

# A Comparative Study of Blitzkrieg and Cold Start Doctrine: Lessons and Countermeasures for Pakistan

**Muhammad Ali Baig\***

**Hamid Iqbal\*\***

## **Abstract**

The legacy of Blitzkrieg as deployed by the *Wehrmacht* during World War II cannot be denied due to its lethality, speed and surprise which completely out-manoeuvred the enemy. While employing its basic tenets, the Indian Army announced a doctrine known as the Cold Start Doctrine (CSD) in 2004. Germany used Blitzkrieg as an operational level doctrine, but India wants to bring into play the same tactics on a strategic level. The effectiveness of this German battle plan makes it critical for Pakistan to analyse the repercussions of CSD in case of an armed conflict with India. This article is an effort to look for ways in which the Pakistan Armed Forces (PAF) can deter, repel and respond to an attack by employing conventional forces, while remaining strictly below the nuclear threshold.

**Key words:** Blitzkrieg, Cold Start Doctrine, Pakistan, India, Conventional Warfare, Manoeuvre Warfare.

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\* The author is a writer at *Daily Times*, *Pakistan Observer* and *Pakistan Today* and currently a Scholar at the National Defence University in Islamabad, Pakistan.

\*\* The author is an International Relations Lecturer at the National Defence University in Islamabad, Pakistan.

## Introduction

There is no doubt that a country without a strong Air Force is at the mercy of any aggressor. Pakistan must build up her Air Force as quickly as possible. It must be an efficient air force second to none and must take its right place with the Army and the Navy in securing Pakistan's defence.

- Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah's address to Pakistan Air Force at Risalpur on April 13, 1948<sup>1</sup>

War has been an integral part of human civilisation. The military force of a state not only ensures security, it guarantees a rapid and credible response in case of an armed conflict. The size, structure, organisation and equipment along with training play a vital role in the effectiveness of any military force. Apart from these pivotal constituent elements, the doctrine by the virtue of which a military force guides its actions serves as the basic framework to achieve its objectives.

Military forces across the globe formulate, devise and revise their military decision-making and strategic goals to keep up with the ever evolving nature of warfare. Given how war continues to overshadow the history of mankind,<sup>2</sup> analysts and strategists remain fascinated with the study of doctrines under which wars have been fought and continue to do so. This inquisitiveness leads to better understanding about the nature of war and may help prevent military misfortunes. Take the example of Germany's unprecedented victory in May 1940 over the French military which was armed with superior equipment and firepower and greater numbers, but their German counterparts were able to catastrophically defeat them along with Britain, Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg.

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<sup>1</sup> Sultan M. Hali, "Quaid-e-Azam and Pakistan Air Force," *Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah Blog*, accessed 14 February 2018, <http://m-a-jinnah.blogspot.com/2010/04/quaid-e-azam-and-pakistan-air-force.html>.

<sup>2</sup> Gwynne Dyer, *War* (New York: Crown Publishers, 1985), xi.

The unparalleled German conquest – apart from many other aspects – was the result of its better military tactics.<sup>3</sup>

Similarly, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) devised the doctrine of ‘Massive Retaliation’ to deter and strike back in case of a Soviet invasion of Europe. The doctrine explicitly articulated that the NATO Military Forces will not respond with conventional means but will rely on nuclear weapons to destroy the Soviet Union.<sup>4</sup> It can be argued that this doctrine posed a credible threat and prevented any misadventure by the Soviet Red Army.

The German military devised a battle plan named as ‘Schlieffen Plan’ to attack France to accomplish a swift and vital victory instead of an unnecessary and wearisome war. The German battle plan was watchfully and vigilantly built up and designed while keeping imperative strategic and operational facets into consideration. It was planned not only to overwhelm France in a relatively short period of time, but also to dishearten the French nation. Colmar von der Goltz, a German Field Marshal said that ‘The enemy is conquered not by the devastation of his existence but by the obliteration of his hopes of victory.’<sup>5</sup> The lack of mobility in German Military Forces resulted in the defeat of German Empire during the Great War. It cast an indelible shadow over the German nation which paralysed it. The Central Powers like Germany were also not able to withstand the devastation and disintegrated. The Treaty of Versailles (1919) had 440 clauses and 414 of them were intended to punish Germany.<sup>6</sup> It was a devastating humiliation for the entire German nation that came under the mercy and discretion of the Allied Powers.

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<sup>3</sup> Steven W. Knott, “‘Knowledge Must Become Capability’: Institutional Intellectualism as an Agent for Military Transformation,” in *Essays 2004* (Washington, D.C.: National Defence University Press, 2004), 50-51.

<sup>4</sup> Dyer, *War*, 181.

<sup>5</sup> Colmar von der Goltz, *The Conduct of War: A Brief Study of its Most Important Principles and Forms*, trans., Joseph T. Dickman (Kansas, Missouri: Hudson-Kimberly Publishing, 1896), 20-21.

<sup>6</sup> “Third Reich: The Rise and Fall (Part-I The Rise),” DVD, 2010, A&E Television Networks.

The Germans learnt their lesson from the stalemate<sup>7</sup> and war of attrition during the Great War. The slow, sluggish and static trench warfare greatly affected the soldiers and officers, whilst acting as a catalyst in the thinking process to overcome the stalemate. Britain used tanks for the first time on the battlefield in 1916. These tanks were slow and mostly unreliable.

Lieutenant Ernst Volckheim was an officer of the German Army and saw action during the Great War.<sup>8</sup> Based upon his experiences, he argued for using the radio for coordination between the tank leaders. German Army's Chief of Staff General J.F. Hans von Seeckt commanded the army just after the First World War from 1919 to 1926. Seeckt supplemented the concept of *Panzerwaffe* (armoured force) and also published Army Regulation 487 with the title *Führung und Gefecht der verbundenen Waffen* (Leadership and Battle with Combined Arms) in 1921.<sup>9</sup> In the early 1920s similar to German Army, the British Army was also concentrating on the muscular influence and portability of its tanks on the battleground. Britain had prior experience and know-how about the significance of armour during the Great War. Captain Basil H. Liddell Hart was the pioneer Englishman who came up with an indirect approach to strategy and mechanising tank warfare.<sup>10</sup>

General Heinz Guderian was an officer of the German Army, born on June 17, 1888 in Kulm, then German Empire.<sup>11</sup> After the Great War, he was given many postings and due to his professionalism, intellect, and expertise he was promoted to the rank of *Oberstleutnant* (Lieutenant Colonel) on February 01, 1931.<sup>12</sup> His idea was to build up a division-sized troop contingent with the ability and capacity to conduct operations

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<sup>7</sup> Knott, "Knowledge Must Become Capability," 39-55. A situation on the battlefield where no side is able to dominate the other in a decisive manner.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid., 48.

<sup>9</sup> James S. Corum, *The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seeckt and German Military Reform*, Modern War Studies (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1992), 254.

<sup>10</sup> *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, s.v. "Sir Basil Liddell Hart: British Military Historian," accessed July 24, 2014, <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Basil-Henry-Liddell-Hart>.

<sup>11</sup> Franz Kurowski, *Panzer Aces III: German Tank Commanders in Combat in WW II*, Stackpole Military History Series (Mechanicsburg: Stackpole Books, 2010), 125.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., 126.

autonomously on an operational level.<sup>13</sup> His ideas met criticism and were regarded as too impractical and rather unfeasible.<sup>14</sup> On August 01, 1936, Guderian advanced to the rank of Major General and in the following year, he published a book related to armoured forces titled *Achtung Panzer* (Attention Tank) (1937). The publication earned him great distinction in the field of armoured fighting. Demarcating the concept of extremely portable and autonomous armoured tanks, he argued that:

In this year, 1929, I became convinced that tanks working on their own or in conjunction with infantry could never achieve decisive importance. My historical studies, the exercises carried out in England and our own experiences with mock-ups had persuaded me that tanks would never be able to produce their full effect until the other weapons on whose support they must inevitably rely were brought up to their standard of speed and of cross-country performance. In such a formation of all arms, the tanks must play the primary role, the other weapons being subordinated to the requirements of the armour. It would be wrong to include tanks in infantry divisions: what was needed were armoured divisions which would include all the supporting arms needed to allow the tanks to fight with full effect.<sup>15</sup>

President Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg witnessed the manoeuvres of 1932 and keenly highlighted the errors. Guderian himself was astounded by the watchfulness of the elderly Hindenburg.<sup>16</sup> When Adolf Hitler became the Chancellor of Germany on January 30, 1933, it was the right time for Guderian to demonstrate to the newly elected Chancellor the potential and capability of his mechanised concepts. Hitler carefully observed the demonstration and was delighted to see the manoeuvres, especially the agility and precision of the units, and said

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<sup>13</sup> Ibid., 127.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.

<sup>15</sup> Heinz Guderian, *Panzer Leader*, 2nd ed., trans., Constantine Fitzgibbon (Boston: Da Capo Press, 2002), 24.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., 29.

repetitively ‘That’s what I need! That’s what I want to have.’<sup>17</sup> It can be deduced that this was the beginning of *Panzerwaffe* (armoured force) in the Third Reich and in the years to come *Heer* (German Army) was destined to be one of the most muscular and capable armoured force in Europe.

Almost a century later, the attack on the Indian Parliament in December 2001 and in retaliation, the mass mobilisation of troops alongside the Pakistan border known as Operation *Parakram*, revealed severe weaknesses and structural faults of the *Sundarji* Doctrine. It exhibited that the mobilisation was slow and sluggish. India suffered 800 casualties and had to bear financial losses of USD 2 billion.<sup>18</sup> Pakistan was relatively quick to deploy its forces on its Eastern borders and the speed of its forces denied India the pivotal element of surprise. This led India’s military thinkers to develop and come up with a new and more mobile doctrine. This 2001-02 military standoff became the initiation of the thought process that actually resulted in the creation of the Cold Start Doctrine (CSD) in April 2004.<sup>19</sup>

This article analyses the common theoretical and conceptual attributes of the German Blitzkrieg and India’s CSD and discusses the response options of Pakistan while remaining below the nuclear umbrella. The authors argue that the CSD is dangerous due to its conceptual foundations yet it can be deterred and successfully repelled by using conventional means. Also, Germany utilised Blitzkrieg on the operational level, while Indian wants to employ the same concept at the strategic level of war. This study is a careful examination of both battle plans which determines the philosophical foundations of the CSD and proves it to be an offshoot of Blitzkrieg.

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<sup>17</sup> Ibid., 30.

<sup>18</sup> Javed Hussain, “India’s Cold Start Doctrine,” *News International*, October 1, 2016, <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/153951-Indias-cold-start-doctrine>; Shashank Joshi, “India’s Military Instrument: A Doctrine Stillborn,” *Journal of Strategic Studies* 36, no. 4 (2013): 512-540 (514).

<sup>19</sup> Joshi, “India’s Military Instrument: A Doctrine Stillborn,” 515.

## **An Overview**

General Carl von Clausewitz said that ‘War is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means.’<sup>20</sup> Strategic victory is an achievement of political objectives and the securitisation of national interests – together, they are the main purpose of any war.

India’s CSD is an offshoot of the German Blitzkrieg. CSD’s pivotal concept of employing division-sized Integrated Battle Groups (IBGs) was conceived in 1937 by then Major General Heinz Guderian in his book *Achtung Panzer* (Attention Tank).<sup>21</sup> This similarity indicates that CSD is fundamentally a borrowed concept and not a genuine brainchild of the Indian military mind. However, Blitzkrieg was executed by the *Wehrmacht* on an operational level to significantly win battles, while on the other hand, the Indian Army intends to use the CSD at a strategic level. Both battle plans are largely similar with some minor differences, primarily due to being almost a century apart.

## **Blitzkrieg**

Blitzkrieg is a term comprising of two words from the German language, ‘blitz’ stands for lightning and ‘krieg’ denotes war. This term refers to a specific art of warfare known as lightning war. Guderian acknowledged that ‘Blitzkrieg’ was not the officially termed doctrine of the *Wehrmacht* during the Second World War rather it was used by a reporter of the *Times Magazine* following the attack on Poland in September 1939.<sup>22</sup> While Fowler shares that a German commentator was so astonished by the Polish campaign conducted by the German military that he wrote a piece entitled

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<sup>20</sup> Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, eds. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 87.

<sup>21</sup> Heinz Guderian, *Achtung-Panzer Die Entwicklung Der Panzerwaffe, Ihre KampfaktikundIhreOperatioenMöglichkeiten* (Stuttgart: Union Deutsche Verlagsgefellschaft, 1937).

<sup>22</sup> Guderian, *Panzer Leader*, 461.


*Blitzmarschnach Warschau* (Lightning March to Warsaw).<sup>23</sup> After the Second World War, the Blitzkrieg tactics have been cautiously examined by many historians, analysts and military strategists. This examination has revealed quite a few foundational elements responsible at the rear of the thriving and unprecedented results of Blitzkrieg operations, which inherently require overall coordination and synergy between the invading forces for the realisation of its aims and objectives.

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
<sup>23</sup> Will Fowler, *Blitzkrieg 1: Poland and Scandinavia (1939-1940)* (Hersham: Ian Allan Publishing, 2002), 6.

**Figure-1**  
**Different Stages of Blitzkrieg**


**RIGHT:** In the first stage of *Blitzkrieg* bombers attack narrow front and also isolate it from communications at the rear. Small scale spoiling attacks are launched by ground forces against other parts of the front. Simultaneously tanks supported by mechanised infantry and SP artillery move up to attack the *Schwerpunkt*.\*



**RIGHT:** The front breaks at the *Schwerpunkt*. The main weight of the attack and tanks punch through the shattered defences with artillery and infantry following. Troops hold the shoulder of the breakthrough and bombers hit enemy HQs and troop concentrations.



**RIGHT:** Collapse sets in along the front as armoured forces fan out, isolating pockets of enemy troops and attacking positions from the rear. Bombers range deeper into the hinterland supporting the armoured thrusts.



\**Schwerpunkt*. Concentrated point

Source: Fowler, *Blitzkrieg 1: Poland and Scandinavia (1939-1940)*, 7.

### Deceive the Enemy

The most important element of Blitzkrieg battle plan is to deceive the enemy. Sun Tzu put great emphasis on this element and said that ‘all warfare is based on deception.’<sup>24</sup> By deceiving the enemy, the invader keeps the invaded in an invariable position of speculation about the probable and possible place of attack.<sup>25</sup> Thus, this operation demands deception in order to achieve its desired objectives. If an attacker is clever enough to deceive the enemy, then it gives the former complete strategic advantage that is eventually mirrored in the speedy and rapid execution and accomplishment of the objectives envisaged.

### Surprise and Speed

Blitzkrieg demands the constituent component of surprise.<sup>26</sup> It necessitates total silence before the attack which gives the attacker an enormous and remarkable strategic advantage to catch the enemy entirely unprepared and paralyse the defending military as well as deeply affect its morale. According to Major General J.F.C. Fuller ‘Speed, and still more speed, and always speed was the secret...and that demanded audacity, more audacity and always audacity.’<sup>27</sup> Without this pivotal ingredient, the battle plan is incomplete.<sup>28</sup> If the invading forces are not able to manoeuvre quickly and at a high speed, then the adversary forces would be able to recuperate and focus their attention on a potential counterattack. Speed is also central since this battle strategy stresses on as little combating as possible. This element is also imperative to surround the enemy by following the Pincer Movement or a Double Pincer Movement.

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<sup>24</sup> Sun Tzu Wu, *Sun Tzu on the Art of War: The Oldest Military Treatise in the World*, trans. Lionel Giles (Leicester: Allandale Online Publishing, 2000), 3.

<sup>25</sup> Gordon Stevens, “Battleplan - The Complete Series,” documentary, 2006, Discovery Wings and Fremantle Media.

<sup>26</sup> Guderian, *Panzer Leader*, 15.

<sup>27</sup> C. N. Trueman, s.v. “Blitzkrieg,” *History Learning Site*, May 14, 2015, <http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/world-war-two/world-war-two-and-eastern-europe/blitzkrieg/>.

<sup>28</sup> Guderian, *Panzer Leader*, 15.

### Controlling the Air

Battistelli argued that it was Field Marshal Erwin Rommel who conceived that without control of the air, the desired battle objectives cannot be achieved.<sup>29</sup> A robust and effectual air force is indispensable to provide an active fire support to the attacking ground forces.<sup>30</sup> Blitzkrieg was a triumph since the military used their *Luftwaffe* (German Air Force) in a successful way.

### Achieve Breakthrough

The defending enemy usually possesses fortified and reinforced positions to defend itself from an attack. These positions form a formidable line of defence and are relatively hard to out-manoeuvre. Blitzkrieg demands an early breach in the enemy's line of defence to obtain encouraging results. The spearheaded infiltration by the armoured force comprising of tanks is meant to accomplish a breakthrough and the mechanised troops are to hold those openings with the *Stuka* bombers eventually striking adversary troop concentrations.<sup>31</sup> The breach or breakthrough resembles the commencement of the chance to manipulate the vulnerabilities of the opponent. The particular position is cautiously scrutinised and decided, and the weakest one is chosen. This position enables one to breach the defences and to enter enemy territory in overpowering numbers to totally outflank it.

### Schwerpunkt (Concentration of Force)

An intense and concerted attack by rapidly moving armoured forces achieves crucial impact at the operational level and is a most valuable arsenal.<sup>32</sup> The great numbers of the advancing force while manipulating the weakest position in the adversary's line of defence facilitates in seizing complete benefit of the breach.

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<sup>29</sup> Pier Paolo Battistelli, *Erwin Rommel* (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2010), 28.

<sup>30</sup> Guderian, *Panzer Leader*, 98.

<sup>31</sup> Fowler, *Blitzkrieg 1: Poland and Scandinavia (1939-1940)*, 7.

<sup>32</sup> Corum, *The Roots of Blitzkrieg*, 130-131.

### Deep Strike

A deep strike is a prerequisite in a Blitzkrieg-style operation to generate timidity and anxiety among the adversary forces and civilians.<sup>33</sup> Striking deep into the opponent's territory can produce confusion amongst the ranks of the rival forces, whether to halt the core driving force of the assault or to focus their attention to use the choke points as an instrument to dislocate it.

### Follow-Up

The speed of the assault must be sustained to frustrate the adversary forces from recovering and presenting any confrontation to the core driving force. The tanks hammer away at the fortifications of the enemy and then troops and artillery follow to seize the gaps.<sup>34</sup> It is to maintain and sustain the spearheaded breach and infiltration.

### Psychological Warfare

In a Blitzkrieg attack, the first wave comprised of Ju-87 *Stuka* dive bombers.<sup>35</sup> The blow generated from the *Stuka* and the high-pitched scream of its diving frightened the troops on the ground.<sup>36</sup> Guderian argued that the rapid moving armoured military forces, synchronised by radio communications and a leader who led from the front has psychological attributes.<sup>37</sup> The close air support by *Stuka* dive bombers not only knocked imperative ground targets but also assisted in crippling the nerves of the rival forces. *Stuka* bombers besides their bombing role also conducted propaganda missions by disseminating misinformation and disinformation using loudspeakers. The cornerstone of the Blitzkrieg battle plan was to mentally and psychologically outplay the foe.

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<sup>33</sup> Ibid., 125.

<sup>34</sup> Fowler, *Blitzkrieg 1: Poland and Scandinavia (1939-1940)*, 7.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid., 39.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid., 48.

<sup>37</sup> Guderian, *Panzer Leader*, ix.

### ***The Cold Start Doctrine (CSD)***

The CSD is India's limited war doctrine designed and developed for possible use against neighbouring Pakistan in case of a war. The doctrine was unveiled in April 2004 and the intention behind its creation was to give the Indian Armed Forces (IAF) a clear set of goals to achieve the political motives of the state through force. Moreover, it was felt by the top military leadership that a threat must be posed towards Pakistan in order to create deterrence. This doctrine is a technology-oriented version of the German Blitzkrieg to be used as an offensive military instrument against Pakistan with utmost speed and strategic surprise by penetrating inside its territory, while pursuing an intense battle to significantly destroy its military, ultimately denying justification to use nuclear weapons and seeking international help from Beijing, Brussels and Washington to halt an Indian military advance.<sup>38</sup> It is also known as Proactive Strategy (PAS),<sup>39</sup> and includes the following fundamental elements:

#### **Integrated Battle Groups (IBGs) and Pivot Corps (Holding Corps)**

India has three strike corps, each having an armoured division, mechanised infantry and substantial artillery support. The CSD requires the transformation of the three strike corps into eight division-sized IBGs. Having the ability to operate independently, they will strike at eight different and unpredictable locations inside Pakistan with air support and artillery cover.<sup>40</sup>

The role of the Pivot Corps is to ensure defence at the border, having one infantry division and one mechanised division and a number of armoured units to retaliate enemy penetrations.<sup>41</sup> The main idea behind

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<sup>38</sup> Walter C. Ladwig III, "A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army's New Limited War Doctrine," *International Security* 32, no. 3 (2007/08): 158-190 (163-166).

<sup>39</sup> Muhammad Zeeshan Ali, *Strategic Delusions – The Cold Start Doctrine: Proactive Strategy* (Leavenworth: United States Army Command and General Staff College, 2016).

<sup>40</sup> Subhash Kapila, "India's New 'Cold Start' War Doctrine Strategically Reviewed" (paper no. 991, South Asia Analysis Group, New Delhi, 2004), <http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/paper991>.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid.

pivot corps is to offer operational security to the IBGs and to protect the points of breakthrough while ensuring their safe return as well.

#### Narrow Territorial Gains through Speed, Surprise and Deception

The goal of Indian military operations is likely to make narrow territorial gains of almost 50–80 kilometres deep which could be used in post-conflict talks to extort Pakistan.<sup>42</sup> The gains are likely to be achieved in such areas which are thickly populated so that the military is unable to fully utilise its arsenal ostensibly in view of collateral damage. The speed of the IBGs will ensure that Beijing, Washington or Brussels would not have time to intervene on behalf of Pakistan.<sup>43</sup> The positioning of the IBGs near the International Border would significantly reduce the time for mobilisation and would also help in achieving strategic surprise, thus, paralysing the defence mechanism of the PAF.<sup>44</sup>

#### Terrain, Short Distance, Deep Strike and Special Forces

The terrain and geography of any region play a vital role advantageously as well as disadvantageously for both the invading and defending forces. Not only are there no natural boundaries between India and Pakistan, the plains and deserts of Punjab and Sindh are perfect regions for armoured thrusts like the CSD. The German Blitzkrieg proved successful in short distance operations during the Second World War. Similarly, while following the footsteps of Blitzkrieg, India's military planners intend to operationalise the CSD to grab and hold Pakistani territory in a short distance operation. The starting point of mobilisation of troops, the culmination point and return to India after the operations would roughly comprise of almost 300-400 kilometres. The short distance also reduces the need for re-supply and follow-up forces. The proposed short distance strike is, in fact, a deep strike for Pakistan following its narrow strategic depth from its Eastern to Western borders. The CSD also envisions using

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<sup>42</sup> Vijay Mohan, "Shift in Army's War Strategy," *Tribune*, May 12, 2005, <http://www.tribuneindia.com/2005/20050513/main8.htm>.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid.

specially trained units for the successful execution of operations. The Indian Military Exercises codenamed *Ashwamdeh* in April 2007, *Vayu Shakti* in February 2010 and *Yodha Shakti* in May 2010 were conducted to fully synchronise the Special Forces to be used in possible employment of the CSD.

#### Manoeuvre Warfare, Firepower and Operational Readiness

Manoeuvre (or Third Generation) Warfare intends to remain a step ahead of the enemy by manoeuvring forces in such a manner that the enemy remains in a constant state of confusion by bypassing enemy lines and collapsing their forces from the rear. The CSD also requires destroying a significant portion of Pakistan's defenders in an intense battle that demands superior firepower in relatively less time.<sup>45</sup> The use of firepower connects this Doctrine to Second Generation Warfare as well. The most important lesson learnt by India's military in the aftermath of Operation *Parakram* was their lack of operational readiness. The CSD is an ambitious concept and places a lot of pressure on the IBGs to maintain operational readiness at all times.

#### Information-Electronic Warfare (EW) and Network-Centric Warfare (NCW)

Information and Electronic Warfare help in the dissemination of misinformation, disinformation and propaganda. They also facilitate intelligence gathering, surveillance and reconnaissance. The CSD requires the gathering of valuable information as well as the spread of wrong information while jamming and sabotaging the information infrastructure of Pakistan to deprive it from necessary situational awareness. The Indian Military conducted *Hind Shakti* Exercise in April 2009 to test its electronic, information and NCW capabilities. India also acquired Long-Range Reconnaissance and Observation System (LORROS), Weapon

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<sup>45</sup> Ladwig III, "A Cold Start for Hot Wars?" 165.

Locating Radars (WLRs) and Battlefield Surveillance Radars (BFSRs) to increase its EW and NCW capabilities.<sup>46</sup>

#### Breaking the Cohesion of the PAF (Psychological Warfare)

The Indian military planners want to employ psychological warfare to break the will, morale and determination of the PAF, and to consequently inflict devastating effects on their cohesion and organisation. Simply put, India wants to ‘psych-out’ Pakistan with its simultaneous attack on different and multiple locations using its IBGs.<sup>47</sup> This concept again comes from the German Blitzkrieg. The French suffered severe decision-making problems and India is hoping that while employing the same concept against Pakistan, the results would be similar.

#### Control over the Skies

The CSD necessitates the concept of ‘air superiority’ so that fighters and bombers of the Indian Air Force (IAF), Naval Air Wing, reconnaissance and armed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and gunship helicopters are able to conduct operations without restraint to direct, guard, help and sustain the ground forces so that they can achieve narrow territorial gains inside Pakistani territory. The close air support (CAS) would reduce Indian losses and significantly augment the pace of operational execution. India’s potential ‘air superiority’ will bar any counterattacks.<sup>48</sup> In the past, Blitzkrieg utilised ‘air superiority’ that deprived the adversaries of Germany to use their air forces which eventually allowed the *Luftwaffe* to use its especially designed ground attack Ju-87 *Stuka* dive bombers to give close air support to the attacking legions of the German Armed Forces.

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<sup>46</sup> Sannia Abdullah, “Cold Start in Strategic Calculus,” *IPRI Journal* 12, no. 1 (2012): 1-27 (13-17), <http://www.ipripak.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/art1asanw12.pdf>.

<sup>47</sup> Ali Ahmed, *India’s Limited War Doctrine: The Structural Factor*, IDSA Monograph Series 10 (New Delhi: Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 2012), 32, <https://idsa.in/system/files/Monograph10.pdf>.

<sup>48</sup> Joshi, “India’s Military Instrument: A Doctrine Stillborn,” 518.

### Using Pakistan's Population as Human Shields

The most dangerous element of the doctrine is that it plans to achieve narrow territorial gains inside Pakistan to use it as a bargaining chip in post-conflict scenario. The adjacent areas of Pakistan in relation to India are thickly populated and ostensibly it seems that India wants to achieve mainly two objectives by over-running the Pakistani population. First, by capturing these areas, Pakistan would not be in a position to launch a counterattack to safeguard its own people and to minimise collateral damage. Second, India could use the population as human shields to coerce Pakistan in its demands.

### **Drawing Comparisons**

The importance of a military doctrine can be best understood by the teachings of British Naval strategist Sir Julian Corbett. He, during the Great War said that the 'doctrine is the soul of warfare.'<sup>49</sup> The NATO defines doctrine as 'the fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of the objectives.'<sup>50</sup> Though Blitzkrieg is considered an old and out-dated military strategy, it still exists today on modern battlefields. Development of explosive reactive armour (ERA), rolled homogenous armour (RHA) and composite armour have catalysed the decisive role of armoured forces. The close air support (CAS) aircraft with precision-guided munitions, self-propelled artillery and gunship helicopters have refined battle plans. Gunship helicopters and gunship aircrafts like the US AC-130 Spectre have given birth to the concept of 'artillery in the air'. The relatively recent development of UAVs and armed UAVs has also changed the way battle plans can now be executed.

The CSD is not a revolutionary masterpiece of the Indian military mind, rather it is a building built on the philosophical foundations of the German art of war. Germans, along with the Central Powers, suffered chaotically during trench warfare. Several attempts were made to turn the

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<sup>49</sup> Geoffrey Sloan, "Military Doctrine, Command Philosophy and the Generation of Fighting Power: Genesis and Theory," *International Affairs* 88, no. 2 (2012): 243–63.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid.

tide of the battle, but proved to be fruitless. The British were the first to introduce tanks on the battlefields of Europe during the Battle of Somme on September 15, 1916.<sup>51</sup> Germans were aware of the power and effectiveness of the artillery, but had never experienced tanks. They also produced long-range guns such as the Gustav Gun and the Paris Gun to hit targets far from the battlefield, but these guns were either too heavy or simply lacked mobility. The tanks were able to take advantage of the gaps they created, but their speed was too slow. After the war, both the victorious Allies and the defeated Central Powers learnt that to win a decisive and fast war, tanks have to play a central role in overcoming the stalemate.

Pakistan and India have fought three major wars, the limited war at Kargil and several border skirmishes against each other. India has learnt that regardless of its conventional superiority, it has always failed to win a decisive and quick war against Pakistan. The obsession with achieving victory in Hitler's style as during World War II, has led India to devise the CSD to ensure swift execution of war. Indian obsession with this doctrine clearly exhibits its expansionist designs and ambitions since it is dominated by the believers of 'Greater India' or the concept of *Hindutva*.<sup>52</sup>

The roots of Blitzkrieg lie in the feelings of revenge and hatred that was caused by the Treaty of Versailles in the hearts and minds of not only German military strategists but also the common people.<sup>53</sup> It is one of the reasons that the early conquests of Hitler using Blitzkrieg tactics during World War II were received with great enthusiasm and zeal by the German people.

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<sup>51</sup> J. F. C. Fuller, *Decisive Battles of the U.S.A.* (New York: Thomas Yoseloff, 1942), 16-17.

<sup>52</sup> The entire book revolves around the particular concept of *Hindutva*. Vinayak Damodar Savarkar, *Hindutva*, 5th ed. (Bombay: Veer Savarkar Prakashan, 1969).

<sup>53</sup> Dianne Stine Thomas and George Constable, eds., *WWII: Time-Life Books History of the Second World War*, 1st ed. (New York: Time-Life Books, 1989), 14-20.

## **Perceptions within Pakistan**

It is understandable that the CSD due to its roots in a battle-tested and historically proven set of tactics – Blitzkrieg – has had a drastic effect on Pakistan’s policymakers – both civil and military as reflected in the statement of former Chief of Army Staff General Kayani: ‘We plan on adversaries’ capabilities, not intentions.’<sup>54</sup> The CSD or PAS as an official doctrine has been denied on a number of occasions by the Indian military and in 2010 then Indian Army Chief V. K. Singh even said, ‘There is nothing called Cold Start.’<sup>55</sup> However, the corroboration of its existence by the serving Indian Army Chief General Bipin Rawat in January 2017<sup>56</sup> eliminated all existing suspicions and uncertainties.

More recently, the Prime Minister of Pakistan Shahid Khaqan Abbasi while addressing the 72nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) – referred to the Doctrine by using the words ‘limited war doctrine’<sup>57</sup> – highlighted the danger of a conventional war between two nuclear-armed states. Abbasi also indicated that Pakistan developed short-range ballistic/nuclear missiles to counter it.<sup>58</sup> These statements indicate that Pakistan takes this Doctrine very seriously and has devised nuclear as well as conventional responses to counter it.

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<sup>54</sup> Francisco Aguilar, Randy Bell, Natalay Black, Sayce Falk, Sasha Rogers and Aki Peritz, “An Introduction to Pakistan’s Military” (paper, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, Cambridge, 2011), 10, <https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/Pakistan-Military-final-B.pdf>.

<sup>55</sup> “What is India’s Cold Start Doctrine?” *Indian Express*, September 21, 2017, <http://indianexpress.com/article/what-is/what-is-india-cold-start-doctrine-military-strategy-india-pakistan-indian-armed-forces-4854019/>.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid.

<sup>57</sup> Shahid Khaqan Abbasi, “Remarks at the 72nd Session of UNGA” (speech, New York, September 21, 2017), Radio Pakistan, accessed 30 September 2017, <http://www.radio.gov.pk/22-Sep-2017/complete-text-of-pm-shahid-khaqan-abbasi-s-speech-at-72nd-session-of-unga-on-sept-21>.

<sup>58</sup> “Cold Start: India’s Clever Plan to Punish a Nuclear-Powered Pakistan,” *Economic Times*, September 21, 2017, <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/cold-start-indias-clever-plan-to-punish-a-nuclear-powered-pakistan/articleshow/60777484.cms>.

Pervaiz Cheema has argued that due to the CSD, Pakistan's decision-makers were left with no choice but to devise a counter strategy.<sup>59</sup> The PAF, aware of its possible ramifications, underwent a series of exercises codenamed *Azm-e-Nau* (The New Resolve) to test and validate its operational readiness, response and the ability of various branches of military to operate together. *Azm-e-Nau* was a set of four drills from 2009 to 2013 aimed to achieve a resultant doctrine – New Concept of War Fighting (NCWF).<sup>60</sup> Before *Azm-e-Nau*, the Pakistan Army conducted its largest drills *Zarb-e-Momin* (Strike of the True Believer) in 1989.

The NCWF mainly concentrates on minimising the time required to mobilise to counter the Indian Forces, thus, denying the enemy the crucial edge of speed. It also focuses on achieving synergy between various branches of the Army and Air Force<sup>61</sup> to attain Guderian's concept of combined arms – the linchpin of Blitzkrieg, and now the CSD. There is little literature available on the NCWF,<sup>62</sup> however, it can be argued that it also focuses on using TNWs. Nevertheless, using TNWs is unconventional, while this article primarily focuses on traditional means to counter the CSD.

The above debate confirms that the leadership of Pakistan both – civil and military – perceives the CSD as a serious security challenge. To overcome this pivotal threat, the civilian leadership actively witnessed military exercises<sup>63</sup> and the military leadership learnt important lessons from these drills – consequently forming the NCWF.

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<sup>59</sup> NIDS, *Security Outlook of the Asia Pacific Countries and its Implications for the Defense Sector*, NIDS Joint Research Series, no. 9 (Tokyo: National Institute for Defense Studies, 2013), 135-136.

<sup>60</sup> Ali, *Strategic Delusions – The Cold Start Doctrine*, 16-17.

<sup>61</sup> Meenakshi Sood, "Pakistan's (Non-Nuclear) Plan to Counter 'Cold Start'," *Diplomat*, March 25, 2017, <https://thediplomat.com/2017/03/pakistans-non-nuclear-plan-to-counter-cold-start/>.

<sup>62</sup> Ali, *Strategic Delusions – The Cold Start Doctrine*, 16.

<sup>63</sup> Muhammad Khan, "From Cold Start to Cold Storage!" *Hilal*, no. 14 (2013), <http://hilal.gov.pk/index.php/component/k2/item/642-from-cold-start-to-cold-storage>. Former Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani, Cabinet Ministers and other members of all political parties witnessed *Azm-e-Nau-III* in April 2010 and again former Prime Minister Mian Nawaz Sharif was present at *Azm-e-Nau-IV*.

### **Why Did India Not Employ Cold Start after Mumbai Attacks in 2008?**

Pakistan's former COAS Gen. Ashfaq Kayani (2007-13) was of the view that Cold Start would be fully operational in five years<sup>64</sup> – he was right. The CSD was especially designed to punish Pakistan in a Mumbai terror attacks-type scenario. Nevertheless, India could not use it against Pakistan in the aftermath of the 2008 Mumbai Attacks. It can be argued that Kayani's assessment was right and at that time, the CSD was not more than a concept and the Indian Army was not in a position to mount a punitive attack against Pakistan. Also, the Indian military plan was too ambitious and dangerous since it intended to outplay Pakistan in terms of diplomacy as well but it was deprived of international support and intervention – consequently, forcing its military advance to a halt. Conversely, Ali argues that India was in a disadvantageous position since it did not have the requisite intelligence about the intentions of Pakistan's security establishment. The author also maintains that while the international environment was in India's favour, Pakistan's frontline role in the War on Terror became a stumbling block that did not allow it to employ this Doctrine.<sup>65</sup> It can be averred that in 2008, this Doctrine was in its embryonic stage and India lacked the required trained and equipped men, material, technological platforms like NCW and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities.

There is no doubt that the CSD was actually created to carry out punitive action against Pakistan in events such as the aftermath of the Mumbai attacks. Nevertheless, one contends Ali's view about the international environment being in India's favour – since it was the former that prevented the latter from executing it.

Nevertheless, the series of exercises conducted by India's military to operationalise this Doctrine while achieving synergy; the control of government by the right-wing Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) backed by Rashtriya Swayamsavek Sangh (RSS) as the flag-bearers of *Hindutva*

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<sup>64</sup> Sood, "Pakistan's (Non-Nuclear) Plan to Counter 'Cold Start'."

<sup>65</sup> Ali, *Strategic Delusions – The Cold Start Doctrine*, 20.

ideology;<sup>66</sup> the acquisition of various latest military equipment; attestation of its presence by India's incumbent COAS; and above all, the growing desire in its civil and military echelons to punish Pakistan – all point in one direction – Cold Start is not dead and very likely to be used.

### **Lessons for Pakistan**

The concept of Security Dilemma given earlier by John Herz, and later Robert Jervis best explains the situation between Pakistan and India.<sup>67</sup> Ali points to the CSD as 'India's security strategy that has brought greater insecurity to South Asia.'<sup>68</sup> This Doctrine is offensive in nature and has certain security elements attached to it. Whatever decision is taken by either side, a constant doubt and uncertainty prevails. This uncertain environment and circumstances can be met by focusing on the fundamental and philosophical foundations of Defensive Realism.

### ***The Army***

The acquisition of Russian T-90S Main Battle Tanks (MBTs) by the Indian Army poses a great threat and is considered a vital part for the execution of the CSD. The tank can fire Anti-Tank Guided Missile (ATGM) from its main 125mm smoothbore gun up to six kilometres. These tanks have shown their battlefield superiority and capability in Syria against the militants of the Islamic State. The indigenously produced Arjun Main Battle Tank is almost 11 tonnes heavier than the T-90 and has a 120mm rifled main gun; and is also capable of firing Laser Homing

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<sup>66</sup> Savarkar, *Hindutva*; Muhammad Mujeeb Afzal, *Bharatiya Janata Party and the Indian Muslims* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2014).

<sup>67</sup> Robert Jervis, *System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 60; John H. Herz, "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 2, no. 2 (1950): 157-180. A state's increased security becomes a source of increased insecurity for another. Jervis has acknowledged that Security Dilemma was first discussed by John Herz.

<sup>68</sup> Ali, *Strategic Delusions – The Cold Start Doctrine*, 1.

Attack Anti-Tank (LAHAT) ATGM up to eight kilometres.<sup>69</sup> The attributes of these MBTs make them ideal for spearheaded penetrations. None of the tanks with the PAF can fire an ATGM from their main gun. Mi-35 Hind-E gunship helicopter as well as indigenously produced gunship helicopters such as the Light Combat Helicopter (LCH) and Rudra by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) are intended to provide the invading ground forces with fire support. The hovering capability of helicopters makes them ‘artillery in the air’ and they can provide the spearheading armour with substantial advantage. The role of artillery has always been decisive and can counter the incoming columns of tanks as well as injure mechanised infantry from a distance. With Pakistan having the Chinese A100 300mm Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) similar to the Russian BM-30 Smerch 300mm MLRS, its employment and use in case of Cold Start execution would provide operational and strategic level advantage. Whether it is towed or self-propelled, artillery provides vital cover for the invading as well as defending forces. Apart from the rocket artillery, towed and self-propelled artillery can also help to defeat the invading forces by providing lethal fire-support for the Armed Forces of Pakistan. The role of 155mm self-propelled M-109 howitzers can be very crucial for the ground forces. There is also a need to procure and standardise howitzers of 155mm calibre to reduce the problem of different calibres.

*Huffington Post India* reported that the Indian Army unveiled its indigenous long-range Advanced Towed Artillery Gun System (ATAGS) on January 26, 2017 at the Republic Day Parade. The gun is capable of Multiple Rounds Simultaneous Impact (MRSI)<sup>70</sup> and can fire precision guided munitions (PGM) as well.<sup>71</sup> Anti-Tank Guided Missiles are mobile

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<sup>69</sup> Defence Research and Development Organization, *DRDO: A Glimpse* (New Delhi: Ministry of Defence, n.d.), 48-66. For more about LAHAT ATGM please see, “Laser Homing Attack Missile (LAHAT),” *Army-Technology*, accessed February 16, 2018, <http://www.army-technology.com/projects/laser-homing-attack-missile/>.

<sup>70</sup> A concept in which a howitzer fires multiple rounds on different angles to land on the target area at the same time.

<sup>71</sup> “India’s Indigenous Artillery Gun “Dhanush” to be Showcased at Republic Day Parade for the First Time,” *HuffPost*, January 23, 2017,

and pose a great threat to enemy armour. They are cheap and the guidance system is reliable. Their range makes them a real tank hunter which engages targets up to 4000 metres and some even beyond that. The conventional superiority of IAF can be matched and countered by understanding the Clausewitzian principle of achieving high-level military objectives by using low-level military means. It would be difficult for Pakistan to procure more and more MBTs. This drawback can be overcome by the effective use of ATGMs like the Chinese-built HJ-8 and the United States (US)-built BGM-71 TOW and several other recoilless rifles.

German Armed Forces tanks were not able to match and stop Soviet T-34 tanks in the early phase of Operation Barbarossa before the inception of the Tiger tank. Germans improvised and used the Flak-88 (88mm) to defeat the Soviet armour quite successively. It had a muzzle velocity of 1000 metres per second and the weight of the shell was 10.2 kilograms.<sup>72</sup> Haupt argued that it was the best anti-tank gun during the Second World War.<sup>73</sup> Germans also used Flak-88 against Allied armour as well even though it was originally developed for anti-air role.<sup>74</sup> To counter low flying air objects such as gunship helicopters and close support aircraft, the FIM-92A Stinger and indigenously produced Anza MK-I, II and III can be useful. Their unique mobility and agility makes them a formidable arsenal in countering low level air threats.

### ***The Air Force***

The acquisition of Su-30 MKI Flanker by Indian Air Force gives it tactical and operational advantage. The Flankers are equipped with Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) that is invaluable in the easy acquisition of targets and in delivering the payload with great accuracy and precision.

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[http://www.huffingtonpost.in/2017/01/23/indias-indigenous-artillery-gun-dhanush-to-be-showcased-at-re\\_a\\_21660764/](http://www.huffingtonpost.in/2017/01/23/indias-indigenous-artillery-gun-dhanush-to-be-showcased-at-re_a_21660764/).

<sup>72</sup> Werner Haupt, *German Anti-Tank Guns: 37Mm - 50Mm - 75Mm - 88Mm Pak, 1935-1945: Without Self-Propelled Mountings*, trans. Edward Force, Schiffer Military History, vol. 24 (West Chester: Schiffer Publishing, 1990), 44.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid. 39.

<sup>74</sup> Battistelli, *Erwin Rommel*, 26; Charles Messenger, *Rommel: Leadership Lessons from the Desert Fox* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 54.

Similarly, the French-built Rafale and Mirage-2000 aircraft comes with a variety of payload to be used against Pakistan. The role of UAVs and Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs) is also increasing. UAVs can provide real time imagery to commanders and UCAVs can deliver lethal payloads. The IAF acquired Harop and Harpy UCAVs and Heron and Searcher UAVs which are also believed to be a part of the invading forces. Apart from their fighting role, these unmanned platforms provide real time imagery, thus contributing towards enhanced situational awareness and NCW.

The Air Force needs to acquire ground-attack aircrafts capable of delivering a lethal payload with accuracy and precision to defeat the invading forces. In other words, its close air-support and air-superiority roles must be enhanced to help stop the incoming armour and deny the enemy ‘control of the air.’ The role of UAVs and UCAVs is becoming central in the modern day battlefield. The running and maintenance costs of unmanned aircraft are significantly low as compared to fighter-bomber aircraft. They are capable of operating in almost all kinds of weather situations as well. Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) and Airborne Early Warning (AEW) ensure rapid data processing, hence, reducing the time taken in the decision-making process. They are also used for electronic warfare by disrupting communications and jamming radars of the enemy.<sup>75</sup>

### ***The Navy***

The Indian Navy has been theoretically tasked with supporting the invading forces in CSD.<sup>76</sup> The procurement of AM-39 Exocet and C-802 anti-ship missiles by Pakistan has reduced the mobility of Indian Navy and minimised the naval threat.<sup>77</sup> However, INS *Vikramaditya* poses a great threat to Pakistan’s naval assets. Moreover, it has MiG-29K

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<sup>75</sup> John Knowles, “The EMSO Question,” *JED - The Journal of Electronic Defense*, January 2017. 6.

<sup>76</sup> Ladwig III, “A Cold Start for Hot Wars?” 164-165.

<sup>77</sup> “Sword / F-22P Class Frigates,” *Naval-Technology*, accessed February 16, 2018, <http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/sword-f22p>.

multirole fighters at its disposal to provide a highly mobile and versatile 'additional firepower.'<sup>78</sup>

### ***Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Assets***

The CSD also intends to disrupt the communication systems of the PAF to create panic in the Command and Control. There are two assumed ways to counter the problem of communications. First, employ Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) and Airborne Early Warning (AEW) to ensure that the commanders get more situational awareness and accelerate the decision-making process. Second, have a more decentralised Command and Control System which should have the capability to operate in a stand-alone mode in case of communications jam. This would also require a commander of great intellect and instinct to take initiative and command the forces in nearly zero communications scenario.

### ***Static or Positional Defence***

Pakistan lacks formidable strategic depth from its Eastern to Western borders and should build fortifications on the Eastern side to discourage India from any adventure. If this is not possible, the thickly populated cities and strategically important areas must be defended like the French did in the form of the famous Maginot Line.<sup>79</sup> By constructing the proposed fortifications, India would have to bypass them, thus, increasing the probability of counterattack by Pakistan, and giving more time to assess the intensity and pace of India's attack. It was this Maginot Line that forced the Germans to penetrate the impassable forest of Ardennes during the German invasion of France and the Low Countries on May 10, 1940. The *Wehrmacht* did not destroy the Maginot Line but managed to bypass it due to the 'sickle cut' or 'Manstein Plan' presented by General Erich von Manstein.<sup>80</sup> Not only Maginot Line but other fortifications like

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<sup>78</sup> Ladwig III, "A Cold Start for Hot Wars?" 164-165.

<sup>79</sup> J. E. Kaufman, H. W. Kaufmann, A. Jankovič-Potočnik and Patrice Lange, *The Maginot Line History and Guide* (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military, 2011).

<sup>80</sup> Benoît Lemay, *Erich von Manstein: Hitler's Master Strategist*, trans. Pierce Heyward (Havertown: Casemate Publishers, 2010), 89-98.

Hindenburg Line in World War I and West Wall (Siegfried Line) and the Atlantic Wall in World War II also proved to be effective lines of defence.<sup>81</sup>

### ***Nuclear – Strategic Forces***

The possible use of TNWs against the invading forces is another option that may result in success, but could also be just as disastrous. First, the First Use of nuclear weapons against India's conventional forces would lead to condemnation by the international community and the case would be quite difficult to defend. Secondly, it would project a sign of weakness vis-à-vis the Armed Forces of Pakistan, which is in fact the world's seventh largest. Although, the nuclear doctrine has been intentionally kept vague to obscure the decision-making of India's Military High Command, it is believed that Pakistan would be justified to use TNWs in case Cold Start is used.

India's Nuclear Policy states that a nuclear strike would be responded with massive nuclear retaliation. This situation can be best understood by the Clausewitzian concept of Inadvertent Escalation of War. Keeping in view the strength of Pakistan's military, the importance of conventional forces cannot be denied even in the nuclear age. Mearsheimer has highlighted the need and importance of conventional forces.<sup>82</sup>

### **Conclusion**

While keeping in view the conventional superiority of the IAF, it is quite understandable that the use of the CSD against Pakistan would be effective and potent. The aim of India's policymakers to exploit the vulnerable strategic depth of Pakistan, and their designs to capture even a small territory for strategic purposes or to divide the country is a matter of

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<sup>81</sup> Chris McNab, ed., *Hitler's Fortresses German Fortifications and Defences 1939-45* (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2014). 137-141.

<sup>82</sup> John J. Mearsheimer, *Conventional Deterrence* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1983).

great concern. There is no single natural border between India and Pakistan which discourages the former's conventional forces to invade in Hitler-style Blitzkrieg operations – apart from the terrain in Kashmir. The Eastern plains and desert areas in Punjab and Sindh are perfect battlefields to conduct spearheaded armoured penetrations like a Blitzkrieg-style invasion.

The strength of conventional forces and their credibility is not only limited to armed conflicts. They ensure actual presence on the ground. It is quite evident that despite having the world's most sophisticated nuclear weapons and delivery systems, the US is maintaining conventional forces armed with the most advanced weapons and equipment. The US has only used nuclear weapons once during World War II against Japan, and since then, it has been using its conventional forces around the globe and conducting military operations other than war (MOOTW).

While maintaining conventional forces puts pressure on the national exchequer, uncertainty about the behaviour of its immediate neighbour and the current anarchy prevailing in the international system, leaves little choice but to rely on one's own defences. Given the security dilemma between Pakistan and India, the importance of conventional forces has taken centre-stage and is growing rapidly.

The serious threat for Pakistan from the CSD is that it is an offshoot of the German Blitzkrieg that was successful in short distance operations in Poland, Denmark, Norway, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Belgium and France, but ultimately failed in Soviet Russia because of the long distance, enormous supply-line and lack of logistics. Despite this failure, German *Wehrmacht* managed to capture or kill three million Soviet troops and acquired a million square miles of Soviet territory.<sup>83</sup> The distance between Pakistan and India is small and it raises the chances of a successful Blitzkrieg-style CSD. Moreover, the lack of any natural border between the two countries also gives huge advantage to the IAF.

It is important for Pakistan to analyse any possible invasion using the Clausewitzian concept. Clausewitz outlined that 'defence is strong but

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<sup>83</sup> Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988), 342.

negative and offence (attack) is weak but positive.<sup>84</sup> The urban terrain of Pakistan's thickly populated areas, on the one hand, could be used as human shields, but civilian urban areas contain buildings and other infrastructure that can be used as 'islands of resistance' and can act as 'web defence'.<sup>85</sup> The Germans suffered the same catastrophe at the Battle of Stalingrad which ultimately resulted in the surrender of the Sixth Army commanded by Field Marshal Friedrich Paulus in February 1943.<sup>86</sup>

India's military devised the CSD after thorough and deep study by considering various aspects of the attack. It seems that the only chief element in devising this strategy is the self-perceived conventional inferiority of the PAF by India. Superiority in doctrine can be translated as superiority in tactics and strategy - these two elements come together and pave the way for superior warfare that ultimately ensures victory. Superior doctrine combined with superior weapons and modern equipment can transform ambitions and objectives into sheer reality. This equation demonstrates the possibility of success for India against Pakistan.

Blitzkrieg employed a decentralised command system in which commanders led from the front and acted completely independent of others. However, the frontline commanders remained in contact with the High Command for further orders. This was exhibited by General Guderian when on May 26, 1940, he was ordered to halt the attack on his drive to Dunkirk. Guderian was not in a mood to halt the pace of the attack and continued the drive on Dunkirk after a halt of almost 48 hours. This is similar to the CSD since it is essentially based on the philosophical foundations of Blitzkrieg. Pakistan can learn from this - operational level commanders should be trained in such a manner that they are able to lead independently. This will enable them to fight a defensive battle, engage in offensive battle and be proficient in taking the fight to the enemy's

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<sup>84</sup> Clausewitz, *On War*, 357-359.

<sup>85</sup> Donald Cranz, *Strongpoints in a Defense against Blitzkrieg: Potential and Problems in Perspective* (Leavenworth: United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1988), 6-7.

<sup>86</sup> Will Fowler, *Blitzkrieg 5: Russia (1942-1943)* (Hersham: Ian Allan Publishing, 2003), 30-49.

territory. This is also likely to enhance the commanders' leadership potential.

The ever-changing international circumstances are rallying in India's favour, primarily due to the convergence of India's Act East Policy and the US Pivot to Asia Policy. The Indo-US Civil Nuclear Deal, Joint Malabar Naval Exercises, Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) and the growing convergence of interests of the two are likely to impact the fragile strategic stability of South Asia. Nonetheless, while the crest and trough relationship between Pakistan and the US is perhaps a part and parcel of their almost seven decades' long diplomatic-strategic relationship, it is unlikely that the West will intervene on behalf of Pakistan in case of the execution of Cold Start. However, President Trump's National Security Strategy clearly adopted an 'America First National Security Strategy' which indicates that the US sees Russia and China as formidable challenges for 'American power, influence, and interests, attempting to erode American security and prosperity.'<sup>87</sup> It can be argued that besides Trump's rhetoric, the US needs Pakistan not only for an honourable and safe exit from Afghanistan, but also for sustainable peace, harmony and for establishing a democratic system there. Consequently, Pakistan can use this US vulnerability as a trump card. It is worth mentioning here that it was Washington's needs that forced New Delhi to remove its forces from the Eastern borders in the aftermath of Operation *Parakram* during the Indo-Pak military stand-off in 2001-02.

The remarkable Sino-Pak history, an increasing convergence of interests and the growing strategic relations and partnership between the two in the form of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) indicates that Pakistan is an important strategic partner for China. *The New York Times*, in fact reported that Trump's cutting aid to Pakistan might result in China's benefit.<sup>88</sup> Also, with India's COAS General Bipin

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<sup>87</sup> White House, GoUS, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Government of United States, 2017), <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf>.

<sup>88</sup> "Pakistan, the Endlessly Troublesome Ally," *New York Times*, January 5, 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/05/opinion/pakistan-the-endlessly-troublesome-ally.html>.

Rawat's 'Two and a Half Front War' concept,<sup>89</sup> if the situation ever exacerbates, it could evolve in Pakistan's favour. Similarly, it was Moscow that brokered the Tashkent Declaration between India and Pakistan after the War of 1965. With Russia's resurgence, its role is likely to increase even more.

From the Clausewitzian notion of 'chance' in opposition to Napoleon's view of 'strictly calculated war', Pakistan's military without having numerical superiority in terms of men, material and equipment can still dominate and even defeat their Indian counterparts – provided they devise a superior doctrine flanked by better organisation and training.<sup>90</sup> ■

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<sup>89</sup> Muhammad Ali Baig, "'Two and a Half Men' and 'Two and a Half Front'," *Daily Times*, November 5, 2017, <https://dailytimes.com.pk/134490/two-half-menand-two-half-front/>.

<sup>90</sup> Ben McLennan, "Train Better, Fight Best," *Australian Army Journal* IX, no. 3 (2012): 55-74 (55-70), [https://www.army.gov.au/sites/g/files/net1846/f/aaaj\\_2012\\_3.pdf](https://www.army.gov.au/sites/g/files/net1846/f/aaaj_2012_3.pdf).