

Russia's Resurgence: Global-Regional Threats and Opportunities

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Abstract

This paper attempts to analyse the resurgence of Russia and the factors behind it, including the role of political leadership and institutions through the lens of history and identity. It briefly looks at the genesis and the overall implications of the Ukrainian crisis vis à vis Russia and the West. The study concludes that while Russia is facing challenges in re-establishing itself as a major global player, hard power politics is not the way forward. Instead, the regime in Moscow should focus on enhancing its position and power through economic alliances and partnerships.

Key words: Russia, Resurgence, Ukraine, Strategic Alliances, Global Player.

Introduction

The rise and fall of great powers is a very common phenomenon in world politics. As the concept of power is relative, history has witnessed the rise and then decline of many great nations such as France, Germany, and Britain. There is a cycle of power transitions in which great powers decline with the passage of time and new powerful states emerge on the world stage.¹ The power of a great nation can be defined in terms of its political influence, military strength and economy. The same can be applied to Russia which continues to be a dominant actor in global politics.² While the disintegration of the Soviet Union into smaller states in 1990 resulted in the geographical decline of its power and influence in the region, over the last decade Russia has started to re-assert

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¹ Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500-2000* (London: Fontana Press, 1989).

² Nazir Hussain and Khurshid Ali Sangay, "The Russian Resurgence and South Asian Region," *IPRI Journal* XII, no. 2 (2012): 15.

itself despite its geographical, economic and political limitations and global challenges.³

The paper tends to explore how and why Russia is resurging on the political stage after its decline, with a special focus on its relationship with neighbouring Ukraine. Factors such as historical background, domestic compulsions, economic and security concerns, and leadership are the important variables which will be studied. The paper also suggests a way forward for Russia in the prevailing challenges and changing global political environment. It concludes that Russia has revived itself as a powerful state, but in the current scenario the concept of a unipolar world has been replaced by a multipolar world; and therefore, Russia and its leadership will have to learn how to share the stage with other powerful states like China and Brazil, apart from the United States.

A Look Back

Following the Napoleonic Wars, Russia's role as a great world power became institutionalised.⁴ The three partitions of Poland and its imperial policy towards Finland and Poland aggrandised Russia's great power status. From the Vienna Settlement (1814-15)⁵ to the Crimean War (1853-1856), Russia secured its great power status.⁶ During the Nineteenth Century, the Russian empire had expanded its territory and its power extended to Afghanistan and China up to the Pacific coast.⁷ It successfully fought WW-I and WW-II and then it cautiously handled the Cold War era.⁸ Its powerful past is evident through its rich history.⁹ But this history has also been traumatic. The failing of the Soviet Empire due to economic stagnation and misplaced focus on the arms race with the United States was a major setback. Mikhail Gorbachev's twin policies of *glasnost* (openness) and *perestroika* (restructuring) spectacularly backfired and resulted in the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.¹⁰ This had a deep psychological

³ Ibid.

⁴ Iver B. Neumann, "Russia as a Great Power, 1815–2007," *Journal of International Relations and Development* 11, no. 2 (2008): 128–151.

⁵ Stella Ghervas, "What was the Congress of Vienna?" *History Today* 64, no.9 (2014), <http://www.historytoday.com/stella-ghervas/what-was-congress-vienna>.

⁶ Neumann, "Russia as a Great Power."

⁷ "A Brief History of Russia," The UCSF Russia Survival Guide, http://missinglink.ucsf.edu/lm/russia_guide/historyofrussia.htm, accessed January 15, 2016.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ "Perestroika" meaning restructuring and "Glasnost" meaning openness was the reform programme introduced by Gorbachev in 1985. Ken Lohatepanont, "Into the Era of Multipolarity: The Resurgence of Russia," *Ken Writes Blog*, July 12, 2015,

impact on Russia with the beginning of a new era that witnessed the superiority of U.S.A. and former pushed into the background. Russia has always demanded equal treatment from its counterparts, particularly the United States and the European Union; and their cold shoulder treatment has been a constant source of frustration for it.¹¹

Therefore, in the present scenario, particularly after the Soviet disintegration, the changing security dynamics and international environment has compelled Russia to look beyond its traditional security realm and safeguard its political and economic interests and expand its role in the global politics.

Resurgence of Russia: Why Now?

The term 'resurgence' has a very simple meaning in the Oxford Dictionary, 'an increase or revival after a period of little activity, popularity, or occurrence.' Generally, it refers to revival, renewal, and recovery, but specifically in the context of Russia, resurgence can be defined as 're-emergence' from its geostrategic decline towards a path of political, economic and military rebuilt.¹² There are certain factors that have contributed towards this resurgence that must be considered in order to understand Russia's foreign policy outlook and national interests. These factors are briefly discussed below:

Leadership

Leadership plays an important role in state policy and its strategic orientation. For the past two decades, Russian politics has been a one-man show revolving around Vladimir Putin who has been switching over the seats of President and Prime Minister. Putin has always envisioned Russia as a great power and has made policies that compliment its power interests and strategies. His personality and vision has made him extremely popular in the Russian public. His vision can be described in one of his statements:

<https://kenwrites.wordpress.com/2015/07/12/into-the-era-of-multipolarity-the-resurgence-of-russia/>.

¹¹ Kristi Govella and Vinod K. Aggarwal, "Introduction: The Fall of the Soviet Union and the Resurgence of Russia," in *Responding to a Resurgent Russia: Russian Policy and Responses from the European Union and the United States*, 1st ed, eds. Vinod K. Aggarwal and Kristi Govella (New York: Springer, 2012), 12.

¹² "Russia Resurging 24 Years after Collapse of USSR," *TRT World*, last modified February 24, 2016, <http://www.trtworld.com/in-depth/russia-resurging-24-years-after-collapse-of-ussr-18635>.

Russia has been a great power for centuries, and remains so. It has always had and still has legitimate zones of interest ... We should not drop our guard in this respect, neither should we allow our opinion to be ignored.¹³

The *Forbes* magazine named Putin as the most powerful man in the world in 2013.¹⁴ *The Economist*, in February 2014, published an article about Russia's advance towards Ukraine and announced it as 'the triumph of Vladimir Putin.'¹⁵ After becoming President, Putin has revisited state policy and enforced three documents: the National Security Concept, the Foreign Policy Concept, and the Military Doctrine that together highlight two important features i.e. identification of 'vital areas' for Russia and outlines for the country's new foreign policy.¹⁶ His domestic policy is to restore internal stability, while his foreign policy is to regain Russia's Soviet era status and to restore its place in world affairs.¹⁷

Domestic Factors

Domestic conditions play an important role in defining the foreign policy of a country. During the Twentieth Century, the Russian Orthodox Church has come back at the heart of Russian politics. The Church has passionately supported Putin since he casts Russia's challenges in the light of 'foreign devils' versus 'Holy Russia.'¹⁸ The Russian Orthodox Church and Putin's Russian state are now inextricably linked. Among Putin's political emoluments are renewed claims of Moscow as a protector for Russian, Slavic and Orthodox people everywhere around the world.¹⁹

Security Concerns

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)'s expansion into Russia's traditional areas of interest, the 'colour revolutions' in the Balkan and

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ "Vladimir Putin is Forbes Magazine's Most Powerful Person in the World", *Telegraph*, accessed January 15, 2016, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/11975033/Vladimir-Putin-is-Forbes-magazines-most-powerful-person-in-the-world.html>.

¹⁵ "The Triumph of Vladimir Putin," *Economist*, February 1, 2014, <http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21595451-successes-abroad-and-winter-olympics-make-russia-look-strong-where-it-matters-it>.

¹⁶ Hussain and Sangay, "The Russian Resurgence," 22.

¹⁷ Oliver Bullough, "Vladimir Putin: The Rebuilding of 'Soviet' Russia," *BBC News*, March 28, 2014, <http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-26769481>.

¹⁸ Jim Eckman, "Vladimir Putin's Worldview and the Resurgence of Russia," *Issues in Perspective*, May 10, 2014, [https://graceuniversity.edu/iip/2014/05/14-05-10-1/](https://graceuniversity.edu/iip/2014/05/14-05-10-/).


¹⁹ Ibid.

Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), American withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty, and the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan have reinforced Russia's interest in a multipolar, rather than unipolar world.²⁰ Over the last 20 years, NATO has reached the former Soviet Union's doorstep. For example, its members now include Poland, a long time Russian enemy and often a reluctant Soviet ally.²¹ Russia sees these NATO moves as a threat to its sovereignty and national pride. So, Russia has finally taken a tough stance (as in the case of Ukraine) and is now using its military prowess and political influence to address these security concerns. Russia's stake in Ukraine is its security since it acts as a buffer zone between Russia and its traditional European enemies.

Economic Concerns

Russia is depending on oil exports and future pipeline projects for its economic growth. Ukraine is a major business zone for Russia because major gas pipelines pass through its eastern part. Ukraine also provides important transit locations and supply routes to Europe. Hence, Russia does not want to lose its control over the Ukrainian market. Figure 1 shows the major pipelines of Russia that transport gas to Europe through Ukraine:

Figure-1
Russian Gas Supplies via Ukraine



Source: "The Strategic Importance of Ukraine and Why both Russia and U.S. are Interested,"

LiveLeak.com, http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=ac4_1431202960.

²⁰ Govella and Aggarwal, "Introduction: The Fall of the Soviet Union," 9.

²¹ Jason Duncan, "What Russia's Resurgence Means for the U.S.," *MLive*, May 12, 2014, http://www.mlive.com/opinion/grand-rapids/index.ssf/2014/05/what_russias_resurgence_means.html.

Limited Role of NATO

When Russia invaded Georgia in 2008, none of the NATO members, including the United States, was ready to provide military support to Georgia and risk a military conflict.²² This NATO/U.S. behaviour has encouraged Russia to defend its interests in the post-Soviet space.²³ In fact, the Russian invasion underscored the spirit of Article V (collective defence) security guarantee provided by NATO to countries in the Russian periphery.²⁴ NATO's lack of response in Crimea has also raised doubts about the effectiveness and durability of its forces and paved the way for Russia to protect its national and security interests abroad.

Emergence of Multipolarity

New powerful states are emerging in the international political system. The traditional power centres are changing and new regional political and economic blocs are being established. A once unipolar world is transforming into a multipolar one. In this context, Russia and many other states such as BRICS that include Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa are emerging on the political stage.²⁵ The Obama administration has learnt the limit of its power after failure in Iraq and the Afghan war. Such atmosphere has created grounds for regional players and former powerful states like Russia to re-assert themselves.²⁶

Gradual Decline of the U.S.

The United States no longer enjoys the political clout it once did²⁷ since over the last few decades its economy has suffered due to the military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan. The failings and failures of both these interventionist misadventures have also raised questions about this militarily superior nation whose ideological influence in the world has declined. Numerous financial scandals/crises have impacted its economy,

²² F. Stephen Larrabee, "Russia, Ukraine, and Central Europe: The Return of Geopolitics," *The Journal of International Affairs*, 63, no. 2 (2010): 33-52.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Francesco Brunello Zanitti, "Russia, China and India Building New Multipolar World Order," January 15, 2015, *Pravada.ru*, http://www.pravdareport.com/world/asia/15-01-2015/129526-russia_china_india-0/#sthash.QAfCLaLa.dpuf retrieved on January 22, 2016.

²⁶ Basheer Nafi, "A Perilous World Order Comes into View," *Middle East Eye*, January 1, 2016, <http://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/perilous-world-order-comes-view-116324369>.

²⁷ Robert Kagan, "Not Fade Away: The Myth of American Decline," *New Republic*, January 11, 2012, <https://newrepublic.com/article/99521/america-world-power-declinism>.

reputation and influence.²⁸ It has been reported that American power is on a downward trajectory because of its overstretched military, risky financial situation and lack of dynamism in the face of new, influential and powerful competitors on the global stage.²⁹

Is a Russian 'Renaissance' Really on the Horizon?

Neo-Nationalism

Russian nationalism has roots in several historical and political beliefs. There is a rise in radical nationalism in Russia due to the break-up of the Soviet Union and emergence of ethnic criminal groups from South Caucasus and Central Asia.³⁰ Under, Boris Yeltsin, there were official attempts to develop a 'national idea' which failed, but the search continued.³¹ The need to infuse a spirit of nationalism, ironically, fragmented society into religious Christian Orthodoxy and Russian radical nationalists nostalgic of the Soviet past, having similar imperialistic ambitions.³² The country's new foreign policy has evoked elements of imperial and Soviet traditions. The deep sense of nationalism is manifested through domestic displays such as Putin's revival of Soviet-style military parades in the Red Square. Many politicians and political scientists such as Arseniy Yatsenyuk and Zbigniew Brzezinski have argued that the March 18, 2014 annexation of Crimea by Russia showed 'Putin's desire to construct the "Soviet Union 2.0" and direct global affairs once more.'³³ Nationalism has been used as a tool to justify everything from Russia's intervention in Syria, to the urgency to host mega events such as the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics and the 2018 World Cup.³⁴ The neo-nationalist rhetoric and sentiment:

²⁸ Chu Shulong and Chen Songchuan, "Is America Declining?" Brookings Institution, November 11, 2011, <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/is-america-declining/>.

²⁹ Jill Hamburg Coplan, "12 Signs America is on the Decline," *Fortune*, July 20, 2015, <http://fortune.com/2015/07/20/united-states-decline-statistics-economic/>.

³⁰ Richard Arnold, "Surveys Show Russian Nationalism is on the Rise. This Explains a lot about the Country's Foreign and Domestic Politics," *Washington Post*, May 30, 2016, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/05/30/surveys-show-russian-nationalism-is-on-the-rise-this-explains-a-lot-about-the-countrys-foreign-and-domestic-politics/>.

³¹ Astrid Tuminez, "Russian Nationalism and Vladimir Putin's Russia," (PONARS Policy Memo no. 151, American International Group, Inc. and Council on Foreign Relations, New York, 2000), https://www.gwu.edu/~ieresgwu/assets/docs/ponars/pm_0151.pdf.

³² Diana Shendrikova, "The Revival of Russian Nationalism," Italian Institute for International Political Studies, April 7, 2014, <http://www.ispionline.it/en/pubblicazione/revival-russian-nationalism-10156>.

³³ Arnold, "Surveys Show Russian Nationalism is on the Rise."

³⁴ Ibid.

Takes the form of the protection of Russian interests and citizens in Russia's sphere of hegemony – i.e. its Inner and Near Abroad and its self-proclaimed “sphere of privileged interests” of which Chechnya, Ukraine and Georgia are a key part. While perhaps not seeking to necessarily restore the old Soviet “evil empire”, and have these countries under tight political, economic and military control as they once were, the foreign policy of the Putin/Medvedev regime does seek to keep these countries under strong Kremlin alignment, as in the case of Chechnya (albeit a nominal part of the Russian Federation already) and Ukraine (a separate nation state, if not viewed so by the Putin/Medvedev regime).³⁵

Strengthening Strategic Alliances

Russia has been historically selling arms to most of the Middle East states, including Algeria, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Libya, Sudan and Yemen, but this industry was impaired under the privatisation policies of Boris Yeltsin. Saddam Hussein's fall in 2003 and Muammar Gaddafi in 2011 also led to the loss of traditional clients. Now, however, the Syrian war has reinvigorated its arms exports:

Between 2011 and 2015, the volume of weapons contracts signed between Moscow and Middle Eastern countries increased substantially, and included a Russian return to Egyptian and Iraqi weapons markets that have recently been dominated by the U.S.³⁶

The country's alignment with the al-Assad regime against the Syrian rebels also shows its strategic resurgence,³⁷ and has ‘cemented its role as a “game changer” in the region.’³⁸ It has played a key role in the P5+1 nuclear agreement with Iran;³⁹ and is extending trade and economic ties with the European and Central Asian states.⁴⁰ It is also improving its

³⁵ Christopher P. Isajiw, “Neo-Nationalism in the Foreign Policy of the Putin/Medvedev Regime,” *E-International Relations Students*, June 22, 2016, <http://www.e-ir.info/2016/06/22/neo-nationalism-in-the-foreign-policy-of-the-putinmedvedev-regime/>.

³⁶ Nikolay Kozhanov, “Arms Exports Add to Russia's Tools of Influence in Middle East,” Chatham House, July 20, 2016, <https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/arms-exports-add-russia-s-tools-influence-middle-east>.

³⁷ Subhash Kapila, “Russia's Military Intervention in Syria Signals Russian Strategic Resurgence” (paper no. 6024, South Asia Analysis Group, October 19, 2015) <http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/node/1881#sthash.FSSR93jB.dpuf>.

³⁸ Nikolay Kozhanov, “Arms Exports Add to Russia's Tools of Influence in Middle East.”

³⁹ Jonas Bernstein, “Russia's Stake in Iran Nuclear Deal,” *Voice of America*, July 18, 2015, <http://www.voanews.com/content/russias-stake-in-iran-nuclear-deal/2867710.html>.

⁴⁰ Hussain and Sangay, “The Russian Resurgence,” 27.

defence relations with the South Asian countries i.e. Pakistan and India. It recently signed a defence deal with Pakistan in August 2015.⁴¹ Kozhanov points out that:

Russia's interest is far from purely economic. Russian federal law states that strengthening military and political positions abroad is the primary goal of Russian military-industrial cooperation, and Russia will undoubtedly use its arms exports industry to attempt to affect the balance of power in the Middle East.

Russia has a prominent role in maritime security in the Asia-Pacific, it has expanded its naval presence in the region⁴² and is also a key part of the East Asia Summit.⁴³

Under the Putin regime, Russia has improved its trade and defence relations with other countries, including North Korea, Venezuela, Greece, Hungary, France and some far-right wing parties across Europe.⁴⁴ It is also deepening its ties with China and apart from trade and investment, the most recent development is the resumption of arms sales between the two countries.⁴⁵ Russia is also building alliances through multilateral organisations such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEc), Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS to enhance its global outreach.⁴⁶

Economic Growth

In addition to Putin's leadership, Russia's economic recovery is playing a major role in driving its resurgence. The most important pillar of Russia's economic recovery has been its boom in earnings from oil and gas

⁴¹ Mateen Haider, "Pakistan, Russia Sign Landmark Defence Deal," *Dawn*, August 20, 2015, <http://www.dawn.com/news/1201473>.

⁴² Stephen Blank, "From Re-set to Resurgence: Russia Finds its Place in the 21st Century Middle East," *Second Line of Defense*, April 29, 2014, <http://www.sldinfo.com/from-re-set-to-resurgence-russia-finds-its-place-in-the-21st-century-middle-east/>.

⁴³ Ajay Kamalakaran, "Russia has Important Role in Asia-Pacific Maritime Security - Indonesian Deputy Minister," *Russia Beyond the Headlines*, October 11, 2015, https://rbth.com/international/2015/10/11/russia_has_important_role_in_asia-pacific_maritime_security_-_i_49945.html.

⁴⁴ Tom Parfitt, "How Vladimir Putin is Building Alliances Around the World," *Telegraph*, February 17, 2015, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/vladimir-putin/11417105/How-Vladimir-Putin-is-building-alliances-around-the-world.html>.

⁴⁵ June Teufel Dreyer, "China and Russia: The Partnership Deepens," Foreign Policy Research Institute, January 7, 2016, <http://www.fpri.org/article/2016/01/china-and-russia-partnership-deepens/>.

⁴⁶ Hussain and Sangay, "The Russian Resurgence," 33.

exports.⁴⁷ The rise of world crude oil prices in the late 1990s and early 2000 boosted the Russian oil industry.⁴⁸ High energy prices allowed Russia to build up its currency reserves and start repaying its foreign debts.⁴⁹ Even after the Ukrainian crisis, Russia still controls gas and oil pipelines in Central Europe, and Europe is dependent on its oil and energy supply.⁵⁰

The effect of low oil prices, falling demand in the European market, the July 2014 economic sanctions on specific sectors which have been prolonged until January 31, 2017 by the EU till the complete implementation of the Minsk agreements,⁵¹ and increased competition in oil export markets are critical challenges faced by Russia. However, low oil prices would not have serious impact on the energy security of Russian consumers because prior to the oil price decline, considerable investments in refineries were made.⁵² Russia's weak ruble would also help the country's national oil companies to withstand the global low oil prices and endure low commodity rates.⁵³

To tackle lack of investment in large export infrastructure projects due to revenue decline in the public sector, particularly energy companies, Russia has planned to extend the Eastern Siberia–Pacific Ocean (ESPO) pipeline capacity from the current level of 50 million tonnes annually to 80 million tonnes annually by 2022 and to provide financing for these projects. The Russian oil industry has undertaken eastward orientation towards China and Asian partners which would not only increase export volumes, but also establish business relations across Asia.⁵⁴ Beside this, Russia has also signed many gas pipeline projects with Korea, Japan, China, Greece, Turkey such as Trans-Korea Gas Pipeline, South European Pipeline, Nord Stream II, and Altai etc.⁵⁵ On July 13, 2015, the ruble hit a new high reaching 56.38 against the dollar and 62.74 against the euro. On May 17,

⁴⁷ Govella and Aggarwal, "Introduction: The Fall of the Soviet Union," 9.

⁴⁸ Fiona Hill, *Energy Empire: Oil, Gas and Russia's Revival* (London: Foreign Policy Centre, 2004), <http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/307.pdf>.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Keith Johnson, "Europe Doubles Down on Russian Gas," *Foreign Policy*, September 11, 2015, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/09/11/europe-doubles-down-on-russian-gas-nord-stream-gazprom-putin/>.

⁵¹ EU "Russia European Union Prolongs Economic Sanctions by Six Months," (press release, Council of the European Union, Brussels, July 1, 2016), <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/07/01-russia-sanctions/>.

⁵² Ekaterina Grushevenko, "The Effects of Lower Oil Prices on Russia," *The National Bureau of Asian Research*, May 14, 2015, <http://nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=561>.


⁵³ "Weak Ruble to Help Russia withstand Low Oil Prices," *Sputnik*, January 4, 2016, <http://sputniknews.com/business/20160104/1032675254/weak-ruble-oil-prices.html>.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Edward C. Chow and Zachary D. Cuyler, "New Russian Gas Export Projects – From Pipe Dreams to Pipelines," Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 22, 2015, <http://csis.org/publication/new-russian-gas-export-projects-pipe-dreams-pipelines>.


2015 the ruble had dropped to 48.67.⁵⁶ The ruble is recovering after losing nearly half its value against the dollar over the course of a year,⁵⁷ as shown in Figures 2 and 3:

Figure-2
Performance of Different Currencies against Russian Ruble



Source: Blakely, “The Russian Ruble has Hit New Highs.”

Figure-3
Russian Ruble Against the Dollar



Source: Matt O’ Brien, “Russia’s Shocking Rebound: The Ruble has Climbed 34 per cent in Just Two Months,” *Washington Post*, April 13, 2015, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/04/13/russias-shocking-rebound-the-ruble-has-climbed-34-percent-in-just-two-months/>.

⁵⁶ Renee Blakely, “The Russian Ruble has Hit New Highs in 2015,” *Market Realist*, August 5, 2015, <http://marketrealist.com/2015/08/russian-ruble-hits-new-highs-2015/>.

⁵⁷ Bill Powell, “What Sanctions? The Russian Economy is Growing Again,” *Newsweek*, April 13, 2015, <http://www.newsweek.com/2015/04/24/putin-was-right-be-confident-about-russias-economy-321934.html>.

Military Might

Russia is the second strongest military power in the world, with the world's largest tank fleet, the second largest aircraft fleet behind the U.S., and the third largest submarine fleet behind the U.S. and China. Kremlin's military spending has increased threefold since 2008 and is expected to grow by 44 per cent in the next three years.⁵⁸ The regime has created a new military branch, the *Aerospace Forces* by merging the Air Force with the Russia Aerospace Defence Forces to counter NATO.⁵⁹ Russian military reforms in 2008,⁶⁰ the introduction of a military doctrine in 2010⁶¹ and the rapid modernisation of Russia's Pacific fleet in 2015⁶² demonstrate that the Russian military is reviving its power and strength. Many analysts and decision makers agree that the Russian military has transformed into a force that can rival NATO's warfare capabilities.⁶³ Table 1 indicates that despite the political and economic setbacks, Russia stands next to the U.S. in military strength:

⁵⁸ Jeremy Bender, "Ranked: The World's 20 Strongest Militaries," *Business Insider Indonesia*, October 3, 2015, <http://www.businessinsider.co.id/these-are-the-worlds-20-strongest-militaries-ranked-2015-9/20/#.Vvt6ENJ97IU>.

⁵⁹ Franz-Stefan Gady, "Russia Creates Powerful New Military Branch to Counter NATO," *Diplomat*, August 7, 2015, <http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/russia-creates-powerful-new-military-branch-to-counter-nato/>.

⁶⁰ Mikhail Barabanov, Konstantin Makienko, and Ruslan Pukhov, *Reform: Toward the New Look of the Russian Army*, report (Moscow: Valdai Discussion Club, 2012), 3, http://vid.rian.ru/ig/valdai/Military_reform_eng.pdf.

⁶¹ CEIP, *The Military Doctrine of Russian Federation*, report (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2010), http://carnegieendowment.org/files/2010russia_military_doctrine.pdf.

⁶² Franz-Stefan Gady, "What to Expect from Russia's Pacific Fleet in 2015?" *Diplomat*, March 2, 2015, <http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/what-to-expect-from-russias-pacific-fleet-in-2015/>.

⁶³ Bettina Renz, "Russia Resurgent? Russian Military Performance in Crimea and its Implications on Western Defence Requirements," *Ballots & Bullets*, November 5, 2014, <http://nottspolitics.org/2014/11/05/russia-resurgent-russian-military-performance-in-crimea-and-its-implications-on-western-defence-requirements/>.

Table-1
Military Strength Indicator

Military strength indicator								Final military strength score
Country	Overall ranking	Active personnel ('000)	Tanks	Aircraft	Attack helicopters	Aircraft carriers	Submarines	
United States	1	0.90	0.86	0.95	0.95	0.95	0.95	0.94
Russia	2	0.81	0.95	0.90	0.90	0.52	0.86	0.80
China	3	0.95	0.90	0.86	0.86	0.52	0.90	0.79
Japan	4	0.38	0.38	0.76	0.81	0.76	0.81	0.72
India	5	0.86	0.81	0.81	0.19	0.76	0.76	0.69
France	6	0.33	0.24	0.67	0.43	0.90	0.57	0.61
South Korea	7	0.76	0.57	0.71	0.71	0.05	0.67	0.52
Italy	8	0.52	0.33	0.38	0.57	0.76	0.43	0.52
UK	9	0.19	0.14	0.52	0.67	0.52	0.57	0.50
Turkey	10	0.57	0.67	0.57	0.57	0.05	0.67	0.47
Pakistan	11	0.71	0.62	0.48	0.48	0.05	0.52	0.41
Egypt	12	0.62	0.76	0.62	0.38	0.05	0.14	0.34
Taiwan	13	0.43	0.52	0.43	0.76	0.05	0.14	0.32
Israel	14	0.24	0.71	0.33	0.48	0.05	0.33	0.32
Australia	15	0.05	0.05	0.10	0.24	0.52	0.43	0.30
Thailand	16	0.48	0.43	0.24	0.14	0.52	0.05	0.28
Poland	17	0.14	0.48	0.19	0.29	0.05	0.33	0.23
Germany	18	0.29	0.19	0.29	0.33	0.05	0.14	0.19
Indonesia	19	0.67	0.29	0.05	0.10	0.05	0.10	0.12
Canada	20	0.10	0.10	0.14	0.05	0.05	0.14	0.10

Source: SIPRI, Global Firepower, Credit Suisse

Source: Lucinda Shen, "Ranked: The Strong Militaries in the World," *Business Insider*, September 29, 2015, <http://www.businessinsider.com/ranked-the-strongest-militaries-in-the-world-2015-9>.

Nuclear Revival

The Federation is gradually replacing its aging stockpile of Soviet-era nuclear weapons with an upgraded nuclear arsenal and nuclear technology suitable for use in the contemporary warfare environment. Moscow continues to maintain a strategic triad of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), strategic submarines (SSBN) with long-range sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and long-range bombers equipped with short-range nuclear-armed missiles and gravity bombs.⁶⁴ According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Russia has extensive and expensive modernisation programmes underway for its current nuclear delivery systems, warheads and production facilities. As of January 2016, Russia has deployed more nuclear and other warheads than the United States.⁶⁵ Together, these two countries have more than 90 per cent of the global nuclear weapons' inventory.⁶⁶

The Ukrainian Crisis

In some ways the question of Russian identity is still predicated on the geographical extent of the old empire, rather than any notion of a modern state. In many ways this is precisely Russia's problem within its identity crisis; the Russian Federation cannot exit from this 'old empire' without risking, to a certain extent, its territorial integrity and identity.⁶⁷

The post-2013 situation in Ukraine emerged out of this identity crisis in the Federation. The Russian-West relations that had begun after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 became strained once again after the crisis.⁶⁸ But in order to understand the Ukrainian crisis, it is important to understand the geography of Ukraine and its geostrategic importance both for the West and Russia.

⁶⁴ Richard Weitz, "Russia's Nuclear Revival and its Challenges," *ISN Security Watch*, August 22, 2014, <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?id=182982>.

⁶⁵ SIPRI, *SIPRI Yearbook 2016: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), <https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/YB16-Summary-ENG.pdf>.

⁶⁶ Lucinda Shen, "Ranked: The Strong Militaries in the World," *Business Insider*, September 29, 2015, <http://www.businessinsider.com/ranked-the-strongest-militaries-in-the-world-2015-9>.

⁶⁷ Dmitri Trenin, *The End of Eurasia: Russia on the Border of Geopolitics and Globalisation* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002), quoted in Christopher P. Isajiw, "Neo-Nationalism in the Foreign Policy of the Putin/Medvedev Regime" (MA disser., Northeastern University, Boston, 2012), <http://www.e-ir.info/2016/06/22/neo-nationalism-in-the-foreign-policy-of-the-putinmedvedev-regime/>.

⁶⁸ Dmitri Trenin, "The Ukraine Crisis and the Resumption of Great-Power Rivalry," (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2014), http://carnegieendowment.org/files/ukraine_great_power_rivalry2014.pdf.

Ukraine's Geography

Ukraine is a country in Eastern Europe, lying on the northern shores of the Black Sea and Sea of Azov. It borders a number of European countries including Poland, Slovakia and Hungary in the west, Belarus in the north, Moldova and Romania in the south-west and Russia in the east.⁶⁹ Ukraine is the second-largest country by area in Europe after Russia. Its border with Russia is the country's longest one.⁷⁰

Figure-4
Map of Ukraine



Source: "Geography," Ukraine-Seth, accessed February 15, 2016,
<https://sites.google.com/a/guhsd.net/mun-ukraine/geography>.

Geostrategic Importance

Ukraine's strategic location has made it a crucial player in the European energy transit network. It is also an important market for both the EU and Russian made goods. Economically, Ukraine is a major manufacturer of ballistic missiles, large transport planes and launch pads for space carriers. It is also a major producer and exporter of steel, with large natural gas deposits and some of the best offshore hydrocarbon deposits in the Black Sea. From a strategic point of view, Ukrainian port cities hold great economic and military importance. The ports of Odessa and Sevastopol provide both military and commercial access for exports, particularly from

⁶⁹ *World Public Library*, s.v. "Geography of Ukraine," accessed November 15, 2016,
<http://www.worldlibrary.org/article/WHEBN0000031826/Geography%20of%20Ukraine>.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

Southern Russia.⁷¹ In fact, its location is important for both the West (to prevent Russia from expanding its influence westwards); and Russia (its gas supply lines pass through Ukraine to Eastern Europe; control of Ukraine means having a buffer state between Russia and the West; prevention of NATO expansion; control of Ukraine's heavy military industry; access to the resources and hydrocarbons of the Black Sea). As Zbigniew K. Brzezinski noted some years ago, without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be a Eurasian empire.⁷²

A Quick Glance at History

During the Nineteenth Century, Ukraine was firmly controlled by Russia. However, while Russia was engaged in its 1918 civil war, Ukraine became independent and proclaimed itself a republic for a short span of time. After the civil war, Ukraine could not withstand Russian pressure and in 1922 again became one of the original constituent republics of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).⁷³ Under Stalin's rule, it faced the terrible famine of 1932-1933 and purges from 1937-1939. Given socio-economic problems, Ukrainians formed the Ukrainian People's Movement for Restructuring (RUKH) in 1989 and demonstrations began in the 1990s. With the breakup of the Soviet Union and collapse of communism, Ukraine finally became independent in 1991.⁷⁴ The country suffered economic decline and inflation for few years, but eventually moved towards a path of gradual growth and stability.

The Conflict

The Ukraine crisis was immediately preceded by competition between the EU and Russia for the future geo-economic orientation of Ukraine. The roots of the crisis lie in the 2008 war between Russia and Georgia, which ended the prospect of enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for both Georgia and Ukraine, and in the beginning of the global financial crisis, which seemed to give more credence to regional economic arrangements. Then, the EU and Russia drew different conclusions from the war and the crisis.⁷⁵

⁷¹ "The Strategic Importance of Ukraine," *Live Leak*.

⁷² Larrabee, "Russia, Ukraine, and Central Europe."

⁷³ "World War I, 1918 Ukraine Declares its Independence," *History.com*, accessed February 15, 2016, <http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/ukraine-declares-its-independence>.

⁷⁴ Tim Lambert, "A Short History of Ukraine," in *A World History Encyclopedia*, accessed February 15, 2016, <http://www.localhistories.org/ukraine.html>.

⁷⁵ Trenin, "The Ukraine Crisis."

The EU launched the *Eastern Partnership Program* in 2009 and politically and economically wished to associate Ukraine along with the other five former Soviet Republics.⁷⁶ The Russian Federation, on its part, wanted Ukraine and others to join its flagship project of *Eurasian Economic Union* energised in 2009 and later signed in May 2014. The truth of the matter was that ‘rather than re-creating the Soviet Union, as suspected in the West, Moscow began building a Russian-led community in Eurasia that would give Russia certain economic benefits and, no less important, better bargaining positions with regard to the country’s big continental neighbours—the EU to the west and China to the east. Including Ukraine into the scheme...was designed to give the new compact the critical mass of 200 million consumers, of which Ukraine would supply almost a quarter.’⁷⁷

Ruled from 2010-14 by the then president Viktor Yanukovich, Ukraine saw sawed between the EU and Russia in search of a better economic deal, ultimately suspending a deal with EU in November 2013,⁷⁸ and instead accepting a generous financial and economic package from Russia a month later. Russia agreed to buy \$15 billion of Ukraine’s debt and reduce the price of gas supplied to Ukraine by one third.⁷⁹ This decision led to mass protests in Kiev, turning into a permanent standoff in the capital’s Independence Square. This essentially civic protest, which became known as the *Euromaidan*, was also joined by nationalist groups that demanded the Ukrainian president’s immediate resignation, which he did and fled.⁸⁰ This led to unrest, particularly in southern and eastern Ukraine from where he had drawn major support. Many pro-Russians and anti-revolution activists started demonstrations in Crimea and other regions having pro-Russian majority. Pro-Russian armed men took control of the Crimean peninsula and the parliament. A referendum was held in Crimea on March 16, 2014 after which Crimea joined Russia on March 18, 2014.⁸¹ The civil war between the pro-Russian elements and the Ukrainian troops continued in the southern and eastern regions of Ukraine called the Donbass region. Elections were held in May 2014, and a new government under President Petro Poroshenko was installed.

⁷⁶ Also Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, and Moldova.

⁷⁷ Trenin, “The Ukraine Crisis” 4.

⁷⁸ Ian Traynor and Oksana Grytsenko, “Ukraine Suspends Talks on EU Trade Pact as Putin Wins Tug of War,” *Guardian*, November 21, 2013, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/21/ukraine-suspends-preparations-eu-trade-pact>.

⁷⁹ “Russia Agrees \$15bn Bailout for Ukraine; Protest Erupts in Kiev,” *Dawn*, December 18, 2013, <http://www.dawn.com/news/1074764>.

⁸⁰ Trenin, “The Ukraine Crisis,” 5.

⁸¹ Chris Morris, “Crimea Referendum: Voters ‘back Russia Union,’” *BBC News*, March 16, 2014, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26606097>.

Two peace agreements were signed in September 2014 and February 2015 respectively between the Ukrainian government and the separatists to end the civil war in the Donbass region. First, the Minsk-I Protocol was signed between representatives of Ukraine, the Russian Federation, the Donetsk People's Republic (DPR), and the Luhansk People's Republic (LPR) to ensure immediate ceasefire. It was brokered by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE),⁸² however, the Minsk-I was unable to control the security situation in Donbass and after continued violations the Minsk Protocol ceasefire collapsed in January 2015. The Minsk-II Protocol was signed between the separatists and Russia which was brokered by Germany and France in February 2015.⁸³ Although minor skirmishes continued for some time, the ceasefire was largely observed with the gradual withdrawal of heavy weaponry from the combat zone. There was a significant decrease in the casualties and ceasefire violations after the Ukrainian government, DPR and the LPR agreed to halt all fighting from September 1, 2015.⁸⁴

Once again peace could not last long and the situation begun to deteriorate in Eastern Ukraine in 2016. It has been reported that there is absence of rule of law in Eastern Ukraine and the civilians have to face arbitrary detentions, torture and human rights abuses at the hands of both Ukrainian and separatist forces. The prolonged crisis and political stalemate has caused sense of despair and isolation among Ukrainians in the conflict zone with an increase in the number conflict-related civilian casualties.⁸⁵ The Normandy meeting held between representatives of Ukraine, France, Germany and Russia at Paris in March 2016 also proved unsuccessful and major disagreements still persist. There has been no significant progress in the meeting over issues such as implementation of the Minsk agreements and holding local elections in Donetsk and Luhansk regions due to security concerns.⁸⁶

⁸² "Ukraine Ceasefire Agreement Signed in Minsk," *CCTV America*, September 5, 2014, <http://www.cctv-america.com/2014/09/05/ukraine-ceasefire-agreement-signed-in-minsk>.

⁸³ "Ukraine Crisis: Leaders Agree Peace Roadmap," *BBC News*, February 12, 2015, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-31435812>.

⁸⁴ "Ukraine and Rebels to Implement Minsk Deal by September 1," *Deutsche Welle*, August 27, 2015, <http://www.dw.com/en/ukraine-and-rebels-to-implement-minsk-deal-by-september-1/a-18676610>.

⁸⁵ Radina Gigova, "Ukraine Crisis: Growing Sense of Despair," *CNN.com*, March 4, 2016, <http://edition.cnn.com/2016/03/03/world/ukraine-un-report/>.

⁸⁶ "'Normandy' Ministers of Foreign Affairs Meet in Paris," *Ukraine Today*, March 3, 2016, <http://uatoday.tv/news/normandy-ministers-of-foreign-affairs-meet-in-paris-603259.html>.

Russia's Role

Russia has remained involved both politically and militarily in the Ukrainian crisis.⁸⁷ In fact, despite the Federation's military involvement in the crisis, the West has been unable to impose heavy sanctions on Russia; and their effect has been moderate.⁸⁸ Russia is intractably set against Ukraine becoming a NATO member or joining the EU alliance, since both will seriously impact Russian interests.⁸⁹ Russia has warned NATO of consequences if Ukraine was allowed to join, thus, ending prospects of Ukrainian NATO membership for the foreseeable future.⁹⁰ At the political level, the Minsk I-II gave leverage to Russia by giving it a 'mediator status' instead of being party to the conflict, without bringing in Crimea and hence giving *de-facto* acceptance to Crimea's annexation.⁹¹

Russian troops without insignia, referred to as the 'little green men' ensured peace and order during the Crimean referendum.⁹² They blockaded the Simferopol international airport and most military bases in Crimea. Their presence in Eastern Ukraine and Crimea highlight Russia's military strength and capability.⁹³

Implications

It is ironic that the EU sanctions imposed on Russia following Crimea's annexation affected European countries whose economy is heavily dependent on Russia.⁹⁴ Alternative pipeline projects had to be proposed such as the Turkish Streamline and South Streamline projects across the Black Sea and Nord Stream-II that runs from Russia to Germany, under the

⁸⁷ "Resurgence of Russia and How to Deal with it," *Info-News*, September 14, 2015, <http://info-news.eu/resurgence-of-russia-and-how-to-deal-with-it/>.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ Ruth Deyermond, "What are Russia's Real Motivations in Ukraine? We Need to Understand Them," *Guardian*, April 27, 2014, <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/apr/27/russia-motivations-ukraine-crisis>.

⁹⁰ Thomas Grove, "Russia: If Ukraine Joins NATO, We 'Will Respond Appropriately,'" *Business Insider*, December 24, 2014, <http://www.businessinsider.com/r-russia-says-nato-pushed-ukraine-to-give-up-neutral-status-2014-12>.

⁹¹ "Resurgence of Russia," *Info-News*.

⁹² "Russia Erecting Monument to 'Little Green Men' Who Took over Crimea," *Moscow Times*, April 26, 2015, <http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/russia-erecting-monument-to-little-green-men-who-took-over-crimea/519768.html>.

⁹³ Renz, "Russia Resurgent?"

⁹⁴ Edward Hunter Christie, "Sanctions after Crimea. Have They Worked?" *NATO Review Magazine*, accessed November, 2015, <http://www.nato.int/docu/Review/2015/Russia/sanctions-after-crimea-have-they-worked/EN/index.htm>.

Baltic Sea and surpasses Ukraine.⁹⁵ Russia also cancelled a gas pipeline agreement with the EU.⁹⁶

For Ukraine, the crisis has led to political unrest. According to the World Bank, the Ukrainian economy shrank by 8 per cent in 2014.⁹⁷ There have been coal shortages because coal was present in separatist controlled regions, apart from oil and gas shortages.⁹⁸

As for Russia, it was ousted out of the G8, and economic sanctions were imposed.⁹⁹ The crisis resulted in devaluation of the ruble which can have far reaching impacts on those whose livelihoods are remittance-based.¹⁰⁰ Russia's economic ties with Europe have also become strained.¹⁰¹ Since NATO's response was lukewarm during the crisis, the Eastern European countries have become concerned about their national security.¹⁰² The Baltic States are concerned about security because of Russian-speaking minorities residing in these states.¹⁰³ A newer development has been Russia's economic cooperation with China.¹⁰⁴ Both have started working on a Siberian pipeline project that would transport gas from Siberia and Russia's Far East to China.¹⁰⁵

⁹⁵ "Russia Wants to Bypass Ukraine, Slovakia with Gas Supplies: Expert", *China.org.cn*, May 20, 2016, http://www.china.org.cn/world/Off_the_Wire/2016-05/20/content_38493309.htm.

⁹⁶ Gabriele Steinhauser, Sean Carney and Emre Peker, "Russia Decision to Drop Pipeline Puts EU in Tough Spot," *Wall Street Journal*, December 2, 2014, <http://www.wsj.com/articles/eu-will-continue-to-focus-on-finding-a-south-stream-solution-1417517402>.

⁹⁷ "World Bank: Ukraine GDP to Shrink 8% This Year," *BBC News*, October 2, 2014, <http://www.bbc.com/news/business-29454965>.

⁹⁸ "Coal Shortages Multiply Ukraine's Misery," *Dawn*, November 30, 2014, <http://www.dawn.com/news/1147786>.

⁹⁹ Alison Smale and Michael D. Shear, "Russia is Ousted from Group of 8 by U.S. and Allies," *New York Times*, March 24, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/25/world/europe/obama-russia-crimea.html?_r=0.

¹⁰⁰ Shaun Walker and Alberto Nardelli, "Russia's Ruble Crisis Poses Threat to Nine Countries Relying on Remittances," *Guardian*, January 18, 2015, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/18/russia-rouble-threat-nine-countries-remittances>.

¹⁰¹ Andrei P. Tsygankov, "Russia-Europe Ties must Get Back on Track," *Moscow Times*, September 9, 2014, <http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/russia-europe-ties-must-get-back-on-track/506734.html>.

¹⁰² Olena Guz, "The Ukrainian Crisis: Consequences for Ukraine and Post-Soviet States," *New East Platform*, January 4, 2015, <http://neweastplatform.org/2015/01/04/the-ukrainian-crisis-consequences-for-ukraine-and-post-soviet-states/>.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Alexander Gabuev, "A 'Soft Alliance'? Russia-China Relations after the Ukraine Crisis" (policy brief, European Council on Foreign Relations, London, 2015), http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR126_-_A_Soft_Alliance_Russia-China_Relations_After_the_Ukraine_Crisis.pdf.

¹⁰⁵ Alexie Lossan, "Why is Russia's Biggest Gas Pipeline being Built on an Uncompetitive Basis?" June 2, 2016, *Russia Beyond The Headlines*,

Conclusion

This study has highlighted that the grounds for Russia's resurgence have been fertile for a while, but Russia needs to compete politically and economically with other powerful states in the international arena. The Ukrainian crisis has strained Russia's ties with the West and Europe, so it needs to work on improving relations with these countries.¹⁰⁶ U.S. domination would continue to challenge Russia's rise, especially if the latter continues to adopt hard power strategies. The Federation needs to use its trade, defence and energy potential to build economic alliances and extra-regional partnerships. For example in South Asia, Russia can strengthen its trade and defence relations with Pakistan. Pakistan is also looking to diversify its foreign policy towards Russia with a decline in its U.S tilt.¹⁰⁷ There is a huge market for Russian products in Pakistan. Both countries can cooperate on issues of mutual interests such as counterterrorism, energy, infrastructure, science and technology.¹⁰⁸

Russian involvement in Ukraine has provided potential lessons to the West that Russia has and will reassert itself and the possibility of a military conflict based on geopolitical interests remains a reality that cannot be ignored. NATO as an organisation will remain powerless unless a unified resolve is achieved among member states to deter Russia's hard power strategies and to provide security to its neighbours.¹⁰⁹ The revival of Russia has global implications but the prospects of a bipolar world are less likely given the changing multipolar dynamics of the international system in the third millennium. ■

https://rbth.com/business/2016/06/02/why-is-russias-biggest-gas-pipeline-being-built-on-an-uncompetitive-basis_599621.

¹⁰⁶ Tsygankov, "Russia-Europe Ties must Get Back on Track."

¹⁰⁷ Nazir Hussain, "Pak-Russia Relations: Lost Opportunities and Future Options," *Journal of Political Studies* 19, no. 1 (2012): 87, http://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/pols/pdf-files/Pak-russia%20relations,%20opportunities%20Nazir_Vol_19_Issue_1_2012.pdf.

¹⁰⁸ Muhammad Nawaz Khan and Beenish Altaf, "Pakistan-Russia Rapprochement and Current Geo-Politics," *IPRI Journal* XIII, no. 1 (2013): 125-134, <http://www.ipripak.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/std4naww13.pdf>.

¹⁰⁹ Michael E. Becker, Matthew S. Cohen, Sidita Kushi and Ian P. McManus, "Reviving the Russian Empire: The Crimean Intervention through a Neoclassical Realist Lens," *European Security* 25, no. 1 (2016): 112-133.