

BOOK REVIEWS

Rajiv Dogra, *Where Borders Bleed: An Insider's Account of Indo-Pak Relations*

(New Delhi: Rupa Publications, 2015), 288.

The author, Rajiv Dogra, is a former Indian Foreign Service officer. He served as a Counsel-General in Pakistan during 1992-1994. As a diplomat, an insider, not an academic, his work projects the official Pakistan policy of the Indian Government. He finds faults with almost all leaders of Pakistan except for Benazir Bhutto with whom he seems to have developed a good rapport while in Pakistan.

He asserts “If Jinnah was the creator of Pakistan and Bhutto its destroyer”, for “the bifurcation of Pakistan into two”, Zia made his country a “nuclear state” and “introduced fundamentalism in its army” and “terrorism as a ‘state policy’ of Pakistan” (p.173). The allegation of ‘state terrorism’ is an Indian perception and propaganda against Pakistan.

He laments that since India had already tested a bomb in 1974, it need not have asserted its nuclear power status in 1998 and thus “India had shot itself in the foot by making Pakistan the nuclear threshold publicly” (p.205).

He talks of Quaid-e-Azam Mohamed Ali Jinnah as “collaborationist” (p.27) and reiterates a popular theme in India that the British wanted the division of India. It is correct that as long as the British wanted to rule over India, they followed the strategy of “divide and rule”. The author does not know that when British wanted to quit India, they were suffering from Russo-phobia and were keen that India remained united so that, with the support of the British, India could stop any possible advance of the Soviets towards the Indian Ocean. They were worried about disruption in their line of communication to their possessions in South East Asia. This has been adequately brought out in the reviewer’s PhD dissertation “Political and Military Perspectives of the Struggle for Pakistan”.¹

Dogra himself contradicts his allegation when he writes that Lord Mountbatten, the British Viceroy in India, on knowing that Jinnah was suffering from “chronic cavitating pulmonary tuberculosis”, had said:

¹ Noor ul Haq, *Making of Pakistan: Military Perspective* (Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, Centre of Excellence, Quaid-i-Azam University, 1993); 2nd print (Rawalpindi: Army Education Press, GHQ, 1995); 3rd print (New Delhi: Reliance Publishing House, 1997); 4th print (Delhi: Saujanya Books, 2000).

“Good God! If I had known all this at the time [before partition], the course would have been different. I would have delayed the granting of independence for several months. There would have been no partition. Pakistan would not have existed. India would remain united. ...” (pp. 44-45).

The author should have known that the British, in their last effort, as late as June 1946, had formulated the Cabinet Mission Plan envisaging a united India, which was accepted by Jinnah but rejected by Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, who in fact was not in favour of sharing power with the former.

He is wrong when he says that if Muhammad Ali Jinnah had been offered to become the prime minister of undivided India,” it may have changed the course of history” (p.15) and partition of India might not have taken place. He does not know that this prospect was there but Jinnah had replied that in the parliament he would have one vote and Mahatma Gandhi would have three. In fact, Jinnah was seeking constitutional safeguards for the Muslims of India which was not acceptable to the Indian National Congress.

He is critical of the ISI and Pakistan Army and alleges that they support the Jihadis and terrorists. In support he cites American writers who had made Pakistan a scapegoat for their failure in Afghanistan. For instance, he refers to the US author, Bruce Riedel, who has written that the “ISI support was critical to the survival and revival of the Taliban after 2001. It provides sanctuary, training camps, expertise, and help with fund raising ... the ISI is thoroughly aware of Taliban activities and the whereabouts of all senior Taliban personnel” (p.244).

The author appreciates Bruce Riedel’s recommendation to the US President Barack Obama that “while not minimizing the need for integrated counter-insurgency operations in Afghanistan, the President needs to stay focused on the real, central threat that is Pakistan” (p.193). The author tells Americans to realize that if “the US were to cut all its civil and military aid, would Pakistan retain its swagger? Would that affect its capacity to sponsor terror? (p.198). He says “the US intervention in Afghanistan was welcome. But the Americans let the victory slip out of their grasp by supping with Pakistan” (p.201), thus shifting the blame of their failure to Pakistan.

He blames Pakistan and its leaders for terrorism in India, and both Bruce Riedel and Rajiv Dogra do not acknowledge that Pakistan itself is the greatest victim of terror and is fighting a relentless war against terror and

has suffered much more at the hands of the terrorists than any other country in the world.

Writing about the Kashmir issue (chapter 8), he blames Pakistan for aggression and also for not withdrawing to make plebiscite possible. The facts tell a different story.

About Kargil he thinks that Prime Minister Nawaz “Sharif and [General Pervez] Musharraf collaborated in an audacious adventure, the one that Benazir had shot down” (p.209) and thinks that Indian “Operation Parakram was to have been a swift military strike on Pakistan for its [alleged] nefarious sponsorship of an attack on the Indian Parliament, and its leadership, on 13 December 2001” (p.214).

About Article 370 of the Indian Constitution, he discloses the Indian intention by citing an Indian minister in the Parliament that “it is the attempt of the Government to see ... article 370 of the Constitution is eroded little by little and in course of time it will be entirely corroded, resulting in Jammu and Kashmir having the same status as other States” (p.224).

Talking about Simla Agreement 1972, he states, without evidence, that Bhutto had “agreed that the line [of control in Kashmir] would be gradually endowed with the ‘characteristics of an international [b]order’ (his words)” (p.166).

About Pakistan-Afghan relations, his statement that “every leader after Zia has pursued the goal set by him, that domination of Afghanistan is vital to Pakistan’s integrity. Meanwhile, the Afghans continue to seethe. A century of strife and wars later, they still rail at the iniquitous Durand Line Agreement” (p.182), is erroneous as the Line is a mutually negotiated and recognized international border since 1893.²

He begins his book with a letter of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (whom he calls “a highly ambitious man” with “Machiavellian love for intrigue”) to his daughter Benazir Bhutto dated June 21, 1978, from his prison in Rawalpindi where he praised Jawaharlal Nehru and his daughter Indra Gandhi “the goddess of India” who had made history in creating Bangladesh and compares Benazir with Indra saying “you, like Indra Gandhi, are making history” (pp.1-2) without elaborating what history he had in mind and why the author has given prominence to this letter.

His favourite theme for which his yearning is difficult to hide is for India to dominate or absorb Pakistan into the Indian Union. Unrealistically,

² “Pak-Afghan Relations,” *IPRI Factfile*, vol.no. 8 (2003), 1-16, 18-19.

he visualizes the advantage, if partition had not taken place, the communal carnage would not have occurred, India would have been greater than China, the Taliban and al-Qaeda would not have prospered, 9/11 would not have taken place, Afghanistan would have been saved, and no suffering from terrorism, etc. (p.7).

He advises the Indian Government that “passivity carries the risk that the next time the provocation might be bigger still. If India continues to tolerate the trespasses against it, this will only encourage Pakistan to up the ante. It will keep crossing the red lines and happily watch India blink” (p.257). He hopes that “given the anarchic unpredictability of its neighbourhood, and as it grows in power, India will be tempted to enforce its will” (p.187).

The author has mixed up facts with fiction and anyone interested in knowing Indian hegemonic objective and propaganda against Pakistan may like to go through this work.

Reviewed by Dr Noor ul Haq, Senior Research Fellow.

Christopher Coker, *The Improbable War China, The United States and the Continuing Logic of Great Power Conflict* (Oxford University Press, 2015), 256.

The Improbable War: China, The United States and the Continuing Logic of Great Power Conflict by Christopher Coker, Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science focuses on big powers' relations in the emerging world order. Discussing the likelihood of conflict between the US and China, the author suggests that there is a fifty-fifty chance of war in the next ten to fifteen years. The next global conflict is likely to be played out in cyberspace and outer space and like all previous wars it will have devastating consequences. His conclusion is based on the 'logic of conflict' theory, which takes into account aspects of history, human nature, causality, strategy and war. Putting these factors together he thinks that the chances of such a war are actually rather good, and to avoid a military conflict both powers must attune themselves to such a possibility.

Divided into four chapters: Historical Analogies and the Logic of History, Dominant Conflicts and the Logic of Great Power Conflict, Strategic Narratives and the Logic of Strategy, and War (and its Protean Logic). The book examines the possibility of a US–China conflict from the phenomenologist's perspective and seeks to find the logic to great power conflicts and examine if it applies in the case of US-Chinese relations. He identifies five logics of Great Power Conflict: First, the Logic of History: lessons can be learned from mistakes (p.72). According to this logic when a rising power confronts a status quo power, war is seen as inevitable. This is due to the "Thucydidean trap", from which states cannot escape. The US represents the status quo power and China the aspiring power. Second, the Logic of Human Nature: humans can be very rational and very unreasonable at the same time. War could result as an emotional outburst. Third, the Logic of Causality: great powers engage in coalitional warfare to maintain the rules of the international system or to 'correct' them. Disputes between states may arise when the 'rules of the road' are challenged. China is actively testing the rules while the US is seeking to enforce them. The Fourth, Logic of Strategy: strategy usually has two purposes – to avoid war or be well-positioned in the event of war. The US and China both operate under strategic constraints. China's strategic autism means it only has an alliance with North-Korea, which is highly averse to Chinese objectives.

The US maintains a functional alliance system but seems not to have a strategic narrative when it comes to China. Fifth, the Logic of War: states might simply be compelled to go to war with each other because they can, exploring possibilities and investing in them.

Building these scenarios, the author briefly explores the potential for Sino-US conflict to erupt at sea and in space and he also suggests that if the two countries were to engage in a cyber-war, it could “become a conventional war.”

The author also discusses various factors that could mitigate the chances of conflict: 1) War between the two states can be avoided if the US abandons its liberal-interventionist foreign policy and is able to strike a deal with China on common interests; 2) A rapprochement between the US and China seems unlikely due to cultural and historical differences between the two countries. However, Russia may provide some common ground between the two countries over the coming decades; 3) The rules of the international system and international law need to be clarified, otherwise China may pose a danger to these; 4) China has the narrative of ‘neither friend nor foe’ and aims to remove US influence from East Asia and the Western Pacific. America, by contrast, lacks such a narrative, although it should build geographical realities into its calculus when dealing with China; 5) Globalisation might act as a peace mechanism. Due to the complexity of the modern world, the resilience level of states has decreased drastically. A war between the US and China would have the most devastating economic outcome in history.

He rejects the liberal view that economic interdependence make war irrational and unlikely between major powers such as China and USA. He holds that ideology and emotional appeals to “national purpose” have just as much influence on states as sober cost-benefit assessments of the national interest. “Most of the great power wars of the past 300 years have resulted from a rising power’s ambitions to alter the norms and rules of international politics” (p.35). In China and the US the world confronts two ‘exceptional’ powers whose values differ markedly; China challenges the current order. The ‘Thucydidean Trap’ — when a conservative status quo power confronts a rising new one — may also play its part in precipitating hostilities. To avoid stumbling into an avoidable war, both Beijing and Washington need a coherent strategy, which neither of them currently has.

The core purpose of the present international order is to prevent war between the great powers, and much will depend on America’s ability to adjust to the rise of China. The rise of China will be as disruptive as the rise

of Germany after 1870, in part because China may have difficulty coming to terms with the nature of its own power. In the same way, the United States will find it difficult to adjust to its own decline. (p.73) The challenge for the United States as the 'dominant power' is that China also has ambitions and a vision for the future world order. The 'Chinese Dream' is different from the American Dream in that the country's ambitions are neither imperialistic nor hegemonic. (p.74) Deep cultural and ideological divides between the two countries will make a peaceful power transition even more difficult. What worries Coker is the gratifying view that war between China and USA is unlikely. If leaders of both countries think that war is impossible, they will not do the hard work of overcoming the mistrust and antagonism generated by their conflicting interests, worldviews, and values.

In this book the author identifies the main reasons why great powers go to war and why they often find themselves in a spiral of conflict from which they can't escape. He looks at the way in which they often misinterpret history; recourse to war is very rarely irrational but it may be unreasonable, and the difference between the two is crucial to grasp. War too has a logic of its own; it has a positively protean ability to change, thus offering new options.

Though biased in favour of the United States, he is not unfair to China and to China's criticisms of the United States. He is critical of the poverty of much US strategic thinking and the United States' often blinkered pursuit of liberal internationalism to the detriment of its own national interests. However, he is convinced that China poses a greater threat to world peace than the United States because democratic societies are more accountable than non-democratic societies. The United States is a status quo power whose instincts, though they may often lead to war and conflict, are not necessarily belligerent.

This book asks a series of questions about the nature of great power conflict and the prospect of a future war between China and the United States. What lessons, for example, can be learned from the First World War? What are the pitfalls of learning the wrong lessons? What importance should be attached to concepts such as the Thucydidean trap? Is national exceptionalism a driver of conflict? Do honour and reputation still spur people to contest each other's claims? If grand strategy involves social intelligence, then how intelligent are China and the United States? In drawing up their respective national strategies, are the two powers

following any particular logic at all? Are they positioning themselves to avoid war, or to be better placed to prevail in the event that war breaks out?

Reviewed by Muhammad Munir, Research Fellow, IPRI.

Joseph S. Nye Jr. *Is the American Century Over?*

(Cambridge UK: Polity Press, 2015), 152.

This book attempts to separate myth from reality about a general perception that the American Century is over. It premises that the American century is far from over; and proposes a strategy for the US to retain its lead in an era of increasingly diffusing power politics. It argues that while America's superpower status may well be tempered by its own domestic problems, it may be many years before the United States cedes its role as the world's most powerful nation. Joseph Nye asserts that the US military is still state-of-the-world, and America outspends China militarily by roughly 4 to 1. Furthermore, China can't compete with the US when it comes to America's military footprint around the globe. He concedes that in economic terms, things look more competitive and by some measures, China's GDP has already surpassed that of the US; and China's huge population makes it the largest market for certain products. He points out that 19 of the top 25 brands are American and that Americans own 46 of the top 500 transnational corporations. "Soft power is the ability to get what you want through traction rather through coercion or payment. And these corporations and brands tend to make America more attractive—that's the soft power part. But also their economic capacity provide for American hard power". Joseph is a proponent of soft power and here he appears overstating its significance.

Joseph says that worrying about the decline of the United States is a great American pastime; he adds that it goes through cycles, "the latest turn of the cycle was the Great Recession and the downturn of the economy. And the slow recovery gave rise to a spurt of declinism. It's also just a matter of conventional wisdom. If you asked in the 1980s a similar question about decline, many Americans, particularly in the rustbelt, felt that Japan was surpassing us—they were going to eat our lunch. It wasn't true at the time." He points to the long history of views that when a rising power challenges an established power this can lead to conflict. He cites Germany's rise which created fear in Britain though this analogy does not fit China's case as Germany had already overtaken Britain in industrial production by 1900; and the Chinese aren't there and won't be there in overall power even in a couple of decades.

He imagines a peaceful transition of the American Century to whatever comes next because great power wars are expensive in the nuclear age whereas there are also a number of common interests that the US shares with other great powers, like financial stability, pandemics, terrorism, and climate change. And because the Chinese have spent a lot of time looking at “lessons from history” they will avoid repetition and not fall into the kind of trap that Germany fell into.

He says that the biggest threat to America isn’t China or India or Russia—it’s America itself. After pointing out America’s enduring strengths — economic, demographic and geographic as well as military, Joseph Nye concludes: “The United States will likely remain the world’s predominant power for many decades to come” if among other factors political dysfunction at home could be avoided.

He recalls the wildly exaggerated American estimates of Soviet power in the 1970s and of Japanese power in the 1980s to suggest that American power relative to China will depend on the uncertainties of future political change in both countries. Many current projections about China are based on GDP growth, and are simple linear extrapolations of current growth rate and are one dimensional and ignore both US military and soft power advantages as well as China’s geopolitical disadvantages in the internal Asian balance of power compared to America’s in Europe, Japan, India, and elsewhere. He believes chances of any power surpassing America were not impossible but not very likely.

Joseph Nye acknowledges that the United States faces serious problems and these problems are real; and failure to address them will weaken the country’s ability to cope with the growing global complexity, but perceiving the twenty-first century as one of American decline is likely to be inaccurate and misleading. The real problem for the United States is not that it will be overtaken by China or another contender, but that it will be faced with a rise in the power resources of many others. This diffusion of power will make the United States relatively less able to control others.

Nye thinks that a better way to understand the issue is to see it as the swing of the foreign policy pendulum between “maximalist” and “retrenchment” policies. Retrenchment is not isolationism, but an adjustment of strategic goals and means. Some believers in imperial overstretch argue that the United States has no choice but to cut back on foreign and defence policy, but this is not the case. As a portion of GDP, currently the United States is spending less than half of what it did at the

peak of the Cold War years— when the American century was being consolidated.

On how and in what way the United States should become involved in the internal affairs of other countries, the writer argues that America should use military force, unilaterally if necessary, when its security or that of its allies is threatened. In other situations such as a dictator killing a large number of his citizens, the United States should only use force if there is a good prospect of success. Generally the United States should stay out of the business of invasion and occupation. He says that if it wishes to prolong the American century, the United States must shape the international environment and create incentives for others through trade, finance, culture, and institutions, and form networks and institutions for action.

The book concludes that the American century is not over, and the world has not entered a post-American world. But the continuation of the American century will not look like it did in the twentieth century. The American share of the world economy will be less than it was in the middle of the last century, and the complexity represented by the rise of other countries as well as the increased role of non-state actors will make it more difficult for anyone to wield influence and organize action. The world will have to live with unipolarity and multipolarity simultaneously. Likewise, leadership will not mean domination. America will have to listen in order to get others to enlist in a multi-partner world.

Nye takes a simplistic view and ignores the fact that the Soviet downfall became a public news all of a sudden, without any prior warning. He also ignores the fact that it is the will of the nation, more than wealth and guns, that keeps the nations afloat. At the time of the collapse of the USSR, all of its nuclear warheads and blue water navy was intact, and so was its military and civil industrial complexes. He misses the war fatigue visible in American decisions and the way it is now outsourcing the conflicts—like Yemen— to regional powers; days when it was over-primed for unilateral interventions are becoming a distant memory.

In this well written work the author seems lost between what he wishes to happen and what is actually evolving. His approach is in contrast to common American public perception— only 28 per cent of Americans believe that their country stands above all others and 15 of 22 countries surveyed thought that China either will replace or has already replaced the United States as the world's leading power. Maybe the book is a morale lifter for the American public.

Reviewed by Air Commodore (R) Khalid Iqbal, Non-Resident Consultant, IPRI.

Mark Fitzpatrick, *Overcoming Pakistan's Nuclear Dangers*
(London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2014), 164.

The author is Director of Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Programme at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), UK. Prior to joining IISS in 2005, he has served in US Department of State for 26 years and has written extensively on non-proliferation issues. The book evaluates the potential nuclear dangers that are attributed to Pakistan's nuclear programme in the West, which he rejects as highly exaggerated.

The book has five chapters. In the first, Fitzpatrick traces the origin of Pakistan's civil nuclear programme to East Pakistan's secession and the Indian nuclear tests of 1974 which became the drivers of Pakistan's decision to go nuclear. He gives a detailed account of the delivery systems (ballistic and cruise missiles) of Pakistan and discusses the alarm in Western circles raised by the testing of short range missile Nasr for its battlefield efficacy. He highlights the basic tenets of Pakistan's nuclear posture as Indo-centric; minimum credible deterrence; and first use. He also takes into account Pakistan's new posture of full spectrum deterrence. Mentioning the energy crisis he rules out the nuclear power generation option due to nuclear safety and security concerns.

The second chapter explains how if nuclear weapons are ever used in the world, these will be used in South Asia because of the unresolved issue of Kashmir. He recognizes the relevance of the 'stability-instability' paradox to the subcontinent's situation where the propensity of low-level conflict leading to nuclear war has potential. He does not question the rationality of South Asian leaders but he emphasizes that South Asian states are new in the nuclear field and have not developed expertise in preventing nuclear mishaps. An escalatory cycle could begin with sub-conventional (terrorist) threats, and Indian response to a terrorist attack may not be as restrained as it was in 2001 and 2008.

The third chapter is devoted to the arms race between India and Pakistan which is about competing capabilities. India is busy developing a more diversified and robust triad of land, air and sea based delivery platforms and multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV) technology for which it would need smaller multiple warheads to fit into a single missile nose cone. India is also developing a Ballistic Missile Defence system to shift the strategic balance in its favour. On the other hand he thinks Pakistan's Tactical Nuclear Weapons as a response to

India's Cold Start Doctrine could undermine deterrence stability in South Asia. He holds that Pakistan's policy makers give little importance to command and control challenges resulting from a full spectrum deterrence posture (that Scott Sagan has described as vulnerability/invulnerability paradox) which can erode a central government's control over weapons in a crisis situation and also make them vulnerable to unauthorized use. He highlights Pakistan's viewpoint which disregards the vulnerability/invulnerability paradox on the basis of the credibility of Pakistan's deterrence. He considers naval capability expansion as the most dangerous aspect of the arms race as India and Pakistan both lack CBMs and conflict resolution mechanisms that could cover their naval forces.

The author touches upon the subject of nuclear terrorism in the next chapter and says that in view of the radicalization in Pakistan there is a perception that Pakistan may become a potential source of nuclear terrorism. But he rejects these hypothetical scenarios and points out that these concerns have been highly exaggerated in Western states which deliberately overlook the measures that Pakistan has been taking to secure its nuclear infrastructure. He acknowledges that no other country has done so much for enhancing nuclear security as has Pakistan. He explains the nuclear security measures taken by the Strategic Plans Division in detail and analyzes the four tier approach to ensure nuclear security, including physical protection, human reliability programmes, an emergency management system and comprehensive training. He compares the Indian or other states' nuclear security measures and points out that there has been no public assessment or discussion about the threats to civil and military nuclear assets and India's security measures against these threats. He also mentions security lapses that have occurred in other countries. After giving an overview of all these incidents he acknowledges that Pakistan's nuclear weapons are as safe and secure as those of any other nuclear country.

In the last chapter of his book Fitzpatrick takes note of the concerns about proliferation and nuclear accidents. He names three states – Iran, North Korea and Libya, that were part of nuclear technology transfer in the past. To prevent future proliferation, he mentions Pakistan's export control legislations and subsequent measures to monitor implementation of these legislations. He is concerned over Saudi Arabia's disillusionment with the West, particularly the US over its policies in the Gulf region, and the forthcoming nuclear deal with Iran. Pakistan, which in the view of some elements could be a source of providing technical assistance to Saudi Arabia has firmly and categorically rejected any such possibility. But on the

issue of nuclear safety, the author thinks nuclear weapons in South Asia are less safe than those of the P-5 states, because of the small number of hot tests conducted by the South Asian states. He says that accidents can occur by fires, sabotage, or crashes of aircraft or trucks or the age of reactors or location in a seismic zone.

He believes that Pakistan should be treated as a normal nuclear country if it adopts policies and practices associated with global nuclear norms. He elaborates three nuclear norms for nuclear weapon states. First, restraint in declaratory policy; second, practices that ensure safety and security; and third, institutional compliance with the global non-proliferation regime. He applies these three norms on Pakistan and recognizes that it complies with the global nuclear norms and argues that time has come to offer Pakistan a nuclear deal like India's and this Western normalization move would be the most powerful tool to positively shape Pakistan's nuclear posture. He supports the Carnegie Endowment Report of 2011, which suggested adopting a criteria-based approach for nuclear cooperation with states outside the NPT and recognizes that Pakistan already meets the minimalist conditions including separating military and civilian facilities, putting the latter under safeguards, export control regimes and nuclear testing moratorium. He cautions that granting India membership of NSG would make it hard for Pakistan to apply for membership in NSG where India would be able to wield a veto power by being a member. He suggests that Pakistan and India should resume the dialogue process to discuss the factors that reduce nuclear risks and enhance deterrence stability.

The book provides a well-informed, comprehensive, and balanced approach to Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme. The use of documented sources from Pakistani authors gives authenticity to his work. He breaks from the common, one sided, biased Western assessments of Pakistan's nuclear programme by carefully examining its drivers and the regional security dynamics that impelled its evolution. He correctly identifies the issues that need to be addressed to establish deterrence stability in South Asia.

Reviewed by Saman Zulfqar, Assistant Research Officer, IPRI.

Carlotta Gall, *The Wrong Enemy: America in Afghanistan 2001-2014*

(US: Houghton Mifflin, 2014), 368.

“The Wrong Enemy: America in Afghanistan 2001-2014” presents the history of Afghanistan and the portrait of a Hamid Karzai who is unable to lead and take practical decisions in a land devastated by ethnic turmoil, foreign occupation and civil war. The book was written before the Afghan Presidential Elections of 2014 so it attempts to analyze and answer some questions like how much better off Afghanistan was likely to be today and what could be the future outlook for it as the United States (US) and its NATO allies withdraw? The author like the general lot of Western writers adamantly pursues the rant that Pakistani governments have followed a ‘duplicitous’ policy in the war on terror overtly standing with the US but inwardly supporting the Taliban and using them to manipulate events in Afghanistan and exercise control over its government in Kabul. Thus it is Pakistan which is ‘the enemy’ and not Afghanistan. The burden of her argument is spent on establishing the myth popularized by Western and Indian observers that the ISI is the real power in Pakistan.

Ms. Gall holds that the Taliban wanted to create an Islamic Emirate in Afghanistan which is not wrong but she further claims that the purpose of the emirate was to continue its guerilla war against the US and its Western allies. Quite naively she thinks the goal for the Pakistani government was to continue to employ proxy forces, Afghan mujahideen and Taliban in Afghanistan, and Kashmiri militants in India to project its influence beyond its border (p.21).

The author states that the US pursued its neo-con agenda led by the Bush administration and shifted important resources from Afghanistan to support its ill-conceived invasion of Iraq in 2003. This left open the door for the Taliban to try and recapture its position in Afghanistan. The reason to choose Hamid Karzai as the head of the government in Kabul was that he was considered a compromise candidate as he was Pashtun and acceptable to the northern part of the country. However, for the next thirteen years Karzai would oversee the most corrupt government in the world.

The author also presents Hamid Karzai’s perspective. She observes that when a society functions “on patronage, a duty to help your relatives and clans comb[ined] with Karzai’s poor management and the influx of vast sums of assistance, often poorly administered by donors, [it] created the

most corrupt regime Afghans had ever seen” (p.216). By 2010, \$900 million in loans disappeared implicating Karzai’s family. The problem is that Karzai is not personally corrupt, yet he has tolerated and benefited from it.

By 2009, Karzai became convinced of the American inability to reign in Taliban, so he decided to negotiate with the Taliban and Pakistan on his own. Richard C. Holbrooke, the US Special envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan began back channel contacts with the Taliban. Holbrooke realized the difficulty Karzai faced and realized further that peace with Pakistan was the key; as he summed up the situation in 2010, “we may be fighting the wrong enemy in the wrong country” (p.222).

After the surge in troops, the Taliban hold in South Afghanistan was broken. Over the next three years the Taliban would be kept at bay, but a new crisis developed with Pakistan over the capture and killing of Osama Bin Laden (OBL). The author devotes a chapter to the raid and the interviews she records here are meant to give an impression that Pakistani officials were involved with OBL’s presence in Abbottabad. She gives no credence to senior American officials who have categorically stated that OBL’s presence was not known to Pakistan government as well as those who acknowledge Pakistan’s help that led to OBL’s capture. Her theories are pretty much loaded against Pakistan.

Not surprisingly she also believes that Pakistan is actively involved in the Afghan conflict and though itself the worst victim of terrorism it supports violence in Afghanistan. The failure on her part to overlook such facts gives her work the looks of a propaganda assignment. But her one sidedness is too blatant to convince an objective inquirer of truth.

The last chapter gives a positive outlook for the future of Afghanistan but doesn’t fail to accuse Pakistan of trying to create unrest in Afghanistan. While she may be right in faulting America’s approach in dealing with counter terrorism through the use of massive bombing as self-defeating as that alienated the Afghan villagers and turned the Afghan people further against what they viewed as their corrupt government in Kabul that was allied with the United States. But in the same context she makes no mention of American drone attacks and their negative impact in Pakistan and the bitterness they created in the area and in strengthening the ranks of the extremists and terrorists. But academic objectivity and intellectual honesty is not the author’s concern. The shallowness of her inquiry and her single-minded mission to tarnish Pakistan is all too easily seen in her handling of the Osama bin Laden episode which is still shrouded in mystery except for

contradictory conjectures that can be accepted or rejected on solid grounds but Ms Gall is all too sure Pakistan was hiding him, something no official of the Obama administration or any serious writer of current affairs has ever claimed. Such zeal and animus do not strengthen her academic credentials.

Review by Gulshan Bibi, Assistant Research Officer, IPRI.

Sandra Walklate & Gabe Mythen, *Contradictions of Terrorism: Security, Risk and Resilience*
(London: Routledge, 2015), 194.

The book under review entitled *Contradictions of Terrorism: Security, Risk and Resilience*, co-written by Sandra Walklate and Gabe Mythen, is an attempt to explore and analyse terrorism through the interplay of “power, inequality and injustice” prevalent in modern day societies. Though 9/11 changed the way the world dealt with the phenomenon as it acquired a trans border character the book looks at it in the historical perspective reverting to the violent politics of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in the United Kingdom all through the later decades of the last century. Terrorist acts have been experienced by nearly all states much before 9/11 happened. But they were isolated happenings perpetrated by unconnected groups for different causes. The 9/11 incident brought a transnational Islamic extremist, fundamentalist movement to the fore. Terrorism acquired a new character, not just a name, al Qaeda.

The authors describe at length the security measures, the risks involved and the resilience shown by states in fighting the contemporary hydra headed menace. The authors argue that the United States (US) and United Kingdom (UK) have flooded their strategies with pre-emption legislations that primarily focus on aggressive power not only at home but wherever the source of the trouble could be located around the world. According to the writers, the first decade of the twenty-first century was dominated by policies of “risk” followed by the second decade that relies on “resilience”.

The authors discuss the behaviour of the states and the media with regard to the current manifestation of terrorism. For one thing it is obvious that people who get killed by terrorist activity get bigger and regular headlines than those killed in accidents or thunder and lightning strikes. It seems terrorism is sold by states in carrying out popular policies while terrorists use media for glorification and impact. It is not difficult to see that the “war on terror” is media-driven, that is it has politics and a glamour side. Partly, because spending and preparedness do deter and prevent some acts of terror, natural calamity is beyond human control; we cannot prevent thunder and lightning which is not selective regarding its targets as opposed to the terrorists who choose their victims – people in authority, lawmakers and other elites as during the IRA’s campaigns.

Over the years, there has been a great deal of literature on terrorism but very few writers have touched upon the criminal aspect of the problem. The authors have eloquently defined the contradictions in regulating and managing terrorism. They explore the ways in which new institutional modes of risk assessment based on the principle of pre-emption have impacted on individuals targeted by them. Noting the dilemmas created by pre-emptive strategies, the authors also elucidate more recent moves to develop the idea of resilience in counter-terrorism and security policy.

The book also discusses the limitations ideological terrorism faces when it is argued that "... despite extensive coverage of al Qaeda's aspirations to establish a Muslim caliphate... many groups using political violence in the world today are interested primarily in altering local rather than global circumstances" (52). Before declaring holy war on America, Osama Bin Laden (OBL) had sanctioned attacks in 1990s in Saudi Arabia, Kenya and Tanzania.

The writers have given lot of space to the brutal and inhuman torture by the US and British forces at Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib and they have no hesitation in declaring that "torture and pre-emptive strikes by the Western nations are themselves deemed illegitimate" (74).

The authors' objective conclusion is that "the war on terror fails to engage with the root causes of terrorism ... conducted by extremist groups, including economic and cultural imperialism, military violence by Western nations in Muslim countries, endemic poverty and weak structures of national governance" (87). Unless there is serious engagement with the historical role of the West in creating the conditions of anger and resentment that fuel terrorism, both domestically and internationally, it is unlikely that the current cycle of violence will be broken, the writers declare. Because, "in defining and approaching 'terrorism' as a protean enemy, the British and US governments have failed to grasp the discrete histories of particular conflicts between state and non-state actors" (88).

The book explains in detail how domestic anti-terror policies in the UK have impacted innocent civilians in terms of searches and relations between black and minority ethnic communities. "Research undertaken by academics since 9/11 indicates that Muslims have been subjected to a range of hostilities including Islamophobic abuse, media stereotyping and racist attacks" (103).

This work is useful for not only academics and students interested in political violence, terrorism, geopolitics and risk, but also for practitioners and experts working in the security fields.

Reviewed by Khalid Chandio, Research Officer, IPRI.

Ekaterina Balabanova, *The Media and Human Rights: The Cosmopolitan Promise*

(London: Routledge, 2015), 210.

The book *Media and Human Rights: The Cosmopolitan Promise*, by Ekaterina Balabanova tries to develop a link between two different subjects: media and human rights. It recognises that the media is more receptive to human rights issues today than at any time in modern history. Today, the media has become interested not only in violations of human rights but also in the institutional apparatus that promotes and protects human rights.

Balabanova identifies three main issues that concern human rights' reporting. The first issue is the knowledge gap, which results in an inadequate understanding of human rights. The second relates to the media's understanding of the concept of human rights according to which it notices the occurrence of violations. Quite often the media is predisposed to seeing violations taking place in other countries while missing the actual state of human rights in their own societies. Coverage of human rights issues at home appears as national or local crime or politics. The third problem concerns the quality of reporting. The media tends to miss the historical, political, social and local context of human rights' stories and fails to provide in-depth analysis of the nature of a given violation. As a result, human rights violations are represented as isolated instances or new events even when they are only the latest in a history of similar violations.

Human rights have become the language of criticism in the international system; the media therefore often works against powerful political and economic interests, and the threat of repercussions for reporting on them can be significant. This means that more often than not the victims of human rights violations are unable or unwilling to look to the media as a means of redressal of their problems.

There is a general lack of work that would give a broad understanding of the nexus between human rights and the media, partly because of disciplinary boundaries. There is a tendency for scholars from law or political science to pay little regard to the media as an actor, or factor, when it comes to examining questions relating to human rights. Likewise, criticisms from media and communication studies' scholars are, as one might expect, very media-centric, with little in the way of detailed examination of the historical and institutional variables, which have underpinned the construction of the international human rights system.

There is, thus, ample scope and space to deepen our understanding of the nexus of the media and human rights by offering a more granular and grounded approach.

The author discusses diverse themes under three parts. Part I provides the overall context by introducing the concept of human rights, their historical evolution and the key contemporary debates and challenges. The first chapter sets out in a systematic way the range of understanding around human rights. It looks at definitions of human rights. It also traces historical roots and the role of the UN and post-1945 legislation. Chapter 2 looks at the relationship between information, media and power. It begins the task of developing the analytical focus for the rest of the book by critically challenging understanding of the role of the media with respect to human rights and connecting this with the function of the media within the state and society.

Part II consists of two chapters which introduce the key themes and topics that are explored in subsequent chapters. The author develops a normative approach to the analysis of the media and human rights through an exploration of the roots and contemporary ideas relating to cosmopolitanism. Her analysis is based on the premise that the media and human rights can be thought of as lying within two main dimensions: a continuum between 'stronger' and 'weaker' forms of cosmopolitanism; and a continuum between more 'optimistic' and 'pessimistic' views of the role of the media in constructing shared values on issues such as human rights.

Part III introduces a series of real-world examples that illustrate the policy and practice of human rights and the media. It is organized on the basis of specific human rights problems and issues by using contemporary case studies to illustrate key characteristics of the human rights–media relationship. Beginning with humanitarian intervention, the quest to legitimize war and the role of public opinion and the media are discussed in relation to problems in defining and agreeing when an intervention is humanitarian in the light of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine. The media's role is explored through an examination of theories around the 'CNN effect' and 'compassion fatigue', illustrated through the case studies of Kosovo (1999) and Libya (2011).

In the context of humanitarian intervention, Balabanova then discusses the issue of genocide that has been fundamental in developing practice around armed intervention. She considers the international human rights norms with regard to genocide and examines the media's coverage of

such gross human rights violations. The two specific case studies explored here are Rwanda (1994) and Darfur (2003–present).

Chapter 6 looks at how the media deals with asylum, refugee and immigration issues as contemporary human rights concerns. These issues are discussed with the help of UK press coverage of immigration and asylum and through the role of an international organization (UNHCR) in using the media to spread its (cosmopolitan) message about refugees.

The question of freedom of expression as a human right is discussed next taking into consideration the international documents and provisions that define it giving specific instances where it is limited and the arguments that are employed to support the curbs. The author shows how despite optimism about new technologies, self-censorship, etc. restrictions on media freedom are justified on the basis of other rights, such as freedom from discrimination, and how the state employs security or ‘societal cohesion’ arguments to limit freedom of expression. In the last chapter the international human rights norms with regard to torture are discussed and how the media’s coverage of such gross human rights violations has been. The horrible happenings at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq close this tragic chapter on human rights and human depravity.

Reviewed by Muhammad Nawaz Khan, Research Officer, IPRI

Glenn Greenwald, *No Place to Hide: Edward Snowden, the NSA and the Surveillance State*

(London: Hamish Hamilton, 2014), 272.

No Place to Hide: Edward Snowden, the NSA, and the US Surveillance State, by Glenn Greenwald was published in 2014 by Hamish Hamilton, London. It is the stunning account of how the author was able to make the global surveillance disclosures and his dramatic interaction with a person that helped him blow the whistle.

Chapter one begins with the story of the writer receiving a cryptic e-mail from an unknown person who insisted on communication through encrypted channels only. This person later turned out to be the 29 year old American computer professional, Edward Joseph "Ed" Snowden, who suddenly sprang to world attention in June 2013 through his disclosure on public media of thousands of classified documents revealing numerous global surveillance programmes, many of them run by United States' National Security Agency (NSA). Four of the five chapters in this book deal directly with the details of the author's communication and direct contact with Snowden. He describes in detail his meetings in Hong Kong with Snowden and Laura Poitras, a documentary filmmaker.

The main revelation is "Collect it all" (chapter 3) – the motto of NSA's Director Keith B. Alexander, which exposes the outrageous immensity of this agency's spying programme implemented with virtually no accountability, no transparency and no limits. Its most invidious aspect was the BOUNDLESS INFORMANT, a code named process under which not only foreign intelligence was the subject but also American public was an equally important target, making a clear breach of personal confidentiality. It monitored all the communication traffic that passes through the US collecting trillions of metadata the second in importance was the programme PRISM which allowed NSA to collect data directly from the servers of nine internet giants including Google, Microsoft and Yahoo, etc. Not only does that confirm what many have suspected that surveillance is happening but it also makes clear that it's happening on a vast scale.

Chapter four discusses the broader implications of surveillance and the way it harms 'privacy', the core condition of personal freedom. Greenwald is right in saying that the feeling you get when someone is watching you is always fear-inducing. Snowden's revelations challenge us

to reflect on the ideal balance between the power of the state to know and the individual right to privacy. It is in the nature of government that information will be collected, and that some of it should remain confidential but who will set these parameters remains a question.

The fifth chapter is important as it condemns influential members of the media for downplaying the expose by treating the writer as a nobody. Among such pillars of the fourth estate the author names even the New York Times and blames them for their failure to serve the interests of the people by not exposing the spying programme way earlier, of which at least some of them had an inkling about.

The book describes the process that led to the confirmation of a US government domestic spying programme. The size and scope of the NSA's surveillance programme beats the inquisitive capabilities of the worst dictatorships throughout the world. Much of the book is devoted to reviewing various NSA surveillance programmes, the agency's intent, objectives, ambitions, and cooperation with other intelligence agencies. The documents within the book also reveal the superciliousness of a security agency that spies without any liability. Greenwald's book is nothing if not well documented and sourced. Evidence is what separates conspiracy theories from reality, and in this sense, the book does not disappoint the reader. Most of it covers the actual slides of presentations, memorandums, and graphs that give the reader an account of the agency's inner workings.

After reading this book one would know that data is collected indiscriminately. And that over the last decade the NSA has collected records on every phone call made by every American as well as email data. And that this happens with the cooperation of the private sector. The NSA reviews the contents of the emails and internet communications of people outside the US, and has tapped the phones of foreign leaders as well. It confirms our suspicions that the use of global surveillance is not limited to the "war on terror", but has advanced towards the diplomatic and even economic advantage of the US. It is a fearless and insightful account and helps the reader understand how the US keeps an eye on the world; what is the purpose and scope of surveillance and where one draws a line between government's authority to know things about individuals, and the privacy. The book concludes with a heated debate on executive power, secret law, failed oversight, submissive journalistic institutions and how these dark forces can be fought with the courage of conviction, transparency, and independent journalism.

Reviewed by Nousheen Ashraf, Intern IPRI

Hasan Suroor, *India's Muslim Spring*

(New Delhi: Rupa Publications India Pvt. Ltd, 2015), 200.

The book under review, '*India's Muslim Spring*', by Hasan Suroor, focuses on the possibility of an uprising of Muslims in India and the role of Muslim youth in that country. The book is divided into eighteen chapters. The main argument of the book is that the majority of Muslim youth is secular and has a positive attitude. It has not exhibited any extremism or indulged in any kind of terrorism. Being educated it does not believe in fundamentalism and its main issue has been jobs, housing and security. The Muslims of India are as patriotic as other communities. Their role has remained very constructive and they have not reacted to anti-Muslim sentiments prevailing among the various Hindu extremist groups and political parties. The discrimination against the Muslims by extremist Hindu groups do contribute to aggravating their religious sentiments.

The author notes that the creation of Pakistan was a key element in increasing conflict between Hindus and Muslims in India. However the ongoing sectarian divisions in the Muslim world are of no concern to them, rather they have adapted into a moderate school of thought. They are proud of being Indian and Muslims at the same time.

One cannot fail to notice contradictory stances in the book. Time and again the author stresses that India is the best place for Muslims to live in but admits in the same breath the prevailing prejudice and the need for protecting Muslim rights. He quotes the common opinion among Muslim intellectuals that Muslims need to be thick skinned and should accept that minorities have to live with certain unwanted conditions.

The author, in the first two chapters of the book, blames Indian politicians for fueling hatred between Hindus and Muslims for their ulterior aims. He disparages the role of subsequent governments in fanning Hindu-Muslim riots. Further, he has criticized the creation of Pakistan by saying that the partition of the Indian subcontinent resulted in socio-cultural vacuum in the Muslim community of India and it was exploited by the extremist forces in India.

The third chapter "Measuring Change" encapsulates four variables for which generally Muslims are considered as extremists : (1) the Muslim attitude to free speech and dissent; (2) the community's perception of its priorities; (3) its treatment of women; and (4) whether it is willing to take responsibility for its own future (p.27). While applying these variables on

Indian Muslims, the author concludes that there has been a remarkable change in their thinking on these issues.

In the next three chapters the author has discussed the role of extremist elements present both among the Muslim and the Hindu communities for pursuing divisive activities. They promote hate campaigns to attain political benefits. He has particularly criticized Muslim fundamentalists for instigating their fellow Muslims about the perceived threats from Hinduism to Islam. They have a conservative interpretation of Sharia and rights of the women.

In chapter seven and eight the author has presented the profiles of some Muslim women of India who have assimilated into a modern life style. The confidence, dress and behaviour of today's Muslim woman has improved from the typical Indian Muslim woman. According to the author Indian law is balanced for all the communities. He presents the success of a divorced woman "Shah Bano" as a case study. She won the case for maintenance from her husband following the Indian Muslim Law. Despite violent demonstrations against the verdict, the case went in her favour.

While discussing political participation of Muslims in Indian politics the author believes that Muslims are now acting as individuals than as a community. There is no such thing as a Muslim vote any more. According to him Muslims have become pragmatic while casting their votes (Chapter 9).

"A Legacy of Ayodhya", the tenth chapter, discusses the question of identity crisis of Muslims of India. It was in the aftermath of the forcible demolition of Babri Masjid by Hindu zealots on 6th December 1992 that for the first time Muslims actually became conscious of their religious identity. The next chapter discusses how the element of religious tolerance has been growing among Muslims in India.

Chapter twelve discusses how the Indian Muslims feel about their rights as a minority. The pressures and prejudices that Muslims in India face in their everyday life are only a version of what a woman in a male dominated society does. The Muslim youth is more relaxed as compared to the old generation regarding their rights as they think that being in minority is never a fun. So better bear it with a grin. The old generation feels that they are treated as outsiders (p.92).

The remaining part of the book discusses the challenges Muslims of India faced in the post 9/11 period. They were harassed after 9/11 attacks. Further, they were seen with suspicion for association with Muslim extremist groups or having pro-Pakistan views. After Babri mosque

demolition there were the Gujarat riots in 2002. They became the victim of various incidents such as the Samjhauta Express blast, Mumbai train bombing, Makka Masjid blast and Ajmair Sharif Dargah explosion. All these incidents were initially blamed on Muslim groups but later it was revealed that most of these incidents were carried out by Hindu extremist group Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS).

At the end, the author is of the view that a Muslim uprising in India has no prospects. He notes that there is a lack of leadership in the Indian Muslim community and Indian nation should move into a new direction and shun racial and religious discrimination. The Indian media should play a positive role to encourage communal harmony. Muslims should develop strong institutions. Government policies are required for the social and economic development of Muslim community and faith of the community on the state needs to be restored.

Although, some of the arguments presented in the book are contrary to the ground realities about the Muslim rights in India, but still the book has some useful information regarding the state of Indian Muslims and it would be a useful reading for those who are interested in India's domestic politics.

Reviewed by Fawad Haider, Intern, IPRI.

Michael Weiss & Hassan Hassan, *ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror* (New York: Regan Arts, 2015), 270.

Both the authors of the book, one being a native Syrian, and the other having intimate experience of Syrian and Iraqi officers, have provided valuable information on this contemporary issue. Western knowhow is limited on this issue as it has scant knowledge of the social structure and social psychology of the concerned people

The founding fathers of extremist movements are not generally religiously motivated people; but they are nationalists mostly who in reaction against foreign domination of their land, culture and society turn to religion, and that too of the fundamentalist form having lost faith in mainstream version of their faith. The contemporary violent reaction of extremist Muslim groups is against the oppressive occupation of Israel, backed by the US and other Western countries.

The present sectarian tensions in the Middle East are also the creation of Western rule which has split the Arab world to perpetuate their domination over the Arab world's natural resources. In Iraq where the ISIS originated Sunnis constitute 20 per cent of the population, whereas Shia Arabs constitute 65 and Sunni Kurds are 17 per cent; the rest consist of smaller groups such as Christians, Assyrians, Yazidis and Turkomens. To the Sunnis the forced implementation of democracy meant the demographic invasion of their power; the Sunnis used democracy as a way of eliminating the others from their birth place. Initially no Sunni Muslim, whether civilian or in the Army, fought the Americans, but when the Americans formed the Governing Council, with thirteen Shia, and only one Sunni Muslim, the Sunnis realized that the Americans are handing over Iraq to the Shias, and that started a strong reaction among the Sunnis, which led to the creation of ISIS.

Saddam Hussain had not anticipated the invasion and occupation of Baghdad by the Americans, in fact what he had prepared Iraq for was a doomsday covering another domestic rebellion from Iraq's Shia majority, or the Kurds. Saddam Hussain constructed an underground apparatus for counter revolution, and strengthened his conventional military power. He beefed up one of his Praetorian divisions, the Fedayeen Saddam, and licensed the creation of the Prosay militias. According to General Bernard Turner, when the first American soldier arrived in Iraq "networks of safe houses, and arms caches for para military forces including material for

making improvised explosives, were established throughout the country. It was in effect, a counter-insurgency strategy to fend off what Saddam saw as the most serious threat to his rule.”

The man who understood this strategy that the post-invasion insurgency actually comprised hold over elements from the old regime, and not the pockets of dead-enders, was Col Derek Harvey, a military intelligence officer in Combined Joint Task Force 7 US Headquarters in Iraq. Col Harvey estimated that close to ninety five thousand members of Saddam Hussain’s Praetorian division, the Special Republican guard, the Mukhabarat (intelligence), the Fedayeen Saddam, and state subsidized militiamen were all rendered unemployed with a stroke of the pen by Paul Bremer, a Bush appointed head of the Coalition Provisional Authority. Many of the sacked officers joined the campaign to expel the invaders. More disaffected Iraqis, victims of controversial policies of the Americans joined this group by announcing de-Baathification shortly after arrival in Baghdad. Saddam Hussain’s Vice-President, Izzat Ibrahim al-Dawri, a member of the Naqshbandi Order, had large stockpiles of weapons, and established his own Army, which took Mosul along with ISIS in 2014.

What all these so called leaders had in common was the desire for their tribe, their clan, and themselves. That was the unifying principle. It was the Sunni Arab Identity, this search for the lost power and prestige that motivated the Sunni insurgency. What Saddam Hussain, Al-Assad, Al-Zarqawi, and Bin Laden all understood and what the US had to discover at great cost, was that the greatest threat to a government in Baghdad was not necessarily jihadism or Baathism, but it was Sunni revanchism.

This analysis of the present situation makes the book valuable for students of the current turmoil in the Middle East. It explains the background of events and facts that are not mentioned in studies and news reports coming from the West that fail to tell the world what gives the ISIS its power and why it has been so easy to acquire control over vast swathes of territory in Iraq and Syria.

I would strongly recommend to all our Academic institutions to be studied as a text book, and would advise the think tanks, to have an in-depth analysis of the book, and pass the knowledge to our general public. By reading this excellent work one gets a clean idea of what this movement is all about, and the distorted image Islam has in the west.

Reviewed by Suleman Yousaf Intern, IPRI.