The Complex Dynamics of Pakistan’s Relationship with China

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Pakistan and China have had a warm relationship since the early sixties. Till the nineties, the relationship was “smooth as silk.” Mao wanted to limit the expanding influence of the US and the USSR by creating links with the third world. Neighbouring Pakistan, then the world’s largest Muslim country, became China’s gateway to the Islamic crescent. In addition, it provided a counterweight to India with whom China had fought a successful border war in 1962, and which was now raising six mountain divisions to combat a future Chinese invasion with the help from the US and the UK.

The Sino-Pakistani relationship entered a turbulent phase in the nineties. All bilateral relationships have to contribute to the multilateral relationships that exist between the two countries and the rest of the world. As discussed later in this paper, the emergence of the Taliban in Afghanistan, the intensification of the separatist movement in Kashmir, and significant changes in domestic and foreign priorities in China documented in a recently issued White Paper on National Defense have interjected disequilibrium in the Sino-Pakistani equation. This paper explores whether the bilateral relationship has run its course and whether it may indeed undergo a reversal. It begins with a review of Pakistan’s historical relationship with China, examines changes in China’s priorities and the influence they have had on its relationships with Pakistan, and concludes with a discussion of future scenarios.

Roots of the Sino-Pakistani Relationship

In the early sixties, China became an ally of Pakistan. The Pakistan International Airlines began air service to Beijing long before any airline from the non-communist world, in large measure because China did not have diplomatic ties with several European counties that wanted to initiate air service. Subsequently, China provided significant amounts of economic and military aid to Pakistan, helped set up an indigenous defense production capability, and more recently provided missile and nuclear technology over vociferous US objections. Till fairly recently, China has consistently backed Pakistan on the issue of Kashmir. Chinese maps often show Kashmir as a region that belongs to neither Pakistan nor India.

Unfortunately, Pakistan has often ignored China’s advice, to its own peril. During the 1965 war with India, China’s Prime Minister, Zhou Enlai, advised Pakistan to wage a people’s war against India, after India attacked Lahore in force on the morning of September 6. The Chinese strategy revolved around a deceptively simple folk poem that Mao Zedong wrote during the revolutionary war and that subsequently guided the strategy of the Red Army:

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The enemy advances, we withdraw
The enemy rests, we harass
The enemy tires, we attack
The enemy withdraws, we pursue

As noted by General Musa, Pakistan’s army chief during that period, the Chinese felt that Pakistan’s strategy was too forward, since it was designed to take on a numerically superior enemy right at the border. The Chinese advised Pakistan to fall back, draw the Indian army into Pakistani territory, and once the Indian lines of communication had gotten stretched, then take on the Indian army in force. These military principles had been elucidated by Chairman Mao during the Long March, and validated through successful practice against numerically superior and better-armed foreign and domestic troops. However, they required a high degree of moral courage and popular support among the people.

Unfortunately, Ayub’s political base was no where as strong as Mao’s, and he did not think he could survive the initial loss of Pakistani territory, possibly including the city of Lahore, even if that ultimately led to victory over India. Air Marshal Asghar Khan, who was Pakistan’s air chief just prior to the 1965 war, and who was brought in by Ayub as a special envoy to China, notes in his memoirs that Zhou Enlai offered a generous package of arms to Pakistan, on Pakistan’s requests. Surprisingly, Ayub did not want the arms to come directly from China because that might upset the Americans, notwithstanding the fact that the arms were needed to offset the crippling effects of the American arms embargo on Pakistan. Zhou was concerned that Pakistan would not be able to hold out long enough for the arms to arrive by that prolonged route. He wanted to meet Ayub in person to go over this matter, to determine his resolve to engage in a protracted war with India, and to suggest that the Pakistani Army change its tactics to put the numerically larger Indian Army on the defensive. However, Ayub was reluctant to have Zhou visit him in Pakistan, again because of fear of upsetting the Americans. Even then, the Chinese issued an ultimatum to India to withdraw from portions of its disputed border with China, putting pressure on the Indian forces that were engaged in hostilities with Pakistan. All of this was to no avail, since Pakistan concluded a ceasefire in less than three weeks.

In 1966, China stepped in to fill the void created by the US arms embargo against Pakistan. It supplied large quantities of arms and ammunition, including hundreds of Chinese-produced F-6 (Russian MiG-19SF) fighters, T-59 (Russian T-54/55) tanks, and four-barreled 20 mm anti-aircraft guns. The equipment was not as sophisticated as the American, British, and Soviet equipment in Pakistan’s or India’s inventories. Yet the sheer magnitude of the shipment gave Pakistan a tremendous boost, in a vindication of Lenin’s adage that “quantity has a quality all its own.” Subsequently, by marrying US technology with Chinese hardware, Pakistan was able to get both quality and quantity. The T-59 tank was refitted with the deadly British L7 main gun. Sidewinder air-to-air missiles, western avionics

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2 Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-Tung, Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1967.
and ejection seats were refitted on the F-6s, creating a very potent Mach 1.4 air superiority fighter and ground attack aircraft. This aircraft was only good for 100 hours of flying but the Pakistanis were able to get about 130 hours out of it. It proved its worth in the 1971 war with India, when the Pakistani Air Force scored a three-to-one kill ratio against the Indian Air Force according to data personally recorded by General Chuck Yeager who was then military advisor in Islamabad.

The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) worked closely with the Pakistan Army’s Corps of Engineers to construct an all-weather highway along the ancient Silk Road. Cutting through seemingly impassable mountains, the Karakorum Highway serves as a land bridge between the countries. Having as much symbolic value as economic value, it ignited emotions in India by conjuring up an image of an invasion from the north, à la the invasions of Genghis Khan and his successors in the Middle Ages.

On the diplomatic front, Pakistan brokered China’s opening towards the US in 1971. This new relationship enabled China to block the emerging border threat from an increasingly belligerent USSR. Pakistan worked assiduously with the US and countries in the Muslim world to get China a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. In February of 1971, with great foresight, China advised Pakistan’s military government led by General Yahya to seek a political settlement with the political leaders of East Pakistan. Yahya and his junta ignored this advice, and launched Operation Searchlight against the Mukti Bahini fighters who were seeking to create an independent state of Bangladesh. With less than 45,000 troops under his command, Lieutenant General Niazi of Pakistan’s Eastern Command had no chance of quelling the rebellion which quickly spread like a Maoan “prairie fire” and engulfed the 75 million citizens of East Pakistan. The resulting hostilities escalated out of control, plunging East Pakistan into a bloody civil war that resulted in massive waves of refugees pouring into the Indian state of Bengal. Pakistan’s attempt to save East Pakistan by opening a second front along the western border with India gave India the long-awaited opportunity to invade East Pakistan in December. Faced with a force that was five times bigger than his tired and beleaguered garrison, and completely cut off from his base in West Pakistan, General Niazi surrendered half of Pakistan to General Arora of the Indian Army.

In the aftermath of this war, India emerged as the dominant power in the South Asian subcontinent. To offset this dominance, China provided more military hardware to Pakistan, and helped set up a domestic arms industry comprised of several factories to build tanks and warplanes. The new hardware included fast moving Shanghai-class naval attack craft. Pakistan equipped these boats with anti-ship missiles, to match the firepower of India’s Soviet-supplied Osa boats that had successfully attacked fuel tanks in the Karachi harbor with Styx missiles. It also included several hundred T-59 tanks and A-5 ground-attack aircraft that Pakistan upgraded with western avionics and ejection seat. In 1972, with Chinese assistance, an F-6 Rebuild Factory was established to avoid sending large numbers of these aircraft to China for overhaul. This factory has since grown into the impressive Pakistan Aeronautical Complex. Since completing its first aircraft in 1982, the plant

9 In recognition of the strategic importance of this accomplishment, Pakistan invested Major-General J.A. Faruqi, head of the Pakistani corps of engineers, with one of its highest awards, the Sitara-e-Pakistan.
has overhauled 265 F-6s, 112 A-5s ground-attack aircraft and 55 F-7s (Soviet MiG 21 derivative) air superiority fighters. Each aircraft is completely rebuilt at the end of 800 flight hours, or roughly eight years of service. The F-7 overhaul takes around 30 weeks; Chinese wiring is replaced with Raychem wiring for better insulation, and all rubber seals are also replaced.\(^{(11)}\)

India’s nuclear explosion in 1974 caused China to accelerate its nuclear, missile, and space programmes to ensure its pre-eminence in the Asia-Pacific region by “restraining Japan and containing India”. China’s assistance to the nuclear and missile programmes of North Korea and Pakistan has been largely motivated by the need to counteract its Asian strategic rivals. According to an Indian analyst, “Beijing has long used Pakistan – dubbed as ‘China’s Israel’ by PLA generals, to contain India’s growing power and repeatedly broken its promises to halt clandestine strategic transfers to Pakistan in violation of NPT Article I obligations. Even the repeated imposition of sanctions did not deter China from working long and hard to transform the China-India nuclear equation of the 1960s into an India-Pakistan nuclear standoff in the 1990s. To take the heat off its proliferation activities, Beijing has encouraged its military allies, Islamabad and Pyongyang, to establish closer nuclear and missile cooperation links since the early 1990s, following Sun Tzu’s advice of ‘subduing the enemy without fighting.’ Such a strategy not only obviates the need for China to pose a direct threat to Japan or India but also allows Beijing to wield its prestige as a disinterested global nuclear power while playing the role of a regional arbiter.”\(^{(12)}\)

When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979, China joined Pakistan in calling for a Soviet withdrawal. It provided arms and ammunition to fight the Soviets and worked actively with Pakistan to create a viable government after the Soviet retreat.\(^{(13)}\) It “fully supported the Pakistani positions on an interim government and symmetry during the Geneva negotiation process and worked closely with Pakistan to provide assistance to Afghan refugees.”\(^{(14)}\) It continued to support Pakistan in its conflict with India over Kashmir, since that conflict pins down the vast majority of India’s armed forces along the border with Pakistan. The Pakistan Air Force was supplied with 160 F-7P, the last of which was delivered in 1992.\(^{(15)}\) To redress this aircraft’s well-known shortcoming as an interceptor, Pakistan has installed uprated Marconi Super Skyranger pulse-Doppler radar.

The most significant military development occurred in 1992 when China supplied Pakistan with 34 M-11 battlefield missiles, a solid-fuel variant of the Soviet Scud-B missile. The trigger for providing these missiles may have been the US decision to supply 150 F-16 war planes to Taiwan over China’s vociferous objections. Subsequently, evidence turned up that China might have helped construct a factory for making these missiles. According to one US account, “For five years the CIA had been carefully tracking the flow of Chinese M-11 missile components into Pakistan. Then at the end of 1995 came a stunning discovery. Agency satellites spotted a curious-looking facility under construction near the


northern Pakistani town of Rawalpindi, just 10 miles from the capital of Islamabad. It had long, narrow buildings with doorways large enough to roll out a rocket the size of the 30-ft. M-11, as well as a test stand nearby, where the solid-fuel engine could be mounted and fired up. The agency concluded that not only was China selling missiles, but it was also helping Pakistan build a factory to manufacture them. For the CIA, uncovering the plant represented ‘a first-class piece of spying,’ says a senior agency official.”

China’s Changed Domestic Priorities

China has recently issued a *White Paper on China’s National Defense in 2000*. This paper has been given extensive publicity in China, where it has been published as an insert in several newsmagazines, including the October 23 issue of the highly respected *Beijing Review*. In addition, to give it a global readership, it has been posted on China’s official web site. As is to be expected, the paper devotes a great deal of space to discussing three issues that are of great concern to China’s defense managers: the long-standing dispute with Taiwan; the US doctrine of Theatre Missile Defense; and relations with neighboring states.

However, what is of greater significance than the articulation of these issues is the statement in the paper that defense is subordinate to economic development. This has several implications for China’s historically close relationship with Pakistan, as discussed later.

The *White Paper* describes China’s bold experiment with free enterprise economics that was begun by Deng Xiaopeng. Deng sought to pull China out of economic stagnation by introducing market competition within the framework of socialist ideology. The slogan “To get rich is glorious” replaced the slogan that “The East is Red” with which Mao had heralded the arrival of communism in China at the Tianamen gate of the Forbidden City, overlooking Tianamen Square on October 1, 1949. Deng pointed out that 55 million offshore Chinese constituted the world’s sixth richest economy, and asked his colleagues in the Chinese Communist Party to imagine what 1.1 billion mainlanders could do on the mainland if given the right market-based incentives. Open markets were created for agricultural produce and market-based pricing was introduced in the agricultural sector. China began to accept loans from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Four economic zones were created to attract foreign capital to China.

After Deng’s death in 1997, the economic modernization program continued to forge ahead under Jiang Zemin’s leadership. Jiang moved to privatize money-losing government owned corporations which still employed the majority of Chinese workers, and showed no signs of holding back what is by all measures “one of modern history’s most daring and heroic economic and social adventures.” Since the experiment began 20 years ago, China’s GDP has been steadily climbing at a rate of 10 percent a year, although the growth rate has fallen by two to three percentage points in recent years. Per capita annual income for city dwellers has almost doubled since 1990 to more than $600. During the Asian-Pacific financial

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20 Margolis, op cit.
crisis of 1997, the Chinese economy did remarkably well and was even able to offer financial support to the increasingly wobbly Russian economy which had been shrinking annually at 7% a year. Some analysts expect China to become the world’s biggest economy by the year 2020, indicating that Deng’s legacy will remain intact into the twenty-first century.\(^\text{22}\) He has accomplished what Mao had only envisioned: a true \textit{Great Leap Forward}.

Deng recognized that without a strong economy, China could not become a great power. He said that China “must grow wealthy and strong,” taking a line from Japan’s Meiji modernizers in the late nineteenth century.\(^\text{23}\) Once China had attained economic strength, it would be in a position to begin developing military capability commensurate with its new status as a great power. It would have to de-emphasize defense spending in the near term in order to become a stronger power. Notes a US assessment, “China’s grand strategy aims for comprehensively developing national power so that Beijing can achieve its long-term national goals. This grand strategy, which Beijing defines as “national development strategy,” has been reaffirmed by the post-Deng collective leadership.

This development strategy is based on an assumption that economic power is the most important and most essential factor in comprehensive national power in an era when “peace and development” are the primary international trends and world war can be avoided. In this context, Beijing places top priority on efforts to promote rapid and sustained economic growth, to raise technological levels in sciences and industry, to explore and develop China’s land-and sea-based national resources, and to secure China’s access to global resources.”\(^\text{24}\)

Consistent with this vision, the \textit{White Paper} states clearly that national defense is subordinate to the nation’s overall goal of economic construction. It says that “developing the economy and strengthening national defense are two strategic tasks in China’s modernization efforts. The Chinese government insists that economic development be taken as the center, while defense work be subordinated to it in the service of the nation’s overall economic construction.” By making economic security the centerpiece of its national agenda, the communist leadership in China hopes to avoid the fate of its Soviet comrades where political liberalization preceded economic liberalization. The USSR collapsed under the weight of its military spending, as it sought to attain military parity with the US, whose economy was six times bigger.

The \textit{White Paper} calls for implementing a military strategy of active defense that seeks to “gain mastery only after the enemy has struck. Such defense combines efforts to deter war with preparations to win self-defense wars in time of peace, and strategic defense with operational and tactical offensive operations in time of war.”

It supports the development of a “lean and strong military force” in the Chinese way. This involves two elements. First, by managing the armed forces according to law, and by transforming “its armed forces from a numerically superior to a qualitatively superior type, and from a manpower-intensive to a technology-intensive type,” it hopes to comprehensively enhance the armed forces’ combat effectiveness. Second, by “combining the armed forces with the people and practicing self-defense by the whole people, China adheres to the concept of


\(^{23}\) Margolis, op cit.


people’s war under modern conditions, and exercises the combination of a streamlined standing army with a powerful reserve force for national defense.”

Compared to many other countries, China’s defense expenditure has remained at a fairly low level. Currently, the share of the national budget going to defense is around 8%, down by one percentage point from five years ago. Total defense spending in 2000 is $14.6 billion, which is only 5% of the defense spending of the United States, and 30% of Japan’s defense spending. As a percentage of GDP, Chinese defense spending is 1.31%, compared with 3% of the US and 2.7% for India. To place these numbers in perspective, it is useful to note that Pakistan is spending anywhere from 25-50% of its national budget on defense, and this represents at least 6% of its GDP. Most defense economists regard 3% of GDP the upper limit on defense spending for developing countries. China has introduced market competition in its defense industries by the creation of ten corporations. In addition, a major program of “downsizing and restructuring” is underway in the armed forces. “In September 1997, China announced an additional reduction of 500,000 troops over the next three years. By the end of 1999, this reduction had been achieved, and the adjustment and reform of the structure and organization of the armed forces had been basically completed.” Several corps headquarters, divisions and regiments have been deactivated. The command structure is now leaner, more agile and efficient. Increased emphasis is being placed on the newly emerging field of information warfare. Additionally, to give them a sharper focus, the armed forces are being pulled out from commercial activities. Over 290 business management bodies have been either completely dismantled or turned over to local governments.

China’s New Foreign Policy

To ensure the success of its military downsizing programmes, China has made complementary changes in its foreign policy. Close economic and political ties have been developed with the bordering Central Asia states. International trade in energy, chemicals and consumer goods is flowing freely across these boundaries. As noted by Ahmed Rashid, in the future these ties could become even more important than China’s ties with the traditional Muslim world. An 800-mile long railway line has been built from the capital of Xinjiang. China is setting up factories in Kazakhstan and has signed several agreements with Uzbekistan. In 1992, it signed a ten-year agreement on economic cooperation with Russia. China has even resolved through diplomacy the single most dangerous territorial question, the dispute with Russia over the disputed border along the Amur and Usuri Rivers, which had almost led to full-scale war between China and the Soviet Union in the sixties. Russia has once again become China’s arms supplier. China bought approximately $8 billion in sophisticated Russian weapons between 1991 and 1999. These sales included 72 SU-27 fighters (akin to US F-15s), with a license to produce 200 more under the Chinese designation of J-11; 4 Kilo-class submarines; 2 Sovremennyi-class guided missile destroyers; 50 T-72 tanks; and 70

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25 There is considerable debate about China’s defense spending, as noted by Michael O’Hanlon, _How to be a Cheap Hawk_, Brookings, 1998. The International Institute of Strategic Studies estimates a spending estimate of $ 35 billion, the US estimates $70 billion and the RAND Corporation estimates $ 150 billion. The US estimate works out to 2.3% of GDP, roughly the worldwide median.


27 Margolis, op cit.
armored personnel carriers. More recently, after four years of negotiation, Moscow and Beijing have concluded a deal for 60 top-of-the line SU-30 fighters.\textsuperscript{28}

The \textit{White Paper} cites several agreements to implement confidence-building measures that have been inked with Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan since the first meeting in Shanghai in April 1996. In particular, it notes the importance of reducing military forces near the borders of the five parties and of not using force, or threatening to use force, against each other. Most notably, the \textit{White Paper} states that the five countries are united in their resolve to not use “the excuse of protecting ethnic or religious interests” to interfere in each other’s internal affairs. It also expresses their combined opposition to “national separatism, religious extremism or terrorism” and other activities that induce social instability. China is pursuing these policies since it is quite vulnerable on its western and northern borders. Ethnic minorities inhabit these areas, many of them Muslim, and these areas are generally the most impoverished in the nation. After the independence of five independent states in Muslim Central Asia in the early 1990s, many Uighur Muslims in Xinjiang Province harbor their own aspirations for independence.\textsuperscript{29} China is very concerned about threats to its territorial integrity. Separatist pressures are being felt all around China’s periphery, including the prosperous southeastern region around Shanghai. The rulers in Beijing are well aware that such movements at the periphery have caused the downfall of dynasties in Chinese history.

Chinese relations with the United States have still not recovered fully from the accidental US bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade during the war over Kosovo. The anniversary of the Korean War was recently observed in China with open criticism of the “US aggressors,” terminology that had not been used since the Vietnam War. In addition, China continues to be deeply troubled by US political, military and economic support for Taiwan. Finally, the US efforts to develop a theater missile defense in concert with Japan have caused great apprehension in China.

On first glance, China’s rapprochement with Russia and its confrontation with the US appears to be a reversal of Chinese policies during the seventies and eighties when it viewed the USSR as its primary security threat, and welcomed US President Nixon to the Great Hall of the People in order to neutralize the Soviet threat to its borders. However, there is an underlying consistency in Chinese foreign policy. It is concerned about the very one-sided global balance of power in which the US dominates all other countries culturally, politically, economically and militarily. The French foreign minister, equally troubled by this development, has called the US an unprecedented “hyper power” that dominates the globe in multiple dimensions: military, economics, politics, and culture. In seeking to create a multipolar world, China wants to restore harmony in global politics. It does not matter if that means reversing the relationship with Russia and the US, since the new alignment now better serves its national interests. This phenomenon is by no means unique to modern China, and resonates with an adage from imperial Britain: “we have no perpetual friends or eternal allies; but we do have interests, both perpetual and eternal.”

To achieve its objectives, China is prepared to be patient. It has rarely underestimated the capabilities of its foes, and will not fight a war under adverse circumstances. This thinking is deeply ingrained in Chinese culture, and dates back


at least 25 centuries to the time when Sun Tzu penned *The Art of War*. Thus, even after half a century of political conflict, not a single shot has been fired over the Taiwan Straits, even though China remains committed to reunification of Taiwan with the mainland. By choreographing its intent to use force should Taiwan declare independence from China, it has now brought matters to a point where the leaders of Taiwan’s Nationalist Party are preparing to visit Beijing to work out a negotiated solution. It has deep rooted differences with Japan, most notably over the Japanese failure to apologize for their war crimes during the Sino-Japanese war that began in 1931 with the invasion of Manchuria and culminated in 1937 with the Rape of Nanjing when 300,000 Chinese were raped, tortured, and put to the sword. It continues to pursue diplomatic channels to gain ownership of several islands that are disputed between the two countries. However, it has no intentions to resort to war with Japan. Indeed, it continues to engage in international trade with Japan, and to accept Japanese economic aid.

**Parallel Developments in Russia**

It is important to note that Russia has also announced its decision to shrink its military forces. Current plans call for a reduction of 600,000 troops over the next five years, from a base of between four and five million troops. About one-fourth of the Russian national budget goes to defense. Yet the Russian armed forces are poorly equipped and trained. Many soldiers are underpaid or not paid at all, and morale is at an all-time low. It is no surprise that Russia lost its first war in Chechnya a few years ago, and has prevailed thus far in the current conflict by using firepower indiscriminately against Chechen fighters and civilians. As the *New York Times* stated in a recent editorial, “Russia can no longer afford to sustain the imperial-size forces it inherited from the Soviet Union. Conversion to a smaller, better-equipped force will allow more effective defense against any foreign threats and would decrease the risk to democracy from restive, underpaid military officers.” While downsizing its forces in aggregate terms, Russia plans to triple spending per soldier over the next decade. This will produce a force strong enough to repel any external threats that may develop along Russia’s frontiers in the Caucasus, Central Asia, or Siberia.

Cost cutting is not confined to conventional arms. Russia also wants to drastically curtail the number of its nuclear warheads, and has invited the United States to follow suit. President Putin wants to draw down the nuclear warheads inventories in the two countries to 1,000 weapons each. According to Aleksei G. Arbatov, a member of the Russian Parliament’s defense committee, “Nuclear weapons are virtual weapons, designed and deployed never to be used. [They provide] the best area to seek economy while using our available resources for peacekeeping, or for countering ethnic or religious extremists and the destabilization which follows them.”

**Disequilibrium Enters the Sino-Pakistani Relationship**

While it devotes considerable space to condemning religious extremism, the *White Paper* makes only a passing reference to South Asia as an area of

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instability along its borders. And it makes no mention of the right of the people of Kashmir to self-determination. This is a major change in Chinese policy towards Pakistan. Over the past decade, several signs have emerged that the China-Pakistan relationship has begun to cool-off. Three factors appear to be at work. First, under Deng Xiaoping, China gave priority to economic development over defense, and began a massive downsizing of its military. This required China to undertake complementary changes in its foreign policy. This program got a boost with the demise of the USSR, China’s major security concern.

At the same time, the departure of the USSR from Afghanistan spurred the rise of the Taliban. Originally a group of students from religious seminaries in southeastern Afghanistan, the Taliban follow a very primitive and rigid interpretation of Sunni Islam that is at odds with the more liberal interpretations followed by the people of Pakistan. They also clash with the beliefs of the Shia sect that has numerous followers in Pakistan. The rights of women are severely impinged upon. For example, they are not allowed to leave their homes to study or work or to choose their own husbands. Men who do not keep beards can be subjected to punishment, even though the keeping of beards, while highly recommended as a tradition of the Holy Prophet Muhammad, is not an obligation in Islam. Because of such practices, many Islamic scholars have called into question the validity of their beliefs. It is unlikely that their approach to Islam would find favour in much of Pakistan, since it is even more primitive than the approach being followed in Pakistan’s support of the Taliban and these are not likely to change anytime soon.

On the defensive side, there are two primary factors. First is Pakistan’s desire to create strategic depth in its territorial boundaries. Geographically, it has a narrow trunk all the way through. It is concerned that India can easily cut it into two pieces if it strikes south of the Punjab network of irrigation canals. Thus, to create strategic depth, it needs Afghanistan or Iran as a buffer zone into which its forces might conduct a strategic retreat. There is evidence that during the Shah’s period, Pakistani warplanes used airfields in Iran to stay out of range of Indian warplanes. Since Pakistan helped the Afghans defeat the Soviets, it has a much higher probability of being able to use Afghanistan as a buffer zone than Iran which is ruled by a Shia-theocracy.

Second, it is painfully aware that prior to the Soviet invasion in 1979, Afghanistan was heavily pro-Indian in its foreign policies. Previous Afghan governments were often questioning the legitimacy of the boundary line between the two countries. Known as the Durand line, this was drawn by Britain during the Raj and regarded by the Afghans as an artifact since ethnic Pushtoons lived on both sides of the line. However, the Pakistani position was that this constituted an international frontier going back to the original agreement in 1893 that was confirmed in 1905 and reaffirmed in the Anglo-Afghan Treaty in 1919. Pakistani governments till Bhutto’s period lived under the spectre of an independent Pushtoonistan being created out of Pakistan’s Frontier province and adjacent elements of eastern Afghanistan. There was also a very real fear that in a war with India, Afghanistan would open a second front against Pakistan.

35 Interview with Dr. Khalid Siddiqi, director, Islamic Education and Information Center, San Jose, California.
38 Ayub Khan, op cit.
On the offensive side, Kashmir remains beyond Pakistan’s reach, even after fifty years of military conflict with India. India has overwhelming military superiority over Pakistan, and attempts by Pakistan in 1947 and 1965 to wage a guerilla war in Indian-administered Kashmir have fizzled out primarily because the “raiders” that have been sent in from the Pakistani side have been poorly trained and failed to inspire an uprising among the local population. The battle-hardy fighters of the Taliban provide a new ray of hope to hawks in the Pakistani military. They are believed to have waged a successful jihad against the much larger and much better equipped forces of the heathen Soviet empire.

Allegedly with approval from Pakistan, the Taliban have joined forces with the freedom fighters in Kashmir to wage a jihad against similarly large and heathen Indian forces. Even though China had long supported the right of the Kashmiri people to self-determination, it is now in a bind. The Taliban forces have also begun to make their presence felt in western China. The first significant disturbances in 1992 in the Xinjiang province predated the arrival of the Taliban. Chinese authorities said the rioters, made up of Uighurs and Kyrgyz, had acquired arms, ammunition, and training from the Afghan Muhajideen. Scores of rioters were arrested and several were executed. The Chinese took the events very seriously, since they threatened to unleash centrifugal forces in the border provinces that would become the proverbial “single spark that can start a prairie fire.” Xinjiang is now regarded as more critical to preserving the overall unity of the Middle Kingdom than Tibet where Han Chinese are now in a majority, and their presence has eliminated most residual resistance. The Karakorum Highway into Pakistan was closed. Yet new disturbances occurred in 1997, this time associated with elements connected with the Taliban. China cautioned Pakistan and asked to exercise her influence on Taliban to desist from such activities.

In many ways, this caution was no different than President Ayub’s resistance to alleged Chinese efforts in the sixties to preach communism in Pakistan. While maintaining close military ties with China, Ayub did not allow Maoist elements to gain a foothold within Pakistan. In later years, Ayub’s foreign minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto fell out with Ayub and created his own political party. He espoused an ideology called Islamic Socialism that was couched in Maoist rhetoric, and reinforced the symbolism by sporting a Mao cap at his mass rallies. However, Maoist thinking failed to take deep root in Pakistan since most Muslims regarded Islamic Socialism as an oxymoron. Furthermore, feudal lords whose credibility as socialists was never well established dominated Bhutto’s party.

In its opposition to extremist Muslim forces that are bent on creating independent Muslim states within its boundaries, China has found a common ally in Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. These five countries signed an agreement in Shahghai in 1996 and have met annually to affirm and expand their commitment to anti-terrorist activities. China knows that the extremist forces are using guerilla war tactics, and seeking to obtain maximum leverage by engaging in asymmetric warfare, a technology that it feels it had perfected during Mao’s Long March. Consequently, when Pakistani forces attacked Indian bases in Kargil in 1999, China did not support Pakistan for fear of encouraging the Taliban.

40 Mao Zedong, op cit.
Second, China initiated a dialogue with India, recognizing its great power aspirations, its increasing ability to project military power, and its emergence as a global center of information technology. The thaw in relations began with Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to Beijing in 1988. As noted by a leading Pakistani diplomat, “the event was symbolized by Deng Xiaoping’s marathon handshake with his Indian guest.” According to a recent Chinese scholar, China regards India as a “great neighbour” and “is indeed concerned about the dispute between India and Pakistan, because pursuing a stable periphery is one of the most important goals of China’s foreign policy. But China does not maintain a position on the dispute itself.” As far back as 1990, China had conveyed to Pakistan that the dispute was one “left over from history,” a polite way of saying it was not taking sides. There has been a big change in China’s long-standing policy on the Kashmir dispute, under which China supported the right of the people of Kashmir to self-determination. During the 1965 war, the Chinese foreign minister, Marshal Chen Yi, had referred to Pakistanis who were fighting for the freedom of Kashmir as China’s “comrade in arms.”

China knows the limitations of its military forces. While large in numbers, they “remain obsolescent, immobile, and without the precision arms and instant communications that make modern fighting forces increasingly lethal.” According to one analyst, they are “an unwieldy monster totally unsuited to the demands of fluid battles of today and in the future.” The last time they were engaged in active operations was in 1979 against Vietnam, an embarrassing campaign that resulted in heavy casualties for the PLA. The US government states that “The vast majority of the [Chinese] fighter fleet is composed of technologically obsolete airframes: about 2,900 are 1950s vintage F-5s and F-6s, with a further 1,000 composed of 1960-70s vintage F-7s. A sizeable—although unknown—percentage of these aircraft are not combat capable. China apparently has no confirmed capability to utilize precision-guided munitions (PGMs).”

The Chinese have also been deeply influenced by the use of sophisticated air power and precision guided munitions in the Gulf War and especially the Kosovo campaign. They feel vulnerable and ill prepared to fight a future war against any hi-tech opposition. This explains their emphasis on force modernization. The program includes “the revamping of force structure, the introduction of joint war-fighting techniques, and the purchase of weapon systems from the West and Russia, to enhance the power-projection capabilities, maneuverability, and lethality of its forces.” They have a long way to go and are not likely to become a potent threat either for the regional or extra regional powers in the short term. Even though the

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46 Iqbal Akhund, op cit.
47 Iqbal Akhund, op cit.
48 Margolis, op cit.
49 Salma Malik, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, June 17, 2000 (Posted on www.stimson.org/cbm/saif/saif.htm).
PLA ground forces are capable of threatening India’s northern and eastern borders, the PLA Air Force is no match for the Indian Air Force. The Indian-made Agni II missile, while it may not have been weaponized at this stage, appears to be superior to Chinese missiles in terms of accuracy, reliability, speed of launch, and mobility, and most of China is now within Indian range. China’s future leadership may be tempted, as Mao was in 1962, to “teach a lesson” to India. However, the Indians have made it plain that they will not be routed a second time, and intend to return any Chinese “lesson” in kind.\textsuperscript{52}

Nevertheless, Sino-Indian relations in the near to medium term are likely to display rapprochement and strategic accommodation for each other’s interests.\textsuperscript{53} The Line of Actual Control (LAC) between the two countries created after the 1962 war has become a progressively “cold” border, and has been formalized further in the Peace and Tranquility Agreement signed by the two countries in 1993. The two countries have agreed to maintain the LAC as the de facto international border pending its jurisdictional settlement. The foreign ministers of the two countries have exchanged visits and initiated a security dialogue.\textsuperscript{54} This has been followed by a high profile visit to China by the president of India. Notably, China joined the US in condemning not only India but also Pakistan for conducting the tit-for-tat tests. The Indian tests had been preceded by a statement by the foreign minister of India that China was India’s number one enemy. This statement was later qualified as being his personal statement and not that of the Government of India.

Third, China is engaged in a very delicate balancing act with the US. On the one hand, it opposes the emergence of the US as the world’s only super power, and is very concerned about US support to Taiwan. Yet, for its continued economic development, it needs the US as a trading partner.\textsuperscript{55} US support was critical to gaining entry into the WTO. Thus, to avoid US sanctions, China has yielded to US pressure and declared that it is not providing missile technology to Pakistan. This may be because the missile deals with Pakistan have become less lucrative as Pakistan’s program has become more developed, and China can stand to gain more revenue by launching American satellites into space atop Chinese rockets. According to a British expert, Simon Henderson, Pakistan’s strategic need to be able to hit all of India is better served by the Nodong MRBM missile technology that it has acquired from North Korea than by China’s SRBM M-11 missiles.\textsuperscript{56}

Scenarios of the Future

Any bilateral relationship has to fit into and reinforce the network of multilateral relationships that each of the two countries has with other countries, or it ceases to exist. In the sixties, Pakistan and China shared a common enemy in India. And China wanted to get closer to the Muslim world, a role that Pakistan helped facilitate. This set of common interests allowed Pakistan to develop close ties simultaneously with China and the US, even though the latter two countries were adversaries. Pakistan also served as a conduit for western technology to flow into China, particular military technology related to avionics, radar systems, and

\textsuperscript{52} Margolis, op cit.
sidewinder missiles. More recently, it is believed to have provided technology related to aerial missiles. This factor has diminished in importance as China has now obtained substantial access to western technology on its own, with 400 of the world’s top 500 multinational corporations now operating in China.

Furthermore, because of the changes in its foreign policy, China is now anxious to have stability along its borders, and the Pakistani-Indian conflict seriously detracts from that goal. China is also concerned about the influence of the Taliban in fomenting separatist movements in Xinjiang. Pakistan’s close ties with the Taliban can have a much more damaging impact on its relations with China, unlike its close ties with the US in the sixties.

In the future, the China-Pakistan relationship is likely to cool off further if Pakistan continues to support the Taliban. China will come down hard on Pakistan, but how hard depends on how tenuous is the situation in its troubled border regions including Xinjiang and Tibet. It knows that India is geared up to foment separatist movements in Tibet if China openly supports the Kashmiri movement. It is likely that Pakistan’s China ties will continue to cool off till they reach such a low point that Pakistan realizes the true costs of its patronage of the Taliban is unacceptable, and stops the patronage. Of course, it is also possible that global pressures on the Taliban to change their policies may diminish the power of the Taliban both within and outside Afghanistan, thereby eliminating this serious irritant from the Sino-Pakistani equation.

There is a much higher possibility that Chinese-US relations will continue to worsen, possibly because of continued US support to Taiwan, and the US desire to establish a Theatre Missile Defense in concert with Japan. China may then choose to play the “Pakistan card” to further infuriate the US. Pakistan would then become the beneficiary of additional nuclear and missile technology. Additionally, if an increasingly cocky India, equipped with aircraft carriers and blue water submarines, begins to militarily threaten China, China may begin arming Pakistan with strategic weapons.

There are signs that Pakistan is ignoring subtle signals that have been emanating from China for almost a decade now. Or it may be misreading them. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that Pakistan’s relationship with China will undergo a reversal. Pakistan is likely to remain China’s ally in most scenarios, especially after the development of its nuclear capability. However, it cannot take China for granted. The drivers that originally drove the Sino-Pakistani relationship have shifted, since today’s China wants to see stability both along its borders and inside these borders.

**Recent Developments in the Sino-Pakistani Relationship**

China remains committed to seeing stability along all its borders, to ensure the success of its long-term plans of economic development. It has been instrumental in creating the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which includes six member states comprising Uzbekistan and the five original members of the Shanghai Five partnership that was formed in 1996. The SCO member states

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57 As noted by Ehsan Ahrari, op cit., “the Taliban syndrome is likely to threaten Pakistan’s strategic interests and domestic stability.” It has disturbed relations not only with China but Shiite Iran, since the Taliban are seeking to promote a puritanical form of Sunni Islam. It has also injected violence into Pakistani circles, as the Taliban and their allies in Pakistan have begun to pursue a militant Sunni agenda inside Pakistan.

cover three-fifths of the Eurasian continent and comprise a quarter of the world’s population. While reiterating their commitment to battling terrorism, separatism, and extremism, the SCO member states have expanded their agenda to include economic cooperation, trade and foreign affairs. In the realm of foreign policy, they are united on the need to create a multi-polar world, to oppose the US National Missile Defense (NMD) programme, and to support the continuation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense (ABM) Treaty, which the Bush administration seems anxious to scuttle. They have reiterated their resolve to settle international disputes in peaceful ways without using force or threatening to use force. Pakistan has expressed interest in joining the SCO, because it shares many of the world views with SCO, and would like access to the markets of the Central Asian republics. However, it has to first change a strong negative perception widely shared among the SCO members that it is letting extremist elements operate from its soil, and that it is the real force behind the Taliban.

Chinese trade with India continues to grow. Indian foreign minister Jaswant Singh’s visit to Beijing in June 1999 has helped diffuse Sino-Indian tensions that were created by the Pokhran explosions of May 1998. Tensions have also dissipated with the Tehalka scandal-induced departure of Defense Minister George Fernandes from the political scene in Indian, since he had specifically cited the Chinese threat as the driving force behind the Indian nuclear tests. Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan has paid a return visit to India in July 2000, representing a continuation of high-level visits between the two countries. Most recently, the Chief of the Indian Air Force has visited China, representing a significant milestone in the military exchanges between the two countries. The IAF chief’s visit was aimed at promoting stability in the Sino-Indian relationship, avoiding strategic misunderstandings that could lead to a conflict, and preventing a crisis from emerging in the first place.59

China has censured India for eagerly embracing the US NMD programme, but also stated that it will not let this factor get in the way of improving Sino-Indian ties.60 This approach is analogous to the well-known Chinese position about Pakistan’s membership of the US-sponsored SEATO pact in the fifties and sixties. China censured Pakistan for belonging to SEATO, since that pact was aimed at containing Chinese communism in south-east Asia, but did not let this source of friction get in the way of improving Sino-Pakistan ties.

Even though China is continuing to improve its relationship with India, Chinese military cooperation with Pakistan continues at a rapid pace. Chinese Defense Minister General Chi Haotian visited Islamabad in February 1999, and his visit was reciprocated by General Pervaiz Musharraf’s visit to Beijing in May 1999, in his capacity as Chief of the Army Staff. Musharraf spoke of the growing state-to-state and military-to-military contacts between the two countries, and of how the friendly ties between Pakistan and China were serving the cause of peace and security in the region. The Washington Times reported in February 2001 that a CIA analysis has concluded Beijing continues to send “substantial” assistance to Pakistan for its ballistic missile programme, and US experts say they cannot rule out Chinese aid for Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme.

The China-US-Taiwan standoff is likely to continue for the indefinite future, and may well bring China closer to Pakistan. In the aftermath of the spy

plane incident on April 1, 2001—involving a collision between a US EP-3E Aries plane and a Chinese F-8 fighter over the South China Sea—the US has made a major commitment to supplying Taiwan with modern military equipment. This will have the indirect effect of boosting Chinese military cooperation with Pakistan.

Senior Chinese Parliamentarian Li Peng visited Islamabad in April 1999, and talked once again of the need to shelve long-standing disputes. He cited new trends in the region of settling mutual issues through dialogue and discussion. China was not pleased by the Kargil campaign in May 1999, which it saw as being contrary to these regional trends. To soothe the irritations between the two countries, and explore new avenues for growth, veteran Pakistani diplomat Agha Shahi visited Beijing in July 2000. During his visit to two Chinese think tanks in Shanghai and Beijing, he spoke of the global and regional disequilibrium that had been created by the emergence of a unipolar power structure centered on the United States. He also spoke of the dangers posed by the paradigm shift in US policy toward South Asia. His Chinese counterparts shared his concerns. However, on the issue of India-Pakistan confrontation, they advised Pakistan to settle the dispute through dialogue and discussion. They reassured Pakistan that Chinese policy towards India was not aimed against Pakistan. China did not want to pursue a policy of confrontation with India, because it would only push India closer to the US.

Premier Zhu visited Pakistan in May 2001 on the first leg of a multi-nation tour. Zhu laid out a four-point agenda for further development of Sino-Pakistani ties, involving (1) agricultural cooperation, (2) infrastructure development, (3) economic cooperation and trade in new areas such as broadband networking and software development, and (4) exploration of new ways of cooperation involving joint ventures and leasing.61 Both countries agreed that there is substantial potential for expanding bilateral trade, which now stands at $1 billion. One of the major agreements signed during Zhu’s visit was related to the development of a major deep-sea port at Gwadar, located at the mouth of the Gulf of Oman.

There might well be a military dimension to this deal, which on paper appears to be a commercial venture. Pakistan has apparently granted docking permission to Chinese naval vessels, giving China a permanent naval presence in the Indian Ocean.62 This will allow Beijing to exert influence along some of the world’s busiest shipping lanes flowing into and out of the Persian Gulf. It is expected that China will help Pakistan develop the Makran Coastal Highway, linking Gwadar with Karachi, and develop another highway from Ratodero to Khuzdar, that will link up with the Indus Highway and then to the Karakorum Highway that continues to the Chinese border with Pakistan. These improvements in Pakistan’s physical infrastructure have not been lost on India’s security managers, since they provide China a well-equipped staging ground on India’s western flank. China has been building a railway link to Myanmar in the East, and also maintains a naval presence in the Bay of Bengal, on India’s eastern flank.

The Gwadar port has the potential to become a regional trading hub, providing a vital international outlet to the economies of the Central Asian republics, through Ashkhabad, the capital of Turkmenistan. It can similarly provide global access to Chinese industry located in Xinjiang. However, one needs to be realistic about the development of the port of Gwadar. It is at least six years away from completion, and its funding, estimated at $1.2 billion, is still up in the air. So

far, China has only given Pakistan a loan of $250 million on soft terms, to initiate work on Phase I. This will take three years to completion.\(^6\)

The Taliban factor continues to be an irritant in Sino-Pakistani ties. To soothe over these differences, Pakistan sent the head of Pakistan’s Jamaat-e-Islami party and a leading Islamist politician, Qazi Hussain Ahmed, to Beijing in June 2000. He reassured China that Pakistan had no intention of fomenting an insurrection in Xinjiang, and that China may well be able to use Pakistan as a conduit for holding discussions with the Taliban. Several meetings between Chinese officials and the Taliban have taken place in Kabul, but have remained inconclusive. The Taliban have apparently pledged not to support separatist elements in Xinjiang, but weapons continue to flow into Xinjiang.

Pakistan’s leaders know that China will not support them in another Kargilian adventure in Kashmir. However, it will be difficult for President Musharraf to rein in the Islamists within the Pakistani high command if the Agra summit fails to produce a concrete resolution of the Kashmir dispute, involving transparent concessions by India in its long standing position that the entire Kashmir region is an integral part of India.\(^6\) If Pakistan reactivates its support for the militants in Kashmir, causing significant harm to India’s military interests in the region, it may provoke India to launch a strong counter-attack on Pakistan into Sindh, accompanied by a naval blockade of the port of Karachi. In that case, Pakistan should not expect China to come to its aid. Even though China had made very strong verbal statements in 1971 about supporting Pakistan’s territorial integrity, it did not intervene when India invaded East Pakistan, since it regarded the problem as one of Pakistan’s own making.

There are thus very real limits to what Pakistan should expect from China. In many ways, these limits are analogous to what the US will do or not do for Taiwan in its conflict with China. The US will provide arms and supplies to strengthen Taiwan’s military, and prevent China from attacking Taiwan. It may decide to aid Taiwan if China launches an all out attack on the island, but even that is not a foregone possibility. What is completely unlikely is that the US will support Taiwan if the latter declares independence from China, and provokes an attack by China.


\(^{64}\) Tashbih Sayyed, “Islamist generals plotting to sabotage the summit,” *Pakistan Today*, June 29, 2001.
Kashmir – Territory and People: An American Perspective

Stephen Philip Cohen*

Kashmir is both cause and consequence of the India-Pakistan conundrum. It is primarily a dispute about justice and people, although its territorial dimensions are complicated enough. Like many intractable problems, it is hard to tell where domestic politics ends and foreign policy begins, and the dispute has become firmly wedged in the internal politics of both countries.

The territorial Kashmir is the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir and consists of the Hindu-majority Jammu, south of the Pir Panjal range of mountains that separates the Valley of Kashmir from the rest of India, the Buddhist-majority districts that comprise Ladakh, which is the subject of a separate dispute between India and China—the latter in possession of some portions of Ladakh claimed by the Indian government, the Punjabi-influenced districts of Mirpur and Muzaffarabad (now part of what the Pakistanis call “Azad” or Free Kashmir and the Indians call “Pakistan Occupied Kashmir”), the Northern Areas or Territories, consisting of Baltistan, Hunza, and the Gilgit Agency, sparsely settled, with a predominantly Muslim population; a portion of this region, north of the peak K-2, which was ceded to China by Islamabad in an agreement reached on March 2, 1963. Finally, there is the “Vale”, or Valley of Kashmir centered on Srinagar (now called “Held Kashmir” by the Pakistan government). The Valley contains most of the state’s population and resources, and is the sub-region most often equated with “Kashmir” in the minds of Indians, Pakistanis and foreigners alike. Some states, such as Britain, dodge the sovereignty issue by these locations and refer to “Indian-Administered” and “Pakistan-Administered” Kashmir.

These different sub-regions have very different ethnic and religious composition. Jammu is about 60 percent Hindu and 40 percent Muslim; Ladakh is about 50-55 percent Buddhist, and culturally linked to Tibetan Buddhism (although the Kargil district contains a substantial number of Shi’ite Muslims as do the Northern Territories). The Valley is overwhelmingly (about ninety percent) Sunni Muslim, but the Hindu minority includes one of the most important of Indian castes: the Kashmiri Brahmins (to which the Nehru family and many other senior Indian politicians and bureaucrats belong). There is also a significant non-Kashmiri Gujjar Muslim population in and near the Valley. Finally, Mirpur and Muzaffarabad are entirely Sunni Muslim, albeit with a strong Punjabi cultural influence.

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The physical or territorial Kashmir has contributed to the overall dispute between India and Pakistan in several ways. The military establishments on both sides of the border insist that control over Kashmir is critical to the defense of their respective countries. The Indian army, echoing nineteenth century British geopolitics, claims that giving up the mountainous Kashmir would expose the plains of Punjab and Haryana, and even Delhi, to foreign (in this case, Pakistani) attack. The Valley is strategically important because of the communication links that run through it to Ladakh and to Siachin, where the Indians and Pakistanis remain frozen in conflict. The threat to Kargil, in 1999, was more serious than Siachin, because it overlooked the already perilous road from Srinagar to Siachin and Leh.

Pakistan has a quite different view of Kashmir’s geopolitics. Its strategists point out that for years the major access roads to Kashmir led through what is now Pakistan, and that the proximity of the capital, Islamabad, to Kashmir makes it vulnerable to an Indian offensive along the Jhelum river. Further, Pakistanis argue that the inclusion of Kashmir would give it a strategic depth that Pakistan otherwise lacks. While both countries are now nuclear, Pakistan is “thinner.” On the whole, however, Pakistan’s choice of proxy war tactics since the late 1980s is dictated as much by the political hope of a Kashmiri uprising as it is the result of military necessity.

Finally, Kashmir is the source of many vital South Asian rivers, including the Indus and the famous five rivers of the Punjab: Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, Beas and Sutlej. In one of their major agreements, brokered by the World Bank in 1960, India and Pakistan agreed to a permanent division of the water through a series of dams and canals. This costly project left the land on both sides of the new international border more poorly irrigated than before, but at least the Indus Water Treaty has been peacefully implemented.

The second “Kashmir,” found in the minds of politicians, strategists, and scholars, is a place where national and sub-national identities are ranged against each other. The conflict in this Kashmir is as much a clash between identities, imagination, and history, as it is a conflict over territory, resources and peoples. Competing histories, strategies, and policies spring from these different images of self and other.

Pakistanis have long argued that the Kashmir problem stems from India’s denial of justice to the Kashmiri people (by not allowing them to join Pakistan), and by not accepting Pakistan’s own legitimacy. Once New Delhi were to pursue a just policy, then a peaceful solution to the Kashmir problem could be found. For the Pakistanis, Kashmir remains the “unfinished business” of the 1947 partition. Pakistan, the self-professed homeland for an oppressed and threatened Muslim minority in the Subcontinent, finds it difficult to leave a Muslim majority region to a Hindu-majority state.

Indians, however, argue that Pakistan, a state defined and driven by its religion, is given to irredentist aspirations in Kashmir because it is unwilling to

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6 For a discussion of the Pakistani view on the strategic importance of Kashmir, see Cohen, The Pakistan Army, pp. 141 ff.


accept the fact of a secular India. India, a nominally secular state, finds it difficult to turn over a Muslim majority region to a Muslim neighbor just because it is Muslim. The presence of this minority belies the need for Pakistan to exist at all (giving rise to the Pakistani assertion that Indians have never reconciled themselves to Pakistan). Indians also point to Bangladesh as proof that Jinnah’s call for a separate religion-based homeland for the Subcontinent’s Muslims was untenable. In contrast, India’s secularism, strengthened by the presence of a Muslim-majority state of Kashmir within India, proves that religion alone does not make a nation. Indians maintain that Kashmir cannot be resolved until Pakistanis alter their views on secularism. Of course, this would also mean a change in the identity of Pakistan, a contentious subject in both states.

These same themes of dominance, hegemony, and identity are replicated within the state itself. The minority Buddhist Ladakhis would prefer to be governed directly from New Delhi, and (like their Shi’ia neighbours) fear being ruled from a Sunni Muslim dominated government in Srinagar. In Jammu, much of the majority Hindu population has long been discontented with the special status lavished upon the Valley by the Union Government in New Delhi. Finally, the small Kashmiri Pandit Brahmin community in the Valley is especially fearful. It has lost its privileged position within the administration of the state and much of its dominance in academia and the professions. After the onset of militant Islamic protests, most of the Pandit community fled the Valley for Jammu and several Indian cities (especially New Delhi), where they live in wretched exile. Some of their representatives have demanded Panum Kashmir, a homeland for the tiny Brahmin community within Kashmir.

**Underlying Causes**

The original Kashmir dispute arose because of British failings at the time they divided and quit India in 1947. There were two failures, one of imagination, and one of will. The failure of imagination was expressed in the mechanism by which the princely states were divided between India and Pakistan. The ruler was to decide on accession to India or Pakistan. While British, Indians, and Pakistanis, agreed that a “third way,” independence, was to be ruled out, there was no way to ensure that each ruler would make a fair or reasonable decision even though the British, the Indians, and the Pakistanis opposed the further partition of the Subcontinent. In the case of Kashmir, a Hindu ruler governed a largely Muslim populations, but was also considering independence.

The failure of will evident in the hasty retreat from India by the British, who took their army with them, leaving the bewildered Indian and Pakistan armies behind. Had the date not been rushed forward, the partition of India could have been managed in a more orderly fashion. Instead, it was accompanied by horrific bloodshed, which embittered at least one generation on both sides of the new border, leaving a seemingly permanent legacy of hatred and revenge for further generations. While Indians and Pakistanis from regions distant from the frontier were less affected, the Pakistan army was particularly traumatized. Most of its officers came from the newly-divided Punjab or were migrants from north India, and their desire to build a new army was partly motivated by the desire to settle scores. Further, they defined the purpose of the Pakistan army as primarily India-

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9 For an extensive review of the Indian position see, Ashutosh Varshney, “Three Compromised Nationalisms: Why Kashmir has been a Problem,” in Thomas, Perspectives.
oriented, a doctrine that has been passed down through four generations of Pakistani officers.

Leaders in both countries compounded the original problem when they turned Kashmir into a badge of their respective national identities. For Pakistan, which defined itself as a homeland for Indian Muslims, the existence of a Muslim majority area under “Hindu” Indian rule was grating; the purpose of creating Pakistan was to free Muslims from the tyranny of majority rule (and hence, of rule by the majority Hindu population). For Indians, their country had to include such predominantly Muslim regions to demonstrate the secular nature of the new Indian state; since neither India nor Pakistan, so-defined, could be complete without Kashmir, this enormously raised the stakes involved for both.

Subsequently, Kashmir came to play a role in the respective domestic politics of both states. For Pakistani leaders, both civilian and military, Kashmir was a helpful diversion from the daunting task of nation building. There are also powerful Kashmiri-dominated constituencies in major Pakistani cities. On the Indian side the small, but influential Kashmiri Hindu community was over-represented in the higher reaches of the Indian government, not least in the presence of the Nehru family, a Kashmiri Pandit clan that had migrated to Uttar Pradesh from the Valley. Kashmir also acquired an unexpected military dimension. After Pakistan crossed the cease-fire line to set off the 1965 war, it became a strategic extension of the international border to the south. In addition, China holds substantial territory (in Ladakh) claimed by India, and New Delhi itself has made claims on regions which, historically, had been subordinated to the rulers of Kashmir (Gilgit and Hunza) but which are now administered by Pakistan. From 1984 onward, advances in training and high altitude warfare have turned the most inaccessible part of Kashmir—the Siachin Glacier—in to a battleground, although more soldiers were cruelly killed by frostbite than bullets. 10 The recent limited war in Kargil raised the stakes considerably, as it was the first time that offensive airpower has been used between Indian and Pakistani forces since 1971.

Kashmir was also indirectly linked to the Cold War. The Kashmir issue was born at about the same time the Cold War got underway. Washington and Moscow armed India and Pakistan (often both at the same time), they supported one side or the other in various international for a and the Soviets wielded the veto threat on behalf of India in the UN Security Council. However, they ultimately reached an understanding that they would not let the Kashmir conflict (or India-Pakistan tensions) affect their core strategic relationship. 11 Ironically, the process by which the Cold War ended had an impact on Kashmir itself because the forces of democracy and nationalism that destroyed the Soviet Union and freed Eastern Europe were at work in Kashmir. 12 Other models were the liberation and revolutionary movements in the Islamic world – Iran, Afghanistan, and most

11 For a discussion of the impact of the Cold War on Kashmir and South Asia by one of the chief architects of American policy during the Kissinger era, see Peter W. Rodman, More Precious than Peace: The Cold War and the Struggle for the Third World (New York: Charles Scribner Sons, 1994.) For an excellent academic study covering the U.S.-Pakistan relationship see Robert McMahon, the Cold War on the Periphery: the United States, India, and Pakistan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).
12 This point is made by several Indian and Pakistani authors in Kanti P. Bajpai and Stephen P. Cohen, eds., South Asia After the Cold War (Boulder: Westview, 1993). See especially the chapters by Pervaiz I. Cheema and Lieut. Gen. M.L.Chibber.
strikingly (since it was extensively covered by Indian and Pakistani television services), the Palestinian *Intifada*.

Finally, there is a contemporary dimension to Kashmir: the stirrings of a national self-determination movement among Kashmiri Muslims. Encouraged by neither India nor Pakistan, it had been present but muted for decades, and burst into view in late 1989 after a spell of particularly bad Indian governance in the state. Angry and resentful at their treatment by New Delhi and not attracted to even a democratic Pakistan, younger Kashmiris especially looked to Afghanistan, Iran, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe for models, and to emigres in America, Britain, and Canada for support. In an era when the international economy is fast-changing (including the advent of self-sustaining tourist destinations), and the prospect of the direct linkage of Central Asia to Kashmir, the old argument that Kashmir is not economically self-sufficient unless it is attached to a major state has lost credibility.

This emergence of a movement for self-rule by a younger generation of Kashmiris was the result of decades of mismanagement, but more specifically the manipulation of Kashmiri politics in the 1980s, first by Indira Gandhi and then by Rajiv Gandhi. They alternatively opposed and coopted Dr. Farooq Abdullah, a weak carbon copy of his father, Sheikh Abdullah. By joining with Congress in 1987, Farooq provoked his own followers, and after the rigged election of 1988, they turned to Pakistan for assistance.

Sumit Ganguly's overview of the onset of the Kashmir crisis concludes that a combination of the slow and imperfect growth of political mobilization of the valley Kashmiris, especially among the younger generations, plus the decay of Indian political institutions, or at least those dealing directly with Kashmir, were the twin forces that explain the rise of the ethno-religious separatist movement in Kashmir. Kashmiris were mobilized too late, too quickly and therefore, imperfectly. "Kashmiriyat" (the refined amalgam of Hindu-Muslim culture that characterizes the Valley and surrounding areas) remains, but is not the rallying point for this mobilization.

This social revolution took India and Pakistan by surprise. Except for a few scholar and some administrators, it was neither examined nor were its political implications understood. Undoubtedly Pakistani support was provided—it was never hidden—and Pakistanis speak proudly of their assistance to the Kashmiris and their right to help the latter free themselves from an oppressive Indian state. However, Pakistan's role was not the decisive factor in starting the uprising, although it has been a critical factor in sustaining it.

### Strategic Implications

As a strategic and diplomatic issue, Kashmir has waxed and waned. While it was the central objective of the first two India-Pakistan wars (1948, 1965), it was not an issue of high priority for either state from 1965 war until late 1989. Kashmir played no role in the 1971 war fought over the status of the separation of East Bengal from Pakistan. However, the Simla agreement seemed to offer a solution: defer a formal settlement and in the meantime improve India-Pakistan relations. Kashmir was not a major issue for nearly twenty years until the 1989 uprising.

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13 Ganguly, *The Crisis in Kashmir*, p. 27.

Since then, both regional instability and regional nuclear programmes have increased. Both are inextricably linked to Kashmir. Many Indian policy makers believe that Pakistan intends to use its new nuclear capability to make a grab for Kashmir, since escalation to conventional war would be risky. They also point to the connections between the Afghan war and the training of Kashmiri militants, and thus American responsibility for India's Kashmir problem. The Indian logic is that if Washington had not lavishly supported extremist Muslim elements in Afghanistan, then Kashmir would not have been radicalized. This ignores the large-scale supplies of weapons by both Iran and China, and, above all India’s own mismanagement of Kashmiri politics, especially the imposition of corrupt governments and the absence of free elections.

The failure of diplomacy to resolve the Kashmir dispute is remarkable, given the amount of international as well as regional attention paid to it. After the 1948, 1962 and 1965 wars, there were concerted efforts to resolve Kashmir. In 1948, the United Nations became deeply involved—Kashmir is the oldest conflict inscribed in the body of UN resolutions and is certainly one of the most serious. After the 1962 India-China war there were intensive but fruitless American and British efforts to bridge the gap between Delhi and Islamabad. The end of the 1965 war saw the Soviet Union as a regional peacemaker. The Soviets did manage to promote a general peace treaty at Tashkent, but this could not prevent a civil and international war in 1970-71 over East Pakistan/Bangladesh.

The most consistent feature of great power influence on the Kashmir problem has been its ineffectiveness. Beyond their regional Cold War patronage, both the United States and the Soviet Union have played significant, often parallel and cooperative roles in the subcontinent. Over the years, the United States had considerable influence with both India and Pakistan; at one point the Soviet Union, generally regarded as pro-Indian, moved closer to Pakistan even providing military assistance to Islamabad and brokering the 1966 Tashkent agreement. Yet neither superpower seemed to be able to make a difference. This suggests that any outside power should step carefully if it seeks to end or even moderate this conflict.

Kashmir was important only insofar as it concerned their respective regional partners, yet both resisted being dragged into the Kashmir issue by those same partners. While Indians and Pakistanis often based their regional calculation on the assistance of outside support for their position on Kashmir, this support has been limited and constrained. For years the Soviets provided India with an automatic veto in the United Nations on Kashmir-related resolutions, and otherwise backed New Delhi diplomatically. The Pakistanis became more dependent on the United States for political and military support, but could never get the United States to commit itself to firm security assurances against India, precisely because Washington was afraid of being sucked into a Kashmir conflict. Both Washington and Moscow made several inconclusive efforts to mediate the dispute or bring about its peaceful resolution, but were wary of anything more. It took the 1990 crisis with

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16 Wirsing, p. 190.
its nuclear dimension, to bring the United States back to the region, and then only briefly.

After India defeated Pakistan in 1971, India kept outsiders at a distance as it sought to reach a bilateral understanding with Pakistan. Mrs. Gandhi and Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto met in the Indian hill station of Simla in late June and early July 1972. There, after a long and complicated negotiation they committed their countries to a bilateral settlement of all outstanding disputes. Presumably, this included Kashmir (which was mentioned only in the last paragraph of the text). The Simla Agreement did not rule out mediation or multilateral diplomacy, if both sides agreed.

Ironically, divergent interpretations of Simla added another layer of India-Pakistan distrust. While there is a formal text, there may have been verbal agreements between the two leaders that have never been made public. According to most Indian accounts, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto told Mrs. Gandhi that he was willing to settle the Kashmir dispute along the Line of Control, but could not do so for a while because he was still weak politically. Pakistani accounts claim that Bhutto did no such thing, and that in any case the written agreement is what matters. For India, Simla had supplanted the UN resolutions as a point of reference for resolving the Kashmir dispute. After all, Indian leaders reasoned, the two parties had pledged to work directly with one another, implicitly abandoning extra-regional diplomacy. For Pakistan, Simla supplemented but did not replace the operative UN resolutions on Kashmir.

After the Simla Agreement, the Kashmir dispute seemed to subside. The Indian government began to view the LOC as a more or less permanent border, which did not prevent them from nibbling away at the Pakistani positions as in Siachin. For Pakistani diplomats the Simla Agreement neither replaced the UN resolutions nor did the conversion of the ceasefire line into a LOC produce a permanent international border. Guided by these varied interpretations both sides continued to press their respective claims whenever the opportunity arose, but for seventeen years Kashmir was widely regarded outside the region as either solved or on the way to resolution. Other regional issues displaced Kashmir—the 1974 Indian nuclear test, Pakistan’s covert nuclear weapons programme, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. Between 1972 and 1994 India and Pakistan held forty-five bilateral meetings, only one was fully devoted to Kashmir.18

Since the uprising of 1989, the situation in Kashmir has become a bloody stalemate. India continues to apply a mixture of pressure and inducement, organizing its own counter terrorist squads made up of ex-terrorists and sent by them against the Pakistan-sponsored “freedom fighters.” Numerous bomb blasts in major Indian and Pakistani cities, several unexplained railway wrecks, the occasional air high-jacking, and miscellaneous acts of sabotage seem to be evidence of organized attempts to exploit local grievances and extract revenge. While Indian officials claim a decline in “militancy,” international human rights groups and independent observers report little change, and within Kashmir the death toll mounts. Most of the Kashmiri population remains alienated, whether they are the Pandits (many of whom have fled their homes), or the Valley Muslims, bitterly divided and increasingly terrorized by radical Islamic groups.

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Towards a Solution?

Over the years many solutions have been proposed for the Kashmir problem. These included partition along the Line of Control, ‘soft borders’ between the two parts of Kashmir (pending a solution to the entire problem), a region-by-region plebiscite of Kashmiris, referendum, UN trusteeship, the ‘Trieste’ and ‘Andorra’ models (whereby the same territory is shared by two states, or a nominally sovereign territory in fact is controlled jointly by two states), revolutionary warfare, depopulation of Muslim Kashmiris and repopulation by Hindus from India, patience, good government, a revival of ‘human values,’ and doing nothing. The dispute has not been resolved because of at least three factors.

First, over the long run, the existence of the Cold War led both Americans and the Soviets to see this regional dispute not for what it was but as part of the systemic East-West struggle.

Second, both states have been inflexible over the years. India’s strategy has been to gradually erode Kashmir’s special status under Article 370 of the Constitution of India, which grants the state a special status in the Indian Union. It also pretended that the problem was ‘solved’ by the Simla Agreement. This dual strategy of no-change within Kashmir, and no-discussion of it with Pakistan failed to prepare New Delhi for the events of the late 1980s. India rejected the political option, it rejected a strategy of accommodating Kashmiri demands, it excluded Pakistan from its Kashmir policy, and it has stubbornly opposed outside efforts to mediate the dispute. Yet, New Delhi lacks the resources, the will or a strategy to deal with the Kashmir problem unilaterally. Pakistan, on the other hand, has often resorted to force in attempting to wrest Kashmir from India, further alienating the Kashmiris themselves in 1947-48 and in 1965, and providing the Indian government with the perfect excuse to avoid negotiations.

Third, it must be said that the Kashmiris, while patently victims, have not been reluctant to exploit the situation. A significant number of Kashmiris have always sought independence from India and Pakistan. The two states disagree as to which should control Kashmir and the mechanism for determining Kashmiri sentiment, but they are unified in their opposition to an independent state. Thus the seemingly well-intentioned proposal, heard frequently from Americans and other outsiders, that Kashmiris be ‘consulted’ or have a voice in determining their own fate is threatening to both Islamabad and Delhi.

The Kashmir problem is so complicated, that it is hard to say how its resolution might begin. Like the Middle East peace process, there are degrees of contentiousness. While the Valley Muslims feel aggrieved that they are dominated by Indians, other Kashmiri groups, especially the Pandits, and the largely Buddhist population of Ladakh, fear the dominance of the state by Muslims. Thus, a number of proposals have suggested the possibility of separating the Valley from other regions (Azad Kashmir, Ladakh, Jammu), and allocating parts of Jammu and Kashmir to India and Pakistan, leaving to the end the intensely disputed Valley.

Further complicating the situation, ‘Kashmir’ is not a homogeneous issue in India and Pakistan. During the height of the 1990 Kashmir crisis, it was clear that

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19 Some elements of the Bharatiya Janata Party have recommended that Kashmir be repopulated with Hindus, once its special constitutional status (Article 370) was eliminated. The Andorra precedent of the thirteenth century—a treaty between Spain and France guaranteeing Andorra’s internal autonomy—has been discussed by Jean Alphonse Bernard of Paris; Jagmohan, one of the key principals in the most recent crises in Kashmir, has written that the long-term solution rests in a revival of the Indian spirit. See his own record of Kashmir’s crises of Kashmir in My Frozen Turbulence.
the further one was from Delhi and Islamabad the less passion there was about Kashmir. In Madras, Calcutta, Hyderabad (Deccan) and Bombay, Kashmir was, and is seen as New Delhi's obsession; in Karachi, Quetta, Peshawar, and Hyderabad (Sindh), it is seen as a secondary issue, for these provinces relations with Islamabad and the Punjab come first. However, the enormous television coverage given to the Kargil episode in 1999 created a shared image of the Kashmir issue for the Indian public, an image in direct contradiction to that created over many years for a Pakistani public by Pakistan's government-controlled media.

Like proposals to resolve other complex disputes, such as those in the Middle East or China-Taiwan and the two Koreas, "solutions" to the Kashmir problem must operate at many levels. The examples of the Middle East, South Africa, and Ireland, indicate that seemingly intractable disputes can be resolved, or ameliorated, by patience, outside encouragement, and, above all, a strategy that will address the many dimensions of these complex disputes. If a strategy for Kashmir had begun in the early or mid-1980s, then some of the crises that arose later in that decade might have been averted, and it would not now be seen as one of the world's nuclear flash-points.

Any comprehensive solution to the Kashmir problem would involve many concessions, and changes in relations between India and Pakistan (and within each state). It would require a change in India's federal system; it might require changes within Kashmir between its constituent parts; it would necessitate a re-examination of the military balance between India and Pakistan and provisions that would prevent the two states from again turning to arms in Kashmir. Above all, it would require major concessions on the part of Pakistan—and India might have to accept a Pakistani locus standi in Kashmir itself. There also would have to be incentives for Pakistan to cooperate in such ameliorative measures, since its basic strategy is to draw outsiders into the region and to pressure India. In brief, India has to demonstrate to Pakistan that it would be willing to make significant concessions, but also pledge that if Pakistan ceased its support for Kashmiri separatists Delhi would not change its mind once the situation in the Valley had become more normal.

Doing nothing is likely to be the default option for Kashmir. At best, there might be an arrangement that would ensure that the state does not trigger a larger war between the two countries. However, this does little to address Kashmiri grievances or the widespread human rights violations in the state, nor does it address the deeper conflict between India and Pakistan.

One of the major obstacles to reaching a solution of the Kashmir tangle is the belief, on all sides of the dispute, that "time is on our side." Since the Kashmir problem has been mismanaged by two generations of Indians and Pakistanis (and Kashmiris have contributed their own share of errors of omission and commission), there is no age group, except perhaps among the youngest generation of South Asians, who believe that the time has come for a solution. As they briefly pass through an equilibrium point when the time may be right for talks, neither side wants to negotiate since both believe that time is on their side, and that they are just about to, or will after some time, regain the advantage. Moreover, both sides seem to assume that the other will not compromise unless confronted by superior force. ‘Punjab rules’—a zero-sum game with a club behind the back—seem to dominate India-Pakistan relations. The greater Kashmir problem is persuading both sides—and now the Kashmiris themselves (whose perception of how time will bring about an acceptable solution is not clear at all) to examine their own deeper assumptions about how to bring the other to the bargaining table and reach an agreement.
Kashmir needs a "peace process," defined as a routine, systematic engagement of the key parties (in this case, India and Pakistan, with participation by Kashmiris of all political stripes), assisted or encouraged by the international community. All parties must have some incentive to keep the process moving forward, and there must be benefits associated with continuing the process. There is as yet no such peace process in place, but the forthcoming summit between Prime Minister Vajpayee and President Musharraf, and the fact that all parties now refer to such a "peace process" offers some small ray of hope.
India's Endorsement of the US BMD: Challenges for Regional Stability

Zafar Nawaz Jaspal

The proposed United States Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) system with its national and regional variations would be one of the most advanced and complex weapon systems ever developed. The system would entail the construction or upgrade of a complex and geographically disparate array of facilities and components stretching from one continent to the other. The indispensability of the deployment of the X-band ground-based phased-array radar for the National Missile Defence (NMD) system drives United States (US) to improve and consolidate its strategic partnership with its existing allies and forge a new strategic partnership with some other states, for example India. The US strategic partners’ territory would be used for the deployment of the BMD systems. The objectives of the US BMD policy is to build and deploy defences to protect its people and its forward-deployed forces as well as to contribute to the defences of its friends and allies. The countries that are vital in future US missile defence calculation would be recipients of the US military technology and economic aid. President George W. Bush’s intentions to develop a new strategic framework would fortify US defence and intensify the military potential of its strategic partners, consequently destabilising the international strategic stability. Moreover, deploying missile defences will require moving beyond the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. The condemnation of the ABM Treaty will have a series of far-reaching negative consequences for the international security environment.

The US BMD decision would affect global nuclear arms control and provoke strong negative reactions from the Russian Federation and China. It will have a negative cascading effect in South Asia. Therefore, the potential impact of the BMD on South Asian security environment in general and particularly on Pakistan’s defence strategy could not be neglected. The real facts on US policy about the US BMD programme are not known. India has extended its unqualified official support to President Bush’s determination to build an anti-missile shield as a strategic and technological inevitability. This is probably the first time in decades that India has extended such support to US on any global armament issue. Interestingly, the US BMD is now seen in India, as having merits it did not have a year ago. On July 24, 2000, Mr. Jaswant Singh, the Minister for External Affairs of India, in an interview with the Times of India said, 'We have consistently held a view that opposes the militarisation of outer space. The NMD will adversely influence the larger movement towards disarmament of which India is a staunch advocate. We believe that technological superiority will result in a reaction in other parts of the world, thus reviving the possibility of yet another, and newer arms race. We cannot support this development'. This change in Indian stance raises certain questions. For example, what is here for India in the U.S. missile defence plans?

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What benefits can India draw from its participation with the US in such defence shield plans? Such questions need serious consideration. The immediate endorsement was that for obtaining a better relationship with the US. Mr. P.R. Chad, the Director, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi commented that 'this serves India's national self-interest and its larger intention to develop a new relationship with the Bush administration.' The better understanding with the US is essential for New Delhi's ambitious military modernisation programme coupled with its regional and global objectives. According to Mr. Agha Shahi, former foreign minister of Pakistan, 'nevertheless, reversing its traditional disarmament stance, India has seized the opportunity to move closer to the US as a strategic partner, with the ambition of designing, in alliance with the US a totally new security regime for the entire globe'.

The supportive Indian response appears to have been clinched by the prospects of cooperation in developing offensive/defensive missile technologies. Under the new strategic partnership, India would have access to the US sophisticated missile technology and conventional arms. Therefore, the shift from an earlier more forthright opposition to the BMD to a much softer even somewhat welcoming line from the Indian Government would adversely influence the South Asian strategic stability in general, and undermine Pakistan's security in particular.

**US New Strategic Framework**

On May 1, 2001, in his speech at National Defence University, the US President George W. Bush announced his intentions to develop a new strategic framework that is based on concepts of deterrence, which rely on both offensive and defensive forces. He stated:

`Today's world requires a new policy, a broad strategy of active non-proliferation, counter-proliferation, and defences. We must work together with other likeminded nations to deny weapons of terror from those seeking to acquire them. We must work with allies and friends who wish to join with us to defend against the harm they can inflict. And together we must deter anyone who would contemplate their use.... We need new concepts of deterrence that rely on both offensive and defensive forces. Deterrence can no longer be based solely on the threat of nuclear retaliation.... We need a new framework that allows us to build missile defences to counter the different threats of today's world. To do so, we must move beyond the constraints of the 30-year-old ABM Treaty. This treaty does not recognise the present or point us to the future. It enshrines the past'.

The fundamentals of the Bush administration’s new strategic framework rest on their understanding and interpretation of new post-Cold War strategic threats and the US role in international politics. They have been convinced that the knowledge needed to design and build nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles is now widespread. About 30 countries either have, or are trying to acquire ballistic missiles. According to their assessment North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Syria and Libya pose serious threats to US security, because of their modest

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6 See 'President Bush’s Speech on Nuclear Strategy', op cit. The US is very likely to withdraw unilaterally from the 1972 ABM Treaty in the same manner that it withdrew from the Kyoto environmental agreement earlier this year.
ballistic missile capabilities, coupled with their antagonism towards the US and its allies.\(^7\)

Donald Rumsfeld, US Secretary of Defence, stated that ‘imagine what might happen if a rogue state were to demonstrate the capability to strike US or European population with nuclear, chemical or biological weapons of mass destruction. A policy of intentional vulnerability by the Western nations could give this state the power to hold us hostage.’\(^8\) They believe that credible deterrence can no longer be based solely on the prospect of punishment through massive retaliation. Instead, it must be based on a combination of offensive nuclear and non-nuclear defensive capabilities working together to deny potential adversaries, the opportunity and benefits from the threat or use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) against the US. On January 11, 2001, Donald Rumsfeld, in the hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee for his confirmation as Secretary of Defence categorically stated: ‘The US should deploy a missile defence system when it is technologically possible and effective.’\(^9\) He believed that deployment of an effective NMD system could strengthen US and allied security. He further pointed out that the failure to deploy appropriate defensive systems could also have the following adverse effects:

a) Paralysing US ability to act in a crisis or deterring other countries from assisting it;
b) Providing incentives to US friends and allies to develop nuclear capabilities;
c) Putting the US in a position where its only option may be pre-emption;
d) Moving the US to a more isolationist position because of an inability to defend against ballistic missiles.\(^10\)

The Bush administration sees missile defence as a hedge against states, which are not deterred by the overwhelming retaliation capability of the US. Thus, without missile defences, the US and its allies can be susceptible to nuclear blackmail and allow the so-called ‘rogue states’,\(^11\) or, as the US prefers to call them now, ‘countries of concern’, to invade their neighbours. President Bush argued that, for countries of concern, ‘terror and blackmail are a way of life’. He added that ‘they seek’ missiles armed with ‘weapons of mass destruction to keep the US and other responsible nations from helping allies and friends in strategic parts of the world’.\(^12\) This verifies that the Bush administration’s strategic policy takes into account the US forces’ inescapable involvement in future military conflicts, which are regional in scope. These include the high probability of military conflict in the Korean


\(^9\) See ‘Rumsfeld says He will consult more closely with Allies’, *Washington File* (January 12, 2001) http://Usinfo. state. gov/topical/tras nsition/01011201.htm

\(^10\) Ibid.

\(^11\) Like many other terms of political discourse, the term Rogue State has two uses: a propagandist use, applied to assorted enemies, and a literal use that applies to states who do not regard themselves as bound by international norms. Logic suggests that the most powerful states should tend to fall into the latter category unless internally constrained, an expectation that history confirms. In March 1999, the newsletter of the American Society of International Law observed that international law is today probably less highly regarded in the US than at any time in the century. See Noam Chomsky, *Rogue States: The Rule of Force in World Affairs* (London: Pluto Press, 2000) pl.

\(^12\) See Ben Sheppard, ‘US missile defence plans consign ABM Treaty to history, but where do the allies go from here?’ *Jane’s Information Group* (May 3, 2001).
peninsula and in the Taiwan Straits. They visualise a situation where the vulnerability of US troops to local and regional missile threats, e.g. in the Middle East, East Asia and Far East, would do incalculable harm to US interests in the long term\textsuperscript{13}. For example, China might threaten to attack the US if it moved to defend Taiwan against an invasion from the mainland. Similarly, Iran\textsuperscript{14} or Iraq might develop WMD to prevent US intervention in the Persian Gulf. Hence BMD would provide the US a defensive shield and confidence that it could intervene without itself suffering severe consequences.

**China: a Competitor and a Potential Regional Rival**

Since the Cold War ended, American scholars and strategists have debated whether China will pose a security threat to the US homeland, its global and regional interests in East Asia/Far East in the next few decades. For many American strategic analysts, Chinese military of the twenty-first century is replacing the Soviet military of pre-Gorbachev years and Japanese economy of the 1970s as the next big purported threat to American global leadership.\textsuperscript{15} However, in the present international scenario, Washington considers and vocally termed “rogue states” as a threat to its interests. The Americans perceive that it would be difficult to deter these states from attacking the US by the prevalent nuclear deterrence strategy. But this threat perception is debatable. In real terms, these states do not pose any military threat to the Americans homeland. For instance, North Korea one of the most advanced in missiles and weapons of mass destruction technology, among the “rogue states”, is not capable of making multiple launches of missiles. On August 31, 1998, North Korea tested a Taepodong-1 missile, which is believed to be a Nodong with a Scud-like second stage and a small third stage kick-motor. The Taepodong-1 flew only 1320 km.\textsuperscript{16} This proves that in order to develop a long-range ballistic missile, the North Koreans would have to make remarkable progress in propulsion, guidance, airframe, warhead and re-entry vehicle technology. There is no evidence that North Korea has mastered these technologies. At the same time one cannot ignore the fact that North Korea is eager to open normal trade relations with the West, seems to be willing to suspend its long range missiles programme for real material gain. Secondly, North Korea, Iraq and Iran are members of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1967. And all their nuclear facilities are under the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thirdly, there is a reason to doubt that they would ever use their weapons of mass destruction (WMD) against the US, due to the overwhelming US retaliatory capability. The historical record shows that in the past, states have been deterred from using such weapons, when the US threatens to retaliate. For example, Saddam Hussein was deterred from using chemical or biological weapons during the Gulf

\textsuperscript{13} Geographically, East Asia consists of (east) Russia, Mongolia, China, North Korea, South Korea and Japan. However, since it has forward-deployed its troops into this region and formed military alliances with Japan and South Korea, the United States can be regarded as a part of East Asia politically.


\textsuperscript{16} In the 1990s, North Korea tested and then deployed a 1000 km range missile, Nodong, based on a scaled-up Scud engine. See Joseph Cirincione, opcit. p.17.
War, despite his threats to do so, by the US decision that such an attack would meet with a devastating US response.\textsuperscript{17}

It seems that the “rogue states” threat has been exaggerated out of proportion and made a good excuse to develop the BMD system, which would be employed for the containment of other major powers. Interestingly, some scholars opine that the likeliest nuclear attack against the United States would come not from a nuclear missile launched by a rogue state but from a warhead in the belly of a ship or the back of a truck delivered by a group with no return address. Furthermore, the greatest nuclear danger to the US today and in the near future is likely to be an accidental launch of missile armed with nuclear warhead from Russia. The current US policy of maintaining large numbers of highly accurate nuclear weapons, that can be launched promptly to attack Russia’s nuclear forces, stands in the way of reducing this risk.

Some key officials of the Bush administration consider China the predominant threat to American interests. Colin Powell, the Secretary of State has rejected the Clinton administration’s posture of ‘China as a strategic partner’. In his January 17 confirmation hearing he stated: ‘China is a competitor and a potential regional rival’.\textsuperscript{18} On May 1, 2001 in his speech on missile defences, President Bush spoke of reaching out to both Russia and China. While he was elaborating his desire to build a constructive new relationship with Russia, he ruled out any such prospects with China. Washington reinforced this message when the high-level emissaries sent to consult with Asian leaders on American missile defence plans conspicuously omitted Beijing from their itinerary. A lower-level delegation visited Beijing.\textsuperscript{19}

In late January 2001, the US Air Force staged its first ever space war game. The possibility of war in space turned from pure scientific fiction to realistic planning by the Space War Centre at Schriever Air Force Base, Colorado. The simulation was based on a scenario with growing tension between the US and China in 2017. The exercise perceived that in 2017 US would be involved in a conflict with a large near-space peer nation ‘Red’, which threatens to attack ‘Brown’, a small neighbouring country. The good guys ‘Blue’ come to the rescue, launching reusable space planes and deploying missile defences, anti-satellite lasers, and tiny attack satellites known as micro-satellites. Several participants admitted that Red force was modelled on China.\textsuperscript{20} The concept of space war exercise is a part of the US East Asian war fighting strategy. The basic elements of the American’s East Asian strategy are deterring attack on allies and friends; maintaining East Asian bases for global power projection; and preventing spirals of tension among regional actors whose relations are plagued by both historical legacies of mistrust and contemporary sovereignty disputes.\textsuperscript{21} According to Thomas J. Christensen’s assessment, ‘...with certain new equipment and certain strategies, China can pose

\textsuperscript{18} The Clinton administration viewed China as a strategic partner, and emphasized expanded trade rather than disagreement over Taiwan. See John Isaacs, ‘Bush 11 or Reagan 111?, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (May/ June 2001)p. 31. But the structure of the NMD system designed for the Clinton administration is obviously East Asia-oriented, especially in its first deployment phase, C1. In the C1 phase, the only new missile tracking radar will be deployed on Shemya, an outpost well located to watch missiles from East Asia, including Russian Siberia, Korea, and China. The only NMD launch site in the C1 and C2 phases would be in Central Alaska, which is much closer to East Asia than to the Middle East or the European part of Russia.
\textsuperscript{21} See Thomas J. Christensen, opcit. p. 7.
major problems for American security interests, and especially for Taiwan, without the slightest pretence of catching up with the US by an overall measure of national military power or technology'. He added, 'I firmly agreed with those who are sceptical about China's prospects in significantly closing the gap with the US'.

**Technical Know-how of the BMD: Problems and Prospects**

The first indication of a missile launch against the US would come from early warning satellites deployed in geo-synchronous orbits about 36,000 km above the equator. The satellites detect the launch of a missile by seeing the hot and bright plume from its engine. Once the missile is detected, the control centre tells different sensors to track the missile or the warhead and decoy it releases and discriminate between them. After the missile rocket engines have stopped burning, other BMD sensors (X-band ground based phased-array radar and a space-based missile tracking system) take over and detect and track the warhead or warheads as well as discriminate the warhead from any missile debris, decoys or other objects produced by the missile. The data from the radar and space-based sensors could be sent to the command centres. There the data would be correlated to assess the nature of the threat, to discriminate real warheads from decoys, and to determine when interceptors should be launched against incoming targets.

The interceptors (which Americans call a kinetic energy kill vehicle) employ 'hit to-kill' technique - hit a bullet with a bullet. The kill vehicles do not have any explosives. The kill vehicles use infrared sensors to hit targets. They destroy the target by a collision, at very high speed of about 15,000 miles per hour or more, with the target missile. In order to maximize the probability of a successful intercept, the BMD system will fire one or two interceptors at each attacking warhead. If timelines permit, the system may then observe results of the intercept attempts and if necessary fire additional interceptors. If time does not permit the use of this 'shoot-look-shoot' strategy, the defence may simply fire a single salvo of four or five interceptors against each incoming warhead.

There are five basic methods of destroying the hostile missiles:

a) **Pre-launch attack**, meaning attacking the missiles before their launch;

b) **Boost-phase interception**, meaning attacking the missiles while they are being accelerated by their rocket boosters. During the boost phase, booster burns and the missile moves relatively slowly;

c) **Exo-atmospheric interception or in midcourse**, meaning attacking the missiles or their warheads during midcourse in the upper atmosphere or above it, when the attacking missile is traveling outside the atmosphere;

d) **Endo-atmospheric interception**, meaning attacking the missiles or their warheads during the re-entry phases in the lower, denser atmosphere. When the offensive missile is approaching its target within the atmosphere; and

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22 Ibid. To many American analysts China seems devoted to developing new coercive options to exert more control over Taiwan's diplomatic policies, and to threaten or carry out punishment of any third parties that might intervene militarily on Taiwan's behalf, including both US and Japan.

e) **Civil defence**, meaning reducing the effects of the missile attacks by strengthening constructions on the ground or hiding personnel and facilities at safe locations.

The US has not yet determined the specifics of its future missile defences. The decisions about how, and when, and how much, are still decisions to come. What Bush administration is talking about the BMD at the moment is still a concept. But one fact is clear that the architecture of the missile defences would be different from Clinton's administration NMD plan, which pursued plans for midcourse intercepts with the interceptors initially based at a single location. In his speech on May 1, 2001, President Bush briefly mentioned the prospect of land, air, and sea-based defences. Although he discussed the advantages of intercepting missiles in the boost phase during the first few minutes of flight, he admitted that there is still more work to do to determine the final form the defences might take. Nevertheless, the Bush administration has indicated that the BMD plan would be a multi-layered defence system, meaning that the system would combine several of the basic options. On May 2, 2001 Donald Rumsfeld, the Defence Secretary, hinted that in addition to land, air, and sea-based defences, space-based options could not be ruled out. On May 8 he announced that the Pentagon office overseeing missile defences had identified 'eight, ten, or twelve different, things .... that they think merit attention.

The Bush administration's statements regarding the BMD plan indicates that they would adopt an approach, which would be based on the concept that interceptors can destroy the incoming missile at three stages; the boost phase, exo-atmospheric interception or in midcourse and endo-atmospheric interception. Each option has advantages and disadvantages. There is one inflexible rule about missile defence – the later you detect and intercept an enemy missile, the closer it will be when you destroy it, and the smaller the area you can defend. Conversely, the earlier you can detect, and act, the farther away it will be when you destroy it and the greater the area you can defend. Therefore, farther is better. It gives you enough time to gain a chance for a second or third shot if you miss. In addition, during the boost phase the hostile missile travels at a relatively slow speed, presents a high infrared profile, and is well before any deployment of its warheads and decoys. It also eliminates the problems of dealing with multiple warheads or sub-munitions. Hence, the potential to intercept and destroy a missile over enemy territory soon after launch, rather than over friendly territory, makes the development of a boost phase intercept capability very desirable.

But the problem with this option is that the reaction time is very limited. A boost-phase intercept would need to be conducted within the 250-second burn-time of an ICBM. Secondly, the US forward theatre interceptors deployment becomes inevitable to hit the enemy missile in its boost phase. The US has to station its interceptors on land or on cargo ships converted for the single purpose of carrying these interceptors nearer to the state of concern so that its interceptors hit the target

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25 Ibid.

26 Intercepting an ICBM in its boost phase-that is, while the rocket motor is still burning-has other advantages over attempting a mid-course intercept. Instead of having to hit a small, relatively cool warhead that is traveling quickly, the target is a large, hot booster that is moving more slowly. See Richard L. Garwin, 'Boost-Phase Intercept: A Better Alternative' *Arms Control Today* (September 2000).<http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2000-09/bpisept00.asp>

27 Ibid.
within a short span of time. For example, BMD plan designed to hit a missile launched from North Korea interceptors could be deployed at a joint US-Russian site located on Russian territory south of Vladivostok or on US military cargo ships stationed in the Japan Basin. Against Iraqi ICBMs, a single interceptor base in south-east Turkey would suffice to protect the entire US national territory. For countering Iran, US would require interceptors based in the Caspian Sea, or perhaps in Tajikistan and on ships in the Gulf of Oman. But the ships in the Japan Basin, Caspian Sea and Gulf of Oman housing the interceptors are in principle vulnerable to attack from the ships or submarines of concern states. The second alternative being touted for the BMD boost phase intercept is the Air Force’s Airborne Laser (ABL). The programme has not been considered appropriate because of technical hurdles that thwart development.

In case of midcourse, the ICBM can be intercepted while it travels in the vacuum of outer space. This permits more time for decision to the command and control centre for reaction. However, the most serious problem with a mid-course system, as many analysts have pointed out, is that it can be defeated by countermeasures that are quite simple to develop compared with an ICBM programme. For example, light and heavy objects follow identical trajectories in the vacuum of outer space, the offensive ICBM could employ a number of techniques to deceive the intercept vehicle. For example, a substantial number of lightweight decoys could be deployed in parallel with the real warhead, making it difficult for the interceptor to discriminate between them. Such lightweight decoys can be designed to simulate the thermal emissions from the real warhead and even the fluctuation in such emissions or variations in reflected light caused by the warheads’ motion. Alternatively, the offence could employ anti-simulation countermeasures, in which the real warhead is enclosed in a light balloon, making it indistinguishable from a number of accompanying decoy balloons. However, one potential flaw with a balloon decoy is that its temperature could differ greatly from the temperature of the warhead, thus enabling heat-sensitive seekers to easily distinguish between the two. Because a warhead has substantial mass (perhaps 500-1,000 pounds), it does not cool much in its passage through space. Thin, empty decoy balloons, on the other hand, could change temperature rapidly, depending on their surface coating. They could either be warmer than a warhead in sunshine or cooler. At night, they would cool rapidly unless measures were taken to prevent this. This problem, however, could be easily overcome. It takes less than a pound of lithium battery within a decoy balloon to supply as much heat to the interior of the balloon as the warhead itself would have.

Technically, intercept during the re-entry phase or within the atmosphere is easier for the defence due to the ICBM warheads being highly visible to radar and to optical sensors. Because of the very hot ‘wake’ produced by the Mach-23 RV as it enters the atmosphere. Balloons and light chaff are no longer effective against sensors, they will be retarded or destroyed on re-entry. Though there is little time left at this point. Computers can calculate the trajectory of the warheads, making interception possible. But a sophisticated attacker, however, can complicate the

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problem by making the warhead maneuverable and its path may not be determined by the interceptor. In this case the warhead must be destroyed twenty miles above the earth, otherwise there would be fall-out damages.  

The combination of land, sea and air-based elements would make BMD greatly effective. For example, under favourable geographic and technical circumstances nonstatic sea-based BMD can be extremely effective and enjoy the political advantage of being based in international waters. This system cannot be easily targeted by the terrorists because of its mobility.

**Chinese Responses**

Some in Europe even questioned the US threat assessment. However, China had more bluntly criticised US plans than Russia and Europe. China is opposed to BMD, which it sees as a potential threat to its own nuclear missile deterrent. Beijing also fears a regional version of the system could neutralise its missile potential against Taiwan, which it considers a renegade province that must return to its rule. Therefore, it has made clear that it does not accept the rogue state rationale and sees itself as the focus of the US BMD systems. China's interpretation that the BMD is directed against it, seems legitimate, due to Americans’ provocative actions like arming Taiwan with Patriot missile capability, human rights interventions, a higher profile for the Tibetan cause and above all Bush administration's perception that China is an emerging threat to the US security.

China fears that a limited US defence could negate its small arsenal of roughly 20 to 25 ICBMs. It has announced that its opposition to BMD would not change. It is expected that China can respond by developing new quantities and qualities of missiles and warheads capable of compensation for the reduction in their deterrent capabilities that would be brought about by a defensive shield. China is thus likely to invest in a more robust nuclear triad. Within the triad, as China’s strategic long-range strike programmes come to fruition, single warhead liquid-fuel missiles will be replaced with longer-range, multiple warhead, solid-fuel systems. The US BMD could also force changes in China's deployment posture. China currently lacks the technical capability to maintain its nuclear force on a high-alert status. Warheads are stored separately from their missile launchers. Because

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31 At the Shanghai summit, the defence ministers met on June 14, 2001 and expressed support for the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, calling it the "cornerstone of global strategic stability". For more detailed international responses to the US BMD plan see Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, 'US BMD: Leading to a New Era of Arms Race?' *Strategic Studies*, Vol. xxi, No. 1 (Spring 2001)p. 49-53. See also 'Russia wants talks with US, India on NMD' *The Times of India* (June 1, 2001). See also Phil Chetwynd, 'China, Russia, Central Asia unite against missile defence', *The Times of India* (June 16, 2001). Dr Maqbool Ahmad Bhatty, 'SCO: a response to Bush's NMD', *Dawn* (July 1, 2001).
32 Chinese draw links between offensive and defensive missile systems. They have argued that Taiwan could use technologies acquired for a missile defense to develop offensive systems. On June 20, 2001 the Taiwanese army test fired US Patriot missile. The Patriot was fired as the China was conducting massive war games in the region, including the mock invasion of a Taiwanese island. China expressed its strong opposition and dissatisfaction. Chinese foreign ministry spokeswoman Zhang Quiyue said, 'The assistance by the United States in having a test of the Patriot missile violates its commitments'. She added the test also violated the PRC's sovereignty and undermined the stability of the entire Asia-Pacific region. See Annie Huang, 'Army Fires a Test of Patriot Missiles', *The Associated Press* (Taipei: June 21, 2001). See 'China Slams U.S. Over Taiwan's Patriot Missile Test', *Agence France Presse*, (Beijing: June 21,2001).
33 Though the Bush administration has yet to articulate a fully formed China policy, there are unsettling indications that it may be inclined to see China primarily as an emerging military threat. The United States cannot ignore the possibility. See 'China Viewed Narrowly', *The New York Times* (June 10, 2001).
Chinese ICBMs are liquid-fuel, they require lengthy launch preparations. China's current nuclear modernisation plans will bring it within striking distance of deploying a credible and survivable deterrent. However, BMD could prove to be the decisive factor that might persuade Chinese leaders to transform a small strategic deterrent into a full nuclear war-fighting capability. But China's engagement in an arms race with the US would be disastrous for its economy. Perhaps that is part of the American calculation.

**Efficacy of India in the US new Strategic Framework**

The above discussion discloses that the nature and the future of Sino-US relations once again became questionable. The Bush Administration broke the limited consensus of the two governments on building a constructive strategic partnership. One can consider that their future relationships would be competitive or even confrontational, following the pattern of traditional relations among great powers in the past. The differences between the US and China in international and regional strategic issues, such as Iraq, Kosovo, the US-Japan strategic alliance, the US and Taiwan military co-operation and missile defence systems prove that China would be a peer competitor. When the two countries differ in so many strategic issues, it is imperative for the Americans to adopt a containment policy against China. China’s warming relations with the Russian Federation, Central Asian states and Pakistan leaves US to cultivate its strategic partnership with India, besides its East Asian and Far Eastern allies to contain China regionally.

The US has yet to decide how missile defence goal will be technically accomplished. Whatever the final architecture of the proposed missile defence plan would be, Washington has to station its BMD’s critical parts on its allies' territory. If China is the target of the US BMD, the Indian cooperation would be required for enhancing the credibility of the system, against the authorised, accidental and unauthorised missile launches from China. For example, ground-based sensors (Xband Radar) and boost-phase interceptors would be deployed in India, similar to the deployments at Flyingdales (United Kingdom) and Greenland (which is under the sovereignty of Denmark). In addition, the interception at the boost phase has a very short, less than three minutes time span. Therefore the interceptors must be homed near the launch site.

**India’s Warming Relations with the US: Utilitarian Approach**

With the end of the Cold War, India has been forced to rethink its foreign policy priorities. The former Soviet Union, India’s benefactor and primary source of military equipment, is no more, the Non-Aligned Movement is moribund, China’s economy and armed forces have grown by leaps and bounds, and Pakistan established its strategic equilibrium with India by conducting its nuclear explosions in May 1998. In this new environment, US has assumed relatively greater influence as New Delhi has realised that it can no longer play its 'Soviet Card' and as Indian economic policy has actively sought to attract overseas investment capital. Moreover, the President Bush's strategic framework has shifted the focus of policy away from Russia, whose power is by all accounts declining, to China that is regarded as an emergent power of great future significance. Such strategic shifts

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have positive influence on India's relations with the US. With this background India had endorsed US BMD policy. On May 11, 2001, Indian Defence and External Affairs Minister, Jaswant Singh, said after an extended hour-long meeting with the visiting US Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage, 'We are endeavouring to work-out together a totally new security regime which is for the entire globe'.

India can derive many advantages from its support to US BMD plan. According to Pamela Constable, 'India had several motives in welcoming Washington's proposal. It has long sought global prestige as a major democracy and emerging nuclear power, and it is eager to have the U.S. sanctions lifted and to gain a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Moreover, India is keen to replace Pakistan, its neighbouring rival and a Cold War-era ally of the United States, as Washington's strategic partner in the region'.

India, a country that has long criticised US strategic policy, described Bush's speech as “highly significant and far-reaching”. This unprecedented New Delhi's endorsement comes at a time when there are growing signs that the Bush administration may lift US sanctions imposed on India for its May 1998 nuclear tests. In addition, Indians have been aspiring that they will receive assistance and investment in its backward defence industry from the US. This assistance is essential for the rectification of India’s shortcomings in the missiles and other military related technologies. In fact, in 1999, the Indian All-Party Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence severely criticised the ordinance factory board for operating its 39 units in a 'sub-standard environment' and under-utilising their capacity. So, in order to overcome these drawbacks the Indian government has opened its monopolistic state-owned defence industry to private participation through licensing, with a foreign direct investment.

The US new strategic policy communicates that it will assist its allies in developing their defensive capabilities. India has been developing the missile defence systems by fusing the foreign and domestic research and missile components. Despite the fact that thousands of Indian scientists have been working on the missile projects, India still needs foreign assistance for the development of its Theatre Missile Defence (TMD). It has been receiving foreign technology (covertly/overtly) for its missile defence project from the Russian Federation and Israel. India's other preference for augmenting its TMD capability is to buy these missiles from friendly states. For example, Israel is transferring its Arrow Anti-tactical Ballistic Missile (ATBM) and Phalcon--Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft. India is also developing an AEW platform equipped with phased array radar technology, similar to be used by Phalcon, to cue its ATBM system. Therefore, India had negotiated an agreement with the Russian Federation for the acquisition of an advanced air defence system with ATBM capability—either the S300 PMU-1 or the S-300V. The S-300 PMU-1 is a highly mobile surface to air

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39 Ibid.
40 For more details see table number one in Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, 'India's Missile Capabilities: Regional Implications', *National Development and Security*, Vol. IX, No. 3, Serial No. 35 (Spring 2001)pp. 43, 44.
missile system. On June 12, 2001 in a joint venture in missile development, scientists of India and Russia successfully test-fired PJ-10 medium-range, two-staged (liquid-solid propellant) surface-to-surface cruise missile. The 6.9 meter high missile is capable of carrying multiple warheads and can hit a target at about 280 km within 300 seconds. The missile is specifically designed as an anti-ship weaponry system. In addition, the Indian Navy had finalised a deal regarding the purchase of Barak anti-missile defence system with Israel. The Barak missile is designed to operate in high-clutter environment against small fast targets. Its range is 6-8 kilometres. It can deal with sea skimmers coming in at under a metre in height. Moreover it was reported that three Russian-built Kivak-III class stealth frigates are to be commissioned to the Indian Navy in 2002. These frigates are being built for India under a $1 billion deal signed in 1997. Fitted with the most sophisticated weapons, the frigates can destroy Pakistan's Agosta submarines much before coming within the range of their torpedoes.

Indo-Israel cooperation is vital for the success of India’s TMD project. There are ample chances that India's opposition to the US BMD would impede the progress in relations between India and Israel. Consequently, India could face problems in mastering the anti-missile defence technology because under US pressure, Israel would cancel its military cooperation contracts with India. In fact, the US funded the Arrow missile project, developed by the Israeli aircraft industry. Moreover, the US ballistic missile defence policy reveals that the US will not only transfer TMD but also co-operate in the research and development of anti-ballistic missile defence capabilities with its allies, notably, the technologies related to the missile interceptor of the Theatre High Attitude Area Defence (THAAD) system, when modified, have a delivery capability. Therefore, India is keen to develop an understanding with the Americans, which would assist it in transferring and acquiring American missile technology.

**Challenges for Pakistan's Security: Policy Options**

Pakistan's security interests are inextricably tied to India's military posture. Since its independence, Pakistan perceives constant military threats from India. The 1971 tragedy led Pakistan to rely on its own resources, rather than on the external protectors for its security. This 'look within' strategy justified Pakistan’s overt posture of nuclear weapons capability and their delivery systems. In the prevalent South Asian strategic environment, the relationship between India and Pakistan is no longer solely a zero-sum game with only winner and loser. Both states are aware of this harsh reality that nuclear war between them would be a calamity whatever the result in relative disadvantage. Since the overt nuclearization, they appeared to have realised that the presence of nuclear arsenals in both countries, and the associated spectre of nuclear devastation, have forced them to minus all-out war

42 Ibid.
43 See 'India, Russia successfully test cruise missiles', *The Times of India* (June 13,2001). Also see 'India, Russia test cruise missile', *The News* (Rawalpindi: June 13, 2001)p 12.
44 See 'Proven Capabilities in Defence System', *Asia Military Review*, vol.8, issue 1 (February/March, 2000) p46. See also 'Navy sets up panel for cooperation with Israel', *The Hindustan Times* (New Delhi: April 13, 2000).
45 See 'Indian frigates to balance Pak's sub programme', *The Times of India* (May 29, 2001).
46 A Pentagon official said, "We expect US policies to be more liberal in terms of defense transfers to India, not only with regard to Israeli exports, but also with regard to US sanction legislation. This liberalization, we hope, will open a window of opportunity for us to finalize a number of pending deals," referring to the nearly $1 billion worth of contracts under discussion or negotiation. See Aziz Haniffa, 'US may let Israel arm India', *The Hindustan Times* (May 1, 2001).
option from their strategic doctrines. The fact of nuclear possession is forcing strategic pundits in both states to realise the importance of crisis avoidance and management. But India’s commitment to develop its TMD will certainly disturb the delicate balance of power and undermine Pakistan’s security. Psychologically, Indian missiles defence will make Pakistan feel more vulnerable and less secure than before. At the very least, ballistic missile deployments introduce one more element of uncertainty into an already militarised region. Worst case analysis and mirror imaging could oblige Pakistan to devote more resources to its defences for sustaining its nuclear deterrence. The credibility and effectiveness of the Pakistan nuclear deterrent is based on the manifest capability to inflict unacceptable damage on India if it attacks.

Nuclear deterrence is a dynamic concept, which requires constant vigilance to detect and counteract destabilizing developments. Moreover, a nuclear balance is achieved when each side, after absorbing an initial blow, has a second-strike force able to inflict unacceptable damage on adversary. Pakistan’s geographical narrowness or lack of strategic depth and the Indians’ commitment to introduce more sophisticated nuclear capable delivery systems, like cruise missile, and ballistic missile defence systems pose serious challenges to credibility of Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence. The Indian weapons procurement and development policy has potential to erode the strategic equilibrium and shift balance of power in its favour. The calculus of real-politik holds that India behind the safe missile shield might be more likely to adopt military adventurous policies against Pakistan. For instance, by neutralising Pakistan’s retaliatory capabilities with the deployment of anti-missile systems, India could launch a conventional war or nuclear pre-emptive strike against Pakistan, without fear of nuclear retaliation from Pakistan.47 This indicates that Pakistan’s present strategic capabilities cannot provide it a reliable second-strike capability in future against India. Therefore, the caution against relying on forces that are too small is obvious. In fact, small forces would presumably be easier to destroy in a first strike and therefore would have less credibility as a deterrent because the surviving forces might not be able to retaliate. Based on this, nuclear deterrence requires some balance in terms of numbers of weapons and their technologies. With sizeable forces on both sides, the aggressor cannot be certain of a successful first strike. How should Pakistan effectively respond to the new strategic realities? Pakistan has to revise its strategic policy in order to counter the new strategic challenges. While responding to the Indian TMD threat, the alternative means of achieving its objectives must be weighed carefully and then the option that will maximize Pakistan’s gains and minimize its losses (decrease military vulnerability and economic costs) must be chosen. In the present scenario, Pakistan’s strategic policy ought to take the following factors into consideration.

a) South Asian Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty

Pakistan and India have already signed some nuclear and missile related agreements. For example, agreement not to attack each others’ nuclear facilities. Both states are honouring these agreements. Though the expectations would be modest, there are possibilities for more confidence building measures. Pakistan and India should negotiate the South Asian Anti Ballistic Missile (SAABM) Treaty, prohibiting nation-wide defences.

47 Sudden strike and the use thereafter of systems such as Arrow to ward off surviving retaliatory capability might give India a pre-emptive option. See Michael Quinlan, ‘How Robust is India-Pakistan Deterrence?’ *Survival*, Vol. 42, No. 4 (Winter2000-01) p.150.
against strategic and tactical ballistic missiles and barring the development, testing, and deployment of sea, air, space and mobile land-based ABM systems or components. The basis of this treaty would be the mutual recognition that India and Pakistan have already attained a strategic balance based on nuclear deterrence. Neither side could launch a nuclear attack against the other without calculating the risk of a retaliatory strike that would produce unacceptable damage. Therefore, without nation-wide defences, both India and Pakistan have confidence that the other would not risk a nuclear attack, knowing that it would be vulnerable to a retaliatory strike.

The possibility for the constitution of SAABM Treaty is remote between India and Pakistan. But the encouraging factor is that China opposed the developments and deployments of anti-missile systems. India always legitimised its nuclear weapons programme by linking it with China's nuclear weapons capabilities. Therefore, simple rejection of SAABM Treaty is not possible for India.

b) Qualitative and Quantitative Development of Missiles

India’s deployment of missile defences would make imperative the modernization of Pakistan's offensive force so that it could guard itself and penetrate India’s defences. The corollary of this anticipated action-reaction relationship is the hypothesis that the limitation of strategic defences establishes the necessity of offensive limitations. But it seems that India will not limit itself with its offensive might. It will deploy missile defences once it overcomes its technological shortcomings in this field. Therefore, Pakistan's credible nuclear deterrence requires maintenance of an unmistakable, secure retaliatory capability, preferably unchallenged by quantitative or qualitative improvements of Indian missile defence systems. Being a neighbouring state of Pakistan and due to a short-flight time of hostile missiles, India would prefer to adopt a strategy for intercepting Pakistan’s offensive missiles at their pre-launch site and boost phase. Therefore, Pakistan has to adopt some countermeasures to ensure the credibility of its offensive missiles. Notably, for pre-emptive strikes India has to locate where all Pakistani offensive missiles are based. If it discovers them, it could destroy them pre-emptively, in the case of hostilities. However, if Pakistan’s missiles are mobile, and if they are out of garrison and not otherwise observed, they are not vulnerable to such attack. In addition, Pakistan could disperse and store these missiles in hardened silos. Building bombproof hardened silos in plain areas is a costly affair. The economical strategy is that Pakistan shelters its missiles in mountain tunnels. These natural shelters could be modified into bombproof silos by limited financial investment. In addition, it should also build dummy missile silos and make dummy missiles deployments as well. Pakistan should also start working on the technology and techniques, which nullify or defeat the boost phase interceptors. Countermeasures to a boost-phase interceptor system might include redesign of the missiles to become a fast-burn missile. Because the boost phase interceptors carry a simple sensor to detect visible or near-infrared energy, it immediately

detects the bright flame of the rocket and home the interceptor against the flame. Additionally, one-stage dummy missiles might be launched to provoke and disguise the launch of the interceptors. Some analysts also believe that in addition to ballistic missiles, Pakistan ought to develop cruise missiles and missile defence systems. The indigenous development and manufacture of cruise missiles require expertise in airframes, propulsion systems, flight controls and warheads. Unfortunately, at the moment, the development of these systems are not advisable. Pakistan’s economy cannot sustain the burden of additional defence expenditure. Therefore, the best option for Pakistan in the present scenario is to avoid arms race with India. Instead of developing new kinds of offensive and defensive systems, Pakistan should concentrate on and be contented with its existing missile capabilities. It should only increase the numerical strength of its missile potential. For example, if India would be able to intercept Pakistan’s twenty missiles, it must have twenty-five missiles in its arsenal.

Conclusion

The US BMD has an inherent potential to initiate an action-reaction arms race cycle. In the 1960s arms competition was between the US and the Soviet Union. That essentially bilateral competition is still not resolved. Since the primary rationale for the US BMD is that the missile programme is for ‘rogue states’, such as North Korea, Russia fears that the US BMD, even initially limited to counter North Korea, might serve as a base for a highly effective system, capable of countering a reduced number of the Russian ICBMs and SLBMs. In East Asia a more complex scenario is in the offing. China is the most directly influenced by the US BMD initiatives. The most predictable impacts of the BMD are: firstly, it will jeopardise the global strategic balance and stability; and secondly, it will hamper the international arms control and disarmament process and even trigger a new round of arms race. To be specific, it may start off an arms race in outer space, and may also extend the arms race from offensive weapons to defensive weapons. Thirdly, it will undermine the international non-proliferation regime and efforts to reverse the arms race. Fourthly, the US BMD programme will increase the weight of the military factor in international relations, which is detrimental to international peace and security.

The US shifts from the protection of Mutually Assured Destruction towards the pursuit of missile defences, and India’s support to this decision would have negative and destabilising effects on Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence. India’s offensive and defensive modernisation and deployment plans with the assistance of its friendly states would undermine Pakistan’s diplomatic attempt for institutionalising some form of nuclear strategic restraint regime in the region. In addition, India’s successful developments and deployment of missile defences would undermine the strategic equilibrium between India and Pakistan and missile defences would intensify India’s confidence to counter Pakistani retaliatory capability. Hence Pakistan’s response to the Indian anti-missiles plans is inevitable. Most pressing need for Pakistan is to augment its own limited short-range as well as intermediate-range missile force, both qualitatively and quantitatively. In the
present scenario Pakistan has nowhere to go to acquire SAMs/TMDs even if it wanted to purchase them. Moreover, Pakistan's economy may not bear the cost of purchasing TMDs. Therefore, it has to rely on its own existing indigenous scientific missile infrastructure. The best option is that Pakistan modernise its offensive missile capabilities, so that, these missiles dodge the interceptors and successfully inflict intolerable damage by hitting the target. Multiplying the number of missiles and warheads is an applicable choice in the present economic circumstances of Pakistan. Enlarging Pakistan's missile forces to overwhelm the enemy defence certainly has some significant costs for Pakistan’s fragile economy. Nevertheless, it is imperative that Pakistan keep the option of missile build-up intact. The reason for this is that the build-up option is so simple to understand and so certain to work. Another advantage is that the build-up would be visible to the outside and would therefore help to discourage any first strike against Pakistan. In a nutshell, it is the only pragmatic option for maintaining the credibility of Pakistan's nuclear deterrence.
The Political Economy of Pakistan: Failures of Policy and Reform Regimes

Saleem M. Khan

Economic Development in Pakistan since 1950s has used the framework of a mixed economy. This concept combines the economic activities of both public and private sectors. In this framework the government plays a dominant role by regulating and guiding all economic activity. Management of the national economy under a mixed economic system produces two potential effects: the predominance of government in both national economic affairs and private sector activities. These effects make it difficult to predict the course of the economy and complicate economic management. The widespread failure of development efforts especially in poor countries has created doubts about the effectiveness of employing these mixed economy strategies.

During the post-World War II era, there was strong justification for an active role of government and adopting the framework of mixed economy. Development economists and the profession considered these factors critical for economic growth. In the present environment of open competition in major parts of the world, the strategy of free markets has become more popular. The development experience of the past five decades (1950-2000) and the record of performance in both social and economic areas in Pakistan make a strong case for thorough re-examination of economic policy in both its formulation and implementation. This paper’s focus is on the identification of problems, their impact on the economy, strategies for reform, and suggestions for possible improvements in future endeavours.

The framework of mixed economy in Pakistan has remained strictly under official authority. Government intervention has determined the pattern of development, defined the roles of public and private activities, and entrusted the bureaucracy with the tasks of implementation. This government control and sponsorship of business monopolies has failed to create a competitive environment in the free market. The mixed economy, instead of becoming an instrument of balanced development and dynamic performance, has created an administrative and bureaucratic economy. The overwhelming bureaucratic involvement in economic affairs has affected the efficiency of economic institutions. Over the years the availability of external resources has allowed the Pakistan economy to make some economic gains, but the gains from these efforts went mainly to those who held market power or were politically influential and the bulk of the population felt little or no improvement.

Successive regimes in Pakistan, as they conducted economic affairs, tried to practice paternalism. They were often pressured by foreign resource donors to adopt untested, and untried development approaches. A list of the diverse approaches adopted in Pakistan brings this point to the fore: self-reliance (1949-1955), growthmanship (1955-1970), growth with distribution (1972-1978), basic needs (1978-1983), supply-side economics (1983-1992), liberalization and privatization (1992 to date). These approaches and programmes were largely

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dependent on the employment of foreign resources, whereas domestic resources, especially human resources, were grossly under-employed.

Overall, the mixed economy has failed to produce people-friendly benefits and trickle down gains in Pakistan. The control over economic institutions, by a dominated market structure, the lop-sided distribution of income, its ignorance of people’s potential and their needs, and economic inefficiency has failed to achieve socially acceptable results. The nation and its people have paid a heavy price; the dismemberment of their country in December 1971 may be attributable at least in part to the denial of political participation and economic opportunity to its people.

**Problem Identification**

In an international conference on economic development organized by the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics in Islamabad in January 1997, many bureaucrats and policy-makers (both former and current incumbents) made presentations and participated in discussions during a public forum (PIDE, 1997). They were able to arrive at a rare consensus on the many shortcomings that have continued to haunt the economy of Pakistan. They acknowledged three main causes, which led to this poor socio-economic performance:

- Poor Governance
- Priority of Projects over Policies
- Fiscal Imprudence

The dimensions of these problems remain to be researched and analyzed in depth. I will merely outline a few facts and observations that bear upon the nature and scope of the three main causes.

The process of governance in Pakistan has been flawed in many respects—a centralized rule, weak political institutions, widespread corruption and lacking in a tradition of political accountability. The implications have been far reaching for the political-economic system. Bureaucrats, military and feudal leaders continue to seek to control the political and economic institutions and with the avowed purpose of governing the nation. Their attempts to seize and hold power fails to recognize and establish the traditions of democracy and they have paid very little attention to achieving peoples’ participation in national decision making. This pattern of governance has seriously compromised the principles on which the effective functioning of national institutions, formulation and implementation of policies, quality of economic structures, and the impartiality of the legal system depends.

The roots and extensions of misrule in Pakistan lie in its centralized system of governance. Its dictates are reinforced through a hierarchy of civil servants that seeks to control federal, state and local administrations while at the same time avoiding personal responsibility. In the absence of decentralized decision-making, state and local governments have often been ineffective and lack adequate financing. Besides, authorities at the center have never recognized the need for grass-roots participation. This conflict between central authority and local aspirations creates a strong demand for regional autonomy and encourages breakaway tendencies.

Political intrigues and attempts at self-aggrandizement began with the birth of Pakistan and paved the way for interventions in the political process. After a decade of misrule prompted by many bureaucratic interventions, the army, in the name of saving the country, declared the first martial law in 1958, cancelled national elections and abrogated the constitution. The hallmark of this new regime was the attempt to manipulate basic democracy. This attempt failed. Yet another
military regime came to power in 1969 and held the first and the last free and fair election in 1970. Unfortunately it deemed the results unsatisfactory and refused to transfer power to the properly elected representatives of the people.

The elected successor government which assumed power in 1972 in the wake of the national debacle of December 1971, tried to pursue populist policies. It promised its people freedom and paved the way for still another period of martial law. Another military regime overthrew the government elected in 1977 first suspending and later amending the 1973 constitution. The legacy of this regime was a misuse of religion, mismanagement of the economy and the gross violation of human rights. Moreover, under this regime many excesses took place during attempts to silence political dissent.

Starting in 1988, the next two so-called democratic governments have taken economic corruption to new heights. This new breed of leadership emerging from a younger generation proved even more incompetent in attempting to serve public interest and often indulged in mimicking the lifestyle of the “rich and famous” as seen on western television. One government made headlines in The New York Times on January 9, 1998 for leaving a trail of corruption extending across the world while the other had become famous for its financial scandals (The New York Times, 8 January 1998).

There has been systematic pattern of undermining of the existing political and economic institutions—democratic system, constitution, judiciary, commercial banking, labor unions, small business and small farm owners in particular. The democratic system has not been given a chance to function. The constitution has been tampered with so as to serve the needs of each successive ruler. The judiciary has been seriously weakened. The banking sector after having been nationalized is being used for politically driven loans, which are often non-performing. Only big business and large-scale industry have received generous support by the government in subsidies, tax relief, licensing privileges and cheaper investment financing. Small businesses are left on their own. Labor unions have been kept weak. Policies that led to declining real wages have seldom been reviewed. Agriculture has remained subject to unfavorable pricing, disinvestments, and an out-dated land tenure system. In the absence of real land reforms rural life remains in tight feudal grip and remains the victim of share-cropping. Economic institutions that underwrite and promote popular welfare have come under frequent assault. Official irregularities in economic areas have been rather widespread. Some profiles of corruption and mismanagement are described below.

There is a legacy of politically directed lending of non-performing loans from the nationalized banks. Special development funds and rural development programs are clear examples of rent seeking behavior. There is also a scandal involving billions on the import of South Korean cars.

Corruption and bribery have become institutionalized and accepted as a way of life in the country. Economic policies and political activities are tied up in a cycle, which evolves around the corrupt system of licenses, controls, government approval for investments, imports, exports, employment, land purchase, hiring and dismissals, and virtually every other aspect of economic activity. Pervasive corruption greases the wheels of civil service at local state and federal levels, and industry and commerce are badly affected by it. Red tape, abuse of authority for personal gain, and widespread bribes undermine economic efficiency. In the absence of a credible process of accountability and in total disregard of adherence to minimum standards of economic management and efficiency, public money is spent on projects, which have little social or economic value. This culture of corruption
discourages an inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI). Billions more are spent on creating symbols, uninspiring and meaningless national celebrations. Politicians frequently go on foreign travel, taking along planeloads of families and friends and political cronies on shopping and pilgrimage on state expense. Billions disappear in investment leakages and military contracts. No wonder Pakistan ranks as the 10th most corrupt country in the world according to Berlin based Non Governmental Organization (NGO) Transparency International.

Regarding the priority of projects over policy the picture that emerges is even more dismal. Administrative decision making and bureaucratic management have made the economy of Pakistan even more tightly controlled. Foreign assistance and western advisors played a key role in selecting and financing projects in industry, agriculture and infrastructure development and investment in human capital. These have failed to meet the criteria of long-term goals of industrialization, infrastructure building, and agricultural modernization. The development projects that were undertaken were of low national priority and of questionable merit. By and large, they have proven to be expensive and of doubtful value.

Some of the high priced projects were at odds with national priority and needs. For example, railway electrification in Punjab, development of urban centers, and settlement of Punjabis on virgin lands in Sind. The latest is the construction of a Lahore-Peshawar motorway. This on-again, off-again planning, has cost the country dearly in terms of cost escalation, foregone commercial and business activities, investment constraints and has failed to create employment opportunities while reducing state revenues. Other white elephants, projects of a non-developmental character, include the palatial President and Prime Minister Houses, and several other status symbol government structures in Islamabad. Their opportunity cost is high and can be measured in terms of forgone investment in social programmes and other more productive sectors of the economy. The welfare expenditures of Islamabad city put a large burden on the national treasury. It is officially acknowledged that the Islamabad Capital Development Authority’s (CDA) budget is almost 80 percent of national social expenditure.

Project-based development in Pakistan has adversely affected the economy. The economic landscape is full of distortions and dislocation. It has deprived the nation and its people of basic necessities. The existence of excess capacity in industry and the concomitant shortfall in essential raw materials and spare parts has increased the costs for private investors. Another drawback to this project strategy is the resulting environmental damage. The nation’s health has become hostage to both pollution and congestion. Billions of dollars are lost each year due to environmental degradation.

Fiscal prudence in public finance is the key to macroeconomic stability and sustained economic development. Shortfalls in revenues and wasteful non-development expenditures emanate from poor fiscal management. In a political system, which places few constraints of accountability at any level of government, public borrowing and big budget deficits have become the easy way out. Federal deficits exceed 7 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), domestic debt outstanding and interest payments account for 45 percent and 8 percent of GDP. Besides, there is a huge external debt of $ 35 billion with financing charges absorbing 35 percent of the annual export earnings. Currently, external debt stands at about 60 percent of the GDP. The combined sum of domestic and external debt plus annual finance charges is approximately 120 percent of the GDP (The World Bank, 1995-98) (International Comparisons – see Appendix A). Pakistan is in a
“debt trap” and its development process is under siege. Development has become hostage to domestic corruption and external pressures.

Policies such as building a new capital city of Islamabad, the not so well thought out programme of industry and banking nationalization, the phony programmes of rural development and public works, run-away military defense expenditures and so-called programmes of national pride have increased the cost of capital, wasting and diverting it from more productive investments.

**Socio-Economic Impact**

The socio-economic impact of the above-mentioned problems has been in the form of a lop-sided pattern of development, economic dislocations and social inequalities. The economic costs can be defined in terms lost human capital and wasteful use of capital. The social costs to Pakistani society are in the form of unemployment, inflation, environmental degradation, violence and crime. The burden of these costs on the people has reinforced social inequalities. Among the following are a few illustrations of development-based social costs in Pakistan and their implications.

- Market distortions have created income disparities and apparently free lunches-by taxing the poor and subsidizing the influential.
- Involuntary unemployment has resulted in lost wages and output causing the depreciation of human capital.
- Development generated inflation has discouraged productive investment and curtailed purchasing power and the social welfare of the common people.
- Environmental degradation has lowered the quality of life and increased health costs.
- Crime and social deprivation have adversely affected investment and productivity environment in Pakistan.

A survey of the current socio-economic landscape in Pakistan reveals glaring deprivations. Recent estimates indicate that seventy percent of its 40 million people are illiterate; 60 million people lack access to health services, safe water and sanitation. The gross enrollment in elementary education is less than 24 percent and over 30 percent of population lives in poverty; only 35 percent of the population is in the labor force (United Nation Development Program, 1997-98). The future outlook is not optimistic either. Population growth is nearly 3.2 percent, one of the highest in the world. Annual public expenditure on education and health is 2.7 and 1.8 percent of GDP, which is even lower than other countries with lower incomes (International Comparisons- see Appendix B). Overall, the profile of human development is dismal.

The irony is that while the wealthy and influential are being compensated for social costs in a system of government welfare the poor have been forced to pick up the tab.

The adoption of a mixed economy in Pakistan has affected adversely performance levels in both private and public sectors. In the private sector, there are striking examples of “market failure”. Agriculture is far from being modernized and has not become a vibrant sector of the economy. A big segment of farm life is affected by sharecropping and suffers from feudal culture. Public sectors contribute to government failures. The economy is captive to bureaucratic incompetence and inefficiency. The economic gains Pakistan has made in the last five decades would
have been made irrespective of role of the government and its so-called planning and the costs could have been much smaller.

Examining the nature and scope of the problems and costs inflicted on the economy and the people does not mean that the problems encountered and cost inflicted have gone unchallenged. These issues are not new to national debate and have been widely acknowledged in official, professional and national forums. Reforms in the areas of governance, economic policymaking and fiscal management have been instituted and tried but without much success precisely due to the problems identified by the architects of failed development approaches.

Reform Regimes

The nature and scope of economic problems reveals how flawed the process of national policy-making has been in Pakistan. It is not only that projects took precedence over policy making in the official decision-making but also the policy making over the years was not adequately institutionalized and remained an ad hoc process giving power and discretion to individuals rather than pursuing the rules of institutions.

Other evidence also indicate that very few concerted efforts were made to formulate a worthwhile industrial policy, modernize agriculture and develop human capital. Policy decisions have largely responded to domestic political expediencies and external influences and pressures. Reforms in four key areas are worth mentioning: governance (1960s-80s), industrial reforms (1972), land reform (1959, 1973), and economic reforms (1988-98).

Governance based reforms were introduced in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. These reforms amounted to introducing poor models of democracy, arbitrary firing of civil servants charged with corruption, instituting numerous anti-corruption programmes and expanding the security apparatus to maintain law and order. But the root causes of poor governance such as tampering with the constitution and the political process itself were rarely addressed. Frequent interventions in the political process by the leadership coupled with the bureaucratic, military, and feudal controls on the economy have been the real stumbling blocks. The road to good governance and accountability is through a stable and free democratic process, transparency and popular participation in national governance.

Industrialization in Pakistan started in 1950s by establishing consumer goods industries. The industrial reforms of 1972 focused on restructuring and diversification. These strategies were aimed at expanding an industrial base by building a steel mill in Karachi, a heavy tool factory in Taxila, capital goods industries, and agro-based industries such as fertilizer and food processing at various sites throughout the country. However, frequent disruptions in the political process mismanaged the industrial reforms.

The commissioning of land reforms spread over two decades from 1958 to 1977. These reforms were aimed at changing the land tenure systems, distributions of land and loosening the feudal grip and redistribution of land among the landless tenants. But these attempts did not succeed. Land reform programmes in each period were neither effectively designed nor efficiently implemented. At the dawn of the 21st century, the country is still clinging to a feudal dominated land tenure system whose dominant features are sharecropping and backward relations of production subservience of tenants to landowners.

The economic reforms of 1983-97 were based on supply-side approaches—liberalization of the economy, trade, investments and privatization. However, their success depended upon a concerted effort in implementation and obedience to the
“rules of the marketplace.” Due to half-hearted efforts, the expected outcomes of the economic reforms such as rapid economic expansion, export-led growth, higher incomes for all groups, expanded health and education benefits, better housing, and building of “social safety net” have not been adequately realized.

**Conclusion**

The failures of policy and reform regimes in Pakistan have been due mainly to poor governance and non-involvement of the people. In order to adequately attack national problems, the country needs a fresh start. The experience in governance, institution buildings, policy making, and economic reforms gained at such a high cost during the past five decades can provide lessons for changing the future course of national reconstruction and development. Some of my suggestions include the following.

By creating a system of good governance we can develop a workable system of democracy, which both imparts the right of decision making to the people and gives them a stake in its success. Restoring the constitution of 1973 could be a good beginning. It had a process of built-in-accountability. In the future we should avoid temptation to intervene in the political process. Previous interventions have proven to be costly and counter-productive.

The economic policymaking process should be institutionalized. Ad-hocism has proven to be flawed. Fiscal prudence requires reducing non-development expenditures. Civil administration and defense spending should be reexamined and steps taken to reduce them.

One vital factor in our national life that we have often failed to acknowledge is the people, their lives and welfare. The prospect of participation can motivate the people as they discharge their responsibilities and exercise their rights. Once confident of their participation in a more favourable environment they should advance the goals of national rehabilitation and reconstruction much more effectively.

Finally some reflections. At the start of the first millennium, our forefathers led the world in the areas of governance, culture, architect, science and technology. At that time, our world was the center of all that was progress. Baghdad (Iraq) and Cordova (Spain) were the citadels of learning and the shining seats of knowledge, science and technology. In that period of history the focus of the development was on the good governance and the people. In the contemporary period the successive regimes in Pakistan have ignored improvements in governance and have resorted to pushing the people around rather than leading them. Consequently, we have deprived ourselves of progress.

If our citizens are able to participate in national affairs, receive education, enjoy proper nutrition, live in a safe healthy environment and fully develop their natural mental and physical aptitudes in an intellectually stimulating culture, we may regain our lost respect in the world and make progress. If we persist in ignoring the importance of the individual and continue to restrict personal development than we have unfortunately condemned ourselves to a harvest of exactly what we have sown.
From Divergence to Convergence, and Back Again: Some Structural Constraints on Stability in India-Pakistan Relations

Subrata K. Mitra

Introduction

In retrospect, once the dust has settled on the embattled mountain peaks of Kargil, the four months that separate the Lahore Declaration and the first Indian air strikes will be remembered as a period of lost opportunities for lasting peace in South Asia. If the signing of the agreement between the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan in the historic location of Lahore, signaled the maturing of a process of deliberation between India and Pakistan on the main points of conflict including Kashmir, then the discovery of the massive infiltration on the Indian side of the Line of Control, and the rapid Indian response including air strikes, not seen since 1971, were a return to the past when the two neighbours could conceptualize one another only in terms of violent conflict. The sheer rapidity with which the scene changed from diplomacy of Lahore to war in Kargil questions the foundations on which the former was based.

In their own ways Lahore and Kargil describe two different ways of conceptualizing India-Pakistan relations. The Lahore Declaration symbolizes a non-dichotomous model which suggests a substantive base of shared interests from which diplomacy could work towards the containment and solution of other conflicts. Now, the outbreak of war so soon after the fanfare with which the Lahore Accord was signed makes the peace process look irrelevant to the reality of India-Pakistan relations which is better described as a dichotomous model, one where the two countries are seen as locked in a zero sum conflict which leaves no room for negotiation or co-operation. The objective of this essay is to enquire into the origin of the two models and examine their implications for regional security.

The Problem Stated

Both dichotomous and non-dichotomous models start from the premise that states are sovereign actors which act solely out of national interest. The dichotomous model which underpins the analysis of India-Pakistan relations for many observers of South Asian politics since the inception of the two states as a consequence of the Partition of British India. The non-dichotomous model conceptualizes the interests of the two states in non-zero sum terms which allows for co-operation in some areas. There are other secondary differences between the two approaches as well. The dichotomous model is ‘backward looking’ in the sense that it draws its main inspiration from the ‘two-nation theory’ which conceptualizes the contemporary political scene in South Asia in terms of the unfinished history of Partition as long as Pakistan does not have control over the whole of Kashmir. The

\* An earlier version of this paper was presented at a conference on ‘Pakistan: Nuclear Tests and Beyond’, St Antony’s College, Oxford, 28-29 May 1999.

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state of Pakistan, according to the advocates of this approach is locked against a more powerful strategic adversary. In consequence, as the sole actor capable of defending the integrity of the nation, the state can, if need be at the cost of democracy at home, take every measure including alliance and war, to protect its sovereignty. The non-dichotomous mode, on the other hand, looks beyond the Partition of the sub-continent and postulates the foundation of the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation as the point of departure and recognizes the national states as principal but not exclusive actors in regional politics. At a given point of time, the state is represented by specific interests though the representatives of the state typically speak in the name of the whole nation, and with an indefinite time horizon. The non-dichotomous model recognizes actors above and below the state and brings into analysis, interests that are not represented by the state. It casts binary conflicts as nested within larger, regional structures.

Drawing on the history of conflict in South Asia and the logic of two-person non-co-operative games, this paper suggests that lasting peace in the region requires both India and Pakistan to follow the non-dichotomous model. A temporary and fragile truce is possible when both follow the dichotomous model. But belligerency and low intensity war can be expected when one actor follows the dichotomous model and the other a non-dichotomous model. The paper examines the implications of these conjectures on the basis of the history of war and security dilemma in South Asia. It shows that though the dichotomous model has mostly dominated this relation, there has been an increasing realization that the maximization of interests in terms of this model could actually lower the interest of individual actors. These lost ‘peace dividends’ nevertheless remain beyond the reach of the states locked in zero-sum conflicts because of the very logic of the nature of their conflict relations, akin to a prisoner’s dilemma game. Drawing on Axelrod’s model of recursive games and confidence building measures the article shows how a non-dichotomous approach could enhance welfare of both sides. However, the return of violent conflict in Kargil shows the fragility of the process of transition from the dichotomous to the non-dichotomous model. On the basis of the analysis undertaken here, the article suggests that stable peace in the South Asian context requires the adoption of a two-track strategy by both actors and a triangular normalization which involves India, Pakistan and China. Before we look at the origins of the two models and the history of their interaction, we shall briefly examine their formal implications with the help of a two person, non-co-operative game.

A Formal Model of India-Pakistan Relations

The theory employed here is taken from two person non-co-operative games. For each party–India and Pakistan–there is a choice between two tactics:

a) maintain status quo, corresponding to a state of conflict.
b) arms reduction.

Both players make their choices independently (i.e., without negotiating with the other). The ‘pay-offs’ to the players make no inter-personal

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1 See Anita Inder Singh, *The Origins of the Partition of India*, 1936–1947 (Delhi: Oxford University Press; 1987) for a succinct analysis of the conditions leading to the partition of British India. Some of the implications for India and Pakistan, respectively, can be found in Christophe Jaffrelot, *The Hindu Nationalist Movement and Indian Politics, 1925 to the 1990s: Strategies of Identity Building, Implantation and Mobilisation* (Delhi: Viking; 1993), and Seyyed Reza Nasr, *The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution* (London: I.B. Tauris; 1994).
comparison of utility. Thus, 0 implies the least utility to the actor concerned, i.e., a least desirable outcome. Higher numbers in the cell entries imply more utility for the actor concerned, and as such, a more preferable outcome. In the pay-off matrix presented below, the first figure in each cell denotes the utility to the player named on the left (i.e., India) and the second figure the utility to the player named above (i.e., Pakistan).

In the game analysed below, the expected outcome in an end-game scenario is as follows:

If both players try to 'play it safe', i.e., maximize minimum gain, they end up at the status quo where each is individually worse off than the best outcome where both reduce arms. Players might realize that and try to move away unilaterally in the direction of co-operation, leading to unilateral, non-negotiated arms reduction. For this, they run the risk of being punished, as a result of attempts by the other player to take advantage of the window of opportunity to strike the fatal blow. As such, both will be weary and neither will move away from the status quo.

It can be shown that each player would reason from 'how much it stands to lose' in each case and would calculate what could happen at the worst. They would then choose that option which brings the best of the worst possible outcomes. In the language of the game, they would try to maximize the security levels. For India it is [10]; for Pakistan [5]. They would thus unilaterally choose to be at the cell 1.1, with the [10,5] outcome, far less than the possible [50,60] outcome. Thus, a non-cooperative variable sum game produces a sub-optimal game in an end-game scenario.

India-Pakistan payoff matrix:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pakistan</th>
<th>Status quo</th>
<th>reduce arms</th>
<th>India min. gains</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>India status quo</td>
<td>10,5</td>
<td>10,0</td>
<td>[10]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reduce arms</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>50,60</td>
<td>[2]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>min. gains to Pakistan</td>
<td>[5]</td>
<td>[10]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Genesis of the two Models

Following independence, under the leadership of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, India adopted non-alignment and planned development as the cornerstone of India’s domestic politics. In spite of three wars with Pakistan, a serious border conflict with China and the dispatch of Indian Peace Keeping Forces to Sri Lanka and their subsequent ignominious withdrawal, the average voter as well as the politicians of India remain relatively unconcerned about foreign policy. Panchsheel which was intended to provide a link between domestic and foreign policy was based on a non-dichotomous model that however lost most of its moral force in the perception of Pakistan because of its unstated assumption that Kashmir was a non-issue when it came to India-Pakistan relations.
The state of Pakistan, in contrast to India, started with different premises from the outset. As a state based on the two nation theory, Pakistan saw itself as the defender of the Muslims of the sub-continent, and as such, locked in conflict with India on the issue of Kashmir whose Muslim majority should have logically made it a part of its own territory. The greater military resources at the disposal of India have made Pakistan look for an equalizer in the form of military alliances with the United States and subsequently with China. The tit-for-tat nuclear explosions in Pakistan in response to the Indian tests have proved once again the durability of dichotomous thinking in Pakistan. Within this perspective, the bus diplomacy of Vajpayee and Sharif and the Lahore Declaration were an aberration from which, with shots flying in Kargil, the system has retracted to its original state under the weight of the history of conflict and dichotomous thinking on the part of key actors. The cost of this strategy has however been enormous in terms of the economy and arms race in the region.

In order to maintain steady economic growth and credibility in the international market both Pakistan and India need urgently to invest in key sectors of the economy, infrastructure and education, and, at least give the appearance of being serious about solving conflicts with her regional neighbours. Crucial to the latter is a formal or even informal regional security arrangement. The South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC), hamstrung by a Charter which explicitly forbids the public discussion of matters of ‘domestic’ politics, is currently unable to play the role. It is further restrained by the likelihood of parties to conflicts within South Asian calling on the good offices of non-regional forces, lowering the legitimacy and effectiveness of any regional arrangement. Besides, it has not in the past received sufficient endorsement from India, the most important country of the region. While contextual factors such as the personal equations between the Prime Minister of India and Pakistan from 1996-1999 have produced an informal environment of regional conflict resolution, developments in domestic politics in India appear to cast a shadow on the recent foreign policy gains with regard to the creation of a South Asian security framework. The analysis that follows looks at the ensemble of factors that impinge on Indian policy in the face of South Asian security dilemma.

South Asia’s Security Dilemma

Since the departure of British colonial rule from the region, South Asia has witnessed a series of severe border conflicts leading to war as well as serious outbreaks of mass insurgency, riots and communal violence. India and Pakistan had a serious conflict over Kashmir in 1947-1948, a border war in 1965, a war on both the eastern and the western fronts in 1971 and a state of low intensity conflict in the 1980s. The India-China border war of 1962 saw the Chinese troops coming close to the North Indian plains. There have been mass insurgencies in Kashmir, Punjab, Assam and Maoist violence in southern and eastern India. Pakistan has had a continuous series of ethnic conflicts in Sind, Karachi and has faced massive influx of refugees from Afghanistan. Sri Lanka has been beset with insurgency and large scale military operations against the Tamil rebels. Bangladesh has faced insurgency in the Chakma Hill Tract. The Maldives faced a coup which was diffused with Indian assistance. It is strongly, believed that South Asia’s domestic conflicts are not entirely endogenous and that foreign help plays an important role in exacerbating them. South Asia’s domestic and regional conflicts are linked, greatly complicating the issues and contributing to the financial and military burden of maintaining order.
The security problem and the lack of a comprehensive regional security arrangement have had their repercussions on the military budgets. A brief perusal of the relevant statistics shows the imbalance of developmental and military expenses in South Asia. South Asia’s states are quite heavily armed (table 1).

### Table-1

**India and her Neighbours: Conventional Weapons**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Armed Forces (active)</th>
<th>MBT</th>
<th>AIFC/ APC</th>
<th>Artillery</th>
<th>Helicopters</th>
<th>Combat Aircraft</th>
<th>Warships</th>
<th>Sub-marines</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>1,265.000</td>
<td>3.739</td>
<td>1.057</td>
<td>3.585</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>864</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PR China</td>
<td>2,930.000</td>
<td>8.000</td>
<td>2.800</td>
<td>14.500</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>5,845</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>587.000</td>
<td>1.950</td>
<td>820</td>
<td>1.849</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>434</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>115.000</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>126.000</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>40.000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>286.000</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>276.000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>647</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>61.600</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>771</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Notes:  
MBT=Main Battle Tank  
AIFV=Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicle  
APC=Armoured Personnel Carrier  
Artillery includes self propelled, drawn artillery and MLRS-systems.  
Helicopters include combat helicopters and armed helicopters.  
Combat Aircraft includes fighters and fighter bombers. Warships include major surface combatants from frigate upwards.

Their military burden during the post-cold war period has gone up in contrast to the trend in all developing countries taken together (table 2).

### Table-2

**Post-Cold War Military Burden (% change between 1987-94)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Military expenditure</th>
<th>Armed Forces personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>13.920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>9.500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>108.3</td>
<td>3.500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop. Countries</td>
<td>-13.0</td>
<td>13.920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>-36.7</td>
<td>622.160</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Their percent increase of 12.4 in military spending during the period between 1987-1994 is a sharp contrast to the decrease of 41.2 on the part of the industrial countries of the world. Particularly striking is the increase of the military expenditure as a percentage of the GDP between 1985-1994, from 2.6 to 3.6 in India and 5.2 to 7.0 in Pakistan (Table 3).

One can talk about a virtual arms ‘race’ between India and Pakistan in terms of their military expenditure, which, in case of Pakistan, has almost doubled during the period from 1987-1996 (figure 1). By all reckoning, however, the states of South Asia are among the poorest in the world (table 4), a fact that gives great significance to the ‘peace dividends’ (table 5). It should be noted here that the military expenditure of South Asia to a large extent goes into the purchase of arms and technology from powers outside the region and thus, does not act as a multiplier to defence and related industries in the region itself. It thus constitutes a ‘net drain’ on the resources of South Asian countries.

Such heavy military expenditure in South Asia might come across as a surprise in view of the overall poverty of the region. Since strategic thinking of countries is guided by security as well as welfare, it would not, therefore, be unrealistic to expect the decision-makers of the states of South Asia to be aware of the trade-off between the defence and welfare budgets. The question that arises here is why are they unable to go from ‘here’ and reap the benefits of the peace divided by reducing military expenditure? The next section would analyse the question from the point of view of India by concentrating on the evolution of Indian policy during the period after independence. (Table 3)

Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Burden of Military Expenditure in South Asia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% of GDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>South Asia</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia (excl. China)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China (PRC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop. Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial. Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Karachi et. al.: Oxford University Press 1997, p. 80 (Table 4.)
The Evolution of India’s South Asia ‘Policy’ since Independence

This section will provide the historical backdrop to the present context by drawing on the earlier years, going back to Nehru. For the purpose of this analysis, the period can be divided into four phases:

a) Classic non-alignment (1947-1962)

b) War, alliance with the USSR and attempts at regional dominance (1963-89)

c) Contained dominance based on negotiation (1989-1999)

d) The return to conflict and the limits of the ‘two-track’ strategy (1999--)

[a] Classic Non-Alignment (1947-1962) – the ’Nehru Doctrine’

The first place after independence, starting with the first war with Pakistan over Kashmir (1947-1948) and ending with the totally unexpected Himalayan war with China in 1962, is characterized by India’s self-perception as one of the leaders and co-founder of the Non-aligned Movement (NAM). This first phase also was clearly dominated by Jawaharlal Nehru, one of India’s founding fathers. Under his leadership, the newly independent state ventured out onto the international stage, firmly determined to stay clear from any entanglement with superpower politics. Nehru retained a deep distrust of the superpowers and was weary of their designs on the newly emerging post-colonial societies. But Nehru the internationalist was also a great believer in the United Nations Organization and wished to strengthen it by India’s active participation in it. Unfortunately for Nehru (and India), the Kashmir drama was unfolding just about the time that Nehru was seeking to find a just and
honourable place for India in the world system. Contrary to Nehru’s internationalist aspirations, the Kashmir imbroglio and the conflict with Pakistan was to become the focal point of India’s security politics.

Nehru’s view on Kashmir, which amounted to a doctrine-like position, was based on his firm conviction that, thanks to a lawful and legitimate Instrument of Accession, the status of Kashmir, like the other regions of India, was that of an integral part of the Union. The application of this doctrine to the creation of specific policies to Kashmir as to other regions of India during the two decades following independence would depend on the specific circumstances of each. The resulting confusion and contradictions would, in the years to come, give an appearance of a certain fuzziness, to Nehru’s position. At various points, and to different actors, the Nehru ‘doctrine’ would appear inconsistent, indecisive and vulnerable to pressure. Nehru would by turns be perceived as a half-hearted bully and a naïve internationalist. But the power and the institutional strength of this policy consisted in its internal cohesion notwithstanding its apparent contradictions, and, its close links with the ideological basis of the state in India.

Nehru’s Kashmir policy also resulted over the years in a larger paradox with regard to Indian foreign policy. While its rhetoric gave every appearance of being non-dichotomous with regard to Pakistan, thanks to its intransigence when it came to Kashmir it was perceived by Pakistan as essentially dichotomous but not necessarily equipped with the requisite force to reinforce its implied belligerence. The perceptions of Nehru’s policy towards Kashmir which in turn affected the perceptions of India’s overall policy by the key players in the region and in the world at large can be summed up as follows:

[1] **Indecisiveness.** With Nehru as prime minister and as such, the de facto decision-maker of the dominion, India lost valuable time in air-lifting elite troops to defend Kashmir. When they were effectively employed in fending-off the tribesmen, and were poised to push them back to the frontier of Kashmir, instead of pressing on the advantage, Nehru’s India did not put the military success to political use. Instead, the military gains were lost in political manoeuvres.

The same is true for Indian diplomacy on Kashmir. Even when India repeated in every conceivable forum that Kashmir was an integral part of India and that the accession of Kashmir on the basis of the Instrument of Accession was final, India’s decision-makers, nevertheless kept behaving as if this was not the case and channels of negotiation were kept open to settle the Kashmir issue.

The contradiction between India’s principle intransigence regarding the status of Kashmir as an absolute and irrevocable part of India based on the Instrument of Accession and her willingness to negotiate the point when called upon to do so was perceived by Pakistan and the external world as Indian vulnerability to pressure.

[2] **Half-hearted bully.** Nehru’s India, while giving a formal commitment to provide a higher degree of autonomy to Kashmir than what was available to the rest of India, nevertheless took up a series of measures that diluted this in practice. Nehru, however, stopped short of a full integration of Kashmir to bring it in line with the other parts of India. India’s military actions, against Goa in 1961 and

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Indian opposition to self-determination in Kashmir through a ‘plebiscite’ are seen in this light.

Article 370 of the Indian Constitution was originally instituted as a guarantee of the autonomy of Kashmir in all areas except defence, foreign affairs and communication. This formal undertaking was compromised in practice through a steady chipping away as the legal safeguard through amendments of the Constitution and Presidential Orders. On the other hand, full integration was deliberately obstructed through the prohibition of the settlement of refugees through the allocation of evacuee property and a special provision for the return of those who left Kashmir for Pakistan in the future. In spite of the fundamental right to the freedom of movement within India, Indian’s were not allowed to settle in Kashmir.

[3] **Naïve Internationalist.** Nehru’s India went to the Security Council with great fanfare, but then, had cold feet when it came to follow this initiative up with action. Nehru went to the Security Council hoping to get the endorsement of the international community for the Indian position on Kashmir without taking into account the fact that the realpolitik underlying the perceptions of the superpowers dictated otherwise. Nehru’s policy decisions regarding Kashmir, drawn from the basic goals of secure frontiers and popular consent, were increasingly affected by his basic equation of Kashmir’s integration with India as a moral guarantee of India’s secularism. Nehru clearly wanted the world to condemn Pakistan for trying to undo the integration of Kashmir by brute force. When it became clear to Nehru that the world did not accept India’s case as categorically as Nehru had hoped, he became bitter and disillusioned.

[4] **Vulnerability to Pressure.** Above all, Nehru followed the traditional policies of the Indian National Congress which was to rule by consensus and accommodation. He was aware of the conflicting pulls of narrow self-interest and high principle and through a long experience of the congress culture. But Nehru who was also intensely aware of the international arena, was conscious of being constantly under observation and had to find a solution acceptable to all parties concerned. His policies were thus not entirely his choices but were influenced by local conditions in Kashmir; the jockeying for positions and power in India’s national politics, and, the regional and international actors, such as Pakistan, China,

4 For Nehru, Kashmir was crucial for the security of India as well. In his statement on Kashmir on March 1948, Nehru stated that India had only two objectives in Jammu and Kashmir state: “to ensure the freedom and the progress of the people there, and to prevent anything happening that might endanger the security of India”. G.Parthasarathi, ed., Jawaharlal Nehru; Letters to Chief Ministers, vol. 1, 1947-1064, Delhi: Oxford University Press 1985, p 81, fn 15).

5 Nehru even went as far as comparing Pakistan with Nazi Germany: “It is extraordinary how these developments remind one of the technique adopted by Hitler. Indeed, the whole policy of the Muslim League during the past few years has been singularly reminiscent of the Nazi tactics…. Another feature of Pakistan’s attack on Kashmir, which also reminds one of Nazi Germany, is the fierce, blatant and false propaganda that has been carried on by their radio and press.” (G. Parthasarathi, ed., Jawaharlal Nehru: Letters to Chief Ministers, vol. 1, 1947-1964, Delhi: Oxford University Press 1985, p 6-7).

6 Gopal writes, “His [Nehru’s] visit to London and Paris brought home to him how much India was being judged by her conduct in Kashmir and Hyderabad. (Nehru to Patel from Paris, 27 October 1948) He was forced to recognize that his policies did not appear as impeccable to others as they did to him.” Gopal, op.cit., p 33.

7 Sarvepalli Gopal comments: “…whatever Nehru’s romantic attachment to the mountains of Kashmir, it did not influence his policy, and the decisions on Kashmir were not, as has been frequently suggested, being taken by him alone in an overwhelming mood of sentiment.” S. Gopal, op.cit. p.20.
Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States. These conditions changed from one period to another, causing, in the process, Nehru’s policies to fluctuate.

The quintessence of the Nehru doctrine was a moral vision, seeking to balance security with democracy and categorically opposed to the ‘two nation theory’ and the religious dogmatism on which it was perceived to be based. Convinced about the rightness of his cause Nehru believed that with persuasion, patience and enlightenment others in Pakistan and in India would also be able to see things from his point of view.

[b] Attempts at Regional Dominance: the ‘Indira Doctrine’

From 1947 to 1962, Kashmir was the focal point of India’s – and Nehru’s international politics. The 1962 Himalayan war with China drove home the point that there were other security problems, too. Nehru the internationalist was not willing to believe up to the last minute that his vision of “Hindi-Chini bhai bhai” (Indian and Chinese are brothers) was not shared by China and that a war, or at least an armed conflict, was imminent. Therefore, the Chinese attack on Indian position along the border hit the Indian army unprepared. It has been argued that had Nehru been more realistic and less idealistic (or simply less native), this war probably could have been avoided\(^8\). As a direct result of this war, India went on an international shopping spree to acquire – finally – all those sophisticated weapons the Indian armed forces had been lobbying for years. For Pakistan, the pace of India’s armament gave cause for alarm. As Ganguly argues\(^9\), the Pakistani government saw a window of opportunity for the capture of the whole of Kashmir, created through the humiliation and the weakness of the Indian armed forces, closing rapidly. In this very crucial moment. Nehru died, causing a perception of vulnerability on the part of India.

With Nehru removed from the scene, the probability of war increased. On the Pakistani side, the replacement of Nehru by Shastri, perceived as less assertive, reinforced the perception of Indian vulnerability. On the Indian side, on the other hand, the military-strategic initiative passed into the hands of a different group of decision-makers who saw in Kashmir not so much the symbol of India’s commitments to democracy and secularism but, instead territorial, power, national self-interest and security. The policies pursued by Shastri and subsequently Indira Gandhi provide some insights into the transformation of the Nehru doctrine, and to the subtle shift from position of interest with regard to the general directions of India’s Kashmir policy. These new men in charge of India’s security were a military-political complex whose commitment to Kashmir, compared to Nehru’s, was simultaneously less doctrinaire and more realistic. While lowering the intensity of the political rhetoric they were willing and able to increase the stakes in military terms.

Shastri’s succession, stage-managed by the Congress Syndicate – India’s regional power-brokers – took place against a background of ominous developments in the international arena. The famous threat of Bhutto’s thousand year war against India on the floor of the Security Council found much comfort in the statement of the British delegate Sir Patrick Dean, who, while stating the British case for self-
determination in Kashmir, made the statement: “We consider it unrealistic to consider the status of Kashmir purely in terms of the legal effect of the Maharaja’s Instrument of Accession”\(^{10}\). The American representative kept a low profile but in the background was the intense annoyance of President Johnson at what he perceived as Nehru’s high profile moral posturing, coupled with the repeated requests from India for ever-increasing quantities of food aid\(^{11}\).

Lacking Nehru’s stature and probably acting out of a sense of interest (i.e., territory as the basis of the power of the state) rather than position (i.e., Kashmir’s status as symbolic of Indian commitment to secularism), Shastri came out with a package of policies that held out the possibility of a dialogue with Pakistan. Srivastava, Shastri’s biographer, sums them up as follows\(^{12}\):

a) India had no desire whatsoever to acquire even one square inch of Pakistani territory.

b) India genuinely wished Pakistan well and would be delighted to see Pakistan progress and prosper.

c) India would never allow any interference by Pakistan in Kashmir which was an integral part of India, and

d) India and Pakistan had to live together in peace and harmony as they were constituted without either side trying to do anything to destabilize the other.

On the basis of these policy statements of Shastri and the impression gathered by Ayub Khan after their first meeting, the recently constituted Kashmir cell of Pakistan came to the conclusion that the “new Indian Prime Minister was unlikely to loosen India’s links with Kashmir and that it was time for Pakistan to take some overt action for ‘reviving’ the Kashmir issue and, defreezing the Kashmir situation”\(^{13}\).

Shastri’s handling of the situation was entirely in keeping with his character which marked a significant departure from Nehru. He quickly established a personal rapport with the defence chiefs and the leaders of the opposition in the Indian Parliament. In the place of the combination of Nehru’s personal aloofness and the conspiratorial style of Krishna Menon, Nehru’s main link with the party and the country at the height of the Indo-China conflict, Shastri’s method was to build up a strong national consensus to meet the Pakistani challenge in Kashmir. As his biographer puts it, “On the political side, Shastri was in control of the situation and never allowed it to get out of hand. He had shown firmness, self-confidence, self-restraint, wisdom and flexibility. He was in favour of peace, but not peace at any cost”\(^{14}\).

Shastri was able to take the initiative in political as well as military matters, ordering the Indian army to cross the international frontier in order to march in the direction of Lahore to relieve pressure on the Chhamb sector in Kashmir which was facing a massive armoured attack, getting the air force to come into the battle right at the outset in spite of the risk of the superior Pakistani air

\(^{10}\) Asian Recorder, 18-24 March 1964, p. 5726.

\(^{11}\) There is some controversy as to whether Johnson used food aid to pressurize India into taking a less intransigent view of the Pakistani claim to Kashmir. Srivastava, Shastri’s biographer does not believe that to have been the case. See C.P. Srivastava, Lal Bahadur Shastri,Prime Minister of India, 1964-1966: A Life of Truth in Politics (Delhi: Oxford University Press; 1995), pp 174-176. But Lewis, who was Johnson’s aide at that time, thinks otherwise. See John P. Lewis, India’s Political Economy: Governance and Reform (Delhi: Oxford University Press; 1995), pp 96-98.

\(^{12}\) Srivastava, op. cit., p 186.

\(^{13}\) Ibid. p. 186.

\(^{14}\) Ibid. p 198.
crafts. On the other hand, as in the Rann of Kutch where there was a first trial of strength between the Indian and Pakistani forces, in Tashkent, Shastri showed flexibility, trading land against security. Of course the Indian response to Pakistan greatly benefited from the fact that the ‘spontaneous’ mass uprising in Kashmir on which the Pakistani strategy had heavily banked did not take place. Srivastava reports how the people of Kashmir cooperated with the Indian army in order to capture Pakistani infiltrators – a fact that was used effectively by Indian publicity both to present India’s case internationally as an attempt by a nation to defend her legitimate interests, and, internally, to bring the war to Indians in their personal capacity. This equation led in 1965 to the birth of the famous Shastri aphorism – “Jai Jawan – Jai Kisan”- victory to the soldier, victory to the peasant – meant for projecting the production of food and defence of boundaries as two different but complementary methods of safeguarding one’s self-respect and self-confidence.

In spite of their different styles, the essentials of Shastri’s flexible style and military pragmatism were adopted by Indira Gandhi. Under her tutelage, in radical contrast to the tenor of domestic politics in Nehru’s life-time, India went on vigorously using Kashmir to generate power internally as well as by entering into alliances with the Soviet Union. India’s efforts were matched by the efforts of Pakistan – through border provocation, war and diplomacy aimed at the internationalisation of the Kashmir issue, particularly in the UN. Even the Simla Accord, where Indira Gandhi gives sufficient evidence of having moved from position of interest as compared to her father, barely managed to paper over the wide gulf separating the perceptions and policies of the two neighbours.

In view of the brevity of his tenure, it is difficult to say how Shastri would have sought to reconcile the needs for security and democracy in Kashmir. Indira Gandhi clearly opted for the former. The policy of surreptitious integration that saw the autonomy of Kashmir steadily whittled away during Nehru’s second phase, became the explicit basis of policy under Indira Gandhi. Pakistan and possibly the United States as well were slow to appreciate this change which came during 1969-71, which led to the brinkmanship of Pakistani forces in East Pakistan. The war of 1971 which we can call Indira Gandhi’s war because, unlike her father, she stage-managed it with great dexterity and proclaimed the temporary abandonment of Nehru’s doctrinaire commitment to the non-dichotomous model. No serious or sustained efforts were made thereafter to win the hearts and minds of Pakistan and Kashmir while maintaining the needs of secure frontier, democracy and secularism.

The period following the 1971 war can be called retrospectively the “golden age” of Indian international politics. Pakistan was split in two, the Kashmir issue solved, at least militarily, in India’s favour and the USSR had been won as powerful ally against the USA and China. It is not surprising, therefore, to see a triumphant Indira Gandhi formulating a kind of “Monroe-Doctrine” for India. Like its famous predecessor, the Indira ‘Doctrine’ tried on the one hand to keep “foreign hands” off from South Asia, on the other to persuade the smaller states of South Asia that this was done in their own interest. With regard to the smaller South Asian states except Pakistan, the doctrine was not that difficult to implement: there

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was simply not enough interest from outside powers in these states. Trying to keep foreign hands off the Indian Ocean proved to be very difficult, however. In the era of British dominance, the Indian Ocean had been a ‘British Lake’. Now, after the termination of British military presence east of Suez, the US Navy was about to establish their own presence in this waters, which, from an Indian point of view, should be turned into a ‘Mare Indicum’. Inspired by similar attempts in other parts of the word, India tried to establish a zone of peace, which would have virtually closed the Indian Ocean to foreign warships, especially those equipped with nuclear weapons. The ambitious plan misfired, at least partially because of India’s neighbour’s suspicion and their perception of being unduly bullied but basically because of the United States’ interest in the Indian Ocean as a gateway to the Persian Gulf. The Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace Plan (IOZOP) was a still-born child in the very moment the USA acquired Diego Garcia from the United Kingdom.

The single most important event in the two decades discussed here, which still has repercussions today, is the so-called “peaceful explosion” of a nuclear device at Pokhran in 1974. India proved to the word that she had the capability to establish itself as the sixth nuclear power, but for several reasons she abstained. Part of the explanation can be found in the Emergency from 1975-77 and the subsequent change of government. The newly inaugurated Janata government was not as keen for a status as a world power as Indira Gandhi’s government had been. This hiatus in India’s quest for power did not last long, however. The elections of 1980 saw a comeback to power for Indira Gandhi, who had not changed her political ambitions in the meantime. But she found herself more and more entrapped in the Punjab crisis, which culminated in 1984 in the Operation ‘Bluestar’ and her assassination by two of her own Sikh bodyguards. Her son, Rajiv Gandhi, carried on with the same set of international aspirations, but he, too, became a victim of his policies: he was assassinated in 1991 by Tamil extremists after the ill-fated Indian peace-keeping effort in Sri Lanka. With him the Gandhi ‘Dynasty’, as well as India’s attempts to dominate the region through a coercive application of the dichotomous model, came to an end.

[c] Contained Dominance Based on Negotiation (1989-97) – the ‘Gujral Doctrine’

The successive Indian governments after the demise of the Gandhi ‘Dynasty’, all had one thing in common: the weakness of their domestic power base. This weakness necessitated complicated political manoeuvres of those in

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19 Perhaps the most important factor for India’s not going nuclear was the fall of Indra Gandhi and the unequivocal rejection of nuclear weapons as well as nuclear testing by the succeeding Janata government of Prime Minister Morarji Desai. See Smith, Chris, India’s Ad hoc Arsenal. Direction or Drift in Defence Policy? New York: Oxford University Press (SIPRI) 1994, pp. 186 passim.
power to keep their fragile coalitions together. The weakness of the various coalition governments fell in a time of radical domestic changes. Communal riots of unparalleled violence swept through several parts of India, highlighted in December 1992 by the destruction of the Babri mosque by a Hindu mob. The rise of Hindu nationalism, supported by parties like the BJP, went hand in hand with an upsurge of terrorism in the Punjab, in Kashmir and in West Bengal. This forced the Indian policymakers to concentrate on domestic politics, which led to an introspective policy that tried to take international events in its stride.

Unfortunately, this was a time of sweeping changes in the very structure of international relations – the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and the Warsaw Treaty Organization, the process leading to the re-unification of Germany, the end of the Cold War and, finally, the end of India’s most powerful ally, the USSR. These events in the nineteen eighties took India’s policymakers, concentrating on their own domestic problems, by surprise. Obviously, it was very hard for the Indian government to come to terms with the new realities. This can be illustrated by the Indian reaction to the putsch against Michail Gorbachev in Moscow, where the Indian government chose to support the conservative communist elements which tried to save the already doomed communist system.

The Gulf War two years later again found the Indian government in disarray. India, still perceiving itself as one of the leaders of the Non-aligned Movement, first initiated an unsuccessful peace mission to Baghdad and then alienated the USA with first allowing, and then disallowing the refueling of US planes in Bombay. The Indian vote against the UN Security Council’s call for Iraq’s surrender which bracketed the largest democracy of the world with Cuba and Yemen completed the series of Indian diplomatic blunders during the Gulf War^{22}.

In September 1996, India again found itself trapped between a rock and a hard place, this time because of her stance on nuclear weapons and the Comprehensive Test Ban. Only two states supported India in rejecting the test ban: Bhutan and Libya^{23}. In this context, Ramesh Thakur blames the Indian government of being “caught in a time warp^{24} We will see in the “prisoner’s dilemma” below, however, that it is not easy for India to change its politics on nuclear weapons without taking the “Pakistan factor” and the “China factor” into consideration. Nevertheless, India’s position was hard to sell given the realities of an international “quasi taboo” against nuclear weapons.

The spectacular series of Indian diplomatic disasters and the upsurge of communalism and terrorism on the domestic front makes it very easy for the casual observer to overlook the first tentative steps towards peace in South Asia, also initiated by and large by various Indian governments after the end of the Gandhi ‘Dynasty’.

The first factor conducive to peace which has already been mentioned was the internal weakness of the coalition governments from 1989 onwards. The political manoeuvres to keep the coalitions intact led to a process of accommodation between various interest groups. Getting used to politics of accommodation at home could lead to de-emphasising conflictual, dominance-based behaviour towards Pakistan. Illustrative of this point is the resumption of talks between the foreign secretaries of India and Pakistan and the talks between the Prime Ministers, I.K.

^{23} Ramesh Thakur, ibid.
^{24} Ramesh Thakur, op. cit., p.21.
Gujral of India and Nawaz Sharif of Pakistan, themselves in the Maldives in May 1997, and which, despite regime changes finally led to the Lahore Declaration.

A second factor conducive to peace is the process of liberalization and globalization of the Indian economy, which is rapidly picking up pace, and a similar policy in Pakistan, where the industrial and entrepreneurial class forms the power base of the Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. Both India and Pakistan seem to be more interested in furthering their economic relations than with waging war against each other. The focus on economics could lead to a new life for the nearly defunct SAARC, which would certainly help India to improve the bilateral relations with her neighbours. India’s new prime minister I.K. Gujral, sworn in April 1997, even went so far as to talk about unilateral and nonreciprocal concessions from India to her neighbours. His ‘carrot without stick-approach’ has already been called the ‘Gujral Doctrine’.²⁵

A third factor conducive to the potential for a regional security arrangement is a renewed interest of the sole surviving superpower, the USA, in the region. For the USA, South Asia in general and India in particular, forms a region of possible economic growth, and, as such, a lucrative future market for American goods. Therefore, the government in Washington is very keen to sponsor peace initiatives and tries to encourage both India and Pakistan to follow up on their first steps. However, the next steps towards a regional security arrangement are far more sophisticated than one realizes.

There is a growing realization in India that the arms race simply cannot be financed any longer without neglecting economic development at home. The same certainty is true for Pakistan, which is, like India, weary of war.²⁶ Indicative of this trend is a new interest in confidence and security building measures (CSBM).²⁷ The talks about CSBMs between India and Pakistan are perhaps the most important step towards peace in South Asia. Establishing CSBMs between India and Pakistan is the sine qua non for all attempts to solve the Kashmir problem or the nuclear weapons issue within the framework of a regional security arrangement.

While some of these developments created a case for optimism with regard to peace in South Asia, the “China factor” continues to be one major obstacle. Since the days of the Himalayan war in 1962, India has watched China with a weary eye. The possibility of a conflict with China was often put forward to defend Indian armaments and Indian positions on nuclear weapons. The appearance of Chinese warships in the Indian Ocean did not help to alleviate Indian fears, too. Improving Indian relations with China would of cause give the Indian government the chance to concentrate on South Asian problems. Other constraints can be found in the domestic problems of India. In a worst case-scenario, the rising forces of Hindu nationalism could destroy all steps towards peace, and India could embark on chauvinistic politics again.²⁸ Another worst case-possibility would be a divided India, rendered ungovernable by the forces of separatism and terrorism.

²⁵ The Gujral ‘Doctrine’ is publicly denounced as appeasement by the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party. Gujral himself does not have an independent political base. The ruling coalition, dependent on the support of the Congress Party has recently received a severe jolt to its stability. See Khare, Harish, “Cong. (1) decides to give U.F. another Chance”, The Hindu, Sept. 217, 1997, p.1.
²⁶ Ramesh Thakur, op. cit., p.21, argues along the same lines.
²⁸ It is, of course, possible to argue in the opposite direction and suggest that the BJP, once in power, might jettison its aggressive posture and become an advocate of conflict resolution within a regional framework.
The Return to Conflict and the limits of the `Two-track’ Strategy (1999--)

We do not yet have any reliable information on the strategic thinking on
the part of the Pakistani elite; on the Indian side, predictably, great recrimination
between advocates of negotiated settlement of outstanding conflict with Pakistan
and those who could see violent conflict with Pakistan as both natural and
necessary, has already started in the earnest and will get more acrimonious as the
elections to the Lok Sabha, scheduled for September, get nearer. Thinly disguised
by the outpouring of patriotism, the political recriminations on the Indian side (and
presumably on the Pakistani side, but possibly to a lesser extent) reveal two clearly
different mind-sets that underpin the different schools of thought on how the
structural differences of interest between India and Pakistan are organized and the
political language in which they could be articulated.

Indian Opinion and its Implications for Regional Security: 
Results of an Opinion Survey, 1996

India’s domestic politics is an important constraint on her regional policies. In
view of their implications for the potential support for the non-dichotomous
model in the electorate, we have selected three questions from a survey of the
Indian population. After the 1996 parliamentary elections in India, a post-poll
survey was conducted in 108 Lok Sabha constituencies, where 10000 Interviews
were held. Among the questions asked were several which enable us to shed some
light on the security perceptions of the Indian citizens themselves. Because of the
importance of the opinions expressed, the three questions and the answers given by
specific subpopulations provide important insights into both India’s problems an
available alternatives.

The first important question deals with relations with Pakistan: Question:
India should make more efforts to develop friendly relations with Pakistan. Do you
agree or disagree with this?

Table-6a

| Agree (%) | 44.6 |
| Don’t know/no opinion | 37.8 |
| Disagree | 17.6 |

As we can see, a majority of 44.6% favours a development of relations with Pakistan. The detailed levels of agreement, which are clearly connected with the
level of education and religion, can be broken down as follows:

29 The results of this report, which was partially funded by the Konrad-Adenauer Foundation, are
available in: Mitra, Subrata K. and Singh, Vijay Bahadur, Elections and Social Change in India. 
Table-6b

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Illiterate</td>
<td>30.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>36.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>40.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56 years or more</td>
<td>42.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>44.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Up to 25 years</td>
<td>47.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>52.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>57.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College and above</td>
<td>67.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The high level of support for policies resembling those advocated by the Gujral doctrine among highly educated Indians is most significant. Related with that question is the next question, which covers the perception of the people on the Kashmir problem, the most contentious issue between India and Pakistan. Question: People’s opinions are divided on the issue of Kashmir problem. Some people say that the government should suppress the agitation by any means while others say that this problem should be resolved by negotiation. What would you say – should the agitation be suppressed or resolved by negotiation?

Tale-7a:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Should be suppressed</th>
<th>11.1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Resolved through negotiation</td>
<td>33.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have not heard about the Kashmir problem at all</td>
<td>21.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cannot say</td>
<td>31.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is very interesting to see that only a minority of 11.1% opined in favour of suppression, while a majority of 33.5% voted for negotiations. Again, there is a connection between the level of education and the willingness to negotiate:

Table-7b:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Negotiate</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Illiterate</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>24.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56 years or more</td>
<td>29.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>31.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>35.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Up to 25 years</td>
<td>37.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>41.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>45.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College and above</td>
<td>62.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A more hawkish position, however, is taken regarding nuclear weapons: those advocating that India needs nuclear weapons are more numerous than those who argue to the contrary: Question: There is no need for India to make the atomic bomb. Do you agree or disagree?
Table-8a:

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>25.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know/no opinion</td>
<td>38.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>36.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The detailed profile of the ‘peacemongers’ is as follows:

Table-8b:

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illiterate</td>
<td>19.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56 years or more</td>
<td>22.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>23.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>24.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>25.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Up to 25 years</td>
<td>26.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>28.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College and above</td>
<td>29.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>33.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As for the advocates of nuclear weapons, table 8c provides the profile:

Table-8c:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Diagree</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illiterate</td>
<td>22.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>25.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>30.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56 years or more</td>
<td>32.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>36.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>36.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upto 25 years</td>
<td>39.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>46.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College and above</td>
<td>63.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For the government it means that the resumption of talks with Pakistan and probably, the attempts towards establishing CSBMs, is buttressed by a majority of Indians. The nuclear issue, however, will be much more difficult to solve.

**Divergence and Convergence in South Asia’s Regional Politics**

The analysis from the previous section shows that for the last decade, there has been a growing realization among South Asia’s states of the importance and necessity of constituting South Asia as a region, and to look for solutions to the problems of resource and security management within a regional framework. In specific terms, this indicates a convergence towards a regional framework, from the earlier divergence away from the region in search of particular national strategies, often in alliance with non-regional powers. The indicators of this convergence are: attempts at negotiated solutions to outstanding regional conflicts, strengthening of
SAARC, regional trade. CBMs are an evidence that some convergence has taken place. In terms of the arguments presented so far, the following factors could lead India towards convergence:

1. The Gujral doctrine as an evidence of elite awareness of the peace divided on the Indian side:
2. Liberalisation of the Indian market pushing towards the search for regional markets;
3. American encouragement towards conflict-resolution.

On the other hand, the following factors could hinder convergence:

1. Continued insurgency in Kashmir
2. Residual opposition to a rapprochement with Pakistan in some sections of Hindu nationalists and a similar apprehension in the Jamat-I-Islamic in Pakistan
3. The instability of India’s current ruling coalition
4. Resistance from the Pakistani military establishment to a peace deal by politicians
5. The ‘China’ factor, discussed at length below

The Need for a Triangular Normalisation that Includes China

The scenario depicted in the game theoretic model in the first section of this paper which showed the status quo synonymous with conflict as a far from an ideal situation. However, it at least suggests a wasteful but stable relation between the two neighbours. Unfortunately, that is unlikely to be the case in view of the China factor in South Asian politics. The problem we are facing in South Asia is that the India – Pakistan two person game is part of a three person non-co-operative game together with China (the “China factor”). The presence of China makes a stable relationship proportionality difficult. The likely scenario which makes a relationship between India and Pakistan as stable adversaries is presented below:

Suppose that at the outset of play, India and Pakistan work out a ratio of 3:1 which guarantees their mutual threat perception. At the next step, India would demand an additional unit of power k to meet the Chinese threat. Since Pakistan cannot be sure that India would not divert the k units in an end game with Pakistan, for her security needs Pakistan would want an additional increase of k/3. At this point, India, to keep the proportionality, would demand (k/3) x 3, i.e., an additional k, leading to a total of 3+2k units which will send Pakistan on another round of arms procurement. As such, until China is brought into a triangular security nexus along with India and Pakistan, no stable relationship, even adversarial, is possible.

(1) Recent reports of Chinese incursions into Arunachal Pradesh and reactivation of the disputed 650 miles border in India’s North-East known as the Line of Actual Control (LAC) denotes what Indian policy makers regard as the hostile presence of the Chinese. Luke Harding, reporting from New Delhi, comments: ‘superficially polite, relations between New Delhi and Beijing are best characterized as mistrustful. India accuses China of helping Pakistan to stockpile a nuclear and missile arsenal much larger than its own – a claim backed by US intelligence’. Luke Harding, China accused of infiltrating into India, The Guardian Weekly, Oct 18, 2000, p 17.
Table-9

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sequence</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
<th>India</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3+k</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(-k being an Indian security against China)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sequence</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
<th>India</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1+k/3</td>
<td>3+k</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(+k being an Indian security against China)

(k/3 is the additional security which Pakistan demands as proportional defence, since India can redeploy forces)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sequence</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
<th>India</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1+k/3</td>
<td>[3+k+(k/3)x3]=3+2k</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Indian seeks to match the Pakistani additional capacity through a proportional increase)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sequence</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
<th>India</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>3+2k+m</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(m is the new Indian security against China)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sequence</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
<th>India</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>……</td>
<td>……</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Conclusion: Where Do We Go From Here?

For those concerned with South Asia’s security dilemma, the examples of the European Union and the ASEAN hold important lessons with regard to the policies that promote convergence to a regional solution for problems of security and welfare. These comparative cases also indicate the limits to the process of convergence in terms of endogenous and exogenous factors that constitute the boundary conditions of the process. In both the EU and the ASEAN, the presence of external enemies has been an important incentive towards convergence. The lack of radical asymmetries in size has been conducive to co-operation in both cases. The third main factor has been domestic ideology. The American presence on European soil after the war, the democratic constitution imposed on a vastly reduced Germany and the Marshall aid provided a firm basis for economic consolidation; the Franco-German Coal and Steel Community laid, the first groundwork towards regional co-operation. Anti-communism played a similar role in the coming together of the states and markets of Southeast Asia in a similar manner. These factors, as we have seen above, were conspicuous by their absence in South Asia.

In addition to these structural factors, convergence towards stable peace in South Asia has been further handicapped by the self-perception of the actors. As we have seen above, the self-perception of India as a country unequivocally committed to peaceful conflict resolution in the Panchsheela mode is not borne out by the perception by her neighbours who see her as a bully and a belligerent power. The mirror image is provided by Pakistan which has often portrayed itself as the wronged party and the occupant of the moral high ground, often neglecting to temper this image with the fear and anxiety that her position invokes in large parts of India’s electorate and among her policy makers. This mutual self-misperception has produced the chronic Indo-Pakistan rivalry, to the point where the international arena perceives South Asia exclusively in terms of Indo-Pakistan rivalry. Following this is the solicitude of the outside experts to be even-handed between the two warring neighbours. This position is anathema to Indian policymakers who are more prone to speak about India-China rivalry and are at a loss to understand as to why
the world cannot understand the legitimate security needs of India. Indian inability to abide by the terms laid down by the West (the crucial role of India’s threat perception from China is not taken sufficiently into account by western policy makers) is seen as Indian equivocation, for which the West’s preferred solution has been to cut-off aid under the assumption that nation-states can be prevented from going to war because they do not have the cash to start a war.

If we focus on India, we can see that India’s impressive arsenal is not backed up with cultural cohesion, governmental stability or great economic might. Mobilisation on the issue of cultural nationalism, a phenomenon to which Huntington alludes in his concept of Hindu fundamentalism as a political force, is far from it, being both socially inchoate and politically fragmented. Survey data shows simultaneously a peaceful and sanctimonious self-perception but at the same time, the desire to arm on self adequately. The ambiguity regarding CTBT shows the same tendency. On the Pakistani side, on the other hand, there is weary perception of the enormous cost of the nonfactual status quo with India and the awareness of the lost opportunity of the benefits of trade and economic co-operation with India. But the uncertain power equations between the civil and military authorities make it difficult to develop a consensus behind the peace initiative.

The nuclear tests of South Asia have radically altered the security perception of the region because the start of an accidental nuclear war remains high. The fact remains, however, that though India and Pakistan are locked in combat across the Line of Control in Kashmir and both have their armed forces in a state of alert all along their frontier and at sea, the two sides appear to have devised some new rules of engagement. India, while undertaking a maximum mobilization of forces has nevertheless so far desisted from crossing the Line of Control. Pakistan, on her side, has made continuous efforts to involve other powers in this bilateral conflict, looking for the equalizer in international mediation. All along, unlike in the previous three wars, there has been continuous exchanges through the normal diplomatic channels. This two-track strategy – of defending the borders while negotiating – on the part of both the actors is perhaps the best strategy for peace in the region.


32 This fuzzy policy and equally diffused self-perception made sense in the world of superpower rivalry, cold war and non-alignment. The question: has Indian foreign policy got a cohesive goal today, gets no clear answer, because, I.K. Gujral, India’s Prime Minister and author of the Gujral ‘doctrine’ is himself an embattled figure in domestic politics, which, in the eyes of India’s South Asian neighbours reduces the whole policy to an unacceptable level of uncertainty. In Ramesh Thakur’s words, “… 50 years after independence, India is neither rich enough to bribe, powerful enough to bully, nor principled enough to inspire Ramesh Thakur, India in the World. Neither Rich, Powerful, nor Principled, in: Foreign Affairs, Vvol. 70, No. 4, July/August 1997, pp. 15.
The U.S. Balancing Act in South Asia

Andrew C. Winner

The history of U.S. policies towards both Pakistan and India has involved both stated preferences for one state or the other as well as the perception, in Islamabad and New Delhi, that Washington is favouring one or the other through a variety of policy decisions. Perhaps the most famous instance of this was then-U.S. national security advisor Henry Kissinger's tilt towards Pakistan during the 1971 war, as part of a larger policy of balancing the Soviet Union by opening to China. The most recent instance is the concern in Pakistan that, in the wake of the 1998 nuclear tests and relatively short-lived outrage amongst nonproliferation advocates, Washington has begun courting New Delhi as a strategic partner against both anti-western radical Islam in southwest Asia and against China in east Asia.

The issue for the United States in the coming decade is not one of whether to lean towards one side or the other but rather, how to balance a variety of U.S. national security interests that are primarily global in scope but that have elements connected to South Asia. This is easier said than done. Even if the United States does not explicitly express a preference for one state or the other over time, both states will perceive that favouritism exists. This will be particularly true in Pakistan, which views India as its primary security threat. India will be concerned not just about U.S. policies towards Pakistan but also about US policy towards China. In fact, New Delhi has and will continue to push for a de-linking of U.S. policy towards India from that towards Pakistan in part, because of New Delhi's desire to be seen as a player on the larger global stage. Some key U.S. think tanks are also recommending that the new administration de-couple India and Pakistan Policy. While this type of recommendation appears sensible on the surface, it is too simple a construct to apply. In some interest areas, U.S. policy will indeed have to treat India and Pakistan differently. The U.S. simply has different interests to pursue with each country in areas such as democracy, terrorism, and stability in the Persian Gulf. However in other areas, such as nuclear nonproliferation and particularly in crisis stability, policies towards the two must be inextricably linked. Again, the difficulty is balancing these various interests and the policies pursued in advancing them. This article outlines U.S. interests that have relevance for South Asia over the coming decade. It then analyses their intersections and speculates on what the Bush administration's priorities will be in pursuing these various interests.

U.S. Interests and Strategy since the End of the Cold War

The end of the Cold War competition with the Soviet bloc forced the United States to consider anew its national security interests, the potential threats to those interests, and its grand strategy. In large part, two events in the early 1990s set the tone for this reconsideration. The first was Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the U.S.
assembling and leading a coalition to reverse that invasion, and the discoveries by
the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) of the extent of Iraq's weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) programmes. The second event was the ongoing turmoil in the
Balkans, culminating in the Dayton peace accord and the deployment of U.S.
military forces, under a UN mandate, as part of a peace-keeping force in Bosnia.
More recently, the use of NATO airpower and the deployment of peacekeepers in
Kosovo have underscored the fact that the United States will continue to be drawn
into regional conflicts in certain areas of the globe.

The reassessment resulted in a newly articulated U.S. national security
strategy that eschewed a clear list of national interests. Instead, it put forward a
laundry list of challenges to U.S. national security, including ethnic conflict,
proliferation of WMD, large-scale environmental degradation, and population
growth. Under the rubric of "engagement and enlargement," the strategy sought to
sustain American security with military forces that were ready to fight, bolster
America's economic revitalization, and promote democracy abroad. As might be
expected in such a public document, hard choices were not identified, nor were
conflicts noted among particular goals. The long lists of areas of interest and
policies in the succeeding documents made identification of priorities difficult.

However, the military strategy (which emerged from a first year defense
review) that supported this national security strategy was clearer. It focused, in the
first part of the 1990s, on two sets of issues. The first was preparedness to fight and
win a major regional war in both the Persian Gulf (basically a repeat of Iraq's
invasion of Kuwait) and on the Korean peninsula. The assumption in these
scenarios was that potential adversaries would consider early and extensive use of
WMD to offset U.S. conventional military prowess, given the lessons of Operation
Desert Storm. The second set of issues was a preparedness to assist in lesser
contingencies, often involving peace enforcement, peace-keeping, and/or the
delivery of humanitarian assistance. These missions were considered secondary and
would be dropped if necessary if both major regional contingencies occurred
simultaneously or required assets tied up in peace-keeping activities.

Throughout the course of the 1990s, it became clear that requirements for
fighting and winning two major theatre wars, at least within acceptable risk levels,
exceeded existing capabilities, particularly if the pace of secondary operations such
as peace-keeping was high. The second Clinton administration defense review, the
Quadrennial Defense Review made four significant changes to U.S. military
strategy. First, it lowered requirements. U.S. forces were required to fight and win
two major theatre wars (MTWs) nearly simultaneously; in other words, sequentially.
Second, it de-emphasized U.S. involvement in peace-keeping missions. Third, the strategy began to include the potential of a near peer competitor
arising that could challenge the United States directly in the mid-term against which
the United States must hedge with research and development. Although not stated
explicitly, this potential competitor is widely assumed to be China. Finally, it began
to emphasize more starkly the dangers of asymmetrical warfare against the United
States in both the potential regional contingencies and other instances as well.

Basically, the strategy recognized what potential adversaries of the United
States realized following the Gulf war - that no state in the near to medium term

Various versions of this strategy were issued by the Clinton administration, but all had these central
characteristics and themes.
could match America directly through force of conventional arms. Potential adversaries, therefore, began concentrating even more heavily on developing asymmetrical strategies, including terrorism, the use of WMD, and the possibility of using cyber attacks to counter the United States' high technology edge. The U.S. experience in Mogadishu in 1993, where it lost eighteen of its most highly-trained soldiers to militias in a highly chaotic street battle, also heightened awareness in Washington that high technology and airpower would not suffice to meet all the challenges in the future. It also lessened the U.S. taste for engaging heavily in multilateral peace-keeping and peace enforcement operations, causing strategists to look elsewhere for new missions for the U.S. military. Of course, despite this dislike for such missions, the U.S. continued to become involved due to its own view of the requirements for global leadership and, in cases like Kosovo, the need to preserve the credibility of the NATO alliance.

Once beyond the two major theatre wars, the focus of national military strategy has become one of countering asymmetrical threats, including attacks on the U.S. homeland. Terrorist attacks on U.S. forces abroad, like the bombing at the Khobar Towers complex in Saudi Arabia in 1996, heightened awareness of how exposed U.S. forces and installations were when conducting forward presence missions. Improved ballistic missile capabilities by potential adversaries who might be involved in MTWs - namely Iran and North Korea - heightened concerns about proliferation of both WMD and missile delivery capabilities. As mentioned above, the continuing revelations by UNSCOM throughout the 1990s about Iraq's capabilities shocked even the United States.

On the diplomatic side, the end of the Cold War and improving relations with Russia gave impetus to both the arms control and nonproliferation agendas, complementing in many ways the military concern with WMD. The end of the Cold War competition meant to many that strategic weapons in the arsenals of both the United States and Russia could be reduced significantly, thereby living up to the requirement in the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty for nuclear weapons states to take effective measures to end the nuclear arms race. In addition, the demise of the Soviet Union brought about a renewed concern about proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities because Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan all had the potential to become nuclear weapons states by retaining portions of the arsenal of the former Soviet Union that were deployed on their soil. The success in getting these three states to forgo retention of nuclear arsenals encouraged nonproliferation advocates in Washington, leading them to push the broader nonproliferation agenda more vigorously.

This focus on nonproliferation was kept at the forefront of U.S. foreign policy for much of the Clinton administration. However, a rigorous nonproliferation policy has not commanded enough bipartisan support in the U.S. to make it the singular focus of U.S. foreign policy. A quick example of countervailing pressures

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5 The lessons of the battle of Mogadishu for U.S. security strategy were numerous and hotly debated in the United States. To this day no consensus exists. One immediate outcome was a pull-back from even greater U.S. participation in multilateral peace enforcement and peacekeeping missions and an increased suspicion, rightly or wrongly, of UN-led operations. A more long-term consequence was a heightened suspicion of missions that went beyond simple peacekeeping principles and began engaging in what was termed "nation-building."

6 The text of article VI is as follows: "Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control." The full text of the treaty is available on the Web at http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/nptI.html
can be seen in the case of China. While Beijing was clearly engaging in activities that ran counter to U.S. nonproliferation policies, including the transfer of both missile and nuclear technology to Pakistan, other U.S. interests with China, such as trade and the desire for strategic stability in the Taiwan Strait, kept this issue from dominating the relationship. Moreover, despite the longstanding U.S. interest in nonproliferation, it is a difficult policy to pursue in a universal manner.

In fact, historically the U.S. has never pursued an undifferentiated nonproliferation policy, particularly on the nuclear front. While initially the United States had some moments of high-mindedness, such as the placing of all nuclear capabilities under international control through the Baruch plan in the early days of the Cold War, realpolitik has always been part of nonproliferation policy. In fact, some analysts and historians argue persuasively that the Baruch plan was not as high-minded as it seems in retrospect and was in fact designed to constrain Soviet and nascent Chinese nuclear capabilities while preserving the U.S. monopoly on the technology to produce nuclear weapons.7

U.S. Interests and Strategy - Priorities of the Bush Administration

After an extended dispute over the U.S. presidential election, Texas governor George W. Bush was ultimately declared the winner. Now seven months into his administration, the broad outlines of a new U.S. national security and foreign policy are emerging. The extended transition initially slowed consideration of many issues, but the Bush team now appears to be on track. However, like many new administrations, including those who take over from a different political party, the Bush foreign policy team is discovering that there are limits to how much it can break from the policies of its predecessor. Despite the constraints of budgets, allies, and difficult situations in various parts of the world, the Bush administration has articulated some clear and clean breaks from the past.

The first area of emphasis for the Bush administration is on developing and deploying a missile defense system designed first and foremost to protect the United States from what Washington sees as a growing ballistic missile and WMD threat from a small number of hostile states including Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. Over the past seven months, the administration has broadened this vision and begun talking about a missile defense system that could also cover U.S. allies and perhaps even friends. As part of this effort, it has been made clear that the United States will either withdraw from or substantially modify the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972. This indicates continuity with the Clinton administration in terms of the focus on WMD but a different way of approaching it - through an emphasis on unilateral military capabilities vice multilateral regimes or agreements.

Second despite some false starts and protests from friends and allies, the Bush administration has continued to say that it will reduce, to the degree possible, U.S. military involvement in operations other than war - in other words peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations.8 Instead, in the near-term the military will focus its energies on deterring major theatre wars and preparing to fight and win them should deterrence fail. Interestingly, the focus on major theatre wars remains for the near-term, but the Clinton administration requirement to fight

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two nearly simultaneously has been dropped, in large part to free up resources for missile defense and what has been termed "transformation" -- the changing of the military to be better prepared to deter and fight future conflicts.

This is the third difference -- an increased focus on reorienting the U.S. military, in terms of both strategy and capabilities, for future contingencies. While all of the official reviews are not yet done and a formal, Congressionally mandated defense strategy document has yet to be published, the outlines of such a reorientation are becoming clear. Again, missile defense as part of a broader emphasis on defending U.S. territory is going to reap many resources in the revamped strategy and defense budget. This will be part of a focus on countering asymmetrical threats (seen as the threat of the future), ranging from weapons of mass destruction to terrorist strikes to cyber attacks. In addition, the military is going to focus on developing capabilities that would enable it to deter and if necessary dominate any strategic competitor that could arise in the medium to long term. The claim by President Bush during the campaign that the military is going to skip a generation of weapons systems now appears to be a bit hyperbolic, but the Pentagon will be devoting significantly more resources to research and development on new capabilities and systems.

As outlined briefly above, under a Bush administration countering WMD is seen primarily as a defense task, and a critical one in three areas of concern: MTWs, use by rogue states or non-state actors, and potential use by a future peer competitor. WMD should be deterred, countered, defended against. Nonproliferation policy, while a complement to what in the U.S. Pentagon has termed "counter proliferation" is not likely to command as high a priority in a Bush administration. As part of the refocus, the Bush administration has made it very clear that it does not support certain elements of the global nonproliferation regime pushed by the Clinton administration and associated arms control agreements, including the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the U.S. Russian Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. While a Bush administration understands, like all U.S. administrations since World War II, that it serves U.S. interests for fewer states to have nuclear weapons, broad nonproliferation policy is being supplanted by one that focuses on states who have ongoing quarrels with the United States and are seeking to acquire nuclear capabilities. Iraq, Iran, and North Korea top this list.

In sum, the national security strategy of the Bush administration, with its underlying military strategy, is focusing on preparing for a major theatre war, countering asymmetrical threats to the U.S., its deployed forces and its allies, and preparing for a future peer competitor. In all of these areas, weapons of mass destruction are an important component. Such a set of strategies is being accomplished by changing the focus of military spending and operations to de-emphasize U.S. participation in peacekeeping and crisis management operations. In addition research and development on countering weapons of mass destruction and other asymmetrical threats is being increased, even at the expense of replacing current generations of weapons that are becoming obsolete. On the diplomatic front, the administration is emphasizing relationships with traditional allies (although not without some setbacks in areas such as the environment) and appearing to promote unilateral action, or at most action in concert with a few traditional allies, when crises occur. It is, putting less stock in arms control treaties and multilateral legal undertakings, preferring unilateral adjustments of capabilities perhaps combined with broader transparency measures.
Implications for U.S. Policy Towards South Asia

While the above is an admittedly broad brush outline of U.S. interests and strategies under the Bush administration, it is not difficult to see how such a set of interests and policy priorities will affect U.S. relations with both Pakistan and India. Obviously, the U.S. has ongoing relations and interests that are specific to both Pakistan and India, and these will not suddenly be forsaken. However, they will be pursued in the context of, and be influenced significantly by, these higher order interests and policies.

On the military side, the United States will focus on deterring and preparing for a major theatre war, either one on the Korean peninsula or in the Persian Gulf. Neither India nor Pakistan plays a significant role in the U.S. focus on these near-term contingencies or preparations to address them. Korean contingency is remote both geographically and politically from South Asia, and the only connection would be the use of U.S. assets prepositioned on ships based in the Indian Ocean or the transit of the Indian Ocean by U.S. navy forces on their way to the Pacific theatre.

In a future conflict in the Persian Gulf, neither Pakistan nor India is likely to be a direct player. While an improved overall relationship with Pakistan may assist the reputation of the United States with Islamic countries generally, other variables will have a much greater impact on that issue including progress in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process (should it ever resume). It could be argued, perhaps, that Pakistan's support for the Taliban in Afghanistan keeps Iran off-balance and reduces the likelihood that they would directly challenge U.S. interests in the Gulf, but again other factors (U.S. military capabilities, Iranian domestic politics) will have a much greater influence on decisions in Tehran. Finally, the prospect that Pakistan could or would provide military capabilities in the Gulf that would cooperate with U.S. forces in deterring adventurism by either Baghdad or Tehran is highly unlikely. First, the U.S. Pakistani relationship is simply not at that point currently and has many issues to resolve. Second, given other concerns, particularly India, Iran, and instability in Afghanistan, it is unclear whether Islamabad would have any interest in filling this role. Finally, it is unclear whether the Gulf states would currently be willing to have substantial numbers of Pakistani troops on their soil for extended periods of time.

India's role in either preventing or participating in any future Gulf conflict is unclear at best. While India has a growing economic interest in seeing that the free-flow of oil from this region remains steady, its political and military ability to contribute to this goal is extremely small in the near to medium term. Indian development of a true blue water navy capability is years off, and even if the next cruise of the Indian aircraft carrier were to the Persian Gulf, it would not have a measurable impact on stability in the region. In terms of U.S. policy, relations in the region are complex and strained enough without Washington bringing in another player with potentially divergent points of view and an ongoing antagonistic relationship with an Islamic country - Pakistan. The U.S. has a complex enough task in figuring out how to achieve its goals vis-a-vis Iran and Iraq, keep relations on keel with Saudi Arabia and other key GCC states, and facing down the political challenges from Baghdad and Tehran without adding New Delhi to its calculations in the Gulf.

For the United States, the other link to Pakistan and India that relates to a potential major theatre war in the Persian Gulf region is the concern about terrorism in the Middle East. As noted in the U.S. State Department's latest publication on
terrorism, Washington is concerned about terrorism emanating from two regions - South Asia and the Middle East. The trail of evidence on the bombing of the USS Cole has only reinforced this concern, as it appears likely that the perpetrators have links back to Osama bin Laden, who is currently residing in Afghanistan. As noted in the State Department report, increasingly terrorist organizations from the two regions are linked. The issue of terrorism for the United States is twofold. First, it is an asymmetric strategy that adversaries can use against the United States homeland and against deployed forces and U.S. installations worldwide. Second, terrorist attacks against U.S. forces deployed in the Persian Gulf region are a direct attack on the U.S. strategy for deterring and preparing to fight a future war in that region. While terrorist attacks, like that on the Cole, will not drive the U.S. from the region, they may threaten host governments enough to cause them to rethink their willingness to allow U.S. forces to be based on, or deploy to, their territory.

Therefore, combating terrorism is likely to remain at the top of the national security and diplomatic agenda for the Bush administration. For Pakistan, this means that the United States will continue to press it to be less sympathetic to the Taliban in Afghanistan. It will also expect Islamabad to use whatever leverage it has to press for the extradition of bin Laden to the United States or a third country were he could be prosecuted. For India, the focus means that Washington and New Delhi will have a topic that at least generically they can discuss - terrorism in and emanating from South Asia. However, this discussion will not become a core element in U.S.-Indian relations and practical limits to U.S.-Indian cooperation on this topic will quickly become evident. On the U.S. part, its focus is on terrorist activity that may be based in South Asia (specifically Afghanistan) but that is carried out elsewhere. New Delhi's focus, not surprisingly, is on Kashmir. While it will delight in U.S. pressure on Pakistan on any and all issues, New Delhi will limit Washington's involvement in events on the ground in Kashmir.

A second U.S. focus in the coming decade, preparing for a potential peer competitor in the medium term, could potentially have an impact on Washington's relations with both India and Pakistan. Since it is widely recognized that this potential competitor is China, the relationship of both Islamabad and New Delhi to Beijing will come into play. This focus, however, should not be over-emphasized. While a Republican administration will likely be somewhat tougher on Beijing in certain areas such as relations with Taiwan and proliferation, it will not be declaring China an enemy or be constructing a containment policy anytime soon. No consensus exists on the proper policy towards China in the United States. Even with a Republican-controlled White House and (half of) Congress, China policy will remain a mix of engagement, competition, and some defense preparation for something worse. For this reason, hopes by some analysts in both Washington and New Delhi that the two will work together to contain China is fanciful at best. In fact, if the United States ever decided to attempt to contain the growth of Chinese

power, then East Asia (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan) would be the focal point rather than South Asia.  

For India, this U.S. policy of engaging but also hedging with Beijing may prove frustrating. Washington is going to have significant issues with Beijing in the coming decade, not least of which are Taiwan and the construction by the United States of a missile defense system. Those front burner issues, combined with the worry about China's potential as a global adversary, will mean that Washington will continue to consider Beijing more important than New Delhi. It will continue to consider the impact of its policies on China before it will consider their impact on India. For example, in the case of missile defense decisions, the U.S. understands, and may take some minor steps to ameliorate, Chinese worries about missile defense deployments. The fact that Chinese responses to a U.S. missile defense deployment, including modernization and expansion of its nuclear arsenal, has a domino affect on India's nuclear thinking will be recognized but will be much lower on Washington's list of worries, if it appears at all. All of this despite the relatively kind words that New Delhi had about President Bush's statements on missile defense and the highly publicized trip by U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage to India to consult on these issues.

For Pakistan, Washington's policies on China are likely to continue to be focused on technology transfer in the WMD area. The Bush administration will be tougher rhetorically on Beijing about the transfer of either nuclear or missile technology to Pakistan and elsewhere. It will draw brighter lines about what is acceptable and what is unacceptable, and it will be less likely to accept vague assurances from Beijing. That said, it will still remain a difficult issue, and Washington's leverage with Beijing will continue to be limited. In particular, however, the Bush administration will be eager to ensure that China does not proliferate missile capabilities that could defeat future U.S. theatre or national missile defense systems. This means that any suspected future transfer of missile technologies to Pakistan will come under significant scrutiny. If evidence of such transfers is found in the future, it is likely to be harder on Pakistan than on China simply because of the disparity in U.S. interest in the two states and because the United States has more potent sanctions it can apply to Islamabad without significant repercussions in the U.S.

The more general U.S. concern about weapons of mass destruction in South Asia under the Bush administration will have two areas of focus. The first area will be ensuring that the nuclear and missile capabilities in both Pakistan and India do not proliferate further, either to other states or to terrorist organizations. This means that the focus will be on the export control policies of Islamabad and New Delhi and on the physical safety and security of their nuclear arsenals. This concern meshes nicely with the second likely area of focus - that of lowering the chance that nuclear weapons would be used in any future conflict. Achieving both of these goals requires more detailed discussions with both countries about the development of their nuclear doctrines and arsenals and a corresponding lowering of pressure on them to reverse their programs and give up their nuclear capabilities. Bush administration official have suggested that the United States should change its focus and cease trying to get India to eliminate its nuclear arsenal. This does not mean that a Bush administration will openly accept India and Pakistan as nuclear

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weapon’s power, but will, however, be less shrill in its denunciation of the 1998 tests and more pragmatic in its approach to nuclear developments on the subcontinent. This will all come as part of a policy of renewed engagement with both India and Pakistan and a further easing of sanctions that were imposed after the 1998 nuclear tests.

Conclusions

Despite seven months in office, the Bush administration has yet to outline a comprehensive and coherent set of foreign policy goals for South Asia. However, statements by incoming officials who will be responsible for the region and actions like Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Henry Shelton’s July 2001 visit to India show that it will have at least, a different tone from that of the Clinton administration. In fact, General Shelton followed up hints by other administration officials that the U.S. sanctions on India initiated after the May 1998 nuclear tests might be lifted in the near future. It is likely that similar sanctions may also be eased for Pakistan although the issues for Islamabad are a bit more complex because of the coup and some U.S. policy and legal requirements for a return to democracy before certain restrictions can be lifted. This is in line with statements by key administration officials that sanctions will not be utilized as frequently as a tool of policy and that they will be applied only when they have a good chance of success.

Taking as a starting point the broad goals, interests, and strategies laid out by the Bush administration in its first seven months, one can begin to see how U.S. interests and strategies will affect U.S. relations with Pakistan and India. Despite early visits to India and diplomatic interaction with Pakistan, both states should not expect that they would be among the highest priorities for the Bush administration. They likely will be dealt with in the context of higher priority interests areas, including concern about major theatre wars, countering asymmetrical threats to the United States, and preparing for a potential future global adversary. This is not to say that India and Pakistan will be ignored or that a Bush administration will not be mindful of the unique historical, cultural, and political context in which Washington relates to Islamabad and New Delhi. It simply means that Islamabad should not expect some renewed special relationship like that during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, and New Delhi should not expect a Bush administration to attempt to build a new strategic partnership between the United States and India. In this sense, it is unlikely that any actual tilt will occur towards either state.

Washington will be taking a more traditional view of national security and foreign policy over the next four years, focusing on issues that fundamentally affect the security of the United States, its treaty allies, and its traditional friends. For Islamabad, this means a continuing focus on international terrorism and what the government of Pakistan can do to address Washington’s desire to get at Osama bin Laden and hem in terrorist training and planning activities that take place in Afghanistan. A return to democracy will be a continued requirement due to legislative strictures, but a Bush administration is likely to be relatively less concerned about a continuing behind-the-scenes role for the military once civilian rule is restored. On proliferation, the Bush administration will likely shift the focus to one of preventing further horizontal proliferation and possibly beginning to address crisis stability measures. For New Delhi, there will be interest by the Bush

administration in seeing what broader cooperative activities can be started that address Washington's interests in both the Persian Gulf region and southeast Asia. However, the Bush administration is going to want specifics on what India can do for it before moving too far. As with Pakistan, Washington will likely be less concerned with pressing India to reverse its nuclear course and be more concerned with preventing further horizontal proliferation. Although New Delhi is likely to be less interested than Islamabad in discussing these issues, the Bush administration may also try to engage India in discussions about stabilizing measures to reduce potential problems of crisis stability in the future.

All of these areas, however, will come in the context of higher priority goals and interests for the United States. For good or for ill, South Asia is more likely to remain an object of policy than a subject of policy under the Bush administration.
The latest book edited by Dr Hafeez Malik, who holds a prominent place among Pakistani scholars settled in the US, is based on the deliberations of a Seminar in 1997 to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the emergence of Pakistan. Its sub-title, "Founders' Aspirations and Today's Realities", sums up the approach that is reflected in fairly comprehensive analyses of the country's constitutional, political and economic evolution since independence by a galaxy of specialists.

In the Introductory chapter, Dr Hafeez Malik highlights the aspirations of the two personalities who are recognized as the founders of Pakistan. Though Allama Mohammad Iqbal did not live to see the realization of his concept of a separate homeland for the Muslims of the subcontinent, his poetry and writings provided the spiritual foundation for the independent Islamic state to be established to safeguard the values and interests of the Muslims. The other founder, who actually led the struggle for Pakistan was Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah. According to Dr Malik's view, today's Pakistan would be disappointing for both of them.

According to Iqbal's writings, the Islamic State of his vision would be based on religious tolerance, a democratic polity and a prosperous economy. It was to be a "beacon of enlightenment and progress in the Muslim world". The actual state of Pakistan suffers from the effects of a mushrooming population, and of inept leadership drawn from the feudal and industrial classes which, has enriched itself without regard for long-term national goals. Iqbal, who had applauded the Turkish reforms enforced by Kamal Ataturk, had conceived of a new order that combined "spirituality and material development of societies".

Jinnah also had a "liberal and humane political philosophy". He also articulated the notion of Pakistani nationalism based on religious freedom, political equality, and the state's detachment from religious and sectarian squabbles. He had to engage in long and arduous negotiations with the Congress and the British. The Muslim League leadership also had to cope with the opposition of religious organizations. Mistakes were made in handling the accession of states that led to the Kashmir problem becoming a bone of contention, and pitting Pakistan and India in seemingly endless confrontation. By the time Pakistan came into being, Jinnah's health was precarious. He hardly lived for thirteen months after independence, and could not leave his imprint on the constitutional evolution of Pakistan.

The book brings together papers by a group of Pakistani and American scholars, and public figures, who have attempted an evaluation of the performance of Pakistan in its first fifty years. These papers cover three broad areas:
constitutional and political development, internal evolution in some key areas, such as nuclear capability, economy and sectarianism, and lastly, foreign policy.

The constitutional and political development is covered in four chapters, three of them written by well-known Pakistani personalities: former Law Minister S.M.Zafar, retired Justice Javid Iqbal, and retired Army Chief, Gen. K.M.Arif. Craig Baxter, American diplomat and scholar specializing in South Asia, has written the fourth.

Constitutional developments, and the role of the judiciary, are covered somewhat differently in two chapters, one by Mr. S. M. Zafar, a leading lawyer and Dr. Javid Iqbal who apart from being a distinguished judge, also happens to be the son of Allama Iqbal. Mr. Zafar focuses on the history of constitutional development, and traces the events leading up to the 1973 Constitution that established a parliamentary form of government. This constitution evolved through a consensus of all political parties by Bhutto, which has endured. He concludes his paper by stating that Pakistani society appears to be learning from its failures, and he therefore looks to the future with hope.

Justice Iqbal's paper concentrates on the role of the judiciary in the recurrent constitutional crises of Pakistan. He is defensive of the role of the judiciary and maintains that the judges of the superior courts performed their functions to the best of their abilities, in order to uphold the rule of law. He advocates a consensus among the superior judiciary. If the supremacy of the constitution can be upheld in a manner that the three organs of the state perform their functions independently, democracy can flourish and the people can savour the fruits of independence, concludes Dr Javid Iqbal.

General K. M. Arif’s chapter on the role of the military in politics makes fascinating reading. The history of Pakistan is riddled with instability, with the army taking power three times over a period of fifty years. Out of Pakistan's eleven heads of state, six were soldiers or bureaucrats, whose cumulative tenure totaled thirty-six years, during which they dismissed eight out of fifteen prime ministers, dissolved seven out of ten national assemblies. Pakistan experimented with four different types of political systems, parliamentary, presidential, military and a cross between the first two. General Arif enumerates the factors behind this instability, including the influx of several million refugees, the early death of Mr. Jinnah, constant hostility of India, and the inexperienced and inefficient politicians who made a mockery of democracy.

Gen. Arif draws attention not only to the positive contribution of military rule, but also to its adverse fall-out. Among the harmful effects were poor discipline owing to rapid promotions in the armed forces, sucking of the military into the "political quagmire", and downgrading of the role of the judiciary. He admits that "martial law retarded the growth of democracy, weakened the political system, caused constitutional crises, and hindered the development of institutions".

Craig Baxter, US diplomat turned scholar, examines Pakistan from the criteria of a failed state. Though it inherited a functioning government from British India, its leaders failed to deliver in respect of the five factors goals that are the goals of every state, namely 1) state building, 2) nation building, 3) economy building, 4) participation and 5) distribution. The editor considers this rather harsh, as the infrastructure of a federal government did not exist in 1947, and the leadership, headed by Jinnah, who migrated from India, was not familiar with the local cultural milieu.

The next three chapters take up the matters of nuclear capability, its international fallout, and economic development, Munir Ahmad Khan, who was
Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission for almost two decades, provides a comprehensive history of nuclear developments in India and Pakistan. Forced to respond to a possible nuclear threat from India, Pakistan made many proposals to promote non-proliferation in the subcontinent. However, as India turned down all of them, Pakistan felt obliged to acquire a nuclear deterrent. This led to troubled relations with the US, which imposed sanctions on Pakistan that, were multiplied after Pakistan's nuclear tests of May 1998. Walid Iqbal, an attorney in the US, analyses the political and economic realities in the subcontinent after India and Pakistan went overtly nuclear. He concentrates on US efforts to enforce nuclear restraint in the two countries.

A reputable US economist, Robert E. Looney, presents a rather optimistic picture of Pakistan's economic development, highlighting the progress achieved in its first fifty years. However, he also identifies shortcomings, such as large budgetary and balance of payment deficits, increasing inflationary pressures, the population explosion, and inadequacy of human resource and infrastructure development. His analysis of prospects of sustainable development, which is needed if democracy is to flourish, is not pessimistic.

The two chapters on Sectarian Issues have been authored by two Pakistani Americans, with Anwar H. Syed dealing with Shia-Sunni conflict in Pakistan, while Afaq Haydar has covered the Sunni militant outfit, Sipah-e-Sahaba. Both writers agree on the main causes behind the sectarian conflict, among them Gen. Ziaul Haq's Islamization policies, the proactive stance of Iran and Saudi Arabia in this sphere, and the emergence of extremist tendencies among Shias and Sunnis, which the ulema on both sides seek to exploit for political ends.

American and Pakistani scholars share the coverage of foreign policy in the final four chapters. Ambassador Dennis Kux, retired US diplomat who has served in both India and Pakistan follows the roller-coaster course of Pakistan-US relations, with several highs and lows, arising out of Washington's perceptions. The highs during the half-century included the alliance of the 1950s, the Nixon-Ford years in the early seventies and the Afghan war partnership during the 1980s. There were also three periods of friction - during the Kennedy-Johnson years in the 1960s, the period of the Carter administration, and again after the elder Bush enforced the Pressler amendment.

Ambassador Kux also identifies two middling periods of superficially friendly relations that lacked content, covering the Truman years and the later 1990s. He recognizes the need to restructure friendly and normal relations between the two countries, notably after the nuclear tests.

Hafeez Malik, who specializes in Soviet/Russia-Pakistan relations, maintains that the graph of these relations shows hardly any highs but consists of a series of lows. These arose out of the rivalries of the Cold War, and reflected a calculated disregard for the geo-strategic imperatives of Eurasia. The most notable lows related to 1) the early options for some strategic decisions, 2) the crisis of Bangladesh, 3) attempts at bilateralism, and 4) the Soviet debacle over Afghanistan. The post Cold War period also comes in for analysis.

Malik holds the view that opportunities came after 1990 to cement new relations with Russia, and to unlock India's claim to an exclusive relationship with Moscow. In the changed situation after the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russia could have become an alternative source of military hardware for Pakistan, specially following the imposition of sanctions by the US. Pakistan squandered those opportunities, at a time it needed Russian confidence, if not support, to develop constructive relations with the newly independent states of Central Asia.
Former Ambassador Abdul Sattar, who is presently the Foreign Minister, has written the chapter on Pakistan's relations with the West, China and the Middle East. He takes special note of the British role, and maintains that the last British Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten, pursued London's preference for India in the belief that the value of the support of independent India in "terms of world prestige and strategy would be enormous".

Pakistan did much better in its relations with China, which ignored its anti-Communist rhetoric, and came to develop an all-weather relationship with Pakistan, as there was no real conflict of interest between the two countries. A commonality of national interests and perceptions has provided the foundation on which the two countries have developed a comprehensive and collaborative relationship since 1963. China has extended economic and technical aid, as well as nuclear cooperation.

Despite its commitment to seeking close relations with the Muslim world, Pakistan has had a troubled relationship with the Arab states. Among reasons for this situation are Pakistan's alliance with the United States, its stance on the Suez crisis of 1956, and Pakistan's partnership with Iran and Turkey. Sattar devotes considerable attention to Pakistan's role in Afghanistan after the Soviet occupation in 1979. His conclusion, after considering Pakistan's foreign policy over the 50-year period, is that the policy of alliance followed by its leaders was "not flawed conceptually, though it suffered at time from errors of judgment".

The last chapter, by Prof. Robert G. Wirsing of the US covers India Pakistan relations and the problem of Kashmir. The abnormal and confrontational relationship between India and Pakistan arises largely out of the Kashmir problem. Prof. Wirsing, who has been a member of the Kashmir Study Group, has had the opportunity to interview hundreds of citizens and scholars in both countries. His finding is that in Pakistan, "there is a surprising willingness to rethink Pakistan's long standing official position on Jammu and Kashmir" and to recraft its unproductive aspects. On the other hand, there is a generally held view within the Indian elite that India is strong enough to ward off any challenge by Pakistan to its control of Kashmir, specially as Pakistan is viewed as a "nation in social, economic and political tatters" which has "lost the strategic advantages granted it by the Cold War". India envisages a settlement on the basis of the existing Line of Control. However, the accession of both countries to nuclear capability promises to prolong the stalemate.

This is a book that provides an illuminating survey of Pakistan's progress and problems in various fields during its first fifty years in a comprehensive and authoritative manner. Though it stops short of major developments after 1997, including the nuclear tests of 1998 and the military takeover of 1999, it is a valuable work of reference for all those interested in understanding Pakistan, and South Asia. The Oxford University Press and the editor, Prof. Hafeez Malik, merit appreciation for the publication of this volume which deserves to be in all libraries in Pakistan as a valuable work of reference. It should also be distributed through our diplomatic missions to scholars and journalists abroad who want to be enlightened on Pakistan.
The Simla Agreement 1972: Its Wasted Promise

By P.R. Chari & Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, A Publication of Regional Centre for Strategic Studies, Colombo Published by Manohar, New Delhi, 2001, 218 pages, Price Rs. 390.00

By Rafiuddin Ahmed

The Simla Agreement of July 1972, between India and Pakistan was acclaimed at that time as a landmark event in their turbulent history of bitter relationship since the Partition of British India. It was believed to carry a promise of peace and amity between the two countries and of stability and progress in South Asia. Yet in the very early stages of its implementation, the goodwill and the spirit of accommodation it had generated had begun to crumble under the pressure of events that led to the Simla Agreement and the new political compulsions created by it. The impact was deep, overbearing and painful. Although, the Indians still regard the Simla Agreement as an instrument of peace and continue to insist on its being the basis for all future political negotiations and crises resolution, factually during the following thirty years, its attributed elan had since long faded away and its promise of peace is nothing more than a dream.

Did the Simla Agreement really carry the claimed promise of lasting peace between India and Pakistan and for South Asia? What caused its failure and the dissipation of the much talked about Simla Spirit? Is it still workable? These questions have agitated the minds of many in this sub-continent during the decades that followed with increasing instability and confrontation.

Many answers are provided in the comprehensively researched and well documented book under review, The Simla Agreement 1972: Its Wasted Promise, the latest addition on the subject. It consists of two parts, carrying the excellent work by Mr. P.R. Chari, a former member of the Indian Administrative Service and Professor Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, a scholar of international repute and a leading Pakistani authority on regional and international security. Both writers have provided a critical evaluation of events that led to the Simla Agreement and its interpretation from their national perspectives. As one reads through the book, the compilation of facts and the arguments in their analysis and interpretation, particularly those by Professor Cheema advocating Pakistani perceptions, its value almost immediately becomes apparent. The readers would find it interesting and instructive to compare the two versions which bring out the frequent divergence of views and perceptions in the interpretation of events, motivations and compulsions which dominated the process of Simla Agreement and adversely affected the following developments. Perhaps, this alone answers many questions.

The Simla Agreement was the product of 1971 Indo-Pakistan War, a traumatic event in Pakistan’s short history. It was concluded as a result of Pakistan’s military defeat in former East Pakistan and its forced break away into Bangla Desh. Although the victory came easily to the Indians due to peculiarly favourable
conditions in former East Pakistan, it had given to them a decisive moral and psychological ascendancy over their main rivals, in terms of Prisoners of War (POW) and large territories captured in West Pakistan. They were obviously in no mood to give in without extracting maximum benefits and advantages. The most important of these as defined by the Indians were a permanent settlement of the Kashmir dispute, resolution of all differences through bilateral mechanism and establishment of durable peace in South Asia. Implicit in these principles and their application was the acceptance by all, the undisputed Indian leadership and dominance in the region. Although, in retrospect these do not appear too ambitious for a victor who had won the war, the Indians wasted the opportunity in clever and insidious exploitation. The Indian version and the subsequent development of events clearly point towards Indian failure in their stated goals.

The Pakistani leadership had gone to Simla with little to defend their national interests against mounting Indian overbearance and Bengali anger, except perhaps their skill in political negotiations. That they came out of it with minimum bruises without compromising on vital national issues was by itself a great achievement. Their immediate gains were the signing of the Simla Agreement which initiated the process of normalization of relations, vacation of captured territories in West Pakistan, and withdrawal of troops to international borders. Pakistan agreed to the new arrangements in Kashmir related to the conversion of Cease Fire Line (CFL) into Line of Control (LOC) and its inviolability with certain reservation and did not pursue the POW’s case. The latter was a shrewd decision which as the time passed became an Indian liability without gain and worked in favour of Pakistan. Even the Indians agree that it was a mistake which not only hurt the Indian image but failed to coerce Pakistan into recognizing Bangla Desh. Pakistan also played her China card well.

Thus in the final analysis it seems that it was the settlement of the Kashmir dispute that captured the main attention of the Simla Agreement and perhaps the only area where certain relevant clauses of the Agreement still stick and continue to influence the situation. Both authors readily agree to the Indian goals and intention in this respect, in which the redesignation of the CFL as LOC and its inviolability and imposition of bilateralism were directed towards breaking or eroding Kashmir’s disputed linkage with the UN and gradually converting the LOC into a permanent border, while at the same time eliminating third parties option and retaining the ability of coercive manipulation through bilateralism. That the Indians succeeded for a time, there is no doubt but despite their denials, and the Indian version is silent over it, these arrangements too could not endure and were broken by them when they aggressed into Chorbat La and Siachen and defiantly violated the Agreement and created the grounds for the Kargil episode. Although the Pakistanis did not make much noises over the earlier Indian aggressions, the Indians made a big issue out of Kargil in the name of Simla Agreement and succeeded. Nonetheless, these serious military engagements and constantly active LOC, coupled with the decade long state of insurgency and popular freedom movement inside Indian Held Kashmir (IHK) clearly indicate the fragility of the Indian design for the permanent settlement of Kashmir dispute. Peace and stability in South Asia have consistently proved elusive and the promise of Simla Agreement remains unrealized. Now the addition of nuclear factor has further complicated the situation.

Many good reasons have been advanced by the authors for this unfortunate dissolution of a dream, still valid for the Indians to take lessons from. Forced peace and expedient solutions against the wishes of the people do not endure, nor a dispute of the dimension of Kashmir can be wished away. But above all, resolution
of such dispute requires fair and generous attitude and commitments from the contending parties. Instead the Indians succumbed to the base temptations of petty victor, trying to exploit the helplessness of the vanquished. In the process they lost their historic advantage of creating trust and goodwill for establishing durable peace in South Asia. Also, their policy of bilateralism has failed to address a single issue with the other states, since the concept is impaired with Indian advantage of size, power and over-bearance, nor has it prevented from internationalizing the Kashmir dispute. Its invalidity is amply proved in the setbacks caused to the Agra Summit despite Pakistani eagerness and flexibility to resolve the core issue. The current relevance of Simla Agreement as presented by the author, without the basic values of mutual trust and accommodation would remain questionable.

The book is a valuable addition to the genuine research works on 1971 Indo-Pakistan War, a treasure of source material and references and a must-read by students of political science and regional affairs.
POLICY STATEMENTS
(JAN 2001 – JUNE 2001)

DOCUMENT # 1

Chief Executive General Pervez Musharraf’s
Speech at the Third D-8 Summit, Cairo,
February 25, 2001

“I am delighted to be re-visiting the beautiful city of Cairo, a cradle of history and
 civilization. We are touched by the warm reception and cordial hospitality extended
to us in the true traditions of your great country. The deep and abiding friendship
between Pakistan and Egypt enhances for us the significance of this Summit, firstly
because it is being held in Cairo and also because of the assumption of the
Chairmanship of the D-8 by you, Mr. President. I am confident that under your
leadership, this Summit will be a resounding success. I would like to express our
sincere thanks and appreciation to the Prime Minister of Bangladesh for providing
leadership to our organization during the past two years. I commend the untiring
efforts of our Executive Director, Ambassador Ayhan Kamel, in promoting D-8
cooperation and advancing our common objectives.

Mr. President,
Four years ago, a shared vision motivated the leaders of our countries to gather in
Istanbul to lay the foundation of the Developing-Eight, to promote economic, trade
and technological cooperation among the member states. Developing such
collaboration among countries of similar background and economies, is an endeavor
in step with the spirit of our times. The results achieved thus far may have fallen
short of the early expectations, yet, the Group has achieved a momentum, which
however, must be accelerated to forge a stronger partnership for development. Since
the Istanbul Summit, the D-8 has developed significant cooperation, created a
structure for coordinating its activities and identified projects, priorities and
designated sectors of responsibility for each member state. The Cairo Summit has
added a new welcome dimension to our cooperation by co-opting the private sector
with D-8 activities.
We applaud the holding of the first D-8 Business Forum on the eve of this Summit.
We are encouraged by the enthusiastic participation of entrepreneurs, investors and
business-executives in this Forum. It is both a challenge and a responsibility for our
governments to facilitate greater interaction among our respective private sector
businesses, which will undoubtedly lead to the expansion of our mutual trade and
economic cooperation. In this regard, signing of the agreement for easing of visa
procedures yesterday, is a positive step. The proposals for harmonization of customs
procedures and banking systems as well as the promotion of Information and net-
working through new mechanisms need to be promoted and pursued. Pakistan is
ready to consider lowering of tariffs within the D-8 framework, consistent with our
international obligations. This idea is viable and needs to be studied for developing
practical recommendations.”
We should come up with new strategies for enhancing mutual cooperation in trade. We need to exploit the large potential that exists in this area. The combined volume of world trade from our eight countries exceeds US $ 400 billion, while the intra D-8 trade comes to only US $ 14 billion. There is thus enormous scope for expansion of our mutual trade.

Mr. President,

Pakistan as the coordinator for the sector on agriculture, has arranged a number of meetings on various agriculture related matters since the Istanbul Summit. The workshop on Food Security held in Islamabad in late 1999, adopted several recommendations designed to increase food production as well as measures to provide food resources to the poor. Pakistan also compiled a directory of Aquaculture experts, scientists and institutions. Pakistan has now offered to hold three seminars and workshops: on Bio-technology for increasing agricultural productivity; on alternate/organic fertilizer; on conservation of farm animal genetic resources.

In the future, we hope to come up with additional proposals not only in the agriculture sector but also other areas of development to which we have assigned high priority in our country. Mr. President, Domestically, my Government has assigned the highest priority to the tasks of economic revival, reform, and institution building. Information technology, energy, agriculture have been selected for special focus as sectors of rapid growth. We have also initiated wide ranging poverty alleviation programmes, including micro-financing, food support and rural and urban development programmes. A major effort on the part of the Government is directed at improving the quality of education in the country. Without strong technological educational and information base, we cannot take advantage of the economic opportunities in the new international environment of globalized world economy.

Mr. President,

The new global environment determined by the phenomenal technological progress, rapid development and communication and information revolutions, confronts every country with new challenges. Globalization has benefited many regions and countries and has raised expectations for rapid economic growth. At the same time, it has spawned greater inequities and compounded difficulties for weaker economies. The global trade regime benefits mainly the rich and technologically advanced countries. Besides, external debt burden is stifling economic growth in most developing countries including Pakistan. This problem has reached alarming proportion and was thus a major issue at the South Summit in Havana and at the UN Millennium Summit last year. The developing world needs debt relief on a large scale, to bring about the stability necessary for development. Our Group should join the efforts of other developing countries to address this grave problem.

Mr. President,

As we are also members of the organization of the Islamic Conference, let us take a dispassionate look at the scenario in the Islamic world. Our economic picture is dismal. Despite possessing 70 percent of the world’s energy resources and representing a quarter of the world’s population, our collective contribution to the global economy is insignificant. The collective annual GDP of the OIC countries is around US $ 1200 billion, while that of Japan alone is a staggering US $ 5500 billion.
We need to ask ourselves, why this disparity? This is only due to the vast technological superiority of the developed countries, which in turn is only because of the better developed human resource. There are only about 380 universities in the entire Muslim world as against 1000 universities in Japan alone. The OIC countries produce only 500 PhDs annually in contrast to 3500 PhDs from the UK alone. Not just this, the Muslim countries managed to produce just one percent of the world’s research publications.

Human resource is our most valuable asset that needs to be nurtured and developed. In this context, I propose that the D-8 should identify various reputed scientific and technological centres in the member states for promotion of exchange programmes and preferential access to our youth. The product of these institutions will be a valuable asset for the development of the knowledge base in our countries and the Islamic world.

Here, I would like to emphasize the need for strong collaboration between the D-8, Group and the OIC. Our countries should not only develop within the D-8 framework but assume the role of an engine of growth for the Islamic World.

Mr. President,
In several regions of the world, absence of peace and stability, coupled with security concerns, heightened the challenges of development. Economic well-being flourishes in peaceful condition; instability is detrimental to progress. For most part of the last century the Middle East has suffered because of denial of justice to the Palestinian people and the consequent Arab-Israeli conflict. The Arab and Islamic world continues to experience the pain of this tragedy and the negative impact of the conflict on economic development and well being of the people in the region.

We stand united with our Arab brothers in demanding a just and lasting solution to the Palestinian problems.

Mr. President,
Peace has also eluded South Asia for over half a century. The long-standing Kashmir dispute has been universally recognized as the root cause of tensions in South Asia. Pakistan has consistently sought a peaceful resolution of the dispute in accordance with the wishes of the Kashmiri people, through meaningful dialogue and on the basis of international norms of justice and legality. We look for support from the Muslim Ummah for the Kashmiri cause.

The unstable Afghan situation is, indeed, also a matter of concern for us. A humanitarian disaster is impending in Afghanistan. The ongoing strife, unprecedented drought as well as additional UN sanctions have compounded the hardships of the Afghan people and has led to a large influx of refugees into Pakistan. This situation demands that the international community in general and the Islamic countries more specifically, come forward with increased humanitarian assistance to avert the looming humanitarian disaster. Afghanistan crisis for peace can only be achieved through engagement and recognition of ground realities. The Taliban should be engaged rather than isolated.

Mr. President,
Our countries are endowed with enormous human and natural resources. We face similar challenges of development. Our aspirations and objectives are complimentary. Let us decide today to provide each other preferential support in the areas of economic and developmental cooperation. May Allah guide our endeavours
for the realization of our full potential and for the collective progress and prosperity of our countries and the Islamic world.

I thank you all.”

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**DOCUMENT # 2**

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
(Office of the Spokesman April 17, 200)

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY OF STATE COLIN L. POWELL
Situation in the Middle East

Text: Powell’s Statement on Middle East Violence


The United States is deeply concerned about the events of the last four days in the Middle East, including the Hezbollah attack on Israeli forces at Sheba’a Farms, the Israeli retaliatory attack directed at Syrian positions in Lebanon, the ongoing Palestinian mortar attacks into Israel, and last night’s Israeli retaliation in Gaza. The situation is threatening to escalate further, posing the risk of a broader conflict. We call upon all sides to exercise maximum restraint, to reduce tensions, and to take steps to end the violence immediately.

The hostilities last night in Gaza were precipitated by the provocative Palestinian mortar attacks on Israel. The Israeli response was excessive and disproportionate. We call upon both sides to respect the agreements they’ve signed. For the Palestinians, this includes implementing their commitment to renounce terrorism and violence, to exercise control over all elements of the P.L.O. and the Palestinian Authority, and to discipline violators. For the Israelis, this includes respecting their commitment to withdraw from Gaza according to the terms of the agreements signed by Israel and the Palestinians. There can be no military solution to this conflict. We continue to strongly believe that the resumption of bilateral security cooperation is essential to reduce and eventually end the violence. We are continuing to work with the parties so that they can resume as soon as possible the security discussions they began two weeks ago.

The United States remains prepared to assist the parties in taking steps to reduce the violence, seeking ways to restore trust and confidence, and assisting them in resolving their differences through negotiations.
The following is the text of the Tehran Declaration signed by the Prime Minister, Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee and President of Islamic Republic of Iran, Mr. Ayatullah Mohammed Khatami in Tehran on April 10, 2001:

The Republic of India and The Islamic Republic of Iran hereinafter referred to as the Sides:

- Conscious of the civilisational affinities and historical links between the two countries.
- Noting their shared interests, common challenges and aspirations as two ancient civilizations and as two developing countries.
- Desirous of realising the vast potential of bilateral co-operation in political, strategic, economic, technological and cultural fields, including trade, industry, technology, energy, transportation and agriculture.
- Convinced that strengthened bilateral relations will be mutually beneficial and enhance regional peace and stability.
- Seeking to build upon the desire of the peoples of both countries to develop closer ties,

Declare and adopt the following:

The sides affirm that respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, equality and non-interference in each other’s internal affairs are fundamental principles of friendly relations amongst States. The Sides affirm that only an equitable, pluralistic and co-operative international order can address effectively the challenges of our era.

Affirming that Dialogue among Civilisations, as a new paradigm in international relations, provides a conducive ground for constructive interaction and effective cooperation, the sides call upon the international community in this UN year of Dialogue among Civilisations, to rededicate itself to the principles of tolerance, pluralism and respect for diversity and to share its commitment to promote the concept of Dialogue among Civilisations.

The sides reaffirm their commitment to the goal of achieving general and complete disarmament under the effective international control and in this regard, emphasise the need for conclusion of a multilaterally negotiated agreement on the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specific time frame. Both sides express concern over restrictions on exports to developing countries of material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes and reaffirm, in this context, the right of States to development, research, production and use of technology, material and equipment for such purposes.

The sides affirm the importance of preservation of peace, security and stability in the region. Mutually beneficial trade and transportation links as well as regional economic co-operation among the countries of the region are essential factors for progress and development of the entire region. The Sides note in particular the importance of secure and peaceful environment to the development of commerce and the promotion of economic growth in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean.
regions. The Sides also consider security and stability in Central Asia of vital importance to them.
Both sides condemn terrorism in all its forms. The Sides recognize the serious threats posed to nations states and international peace and security by the growing threat of international terrorism and extremism. They also condemn states that aid, abet and directly support international terrorism and call on the international community to intensify its efforts to combat international terrorism. They reiterate their resolve to work to strengthen the international consensus and legal regimes against terrorism, including early finalization of a Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism.
The sides agree that the unity, territorial integrity, Independence and sovereignty of Afghanistan is crucial for the maintenance of peace and stability of the region. They agree that a military resolution to the civil conflict in Afghanistan is not possible and the establishment of genuinely broad-based government representing the aspirations of Afghan people is essential for the peace and stability in Afghanistan. They also express their deep concern over the growth of extremism and the threat of terrorism and illegal trade in narcotics emanating from the area of the extremists.
The Sides consider globalization as a challenge of our time. While it should offer certain opportunities for growth and development at present the benefits of globalization are unevenly shared among the nations and much remains to be done to ensure that its benefits be comprehensively and equitably distributed at the global level.
Flowing from their commitment to promote the socio-economic development and prosperity of their people, the Sides agree to launch a new phase of constructive and mutually beneficial cooperation covering, in particular, the areas of energy, transit and transport, industry, agriculture and service sectors.
The geographical situation of Iran and its abundant energy resources along with the rapidly expanding Indian economy and energy market on the other, create a unique complementarity which the Sides agree to harness for mutual benefit. In this context they agreed to accelerate the process of working out an appropriate scheme for the pipeline options and finalizing the agreement reached on LNG.
The Sides reaffirm their commitment to strengthen transport and transit cooperation. In this context and in line with the proper implementation of Inter-governmental Agreement of International North-South Corridor between Iran, India and Russia and Agreement on International Transit of goods between Iran, India and Turkmenistan. They agree to encourage the businessmen and traders of the two countries to better utilise the said corridors. The Sides agree to actively promote scientific and technological cooperation, including among others, joint research projects, short and long term training courses and exchange of related information on a regular basis.
The sides emphasised the important role played by cultural interaction in promoting bilateral relation and establishing peace and stability among nations, agree to take necessary steps by the concerned bodies of the two countries in expanding cultural and artistic cooperation in all fields. The sides agreed to facilitate tourism between the two countries.
The sides reaffirm their commitment to the strengthening and deepening of consultations and to enhancing their coordination on bilateral regional and multilateral issues of common concern. In this regard they will pursue and continue regular structured and comprehensive mutual consultations. They note the useful contribution of the Joint Commission as well as the Joint Business Council and
resolve to further enhance trade and economic links, including through facilitation of visits and exchanges.
The Sides welcome the role played by interaction between the Islamic Consultative Assembly and the Indian Parliament as also people to people exchanges in promoting mutual understanding and dialogue and resolve to enhance it further.
Signed on April 10, 2001 at Tehran in two originals, each in Hindi, Persian and English languages.

DOCUMENT # 4

NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENCE
Text of President Bush Speech on Missile Defence
At National Defence University, Washington D.C.

White House transcript. (http://www.acronym.org.uk/bush1.htm)

“Today, we want us to think back some 30 years to a far different time in a far different world. The United States and the Soviet Union were locked in a hostile rivalry. The Soviet Union was our unquestioned enemy; a highly-armed threat to freedom and democracy. Far more than that, the wall in Berlin divided us. Our highest ideal was - and remains - individual liberty. Theirs was the construction of a vast communist empire. Their totalitarian regime held much of Europe captive behind an iron curtain.

We didn’t trust them, and for good reason. Our deep differences were expressed in a dangerous military confrontation that resulted in thousands of nuclear weapons pointed at each other on hair-trigger alert. Security of both the United States and the Soviet Union was based on a grim premise: that neither side would fire nuclear weapons at each other, because doing so would mean the end of both nations.
We even went so far as to codify this relationship in a 1972 ABM Treaty, based on the doctrine that our very survival would best be insured by leaving both sides completely open and vulnerable to nuclear attack. The threat was real and vivid. The Strategic Air Command had an airborne command post called the Looking Glass, aloft 24 hours a day, ready in case the President ordered our strategic forces to move towards their targets and release their nuclear ordnance. The Soviet Union had almost 1.5 million troops deep in the heart of Europe, in Poland and Czechoslovakia, Hungary and East Germany. We used our nuclear weapons not just to prevent the Soviet Union from using their nuclear weapons, but also to contain their conventional military forces, to prevent them from extending the Iron Curtain into parts of Europe and Asia that were still free.

In that world, few other nations had nuclear weapons and most of those who did were responsible allies, such as Britain and France. We worried about the proliferation of nuclear weapons to other countries, but it was mostly a distant threat, not yet a reality.

Today, the sun comes up on a vastly different world. The Wall is gone, and so is the Soviet Union. Today’s Russia is not yesterday’s Soviet Union. Its government is no longer Communist. Its President is elected. Today’s Russia is not our enemy, but a country in transition with an opportunity to emerge as a great nation, democratic, at peace with itself and its neighbors. The Iron Curtain no longer exists. Poland,
Hungary and the Czech Republic are free nations, and they are now our allies in NATO, together with a reunited Germany.

Yet, this is still a dangerous world, a less certain, a less predictable one. More nations have nuclear weapons and still more have nuclear aspirations. Many have chemical and biological weapons. Some already have developed the ballistic missile technology that would allow them to deliver weapons of mass destruction at long distances and at incredible speeds. And a number of these countries are spreading these technologies around the world.

Most troubling of all, the list of these countries includes some of the world’s least-responsible states. Unlike the Cold War, today’s most urgent threat stems not from thousands of ballistic missiles in the Soviet hands, but from a small number of missiles in the hands of these states, states for whom terror and blackmail are a way of life. They seek weapons of mass destruction to intimidate their neighbors, and to keep the United States and other responsible nations from helping allies and friends in strategic parts of the world.

When Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990, the world joined forces to turn him back. But the international community would have faced a very different situation had Hussein been able to blackmail with nuclear weapons. Like Saddam Hussein, some of today’s tyrants are gripped by an implacable hatred of the United States of America. They hate our friends, they hate our values, they hate democracy and freedom and individual liberty. Many care little for the lives of their own people. In such a world, Cold War deterrence is no longer enough.

To maintain peace, to protect our own citizens and our own allies and friends, we must seek security based on more than the grim premise that we can destroy those who seek to destroy us. This is an important opportunity for the world to re-think the unthinkable, and to find new ways to keep the peace.

Today’s world requires a new policy, a broad strategy of active non-proliferation, counter proliferation and defenses. We must work together with other like-minded nations to deny weapons of terror from those seeking to acquire them. We must work with allies and friends who wish to join with us to defend against the harm they can inflict. And together we must deter anyone who would contemplate their use. We need new concepts of deterrence that rely on both offensive and defensive forces. Deterrence can no longer be based solely on the threat of nuclear retaliation. Defenses can strengthen deterrence by reducing the incentive for proliferation.

We need a new framework that allows us to build missile defenses to counter the different threats of today’s world. To do so, we must move beyond the constraints of the 30-year-old ABM Treaty. This treaty does not recognize the present, or point us to the future. It enshrines the past. No treaty that prevents us from addressing today’s threats, that prohibits us from pursuing promising technology to defend ourselves, our friends and our allies is in our interests or in the interests of world peace. This new framework must encourage still further cuts in nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons still have a vital role to play in our security and that of our allies. We can, and will, change the size, the composition, the character of our nuclear forces in a way that reflects the reality that the Cold War is over.

I am committed to achieving a credible deterrent with the lowest-possible number of nuclear weapons consistent with our national security needs, including our obligations to our allies. My goal is to move quickly to reduce nuclear forces. The United States will lead by example to achieve our interests and the interests for peace in the world.
Several months ago, I asked Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld to examine all available technologies and basing modes for effective missile defenses that could protect the United States, our deployed forces, our friends and our allies. The Secretary has explored a number of complementary and innovative approaches.

The Secretary has identified near-term options that could allow us to deploy an initial capability against limited threats. In some cases, we can draw on already established technologies that might involve land-based and sea-based capabilities to intercept missiles in mid-course or after they re-enter the atmosphere. We also recognize the substantial advantages of intercepting missiles early in their flight, especially in the boost phase. The preliminary work has produced some promising options for advanced sensors and interceptors that may provide this capability. If based at sea or on aircraft, such approaches could provide limited, but effective, defenses.

We have more work to do to determine the final form the defenses might take. We will explore all these options further. We recognize the technological difficulties we face and we look forward to the challenge. Our nation will assign the best people to this critical task.

We will evaluate what works and what does not. We know that some approaches will not work. We also know that we will be able to build on our successes. When ready, and working with Congress, we will deploy missile defenses to strengthen global security and stability.

I’ve made it clear from the very beginning that I would consult closely on the important subject with our friends and allies who are also threatened by missiles and weapons of mass destruction. Today, I’m announcing the dispatch of high-level representatives to Allied capitals in Europe, Asia, Australia and Canada to discuss our common responsibility to create a new framework for security and stability that reflects the world of today. They will begin leaving next week.

The delegations will be headed by three men on this stage: Rich Armitage, Paul Wolfowitz, and Steve Hadley; deputies of the State Department, the Defense Department and the National Security staff. Their trips will be part of an ongoing process of consultation, involving many people and many levels of government, including my Cabinet Secretaries.

These will be real consultations. We are not presenting our friends and allies with unilateral decisions already made. We look forward to hearing their views, the views of our friends, and to take them into account. We will seek their input on all the issues surrounding the new strategic environment. We’ll also need to reach out to other interested states, including China and Russia. Russia and the United States should work together to develop a new foundation for world peace and security in the 21st century. We should leave behind the constraints of an ABM Treaty that perpetuates a relationship based on distrust and mutual vulnerability. This Treaty ignores the fundamental breakthroughs in technology during the last 30 years. It prohibits us from exploring all options for defending against the threats that face us, our allies and other countries.

That’s why we should work together to replace this Treaty with a new framework that reflects a clear and clean break from the past, and especially from the adversarial legacy of the Cold War. This new cooperative relationship should look to the future, not to the past. It should be reassuring, rather than threatening. It should be premised on openness, mutual confidence and real opportunities for cooperation, including the area of missile defense. It should allow us to share information so that each nation can improve its early warning capability, and its
capability to defend its people and territory. And perhaps one day, we can even cooperate in a joint defense.

I want to complete the work of changing our relationship from one based on a nuclear balance of terror, to one based on common responsibilities and common interests. We may have areas of difference with Russia, but we are not and must not be strategic adversaries. Russia and America both face new threats to security. Together, we can address today’s threats and pursue today’s opportunities. We can explore technologies that have the potential to make us all safer.

This is a time for vision; a time for a new way of thinking; a time for bold leadership. The Looking Glass no longer stands its 24-hour-day vigil. We must all look at the world in a new, realistic way, to preserve peace for generations to come.”

**DOCUMENT # 5**

**BANQUET SPEECH BY THE CHINESE PREMIER ZHU RONGJI**

Islamabad, 11 May 2001

“I am very glad to have the opportunity of paying an official visit to Pakistan, a friend of China, at the invitation of Your Excellency the Chief Executive. The moment we set foot on your soil, we have been immersed in the profound friendship of the Pakistani people towards the Chinese people. This afternoon, Mr. Chief Executive, you and I held candid and fruitful talks and reached consensus on many questions and now you are hosting this grand welcoming dinner. My wife and all the other members of the delegation wish to join me in expressing sincere thanks to you and your wife and extending good wishes to all the Pakistani friends present here.

China and Pakistan are close neighbours. Two thousand years ago, the Silk Road served as a bridge for our friendly exchanges. Today we are closely linked up by the Karakoram Highway. For 50 years since the establishment of diplomatic relations, China-Pakistan friendship and cooperation have continued to develop thanks to our joint efforts. Going beyond differences in social system, ideology and religious belief, we have succeeded in implementing the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, thus setting an example of good-neighbourly friendship, mutual trust and mutually beneficial cooperation. The Chinese Government is ready to further strengthen the partnership of all-round cooperation with Pakistan and instill new vigour and vitality into the friendly relations between our two countries.

Over the past 50 years, China and Pakistan, both development countries, have had mutual understanding and support on many major international issues. Pakistan has always spoken up for China at international forums, firmly supporting China’s efforts to safeguard national unity and territorial integrity and upholding justice and dignity in the cause of international human rights. In the new century, China and Pakistan should continue to step up their cooperation, safeguard the solidarity and interests of the developing countries in a common endeavour to promote the establishment of a just and rational new international political and economic order. South Asia is an important component not only of Asia, but also of the whole world. Peace and development in the region are vitally linked with the stability and prosperity of Asia and the world at large. As a close neighbour to South Asia, China cares about the situation in the region. China sincerely hopes that South Asia will be
able to maintain peace and stability and that countries in the subcontinent can live together in peace and as equals politically, cooperate closely for common development economically, and together work in concert for a secure, harmonious and economically developing South Asia. This not only conforms to the common aspiration and fundamental interests of all peoples in the region, but also is beneficial to peace and stability in Asia and the world at large. The Chinese side is ready to work together with all countries in South Asia including Pakistan and contribute our due share to realizing this goal.

Friends,
At present, China enjoys political stability, vibrant economic development and all-round social progress. Having found a road of development suited to national conditions, the Chinese people are focusing their efforts on boosting economic development, determined to bring about modernization by and large and build China into a strong, prosperous, democratic and culturally advanced socialist country by the middle of this century. Stability and development in China are not only in the interest of prosperity and progress in Asia but an important contribution to world peace and development.

At this moment when old and new friends meet, please allow me to convey once again my sincere thanks to the Chief Executive, to the Government and people of Pakistan for their gracious hospitality and to pay my tribute to personages from various circles and friends who have long been working for China-Pakistan friendship. May the tree of our friendship remain evergreen.”

**DOCUMENTS # 6**

RETURN SPEECH BY GEN PERVEZ MUSHARRAF
Islamabad, 11 May 2001

“Your Excellency Premier Zhu Rongji, Your Excellency

Madame Lao An, Distinguished Members of the Chinese Delegation,

Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,
It is a matter of pleasure for me and members of my Government to extend a very warm welcome to Premier Zhu Rongji, Madam Lao An and all our honoured Chinese guests on the historic occasion of the 50th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Pakistan and the People’s Republic of China. The foundations of these close ties were laid by the sagacious and visionary leaders of our two countries many decades ago. Today, the relationship of friendship, trust and co-operation between the two neighbours stand as a golden example.
Your visit is a landmark because is symbolizes the reaffirmation of our traditional bonds of friendship and also because it is the first at this level between our two countries in the new millennium. We have just concluded very fruitful talks on further consolidating our existing friendship and developing still closer ties in the years ahead.
“Our close relations have remained unaffected by international changes or by domestic changes in our countries. This is due to a shared interest in the peace, security and stability of South Asia and of the wider Asia-Pacific region and our adherence to the principles of the UN other as well as the five principles of Peaceful Co-existence.

“Our two countries hold similar views on regional and international issues, we are opposed to international or regions hegemony and we co-operate with each other closely in international fora.

“Pakistan and China are partners in peace and development. The Government and people of Pakistan deeply appreciate the co-operation, support and assistance extended by China in the areas of economic development and defence. The Chashma Nuclear Power Plant which was inaugurated in March this year, is the latest addition to mega infrastructure projects completed by Pakistan with Chinese co-operation and stands as a monument of Pakistan-China friendship and South-South co-operation.

Excellency,
The people of Pakistan rejoiced at the return of Hong Kong and Macau to China. We fully support the One-China policy and are confident that Taiwan will also soon return to the motherland. We have witnessed with admiration the spectacular progress made by China in recent years in modernizing its economy and in improving the quality of life of its citizens. This has been achieved through the wise policies of China’s leadership and the commitment and dynamism of the Chinese people.
We are confident that in the years ahead, China will reach even greater heights of development and progress. This will also have a positive impact on the economies of developing countries in the Asia-Pacific region.
In Pakistan, my Government has been engaged in the task of economic revival, good governance and strengthening the institutions of state. This would lay the foundations for a true democracy and pave way for a better life for our people. We have made substantial progress in the last nineteen months in improving our economic performance despite the heavy debt burden inherited by us, the recent drought and large influx of Afghan refugees.

Excellency,
The world is passing through uncertain times. We are witnessing and an uneven distribution of global power. A new world order is gradually emerging. We share the international concern at the development and deployment of ballistic missile defences which could jeopardize strategic stability, trigger a new arms race and undermine international efforts armed at arms control and disarmament.
Unresolved disputes and conflicts continue to threaten peace in different regions in South Asia, ambitions of hegemony and aspirations of a great power status by India remain a source of instability and tension. These ambitions led to the Indian nuclear capability in the interests of regional stability and to deter aggression. We have exercised restraint and responsibility in nuclear and missile fields. We desire peaceful resolution of disputes with India and have repeatedly expressed our desire for a meaningful dialogue.
China has always played a positive and constructive role to promote peace and stability in South Asia. In the present regional and international environment, that role is even more vital.
Excellency,

The root cause for the tensions in South Asia remains the unresolved Kashmir dispute, arising from India’s refusal to allow the Kashmiri people to exercise their inherent right to self-determination. This right was also guaranteed to the Kashmiri people by the resolutions of the UN Security Council and pledged to them by both Pakistan and India. Today, the Kashmiri people have engaged in a determined struggle to regain this right. They have made huge sacrifices and have lost more than 70,000 lives in last 10 years besides suffering atrocities through the hands of more than 600,000 Indian occupation forces.

Attempts are often made to bracket the Kashmir freedom struggle with religious extremism or separatism or even with terrorism. It is none of these. The people of Kashmir only want freedom for themselves. They are not separatists, because Kashmir is not and never was a part of India. They are not terrorists. They were forced to take up arms to defend themselves against Indian state-sponsored terrorism. Kashmir involves the destiny of 10 million Kashmiris living under Indian occupation. Indian attempts to impose a military solution in Kashmir will not succeed.

On our Western borders two decades of foreign occupation, conflict and instability in Afghanistan have profoundly affected our security, economy and social fabric. We would like to see an end to the civil war in Afghanistan and the establishment of a representative, multi-ethnic government in accordance with the wishes of the Afghan people. We have always worked together with other countries and the UN to bring peace in Afghanistan and will continue these efforts. The recently imposed one-sided sanctions against the Afghan Government have seriously hampered these efforts and have further aggravated the economic miseries of the common Afghan people.

Instability in Afghanistan also hinders the development of transit routes to the Indian Ocean for the land-locked states of Central Asia with which Pakistan has traditional cultural and commercial ties. The ancient silk route was traversed by traders and travelers from what is now Pakistan Afghanistan and Central Asia, as well as China. These links were disrupted during the colonial period. The Karakoram Highway, an eternal symbol of the dedication of Pakistan and Chinese engineers and workers revived acme of these ties. The independence of the Central Asian countries a decade ago gave rise to expectations of a full restoration of these ancient links but these hopes will remain elusive till restoration of peace in Afghanistan.

Mr. Prime Minister

The strong all-weather time tested friendship and comprehensive partnership between Pakistan and China rests on a strong foundation built up over the past fifty years. It is based on mutual trust and draws its sustenance from close people-to-people contacts. It remains a vital element for the peace ad stability of South Asia and beyond. We will work together with our Chinese friends in the pursuit of our shared goals and further strengthen this model bilateral relationship.”
DOCUMENT # 7

TEXT OF INDIAN PREMIER VAJPAYEE’S LETTER TO PRESIDENT GEN PERVEZ MUSHARRAF

May 25, 2001

Following is the text of the letter written by Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee to Pakistani President Gen Pervez Musharraf inviting him to visit India:

Excellency,

India has through dialogue consistently endeavoured to build a relationship of durable peace, stability and cooperative friendship with Pakistan. Our common enemy is poverty. For the welfare of our people, there is no other recourse but a pursuit of the path of reconciliation of engaging in productive dialogue and by building trust and confidence, I invite you to walk this high road with us.

When I visited Lahore in February 1999, with the objective of beginning a new chapter in our bilateral relations, I had recorded at the Minar-e-Pakistan that a stable, secure and prosperous Pakistan is in India's interest, that remains our conviction.

We have to pick up the threads again, including renewing the Composite Dialogue so that we can put in place a stable structure of cooperation and address all outstanding issues, including J&K.

I have the pleasure to extend a most cordial invitation to Begum Musharraf and you to visit India at your early convenience.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurance of my highest consideration.

Signed
A B Vajpayee

DOCUMENTS # 8

TEXT OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 2 OF 2001

In pursuance of the Proclamation of Emergency of the fourteenth day of October 1999, and in exercise of all powers enabling him in that behalf, the Chief Executive of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan is pleased to make and promulgate the following order:

(1) This Order may be called the Proclamation of Emergency (Amendment) Order, 2001.

(2) It shall come into force at once.

(3) In the Proclamation of Emergency of the fourteenth day of October, 1999, in paragraph

(a) for clause (b) the following shall be substituted, namely:-
(b) The person holding the office of the President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan immediately before the commencement of the Proclamation of Emergency (Amendment) Order, 2001, shall cease to hold the office with immediate effect.

(c) In clause (c), for the word “suspended” occurring at the end, the words “dissolved with immediate effect” shall be substituted; and for clause

(d) the following shall be substituted, namely:-

(d) The Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the Senate have already ceased to hold office; the Speaker and Deputy Speaker of the National Assembly and the Provincial shall also cease to hold office with immediate effect.

DOCUMENT # 9

TEXT OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE’S
ORDER NO.3 OF 2001

AN ORDER to provide for succession to the office of the President. Whereas it is expedient to provide for succession to the office of the President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and for matters connected therewith or ancillary thereto; NOW, THEREFORE, in pursuance of the Proclamation of Emergency of the fourteenth day of October, 1999 and the Provisional Constitution Order 1 of 1999 and I exercise of all other powers enabling him in that behalf, the Chief Executive of the Islamic Republic is please to make and promulgate the following order:-

1. Short title and commencement:-

(1) This Order may be called The President’s Succession Order, 2001.

(2) It shall come into force at once.

2. This Order shall have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the Constitution or any other law.

3. (1) Upon the office of the President becoming vacant for any reason whatsoever, the Chief Executive of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan shall be the President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and shall perform all function assigned to the President by or under the Constitution or by or under any law.

(2) The Chief Executive shall hold office as President until his successor enters upon his office.

(3) Before entering upon his office, the President shall make, before the Chief Justice of Pakistan, oath in the form set out in the Schedule.

4. (1) If the President, by reason of absence from Pakistan or any other cause, is unable to perform his function, the Chief Justice of
Pakistan or, if the Chief Justice of Pakistan is also absent from Pakistan, the most senior Judge of the Supreme Court shall perform the function of President until the President returns to Pakistan or, as the case may be, resume his functions.

(2) Before entering upon his office, the Acting President shall make before the most senior Judge of the Supreme Court oath in the form set out in the Schedule.

DOCUMENT # 10

TEXT OF ADDRESS BY
CE GENERAL PERVEZ MUSHARRAF
AT 25th NATIONAL SEERAT CONFERENCE,
AT ISLAMABAD [June 5, 2001]

Bismillah Hir Rehrnanarahirum

Federal Minister for Religious Affairs, Dr. Mahmood Ghazi Sahib,
All the Respected Ministers,
Federal Secretary for Religious Affairs, Mr. Zubair Kidwai Sahib,
Excellencies,
Ulama and Mashaikh-e-Kiram
And
Honourable Ladies and Gentlemen,

Assalam-o-Alaikum!
I feel extremely happy to be with you in this august assembly. First of all, I would like to compliment the Ministry of Religious Affairs for making excellent arrangements for this conference.

This day carries great significance for all of us Muslims. It was on this day that Allah Almighty sent Hazrat Mohammad (May peace be upon him) to this world to serve as his last messenger to humanity. It was through him that Allah perfected Islam and it is his life and teachings that will provide the guiding light to Muslims till the end of the world.

The Holy prophet brought about a revolution in social relations through Islam. I would like to talk on that frankly, simply and in my own idiom. I do not have a written text before me. That is because I would like to say how I feel like on various issues in a straightforward manner.

What did that Islamic revolution mean? The first thing it did was to provide justice and equity. Dr. Mahmud Ghazi has talked about it so eloquently. There was no discrimination between the rich and the poor, the white and the black. No man had preference over another man. Everyone was treated at par and justly. A spirit of accommodation and tolerance was promoted among them. This led to unanimity and cooperation. A new consciousness developed and unity created strength.
To my mind, without this unity Islam would not have moved forward. At the same time, the importance of moral principles was highlighted and every individual was encouraged to reform himself, in other words, to elevate his moral tone. The society was rid of all evils. And, above all, and this carries weight with me, woman was accorded a place of honour and respect. A truly model society was brought into being, the kind we would like to be created not only in Pakistan but in the whole world.

Allow me now to talk about our present society. Where do we stand and which way we are going? We say Islam is a Din. It is no mere religion. It provides guidance to us in all walks of life. And because of this we claim it is superior to all other faiths. But how do we actually conduct ourselves life. Look at Muslims everywhere and in Pakistan too. Is this what our Din teaches us.

We say Islam is for all times to come because as a Din it relates to practical life. But how does the world look at us. The world sees us as backward and constantly going under. Is there any doubt that we have been left behind all although we claim Islam will carry us forward in every age, every circumstance and every land. Islam is vibrant and forward looking. But more than that claim it is the most tolerant of faiths. How does the world judge our claim? It looks upon us as terrorists. We e been killing each other. And now we want to spread violence and terror abroad. Naturally, the world regards us as terrorists. Our claim of tolerance is phony in eyes. This is where we stand today. It is time we took tock of position. I would like to analyze it like this. All of us sitting here are Muslims. We believe in one God, we accept Prophet Mohammad (May peace be upon him) as the last prophet, and we recite the same Kalima “There is no god but God and Mohammad is the messenger of Allah”.

Anyone who holds these beliefs is a Muslim to me, whether he is a Shia or Sunni, Brelvi or Deobandi. All are Muslims and we are one. No one, believing his own persuasion to be the correct one, has a right to thrust it on others.

Coming to basics about which I have talked and in which we all believe, we are all Muslims. Beyond that if you have a particular approach and thinking, keep them to yourselves. But if you want to propagate them to others, do it nicely. Why quarrel about it? Everyone has a right to his own thinking. In any case, who is going to be the judge?

Are you my judge? Whether I am right or wrong? Whether you are right or wrong? It is Allah Almighty who is the Judge. Only He knows who is right or wrong. Who is a good Muslim. Who is a bad Muslim. We have no right to tell anybody that he is bad and we are good, we are on the right path and he is on the wrong track.

Nobody has this right. This is what I believe in. We are all Muslims. On my part, I can assure you whenever a crisis overtakes Muslims or Islam, you will find me in the forefront. I have just talked about the model society built by the Holy Prophet. Let us try some comparison of our own society with it. Where do we see justice and equity? Do you see it? In Pakistan? Where? Look at the judiciary’s performance. corruption is rampant and misdeemeanour the order of day. Only Sifarish works. Merit has no taker. The poor are oppressed. To be poor in Pakistan is a curse. Everybody oppresses him.

Only the other day, I was listening to a presentation on the Khushhali (prosperity) Bank. Some of the poorest folk who had been given small loans of fifteen, twenty or thirty thousand rupees had come from far off places in Balochistan, Sindh and Punjab. I talked to them. An old man told me that the workers of the Khushhali Bank came to them and gave them the loans but did not accept even a cup tea from them. Otherwise, he said, what is our lot?
Dacoits swoop on us, beat us, we go to the police, they too beat us. This is the justice about which we brag so much that Islam provides. But where is it in Pakistan? And for whom? For the rich, may be. For the powerful may be. What about mutual tolerance? It exists nowhere. Instead, we are killing each other wearing masks. Was Islam propagated like this? Did our prophet do it that way? We know and the world knows that whenever we took up arms for Islam, we did it openly, not hiding behind the masks, not through terror not firing a burst and then slipping away. This is not the way to promote an ideology. Is this the way the ideology of Islam should be promoted? This is sheer cowardice. Do it openly if you want.

It is intolerance that holds our society in its grip. Everyone is trying to thrust his own beliefs on others. Believe me, he says, because I am right. You are unknowing. Come to the right path. But how? First you should correct yourself and then tell others.

There is pervasive hypocrisy. Do we say what we feel and think? No. There is wide contradiction between what we profess and what we do. What comes to our lips is not what we feel in our hearts or what we think about. We are deceiving ourselves as well as the country.

Where is unity? Unity gave us strength. Islam spread through unity in our ranks. Without it, its message would not have got through. Where is that unity which achieved Pakistan in the name of Islam.

We are blessed with all resources. We can develop into a powerful country, ahead of all other Islamic states provided that we are united, otherwise no. We are riven into sects. We are prey to regionalism, ethnicity and provincial disharmony. The provinces are bickering among themselves. No one trusts the others.

Even when the truth is told nobody believes it. Take the case of water distribution. When one tells the other that water is being distributed correctly, he is not believed. Instead he is accused of theft. All kinds of accusations are being traded on the basis of what is stated to be the past experience. There is conflict and dissension but no unity. We are searching for it.

What about adherence to moral principles? Do we notice it anywhere? What we see upheld is clan affiliation, caste and money. But no moral principles. As I said earlier, merit has no place in our society. Do we judge anyone on the basis of his merit, his deserts, his ability or his character? We look to his clan and his pocket. Or we favour him if he belongs to our own area. We follow no moral principles.

And let us not talk much about character. Can we discover it anywhere from amongst us? Are we honest and truthful? I leave that to you to decide. If we had been honest and truthful, our country would, not have been where it stands today. We are never tired of talking about the status that Islam accords to women. We only pay lip service to its teaching. We do not act upon it. This in plain words is hypocrisy. I would now like to turn to more mundane matters.

Pakistan does not live in a void. It is part of the globe. The world has actually turned into a global village. No country can live in isolation or stand alone. For progress and development, every country has to interact with others. Unfortunately, we are weak because of the causes I have already mentioned. We do not suffer from built-in weakness. We have all the resources to develop. But we are ourselves responsible for our weakness.

As we are weak, we have to keep in step with other countries. First acquire strength, only then you can tell others to fall in step with you. We are in no position to dictate
to others. Commonsense demands that first you attain that position from where you can ask others to follow the path you are treading. If you make a premature attempt, you will be crushed and further weakened.

When I say that we should keep in step with others, I do not mean that we do it at the cost of our honour and dignity, or our national interests. I would like to do that with our eyes open and in our own interests. We have to wade through a river where there are crocodiles. It is not smooth sailing that we should expect.

We should also be aware of the present state of the Muslim Ummah. I went to Cairo to take part in the D-8 summit meeting. With the grace of Allah, one fourth of the world population is Muslim. Seventy percent of the world energy resources are in Muslim countries. But our GDP the entire Muslim Ummah taken together, comes to bare twelve to thirteen hundred billion dollars. On the other hand, Japan’s GDP stands at five thousand five hundred billion and Germany’s at two thousand five hundred billion dollars. In other words, Germany’s GDP alone is twice that of the Ummah. And Japan’s is four and a half times that of our GDP although in population we are one fourth of the world’s and are sitting on seventy percent of its energy resources.

Why this is so? An analysis tells us that it is all because of a difference in the advancement of human quality, of environmental development. Other countries have swept forward. Just take education. In the entire Muslim world, there are about 380 universities, of which only 25 are ranking. In Japan alone, one thousand universities award Ph.D. degrees. The entire Muslim Ummah can boast of a total of 500 Ph.D. In England, three thousand do Ph.D. and in India five thousand every year.

It is this that should engage our attention. When we make an assertion, we ‘should have strength to back it up. Wisdom dictates that we should first acquire strength, come on top and then talk.

How to bring about the change. We have the military muscle. We are a nuclear power. But we do not have a matching economic strength. You are aware of the fate of the Soviet Union. It was a super power in military terms but it lacked economic strength. Consequently, it disintegrated. Its present predicament is no secret to you. We have therefore to strengthen our economy in order to create a balance with our military power. From every forum, I have been trying to drive home this point. Economic progress holds the key. It is this that will take us forward.

But how to advance in the economic field? We are taking a number of important steps in this direction. I would avoid details but touch upon some of the salient points.

Our first priority is to improve the law and order situation. Unless the foreign investors come in or our own people make investments, we cannot make any economic headway. So far they have not done that. Neither foreign nor indigenous investment has taken place. I confess our government has failed in this. We have to induce such investment. We are offering several incentives for this purpose. Undoubtedly, law and order is an important factor, which inhibits investment. No one is going to make an investment where there is fear of losing it. An investor first of all looks at the conditions obtaining in a country, particularly law and order. We must therefore attend to it.

What is public order really? It is, in our case, sectarian harmony. In the beginning, Shias and Sunnis were fighting with one another. And now the Brelvis and Deobandis have entered the fray. Do we realize where we are heading? What do we intend doing? Do we wish to become strong? For that you need sectarian harmony.
The only way to bring that about is to leave everybody to hold whatever beliefs he likes. If you are convinced that your path is the right one, and you want others to adopt it, first set your own example, and be sure they will themselves come round. Do not talk because talk leads to conflict. Put up your own example as a model. Let others speak about you. Let them say you are a good man, a wise man, a man of character and you will lead us forward.

But if you beat your own drum, it is of no avail. Rather, we should have a good word for others. That is what makes for sectarian harmony.

For our internal strife, the outside world is asked to declare us terrorists. Some say we are primitive. Others say we are a failed state. It hurts badly. We are one hundred and forty million, we are a nuclear power, and yet somebody gets up and tells us we are a failed state.

Religious and sectarian harmony is therefore an inescapable necessity in Pakistan. It will unite us and bring stability. Only that will attract others to come to Pakistan. Recently, a Chinese Minister was visiting us and we were discussing the question of investment. He said investment is like a sparrow. It flies out as a flock of pigeons but returns one by one. So this sparrow will come to us one by one. We are trying to attract it by throwing feed of incentives before it. I ask you to lend us a helping hand.

Our second failing is to provoke each other through meaningless statements. We can improve the law and order situation by just holding our tongue. We should be able to understand this simple point. If we become a tolerant society, where people with different outlooks can live peacefully, investors will come.

Why should you be unnecessarily railing against the great powers. Is it wisdom that you invite hurt, without any rhyme and reason. As I have told you we are not a powerful country. When we do become powerful, you can afford to indulge in this pastime. They might then be impressed by you. But till then, it is not wise to talk loose and damage yourself. When you do not have the capability, why open your mouth. Why not keep your counsel. If speak you must, do it intelligently.

One example comes to my mind. One hears the boast that we will hoist our flag on the Red Fort (in Delhi). We will do this, we will do that. Have your ever thought of the consequence of such talk on Muslims in India. They are our brothers. They come and meet me. They have told me what repercussions our loose talking has on their position. Is it wise? Why are you talking loose? Why are you damaging yourself and your brothers and sisters? What are you going to gain from it? On the contrary, this provides India with the excuse to talk about you as terrorists and to tell others to declare you as terrorists so that prospective investors shy away from your country. When you kill each other, who will consider Pakistan a safe place for investment.

A freedom struggle is going on in Kashmir. We will always lend them diplomatic support. We will collect funds for them in order to look after the refugees who are coming over after being uprooted from their homes. But the funds that are being raised in their name are going into private pockets. I know it for a fact. If these funds are not being collected for the welfare of the Kashmiri refugees, then whose cause suffers. I know what is going on in Kashmir. I have myself fought there. We are aware of the situation. We are doing our work. There is no need for vain boasts. Whatever we do, we should do it with restraint, prudence and honesty. There is no gain in unnecessary and irresponsible statements and activities, which cause damage to the country.
Just broaden your horizon. When you talk or act, weigh advantages and disadvantages in the scale of national interests. The foremost consideration before you should that we have to make this country powerful.

Above all, religion should never be exploited for political gains. Do not sully our glorious faith. I say this to all those who are guilty of it.

My particular appeal is to all those Ulama who are sitting here to promote harmony among all sects so that we achieve unity in our ranks and are able to devote our entire energies towards economic uplift. How reassuring it is to see Ulama of all persuasions sitting here together. Why can’t we maintain this harmony outside? Why should we weaken ourselves internally?

This is all that I had to say. I could read out the written text but I thought on this auspicious day I should open my I heart before you and talk frankly. You all understand what our problems are.

To me, Pakistan’s progress and welfare means the welfare of the Muslim Ummah. I have no doubt about it is in my mind. I have visited several Muslim countries and met their leaders. They have told me we rely on you, you are a source of strength for us. I have attended the OIC session. We enjoy a prestige in that forum. We are a nation of one hundred and forty million people. We have talent. We can achieve anything. We have resources. We can progress.

We have a coastline, water, gas, coal, in fact, the Thar coal is the world’s biggest coal deposit but it is lying unexploited. Let us together take this country forward. Conflict and dissensions will not contribute towards progress.

We will live out our lives. Others will take our place. Life will go on as usual. Insha’ Allah, Pakistan will live forever. But it will live well if we leave it in good shape for the coming generations. So long we have lived in Pakistan for our ourselves. We have given no consideration to those coming after us. It is our duty to see that when we depart, we leave a better Pakistan for them so that they find a prosperous Pakistan and do not desert and leave it out of fear that it is going to collapse.

We are going to ensure that it continues living. It was not created to wind up. It is a state created for the Muslims and for Islam. If we are firm in our faith, this country will never disappear. It is in our hands to ensure that. We can both keep it afloat and sink it. Insha’ Allah, we are going to pull it forward.

I would close with a prayer that Allah may enable us to follow the Sunnah of the Holy Prophet (May peace be upon him) and become good Muslims so that we can discharge our duties to Allah as well as fulfill our obligations towards fellow-beings. As Dr. Mahmud Ghazi has explained, the duties towards fellow-beings are as important as those towards Allah. But we hardly talk about our obligations towards our fellow-beings.

It is with their discharge that society progresses and the country moves forward. The foremost obligation on us is that we should watch and set right those of our actions which cast their influence on our environment, our families, our neighbourhood and our country. We often neglect that because that demands sacrifice on our part.

I have by now unburdened myself of all that I had to say. If my talk has caused offence to anybody, I apologise for it. It is my way to speak out what is in my mind and heart.

In the end, I express my gratitude to Dr. Mahmud Ghazi and the Ministry of Religious Affairs for providing me an opportunity to speak to you frankly. I was looking for it. I congratulate all those who have won prizes. I hope that in future also this Seerat Conference will continue to be convened and the discussions that
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are held will bring benefits to the people of this country and serve the cause of our Din.
Dr. Ghazi has briefed me about the topic that is going to form the subject of your discussions. I would be keenly looking forward to your contributions so that we can learn from you how to work for the betterment of Pakistan.
I am indeed very grateful to you all, both ladies and gentlemen.

Pakistan Paindabad.

DOCUMENT # 11

TEXT OF PRESS STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT AND C.E.
GENERAL PERVEZ MUSHARRAF
[20 June 2001]

In the name of Allah, the Beneficent and the Most Merciful

Ladies and Gentlemen,
First of all I would like to thank all of you for being present today on this very important day for myself personally and for Pakistan. Today I have taken over as the President of Pakistan through an amendment in a clause of the PCO of 14th October 1999 which allowed continuity to the ex-President of Pakistan. I have been thinking about this change since a number of months; may I say that this has been one of the most difficult decisions that I have taken. It has been most difficult because it involved myself. It involved doing something for myself which I have never done in my life. In my entire career I have never done anything for my own self. God has been very kind to me and God continues to be kind to me. I bow my head in total humility for all the bounties that he has given and showered on me and may I add that I will bow in more humility as I rise. The ex-President Mr. Rafique Tarrar has been a man of honour and a man of dignity.
I have had the best of relationship with him, working relationship and may I add that he is a person who has kept Pakistan’s interest supreme above his self. I honour him for that, I respect him for that and I will continue to respect and honour him for that. I wish him the best of health in his future life. I shall continue to gain from his experience as we continue the governance of Pakistan. I would like to say a few words on why I decided to take over as the President of Pakistan. The first consideration was a constitutional consideration. In that the Assemblies according to the PCO of 14th October 1999 were suspended and there was a degree of uncertainty existing all over the political climate, environment of Pakistan. Whether these Assemblies are being restored or not being restored but then the Supreme Court judgment which actually brought out the non-performance of the Assemblies laid the validity of the Assemblies to rest and therefore eased my job of deciding to dissolve the Assemblies. With the dissolution of Assemblies the Office of the President who was elected by those Assemblies became untenable. Certainly the second consideration was a political consideration, where I have been saying that my major concern for Pakistan is the stability and the harmony of this country, the political stability and harmony of this country. I have also been saying that I would
like to place proper checks and balances on the super structure of the political environment. I have always also been saying that I will ensure and guarantee the continuity and the sustainability of all the reforms, all the restructuring that I and my government are doing. And I have also finally been saying that national interest I will ensure will remain supreme over any personal or political interest. So achieving all this that I have said on the political side was another consideration which led me to this decision.

Lastly it was the economic consideration where the entire business community of Pakistan and people coming from abroad, investors coming from abroad were waiting and asking for proof of the continuity and sustainability of all the reforms and restructuring that we are doing.

So I thought the proof of this what I have been saying that we will guarantee the continuity and sustainability of whatever reforms we are doing and also improving the economic environment of Pakistan it was essential that I undertake this change. So it was basically the constitutional issue, the political consideration and the economic consideration which led me to this decision. But above all, Ladies and Gentlemen I would like to tell you that this decision has been taken in supreme national interest. I feel in all humility that if I have a role to play for this nation I will not shirk, I will not hesitate, I will not back down. So whatever decision whether it involved the embarrassment of a personal decision for myself I hold national interest supreme. I personally in all sincerity, in all honesty think that I have a role to play in this nation. I sincerely think that I have a job to do here and therefore I cannot and I will not let this nation down. So, therefore, the decision to become the President. Having said all this I would like to also give out here that as far as the political activity, the political process is concerned there is no change whatsoever. Let there be no doubt that there is a change in our intentions for the future. The Supreme Court order, Supreme Court judgment of holding elections in October 2002 is very clear, we will abide by that. The Local Government elections, Local Bodies up to District level will be there on 14th August and Provincial and National elections will be held on schedule next year. So there is no change in that. Let there be no doubts on this core. So political activity and all activities will continue as before. I would like to close by only praying to Allah the Almighty that He makes me more humble in the elevation that He has given me and I also pray to Allah that this change augurs well for the future of our beloved nation Pakistan.

Thank you very much."