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Michael Krepon and Toby Dalton, *A Normal Nuclear Pakistan*, (Washington, D.C.: Stimson Center and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2015), 45.

The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Stimson Center, two renowned Washington-based think tanks, released a joint report last year titled 'A Normal Nuclear Pakistan'. It has been doing the rounds among nuclear analysts both here and in the U.S. since its publication.

The Report gives the impression that it is an altogether new idea, but it seems to echo much of what had been postulated by an Adelphi Papers publication of the International Institute of Strategic Studies, London, written by its nuclear expert Mark Fitzpatrick in 2014.[1] In fact, the first proposal for 'normalisation' of nuclear Pakistan goes back to 2011, when it was an earlier Carnegie report written by Toby Dalton, Mark Hibbs and George Perkovich, that had argued for bringing Pakistan into the nuclear mainstream,[2] albeit with certain conditions similar to those postulated by Mark Fitzpatrick and now by the Carnegie-Stimson Report. The 2011 report had also suggested a 'criteria' based approach,[3] rather than a 'country-specific' approach, for allowing entry into the Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG).

The Carnegie-Stimson Report has been written by Michael Krepon and Toby Dalton, who are well-known nuclear analysts. In view of the influence they enjoy in the international strategic community, and particularly in the United States, the Report has been the subject of much discussion and debate. It is interesting to note that much of the debate relating to normalcy has failed to identify what a normal nuclear state is. The Report merely states that Pakistan seeks to be viewed as a 'normal' nuclear state possessing nuclear weapons. Thus, the definition of a normal nuclear state is merely a reference to what Pakistan is perceived to be wanting. In Pakistan, this interest in rendering it normal has not been viewed in a particularly favourable manner for a variety of reasons.

The Report begins by saying that Pakistan wants to be seen as a 'normal' nuclear state with nuclear weapons, and wishes entry into the NSG, and desires to be offered a civil nuclear cooperation deal similar to the one given to India by the United States. The Report observes:

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[1] Mark Fitzpatrick, *Overcoming Pakistan's Nuclear Dangers*, IISS Adelphi Series 443 (London: Routledge, 2014).

[2] Toby Dalton, Mark Hibbs, and George Perkovich, *A Criteria-Based Approach to Nuclear Cooperation with Pakistan*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 22, 2011, http://carnegieendowment.org/ les/nsg_criteria.pdf (April 19, 2016).

[3] Ibid.

> A commercial pathway to being mainstreamed into the global nuclear order is highly unlikely for Pakistan, which lacks the commercial leverage that resulted in a nuclear deal for India. A different path towards mainstreaming is available to Pakistan via nuclear-weapon-related initiatives. Having succeeded in achieving the requirements of 'strategic' deterrence, Pakistan is in a position to consider nuclear initiatives that would clarify its commitment to strengthening nuclear norms, regimes, and practices, and would address widely held perceptions that its nuclear deterrence practices are a major source of danger in South Asia (p.3).

It, then, goes on to propose five nuclear weapon related initiatives that Pakistan must take to be brought into the mainstream. These are: (1) alter its 'declaratory' policy from 'full spectrum' to 'strategic' deterrence; (2) reduce production of 'short range delivery vehicles and tactical nuclear weapons'; (3) end its opposition to Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) negotiations and 'reduce or stop' fissile material production; (4) separate civilian and military nuclear programmes; and (5) sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) even if India does not do so (p. 5). In a subsequent clarification of the proposals, the authors of the Report write that the two most important points are: (a) the lifting of Pakistan's opposition to the FMCT negotiations and stoppage of fissile material production, and (b) signing of the CTBT (p. 5).

In analysing this proposition and the various ideas and thoughts that have been put forward regarding the mainstreaming of Pakistan over the last four years or so needs to be put into perspective. Historically, Pakistan has always expressed reservations about the fairness of the global nuclear order and has pointed out its discriminatory character. In fact, India also has the same historical position. Moreover, Pakistan maintained for a long while, from 1975 to 1997, the need for a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in South Asia, and over the period, had also called for negative security assurances for non-nuclear states. Thus, Pakistan, though critical of the international nuclear order, tried to contribute to rendering it a little fairer by calls for these two measures. However, the international community ignored these initiatives and India eventually proceeded to test nuclear weapons in 1998.

The approach so far to exploring options for Pakistan's inclusion into the nuclear mainstream has been amiss in a number of ways. The general assumption of such studies is that Pakistan is not a 'normal nuclear state' and therefore requires to take certain steps in order to qualify as one. It is unfair to treat Pakistan in such a manner as the criteria of 'normalization' relates to international norms set out by the global nuclear regime, which in

itself is under constant threat of being undermined by the very states that are considered to be leading it.

India has been granted, under the patronage of the U.S, a waiver of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, allowing it to undertake nuclear trade and to import fissile materials for its civilian reactors, leaving its indigenous fissile material produce free for use in military installations and programmes. The U.S. support to India in this regard, came as a unilateral decision, as opposed to the multilateral approach that was taken with Iran in the P5+1 negotiations. It has widely been accepted that this decision stemmed from the greater market appeal that India has for the U.S. However, as a state that continues to champion the universal application of the global nuclear regime, U.S. decisions with regard to India have greatly undermined the credibility of the regime.

The most glaring blow to the integrity of the global nuclear order is the Additional Protocol that India has signed with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It has been dubbed as the worst in terms of compliance and is not considered in any way to be contributing towards a strengthening of existing international non-proliferation norms. According to the Additional Protocol that India signed with the IAEA, it has committed merely to report details about exports to non-weapon states of the source materials, uranium and thorium. Moreover, this reporting shall only be done when the amount of materials being exported exceeds 10 tonnes of uranium and 20 tonnes of thorium per year, which, according to the International Panel of Fissile Materials (IPFM), is the only new safeguard measure India has agreed to.

Both Pakistan and India have recorded their protests against the discriminatory nature of the international nuclear order in the past. However, given the opportunity to benefit from positive discrimination, India has not hesitated in thinking twice about its past commitment to an equal opportunity set-up. Should it then come as a surprise, when questions arise regarding the normalcy of the global nuclear regime itself, against the norms and set criteria by which states are judged to be normal or otherwise?

As for specific measures being listed for Pakistan to undertake, signing CTBT is one of them. It can be recalled that when the Indo-U.S. deal was negotiated, signing the CTBT was also a requirement laid out for India. However, India has studiously avoided signing the treaty so far and seems to have no intention of signing it in the future. It may be added here that the CTBT has not been ratified by the United States itself, even after nearly twenty years of its adoption. As regards Pakistan, we have not done so because of India's unwillingness to do the same.

The second important point in the proposals listed in the Carnegie-Stimson Report, about stopping production of fissile material and lifting of

our supposed veto on the FMCT negotiations in Geneva, is again a demand that does not take into account the broader picture and is, thus, unfair. There is no call for India to stop production of fissile material. In fact, the waiver granted to India by the NSG, in the wake of its nuclear deal with the United States, has opened up the international market for India to obtain uranium and thus, freed its own uranium stocks to be enriched to weapons grade enriched uranium without let or hindrance.

Regarding the FMCT negotiations, Pakistan has put forward its position in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) as to what it expects to be done for the process to commence. It wants the inclusion of stockpiles in the agenda of the negotiations. Finally, a somewhat sensational speculation in the Report that Pakistan is likely to have the third largest nuclear arsenal in 5-10 years' time is at odds with its academic and scholarly tenor. In any case, the authors seem to overlook the likelihood of India's nuclear arsenal being even bigger in that time span.

It is surprising to note that coming from seasoned analysts, the Report has conveniently dismissed the notion that Pakistan's nuclear policy and posture is in response to serious security threats emanating from India. It needs to be pointed out that should India gain entry into the NSG, Pakistan's prospects of entry into it will diminish considerably due to the organisation's unanimous voting approach to acceptance of new members. Moreover, the country-specific prescription in the five 'suggestions' of voluntary measures are designed for Pakistan specifically. In this context, the proposals go against the criteria-based approach that Pakistan has been asking for.

Pakistan's stance on the global nuclear order and the inclusion requirements has been consistent through time. A criteria-based approach for inclusion into the global nuclear order, and subsequent 'normalisation' is the only way forward in this regard. Country-specific inclusions and exclusions are both unacceptable and Pakistan remains firm on this position. To say that Pakistan wishes to be included into the global nuclear order and to be mainstreamed as a nuclear state would not be a deviation from the truth. However, achieving this status on a discriminatory basis is not the route that Pakistan intends to take. In order for Pakistan to consider accepting being mainstreamed into the international nuclear order, it should be allowed criteria-based access to the Nuclear Suppliers Group and would like to acquire nuclear technology and material from the international market. As Pakistan's record amply demonstrates, it will fulfill all its obligations and responsibilities, if non-discriminatory approach is followed by the international community.

As the record stands, on many an occasion, Pakistan has agreed to voluntarily enlist in safety and security exercises and has also been judged

as the Most Improved Nation according to the 2013 Nuclear Threat Index Report, in terms of safety and security of nuclear materials and installations. Pakistan's interest lies in the conservation of international norms of equal opportunity in international nuclear trade and cooperation. However, this cannot be realised outside of criteria-based approach to mainstreaming, or as it more popularly known, normalisation.

For the international community a prudent approach would be to negotiate with Pakistan, instead of dictating to Pakistan what it should or should not do. This is the approach that was adopted by the international community with Iran (P5+1 and Iran talks) and is also in operation with North Korea (the Six Party Talks). Pakistan should, likewise, be offered the opportunity of negotiations with the international community for it to be brought into the nuclear mainstream. The international community will have to, also, recognise that merely dictating to Pakistan, without doing anything to correct the strategic imbalance in South Asia, has no chance of success.

In view of these considerations, the Carnegie-Stimson Report is not acceptable to Pakistan in terms of its approach as well as its recommendations. Sooner or later, think tanks in Washington and the nuclear experts who have written the Report will have to come to terms with Pakistan's stance and principled position on nuclear matters. Till such time, the debate is going to remain one-sided and patently unfair.

Reviewed by Ambassador (retd.) Ali Sarwar Naqvi, Executive Director, Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS), Islamabad, Pakistan.

Shahid Ahmad Hashmat, *International Conflict Resolution: Role of the UN and the OIC*
(Islamabad: NUST Publishing, 2014), 277.

Conflict resolution, over the last four decades, has emerged as an important field of study impacting global, regional, national and local unresolved issues of contentious nature. At the end of the Cold War, transformation of conflict took place from inter to intra-state which augmented greater challenges for regional organisations. Yet, inter-state conflicts continue to pose a major threat to global peace and security. The United Nations (UN) and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), therefore, have enormous significance because of the daunting task of resolving conflicts in different parts of the world.

A great deal has been written about the success and failure of the UN in the arena of peace-building and peacekeeping and the role of its two major organs, the General Assembly and Security Council in dealing with aggression, advertent and inadvertent use of force, occupation and other violations of international law. Chapters V-VII of the Charter of the UN focuses on the methodology to deal with the threat to peace and the measures to be taken in case the Security Council resolutions are not complied with.

On the other hand, the OIC formed in September 1969 and composed of 57 Muslim members to take a stand against violence and the outbreak of armed conflicts in various Muslim countries (primarily in the Middle East), has no specific conflict resolution and management mechanism.

This book focuses on four things: the conceptual and theoretical dimensions of conflict and conflict resolution; the role of the UN and the OIC; and recommendations for a viable role of the OIC for dealing with inter and intra-state conflicts in the Muslim world. The author suggests reforming OIC's decision-making mechanisms and making it more effective.

A major component of the book is based on a survey done by the author about UN peacekeeping and a questionnaire submitted to a cross-section of society about the structural weaknesses of the OIC and measures to reform its performance. Since the author has been associated with UN peacekeeping operations, his insight on this issue is reflected in the manuscript.

The most interesting part of the book deals with the OIC, its predicament and failure to deal with the conflicts which plague most Muslim countries and the level of violence which has permeated Muslim societies. One agrees with the author's main contention that 'Many members of OIC are facing intra-state conflicts which pose a serious threat

to their existence and integrity. The OIC has discussed most of these issues in almost all sessions of the Islamic Summit and the Council of Ministers. However, nothing much beyond discussions, advice, suggestions etc. has been done' (p. 123).

Furthermore, the author is of the view that 'OIC member states also badly suffer from lack of human development, extremely poor standards of technological knowhow, low level of industrialisation, weak organisational and managerial abilities and poor standard of governance. Above all, they lack dynamic and visionary leadership which can bring revolutionary changes to transform the present state of anxiety and frustration into positive hope in order to contribute to world peace, security, progress and prosperity' (p. 127)**.** Majority members of the OIC have low Human Development rankings; are dependent on foreign aid and unable to provide the basic necessities of life to their people.

The biggest failure of the OIC lies in its inability to play a viable role for peace in regions which are violent and conflict-ridden. In this regard, the author suggests that 'the OIC must embark upon undertaking peacekeeping operations under the OIC auspices, as envisaged in Article 52 and 53, Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Peacekeeping operations have been carried out by OSCE, NATO, Economic Community of Western African States and Collective Security Treaty Organization' (p. 173).

The real question, however, is whether the OIC is capable of undertaking such a gigantic task when it has neither the political will nor the policy to launch peacekeeping operations. The OIC can certainly pull together a peacekeeping force for dealing with violent conflicts in Syria and Yemen, but its organisational weaknesses and feeble leadership are major impediments in this regard.

On the whole, the book provides a wealth of information and insight on the UN and OIC in the context of conflict resolution mechanisms. It also provides valuable recommendations to revitalise the OIC's role for the peaceful management and resolution of conflicts.

Reviewed by Dr Moonis Ahmar, Meritorious Professor and Dean Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Karachi, Pakistan.

William McCants, *The ISIS Apocalypse: The History, Strategy, and Doomsday Vision of the Islamic State* (New York: Macmillan Publishers, September 2015), 256.

In *The ISIS Apocalypse: The History, Strategy, and Doomsday Vision of the Islamic State* William McCants has correlated *Jihad* (holy war) and the Apocalypse in a very profound manner. The genesis and evolution of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has been explained in detail from three different dimensions. First, a credible leadership in the form of *emir* (ruler) Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi claiming its descent from the Holy Prophet (PBUH) emerged, which consolidated power through support from Hajji Bakr, a former colonel in Saddam Hussein's army. Second, political turmoil in the Middle East, particularly the Syrian crisis provided a powerful base and the split between ISIS and Al-Qaeda made the role of the former pre-eminent and latter weaker in the global *jihadist* (those fighting in the name of Islam) community. Third, ISIS's proclamation of a 'caliphate' (a state governed in accordance with Islamic law, or Sharia), or 'Islamic State' in 2014 also proved successful in attracting Muslims from around the globe to fight under its black banner and flag. The Islamic State's 'cause proved so compelling among *jihadists* that it supplanted its former master, Al-Qaeda', to lead the *jihadist* movement. 'The spread of the flag, then, traces the spread of an idea and chronicles a major changing of the guard in the global jihadist movement' (p. 6-7).

The author traces back IS's birth to the 1999 meeting between senior members of Al-Qaeda and Abu Musa'b al-Zarqawi (d. 2006), a Jordanian *jihadist*, who was trying to establish a caliphate in the Fertile Crescent stretching from eastern Mediterranean through Iraq. Despite Zarqawi's extreme views, Al-Qaeda leaders chose him to establish a training camp in Afghanistan (Herat) and attract jihadists from Palestine, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Turkey. After the fall of Taliban, Zarqawi fled to Iraq where he set up building his clandestine network and leading Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), welcoming recruits from Saddam Hussein's security forces. The aims and strategic thinking of Zarqawi and Al-Qaeda differed. Al-Qaeda avoided sectarian war in Iraq and was focused on U.S exit from Iraq. Zarqawi, on the other hand, hated *Shias* and local autocrats, whom he wanted to overthrow since he believed they were collaborating with the Americans to subjugate the *Sunnis*. Zarqawi fomented civil war and opposed to Al-Qaeda's strategy of achieving popular support before establishing the Caliphate, declared Caliphate in 2006 without consulting Bin Laden or Ayman al Zawahiri (p.16).

Abu Ayyub al-Masri took over AQI after Zarqawi's death in 2006. Masri tried to heal the rift between IS and Al-Qaeda. He informed his bosses that the 'commander of the faithful', Abu Umar Al-Baghdadi (d. 2010) had pledged allegiance to Bin Laden in front of *jihadist* groups in Iraq, but lately announced the dissolution of Al-Qaeda in Iraq and reassigned all its fighters to IS in Iraq (p.17). Al-Qaeda leaders were not only angry that the IS had challenged Bin Laden's authority by not seeking his approval, but also that it had declared itself too soon. By declaring itself pre-maturely, the IS had taken on the burden of governance and had also invited foreign interventions. Despite Al-Qaeda's private misgivings, its leaders presented a united front in the public and endorsed the establishment of the state (p.19).

According to McCant, the Islamic State flag played a crucial role in its rise to power. The flag was not only a 'symbol of its government' in Iraq, but also the 'herald of the future caliphate', and was the 'harbinger of the final battle at the End of Days' (p.22). The author also explains the 'striking parallels' between the Abbasid Empire (the Sunni movement that dominated the Islamic world from the 8th to the 13th centuries) and the Islamic State revolution. They both 'share a name *(dawla)*, symbols and colours, apocalyptic propaganda, clandestine networks and an insurgency in Syria and Iraq' (p.27).

After the establishment of Islamic State in 2006, Sunnis who did not show allegiance to IS or defied its rule were considered apostates or rebels which resulted in compelling Jamaat Ansar Al-Sunna (an insurgent Sunni group in Iraq and Syria), the Islamic Army in Iraq (underground Islamist militant organisations formed following the 2003 invasion of Iraq) and other militias to talk to the Americans in late 2006 and early 2007 to find a way to get rid of the group (p.35).

The IS even failed to improve local economies and its zealous implementation of *Hudud* (Islamic criminal law) scared the people. Its own ranks were getting restless. According to McCants the State failed as an organization because it did not understand Iraqis well; the foreign fighters did not get along well with the local fighters; and the IS commanders lacked co-ordination (p.43).

Simultaneously, as the Islamic State was stumbling in Iraq, another Al-Qaeda affiliate in Yemen, the Al-Qaeda in Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) followed by Al-Qaeda's branch in North Africa, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghrib (AQIM) and Al-Qaeda's franchise in Somali, the Shabab, had taken up IS's standard and its projects. Like the IS, all these groups attempted to govern the territory they conquered, but eventually failed to create durable governments. Even if they were able to provide public services and manage the local economies they were not lenient in

implementation of *Hudud* punishments. The Al-Qaeda's affiliates went *'glocal'* by prioritising state-building which still threatened the West and hence invited a powerful response.

Describing the revival of the IS in Iraq/Syria and the controversial relationship between Al-Qaeda and the IS, McCant explains how Hajji Bakr, a former colonel in Saddam's Army, after Umar Al-Baghdadi's death in the 2010 U.S raid, took advantage of the situation and gathered support for Abu-al Baghdadi to be the 'commander of the faithful', with Al-Qaeda left out of the picture once again. After Bin Laden's death in 2011, Baghdadi assured the new leader, Ayman Al-Zawahiri of his group's loyalty to Al-Qaeda. On Zawahiri's order, the IS in Iraq, dispatched its group, Nusra Front, to Syria, headed by Abu Muhammad Al-Jawlani.

The Front began collaborating with other Sunni insurgent groups against the Syrian government. Given different strategic orientations and disputes over control of resources, especially oil and loyalty of Nusra fighters, the split resulted in Baghdadi's announcement of Nusra as its branch in Syria. Jawlani responded by declaring Nusra's independence from the IS and pledging an oath of allegiance directly to Zawahiri, as leader of Al-Qaeda (p.91). In response to a private message sent by Baghdadi, Zawahiri ordered the IS to renounce its claim on Syria and go back to Iraq, while Nusra should continue its fight in Syria as an Al-Qaeda affiliate. Baghdadi publicly rejected this ruling which made Zawahiri renounce Al-Qaeda's ties or connections with the group. IS's spokesperson, Adnani argued that the IS had never been a part of Al-Qaeda and that the latter had disbanded in Iraq when the IS was declared in 2006 (p.92-93). Annoyed Zawahiri clarified the historical relationship between Al-Qaeda and IS by citing internal Al-Qaeda memos. Flustered by Zawahiri's reaction, the IS responded that the State was under Al-Qaeda's command on matters outside Iraq (p.94). They even killed Abu Khalid Al-Suri, the man Zawahiri had sent to heal the rift between the IS and Nusra front, when he openly criticised the IS in a statement.

In the last two chapters, the author has highlighted the sectarian Apocalypse and re-establishment of the Caliphate by the IS. He quotes Sunni and Shia prophecies that mention the End of Times and emergence of *Mahdi*, the saviour of the Muslims. McCants writes that the 'chaos unleashed by the Arab Spring' convinced the Arab Muslims and the *jihadists* around the globe 'that the end of the world was nigh' (p. 97). 'The mounting violence in Syria', the land mentioned in 'Islamic prophecies as the site of the final battles of the apocalypse, made the doomsday interpretation' imminent. The Dabiq prophecy was quite popular in this regard. Many believed that the Islamic State would defeat the infidel enemies allied against it at *al-A'maq* or *Dabiq,* two places close to the

Syrian border and Turkey. There were also prophecies about an *Antichrist* who would appear in the empty area between Syria and Iraq, but were intentionally avoided by the IS and its fans, as it was precisely where IS was located (p.107). Many of the Sunni and Shia militants have bitterly fought with each other 'motivated by a common apocalyptic belief that they fight in the vanguard of the *Mahdi-The Rightly Guided One'* (p.105) against Sufyani (Mahdi's opposite), from the branch of the Umayyad dynasty descended from Abu Sufyan.

According to McCants, early Islamic prophecies of the End of Times, resonated with the conflicts in Syria and Iraq, not because of geographical settings rather due to IS's flag colours black and white which matched Al-Qaeda's; similar to Hezbollah's yellow and green flag (p.110).

Modern day prophesies and focus on Mahdi's battle has heightened sectarian apocalyptic fervour, where each sect is trying to kill the other for the privilege of destroying infidels and to play a role in the Final Battle. In some cases, the IS has justified acts like slavery under the guise of prophecies and recruited countless women who formed the *Khansa Brigade.* These women migrated to support their husbands in *Jihad* (holy war).

The IS accumulated money, fighters, weapons and land to make a plausible case that it was indeed the Caliphate reborn (p.123). While other groups have been working to overthrow governments, the State was busy creating its own which made it successful in 2014.

And whilst trying to resurrect the Abbasid caliphate in Baghdad on the footprints of Harun al-Rashid, IS's values contradict those of Harun's court such as those about music, terms with Shias etc. Even though the State has done well economically from their loot and plunder policy, they remain rigid on *Hudud* punishments.

From their slogan in 2007 of *Enduring*, they now also proclaim *Expanding* after moving to Syria in 2010[1] since they believe that the prophecy requires global conquest. In 2014, the IS received oaths of allegiance from *jihadists* in Egypt, Libya, Algeria and Saudi Arabia. Accession of the new provinces demonstrates that IS has been constantly expanding and succeeding in its so-called 'divine' mission. It can now utilise the financial and human resources of these new provinces to retaliate against its enemies (p.141). In 2015, rumours circulated that Al-Zawahiri might dissolve Al-Qaeda and if this were to happen the free affiliates might join the State and increase its strength (p.142).

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1 Islamic State followers traditionally shout *baqiya wa tatamaddad* (enduring and expanding) when the Islamic State is mentioned.

In the end, the author draws a very logical comparison between the IS and Al-Qaeda. He is of the view that today's 'apocalyptic' recruiting makes more sense compared to Bin Laden's generation when governments in the Middle East were stable and sectarianism was more subdued. Hence, *it was not Bin Laden's apocalypse.* The IS does not believe in an effective hearts and mind strategy, therefore, *it was not Bin Laden's insurgency*. The Al-Qaeda leaders had counseled affiliates to be lenient in the application of *Hudud* and to avoid blood feuds with other tribes, while the State imposes harsh punishments and kills tribal members who refuse to co-operate with them. Hence, *it was not Bin Laden's caliphate.* Despite all this, the IS was successful in 2013 and 2014 by 'using a propaganda mix of apocalyptism, puritanism, sectarianism, ultraviolence and promise of a caliphate… Bolstered by a combination of government neglect, careful planning, brutal tactics and clever recruitment, the Islamic State had the manpower, money and territory to make a credible claim to be a state' (p.153).

McCants recommendations to tackle the State are similar to the Coalition's current military strategy (pp.155-158). According to him, defeating the State's government would ultimately take time. However, the IS government is likely to crumble soon as no modern *jihadist* outfit that has provoked international intervention has survived.

The ISIS Apocalypse is a very thought provoking, well-written and informative book. The book leaves the readers with the feeling that the Islamic State is more lethal than Al-Qaeda in terms of leadership and strategy. Al-Qaeda's leadership was organised, moderate and disciplined. Al-Qaeda's vision included social development and unity of Muslims, irrespective of sects against the West (infidels). This is reflected in the minor details McCants has added about Bin Laden's personality such as his regret over calling the movement Al-Qaeda (which translates as 'the Base') for not being Islamic enough a name. At another point, he points to Bin Laden being an officer working for the United States Agency for International Development where he encouraged economic growth, easing of taxes, abandoning the state's monopoly and prohibition of deforestation, etc. Unfortunately, the State is rigid and has no limits and morality. It can go to any extent to achieve its strategic objectives and to fulfill its self-interpreted prophecies and use Islamic scripture to justify its actions. The book provides a comprehensive analysis of the history of the Islamic State, the Shia/Sunni split and factionalism and Islam in general. McCants surveys the early failed attempts of state building in Yemen, Mali, and Somalia and shows how the global *jihadists* use social media like Twitter to organise, debate, and recruit fighters from across the globe.

Reviewed by Aymen Ijaz, Assistant Research Officer, Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI), Pakistan.

Salma Malik (ed.), ***Pakistan's Security Problems and Challenges in the Next Decade*** **(Islamabad: Centre for International Strategic Studies, 2015), 309.**

This collection of papers edited by Salma Malik, Assistant Professor, Department of Defence and Strategic Studies at the Quaid-e-Azam University in Pakistan looks at security challenges faced by the country with a traditional state-centric focus. Each of the ten chapters discusses inter-related themes such as state identity, civil-military relations, strategic culture and socio-economic development. The book aims at identifying the co-relation between state security and state identity, a subject that has long been ignored in academic research. This effort distinguishes it from earlier works on Pakistan's national security.

The first chapter by Dr Syed Rifaat Hussain on *Pakistan's Quest for Security: An Historical Analysis* traces Pakistan's perennial insecurity. He gives a detailed historical account of Pakistan's threat perceptions, its policy of external balancing by joining Western alliances and subsequently developing a strategic partnership with China. Apart from traditional security threats, he identifies new security dilemmas for Pakistan in the form of religious Islamic militancy that has caused the state, human as well as material losses.

Ambassador (retd.) Riaz Mohammad Khan in the chapter *Geostrategic Review and Threat Scenario* highlights that Pakistan's geostrategic thinking has been shaped by two distinct and contradictory motivations: first, a sense of vulnerability and the deep-rooted fear of a larger neighbour since the trauma of Partition; while the other motivation has been the equally persistent desire to rectify the wrong done to it at the time of Partition that has led to India's forcible occupation of Kashmir (p.27). The interplay of these two impulses defines Pakistan's strategic decisions and initiatives. He recognises the role of identity associated with Islamic ideology in Pakistan's strategic thinking as a constant that has been exploited by different state actors to achieve their objectives (p.31). He suggests that given the changing regional as well as global strategic environment, Pakistan needs to understand the fact that geostrategic significance viewed from a narrow military sense becomes a source of instability; however, if it is considered as enhancing economic and commercial interests, geostrategic significance can ensure state stability (pp.46-47).

Two chapters have been devoted to the significance of strategic culture. Brigadier (retd.) Naeem Ahmad Salik writes on the *Evolution of Pakistan's Strategic Culture*. While explaining various theoretical perspectives, he identifies an acute sense of insecurity as the defining factor

behind the formulation of Pakistan's strategic culture; with Islamic ideology, historical experiences and the geopolitical environment playing secondary and tertiary roles. Dr Zafar Nawaz Jaspal and Bilal Zubair highlight that Pakistan has been facing a volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous strategic environment since the Partition of British India and this hostile strategic environment has contributed to the country's existing strategic culture (p.198).

Along with external security threats, internal security concerns are also imperative in the strategic calculus of a state. Mr Afzal Ali Shigri identifies the current internal security challenges in the chapter *Internal Security Parameters.* He explains the internal security mechanisms of different provinces, especially the role of institutions such as courts, the prosecution system, police force and rehabilitation department. He highlights the weaknesses of Pakistan's criminal justice system, offers various recommendations and stresses that good governance is a prerequisite for initiating the reforms process (p.117).

Dr Moonis Ahmar in the chapter *Linkage between Internal and External Policy Issues on National Security* defines the concept of national security and identifies the gaps between its traditional and non-traditional meanings. He highlights Pakistan's internal and external security threats, decision-making structure, and lists a number of issues that can impact the national security of Pakistan in the future. He recognises that Pakistan's security dilemma will remain perilous unless issues creating insecurity at the domestic level are addressed (pp. 182,194). He stresses that human security, which is an important component of national security, needs to be given priority (p.194). According to him, initiation of security sector reforms has been a daunting task due to lack of a clear strategy on dealing with security issues, and identifies lack of coordination between institutions responsible for maintaining security at the federal and provincial level as a major challenge (p.195).

Dr Ilhan Niaz touches upon the subject of *Pakistan's Civil-Military Relationship: Past, Present and Future* and argues that there exists an imbalance in civil-military relations that operates in favour of the military. He outlines the various roles and powers of the military which is often used by the state as an administrative reserve and for carrying out emergency response and relief functions; while at the same time it runs its own educational system, has its own corporate empire and remains a major stakeholder in the foreign and defence policymaking process (p.120). He also highlights ineffectiveness of the civilian apparatus and unwise civilian leadership which faces the challenge of political stability (p.120). While foreseeing a future military takeover as being unlikely, he suggests that Pakistan's civilian leadership needs to pay attention to problem resolution,

performance and challenge-response mechanisms in stabilising political and constitutional orders (p. 139).

Another element that is considered significant in addressing security challenges is the economic development of any country. Dr Vaqar Ahmed in the chapter, *Towards Sustainable Economic Development in Pakistan*, highlights Pakistan's economic condition and maintains that the country has been unable to sustain its economic growth in the long-run making it difficult to provide employment or reduce poverty (p.143). He provides various reasons for slow economic growth and points out that while responsibility regarding fiscal resources has shifted from the federal to provincial governments after the 18th Constitutional Amendment, provinces have been unable to manage financial resources (p.149). He suggests changing the political narrative by making it more inclusive to bring about positive economic change (p.156). He identifies social cohesion, public sector transparency, resource mobilisation, market reforms and regional integration as the drivers of future economic growth in Pakistan (p.164).

Ambassador (retd.) Ali Sarwar Naqvi in the chapter, *Reflections on Pakistan's Identity and Nationhood* argues that Pakistan was born in a hurry and due to its sudden birth, the concept of nationhood could not take root at that time (p.218) hindered by issues like delay in constitution making, separation of East Pakistan, and military interventions (p. 219). He defines 'nation' as having pre-existing elements like land, people, language, culture and religion blended into an integral whole through education and culture (p.220). In order for 'state identity' to evolve, one needs to teach Pakistan's historical genesis, its conceptual framework and contemporary relevance, reinforced by folklore (literature, poetry and music) of the people through state patronage (p.220). He highlights two significant factors that hamper the identity formation process and ultimately pose a threat to state security. First, he identifies confusion between the concept of religion and state that not only created a culture of religiosity, but also promoted religious parties' indifference towards state allegiance (pp.221-222). Second, he highlights how disaffection of smaller provinces within a centralized state affects 'nationhood'. Despite all this, he feels that since there have been manifestations of a single nationhood during times of crisis, evolution of a national identity may be difficult, but not impossible (pp. 229-230).

Salma Malik, in the concluding chapter, sums up the debate by enumerating Pakistan's internal as well external security challenges and highlighting the regional strategic environment, while briefly elaborating on the bilateral relations of Pakistan with regional states. Apart from traditional security concerns, she points out that newly evolving threats require a more nuanced state response. While the Government has introduced the National Action Plan (2014) to deal with internal security issues (including domestic

counterterrorism measures), the main issue remains lack of genuine will and capacity to implement these measures (p.252). According to her, there is a need for clarity of purpose and vision at the leadership level, and to educate people about their individual contributions towards the country's future economic and development reforms (pp. 253-54).

This edited volume has touched upon all the significant elements that have bearing on Pakistan's national security. The authors have provided objective analysis of their respective areas of research initiating a thought-provoking debate for researchers, academia and students of international politics.

Reviewed by Saman Zulfqar, Assistant Research Officer, Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI), Pakistan.

Michael W. Doyle, *The Question of Intervention: John Stuart Mill and the Responsibility to Protect* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015), 289.

The author, Michael W. Doyle, is Professor of International Affairs, Law and Political Science at Columbia University, U.S.A. He is best known for authoring *Liberalism and World Politics (1986)*.

In his recent publication *The Question of Intervention: John Stuart Mill and the Responsibility to Protect*, he asserts that the question of when to intervene in the affairs of any country by states and international organisations is highly contentious. Given humanitarian protection, national security and national self-determination considerations, what should the criteria or variables be for international intervention? (p.12) To analyse this, he opted to go back to the basics, that is, to an essay '*A Few Words on Non-Intervention*' written by John Stuart Mill in 1859.

Doyle interprets how Mill addresses two puzzles: First, being a liberal, why does Mill advocate non-intervention? Why not guarantee and globally enforce liberal rights and democracy? Second, after establishing the norm of non-intervention, on what grounds can a state override or disregard this norm? In the end, he expands on Mill's arguments by looking at the relatively contemporary principle of responsibility to protect (R2P).

According to Doyle, two principles follow from Stuart Mill's utilitarian notion. First is, maximum equal liberty, 'allowing each adult to develop his or her own potential on the view that each individual is the best judge of what is and is not in his or her interest' (p.20). The second is representative government which should 'reflect the interests and pleasures of the majority. To Mill, democracy is better as it works well' (p.189). Even though common perception may argue that since democracy is the best form of government, one should advocate enforcing it globally, Mill argued that 'intervention' for the sake of freedom and democracy will not do any good. Democracy cannot be imposed, it needs to be self-chosen (pp.26-27). Looking at United Kingdom and the United States, Mill elaborated that although both are liberal democratic societies; in the UK, a monarch is head of the state and religion is established. In the domestic American context, these traits are radically illegitimate. Thus, particular content of self-determination is what gives it value (p.29). It is through struggle and by achieving one's own democratic revolution that people develop the capacities to exercise and hold on to a government.

Any attempt by a foreign group to establish liberal democracy in another country would only produce outcomes like new civil war, an autocracy or an empire. To test this argument, Doyle looked at historical

records on intervention from 1859 till 2003. He cites 334 examples in a list of interventions (mentioned in the appendix of the book). 221 of them were recorded as militarily successful; 56 led to new civil wars; 68 produced a new autocracy; 146 resulted in an empire; and only 26 produced a free participatory government (pp.44-46).

The second puzzle evaluates factors that create exceptions to the norm of non-intervention. These situations include a) national liberation; b) prevention of harm to the national security of the intervening nation; and c) a humanitarian crisis in the host country (pp. 51-75).

When there is a small minority with a strong demand for self-determination residing in a larger nation, no amount of local struggle leads to satisfactory results for the former. Here, it would be legitimate to assist independence. Examples referred by the author include the American Revolution of 1776 (p.78); separation of Belgium from Netherlands in 1830 (pp.78-81); and dissolution of former Soviet Union. However, how does one identify the majority and its wishes? Moreover, how does one address issues of compensation where partition into two independent states leads to greater impoverishment for one of the newly created entities as in the case of North and South Sudan?

A state can also intervene in order to prevent harm to its national security, for instance, on the basis of *jus ad bellum* (just cause) and *jus in bello* (just means) (pp.7-8). Then, there is the issue of a humanitarian crisis. When the number of casualties, due to oppressive internal measures, becomes severe, something needs to be done by external actors to save lives. The question here becomes how can one have genuine humanitarian intervention, rather than merely using humanitarianism as an excuse for imperialism? Doyle evaluates this concern through the doctrine of responsibility to protect (R2P), especially during intervention in Libya (pp.127-141).

The R2P was unanimously adopted by the United Nations in 2005. It has three pillars: a) every country has the responsibility to protect its own people from crimes against humanity, genocide and ethnic cleansing; b) the international community through the UN accepts the responsibility to assist countries in following the first pillar at their request; c) if a country fails to protect its own citizens, the international community can step in through the UN Security Council (UNSC).

According to Doyle, the third pillar is a revolutionary international commitment. It is both a license and a leash (p.110). It is a license since the 'traditional immunity to non-intervention, as guaranteed by the UN Charter Article 2 (7) that prohibits intervention in the domestic affairs of member states, can be revoked if states fail to protect their citizens' (p.114). It is a leash since the R2P limits legitimate concerns for intervention to four

situations: war crimes; crimes against humanity; ethnic cleansing; and genocide (p.123). It considers all other reasons put on the table for intervention as illegitimate and also gives authorisation for intervention only to the Security Council.

In 2007, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces and the Obama administration used R2P doctrine as justification to intervene in Libya. The justifications given to the UNSC by President Obama included: threat to regional stability; indiscriminate attacks by Gaddafi forces on the Libyan population; and the threat of overrunning Benghazi as Gaddafi's forces moved towards the East in 2011 (p.131). In Obama's words, 'one cannot wait one more day' (p.131). Hence, the UNSC unanimously passed Resolution 1973 authorising member states to take all necessary means including military force to protect civilians in Libya. Many hoped that Gaddafi would negotiate a deal with the rebels to put the country back on course. But neither side was interested in negotiations. As a stalemate began to emerge in March 2011 (p.133), NATO forces and other supporter countries from the Gulf went beyond the legal terms of the UNSC mandate and proceeded to defeat Gaddafi's forces. Instead of acting as a defensive shield for the Libyan population, NATO was criticised for acting as the Libyan rebels' airforce. The doctrine of R2P was wounded by the Libyan outcome as some member states contended that R2P was expeditiously co-opted by Western partisans of 'regime change' (p.140).

The negative effect of this can be seen in Syria where there is no effective pressure on Bashar al-Assad's government, although compared to Libya, more harm is being inflicted on the Syrian population. On top of that, there is the murderous Islamic State of Iraq and the Syria (ISIS) group that has captured almost half of the country and is worse than Assad, but the tool of R2P is not available. Instead of doing any good, lack of shared understanding on R2P within the UN has left the question of legitimate intervention unanswered and unimplemented.

In his book, Michael Doyle has skilfully combined prescriptive arguments with empirical data about the practice of intervention. The book offers fresh thinking on the concept of intervention with examples that reflect the complex realities of world politics. Doyle does not dwell on the purely moral or legal principles, rather his emphasis is on the practicality of intervention. Whether intervention or non-intervention saves lives is attributable to politics, but his book maps a convincing route for human protection by balancing the demands of human dignity and national self-determination.

For all the demonstrative research on the moral underpinnings or effects and effectiveness of intervention, external intervention to end mass suffering remains one of the least likely ways to achieve that purpose. The

challenge, then and now, is to identify the exceptions when foreign intervention is appropriate and just. Neither earlier literature on the subject of intervention has been able to identify that nor does Doyle's book.

Reviewed by Asiya Parveen Mehar, Assistant Research Officer, Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI), Pakistan.