I) constitutes the Geneva Accord on Afghanistan in 1988 that led to the withdrawal of the former Soviet Union in the following year, the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the end of the Cold War. With regard to Afghanistan, the United States thought that its strategic objective had been achieved with the withdrawal of the Soviet forces. It then became deeply involved in the Middle East, following the Gulf War of 1991 and the initiation of a peace process (the Madrid Talks) to bring about a resolution of the Arab–Israeli conflict. These developments constituted an entirely new context, in which the status of South Asia, and more precisely that of Pakistan, had to be defined. The authors observe that, “Islamabad had the most to lose by international change; its close relationship with China, the United States and the supportive Muslim States were all up for recalculation after the Soviet pull-out from Afghanistan.” The changed international situation also presented India with a new challenge. “As the Soviet Union dissolved”, the authors say, “New Delhi was rapidly losing its chief strategic ally, although the full extent of the decline of the Soviet Union was not yet apparent.”

In support of its basic idea that the 1990 crisis was a compound crisis, the book also alludes to the unstable and turbulent political situation in Pakistan and India: 1988 saw the death of Pakistan’s military

ruler of eleven years, General Ziaul Haq, and the formation of minority governments in both India and Pakistan. These developments transformed Pakistan and India into “uncertain political entities”. Between 1987 and 1989, there was a marked deterioration in the strategic relationships between Pakistan and India. The large scale-military exercise (Brasstacks, 1987) conducted by India close to the Pakistan border and Pakistan’s counter exercise on an equally large scale (Zarb-e-Momin) led to heightened tension between the two countries; this explains why Islamabad and New Delhi almost instinctively opted for a confrontational posture in the 1990 crisis, instead of trying to resolve it through rational means.

Since the uprising in Kashmir was the main cause of the 1990 crisis, the book discusses the issue in a great detail in a separate chapter. Entitled “Kashmir: From Simla to Chaos”, the chapter contains a description of the physical features of Kashmir and the nature and character of the Kashmir dispute as perceived by Pakistan and India. This chapter also surveys various international and bilateral efforts made for the resolution of the dispute from 1948 to 1963, including the Simla Agreement signed by Pakistan and India in 1972. Sufficient space is allotted to an exhaustive discussion on the circumstances which ultimately led to the outbreak of the 1989 uprising in the Valley. These developments include the removal of Farooq Abdullah as the Chief Minister of the State, his somersault two years later in aligning the National Conference with the Congress (I) and the massively rigged elections of 1987.

An important dimension of the Kashmir crisis as it unfolded from 1989 onwards is that the international community, particularly the United States, became overtly concerned about it. This concern, as mentioned earlier, was reflected in the hasty dispatch of the Robert Gates mission to Pakistan and India by President George H. Bush in May 1990. The mission, as claimed by its leader, did succeed in defusing the tension between Pakistan and India, thus averting a war that had the potential of escalating into a nuclear exchange. But the crisis gave rise to many questions which were not or could not be answered by the Gates mission. How close were Pakistan and India to war? Was there a real danger or probability of a nuclear exchange between the two? What

would have happened had there been governments led by Ziaul Haq in Pakistan and Rajiv Gandhi in India? What was the role of the international community, and particularly of the United States, in defusing the crisis? To what extent were Prime Ministers Benazir Bhutto and V. P. Singh motivated by domestic political compulsions in their reactions to the crisis? What were the real factors behind the 1989 popular eruptions in Kashmir and how was the crisis likely to develop in future? These are some of the questions that the authors have attempted to answer in this book.

The book gives extensive coverage to the diplomatic involvement of the United States in defusing the crisis of 1990 through the Gates mission and its results. It does not, however, discuss the impact of the concern shown by the international community on the Kashmir crisis itself.

In chapter 6, the book discusses the nuclear dimension of the 1990 crisis and takes Seymour Hersh's *New Yorker* article of 29 March 1993 as the basis of controversy. In his article, Hersh suggests that Pakistan and India were on the brink of a nuclear war in 1990, and that the timely intervention of the United States averted a catastrophe. But the authors conclude that Hersh's view was "largely inaccurate"; they base their conclusion on their own assessment, relying on conversations with a large number of American, Pakistani and Indian civilian officials, diplomats, military and intelligence officers.

Two features of the book make it useful for a better understanding of the 1990 crisis. Firstly, various perspectives and conflicting views have been presented; secondly, the authors have collected information through interviews with key personnel in both Pakistan and India. However, despite the amount of information presented, the book is not sufficiently focused and does not provide conclusive answers to the questions that the authors have raised. ■

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